Stokes v. Brewer
Filing
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OPINION and ORDER Denying 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Denying Certificate of Appealability; and Denying Permission to Appeal in forma pauperis. Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (WBar)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
Larry Stokes,
Petitioner,
v.
Case No. 17-cv-10386
Judith E. Levy
United States District Judge
Catherine S. Bauman,1
Mag. Judge R. Steven Whalen
Respondent.
________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS [1], DENYING CERTIFICATE OF
APPEALABILITY, AND DENYING PERMISSION
TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS
Petitioner Larry Stokes, a Michigan prisoner, is serving a term of
imprisonment for convictions for unarmed robbery, assault with intent to
do great bodily harm less than murder, and larceny in a building. He
seeks habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on the ground that he
was denied his right to due process because the victim, when she
The proper respondent for a habeas petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2254 is the state officer having custody of the petitioner. See Rule 2, Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases. The Court orders the case caption amended to
substitute the warden of Petitioner’s present place of incarceration, Catherine S.
Bauman, as the respondent.
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testified, had extensive facial bruising unrelated to the incident for which
Petitioner was on trial. Petitioner also argues that defense counsel was
ineffective for failing to cross-examine the victim about her injuries.
Because the Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision denying these claims
was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court
precedent, the petition for habeas corpus is denied. The Court also denies
a certificate of appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on
appeal.
I. Background
In 2013, Petitioner was charged in Calhoun County Circuit Court
with larceny in a building, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.360, unarmed
robbery, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.530, and assault with intent to do great
bodily harm less than murder, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.84. People v.
Stokes, No. 319136, 2015 WL 849039, *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2015).
The Michigan Court of Appeals summarized the evidence presented at
trial as follows:
On May 3, 2013, the victim was home alone when defendant
knocked on her door and asked for a glass of water. The victim
was acquainted with defendant, whom she had first met about
three years earlier. After recognizing defendant through the
“peep hole” in the door, she let him in. They engaged in small
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talk in the living room for a short time. The victim eventually
asked defendant to leave, but instead of doing so, defendant
requested a second glass of water. When the victim returned
from the kitchen with the water, defendant asked her for sex.
She told him no. The victim testified that when defendant
stood up, he walked to her television, put his arm around it,
and told her that he was taking it with him. When she
verbally confronted him, defendant punched her. The force of
the blow sent her flying into a chair, and defendant repeatedly
struck her in the back of the head. Defendant eventually left
the victim’s house with her television, one of her cell phones,
and her television remote.
The victim sustained a three centimeter long laceration of her
left eyebrow that required two layers of stitches. She also had
multiple contusions, including significant bruising around her
left eye, bruising in the occipital area of her head, a bruise on
her left hip, and abrasions on her arms.
Id.
A jury found Petitioner guilty of all charges and, on April 23, 2015,
Petitioner was sentenced as a fourth habitual offender to 46 to 180
months for the larceny conviction, 172 to 600 months for the unarmed
robbery conviction, and 114 to 402 months for the assault conviction. Id.
Petitioner filed an appeal of right in the Michigan Court of Appeals
challenging the trial court’s decision to allow the victim to testify despite
extensive facial bruising from an unrelated incident and counsel’s failure
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to request an adjournment or to question the victim about her injuries.
Id. at *1–*2. He also challenged the scoring of an offense variable. Id. at
*3 The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions but
held that the challenged offense variable had been incorrectly scored; the
court remanded for resentencing. Id.
On remand, the trial court
resentenced Petitioner as follows: 46 to 60 months for larceny; 142 to 600
months for unarmed robbery; and 76 to 402 months for assault with
intent to do great bodily harm less than murder. (ECF No. 8-9, PageID.
665.)
Following resentencing, Petitioner filed a second claim of appeal in
the Michigan Court of Appeals. Before filing his brief, he stipulated to
dismiss the appeal, and the Michigan Court of Appeals dismissed the
appeal. People v. Stokes, No. 327561 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2015) (ECF
No. 8-10, PageID.667). Petitioner then filed a motion to withdraw his
stipulation of dismissal on the grounds that he was misled by his
appellate attorney. (ECF No. 8-10, PageID.686.) The court of appeals
construed Petitioner’s motion as a motion for reconsideration and denied
it, noting that Petitioner could raise his claims in a motion for relief from
judgment. People v. Stokes, No. 327561 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2015) (ECF
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No. 8-10, PageID.708). The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to
appeal. People v. Stokes, 499 Mich. 871 (Mich. March 8, 2016).
On January 31, 2017, Petitioner filed this habeas corpus petition.
(ECF No. 1.) He raises the same two claims he raised in his direct appeal:
(1) his right to due process was violated when the trial court allowed the
victim to testify even though she had extensive facial bruising from an
unrelated incident, and (2) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
cross-examine the victim about her injuries.
II. Legal Standard
A § 2254 habeas petition is governed by the heightened standard of
review set forth in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2254. To obtain relief, habeas petitioners who raise
claims previously adjudicated by state courts must “show that the
relevant state-court ‘decision’ (1) ‘was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,’ or (2) ‘was
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceedings.’” Wilson v. Sellers, 138
S. Ct. 1188, 1191 (2018) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). The focus of this
standard “is not whether a federal court believes the state court’s
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determination was incorrect but whether that determination was
unreasonable–a substantially higher threshold.” Schriro v. Landrigan,
550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007). “AEDPA thus imposes a highly deferential
standard for evaluating state-court rulings and demands that state-court
decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766,
773 (2010) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Ultimately, “[a] state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit
precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could
disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v.
Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541
U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). Additionally, a state court’s factual determinations
are presumed correct on federal habeas review, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1),
and review is “limited to the record that was before the state court.”
Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011).
III. Discussion
Petitioner was charged with assaulting the victim in her home on
May 3, 2013. The victim sustained multiple injuries including a threecentimeter laceration of her left eyebrow, significant bruising around her
left eye and bruising in the occipital area of her head. Stokes, 2015 WL
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849039, at *1. Petitioner’s trial commenced about five months later.
Approximately one week prior to trial, another person injured the victim
in an unrelated incident, causing the victim to have obvious trauma to
her face, including two black eyes. (ECF No. 8-4, PageID.261.) Defense
counsel objected to the victim testifying in this condition on the grounds
that the jury might infer the current injuries were somehow related to
the charges against Petitioner and the jury would be unfairly influenced
by sympathy for the victim. (Id. at PageID.262–63.) The trial court held
that the jury had been adequately informed during voir dire that the
victim’s appearance at trial was unrelated to the charges against
Petitioner and that the parties could further explore the issue on direct
and cross-examination. (Id. at PageID.263–64.) The victim testified at
trial that her current injuries were unrelated to the incident for which
Petitioner was charged. (Id. at PageID.266–267.) Petitioner’s counsel did
not cross examine the victim on her appearance at trial. (Id. at
PageID.288–328.) Petitioner argues that admission of this testimony
violated his right to due process and that counsel’s failure to crossexamine the victim on this point rendered her ineffective.
A. Due Process
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Habeas relief is seldom available for a state court’s erroneous
evidentiary ruling because habeas relief “does not lie for errors of state
law.” See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991). An evidentiary ruling
may violate the Due Process Clause (and thereby provide a basis for
habeas relief) where the ruling “is so extremely unfair that its admission
violates ‘fundamental conceptions of justice.’” Dowling v. United States,
493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990) (quoting United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783,
790 (1977)); see also Bugh v. Mitchell, 329 F.3d 496, 512 (6th Cir. 2003)
(due process violation arises only when evidentiary ruling results in
denial of “fundamental fairness”). The Supreme Court “defined the
category of infractions that violate fundamental fairness very narrowly.”
Estelle, 502 U.S. at 73 (1991). To violate due process, an evidentiary
decision must “offend[ ] some principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”
Seymour v. Walker, 224 F.3d 542, 552 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Montana v.
Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43 (1996)).
The Michigan Court of Appeals found no due process violation as a
result of the trial court’s decision to allow the victim to testify in
Petitioner’s case. The court of appeals noted that the jury was specifically
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told that Petitioner had nothing to do with the victim’s injuries visible on
the day of trial and the victim also testified that the assault which caused
the recent injuries was unrelated to Petitioner. Stokes, 2015 WL 849039,
at *1. Photographs of the victim’s injuries following the charged assault
were admitted into evidence as was testimony describing the injuries. Id.
Petitioner cites no Supreme Court decision holding that allowing a
witness to testify under similar circumstances violates due process. The
Court was unable to find any precedent suggesting that a witness’
potentially prejudicial appearance can rise to the level of a due process
violation, particularly when explanatory statements are offered to the
jury during voir dire and clarifying testimony is provided on direct
examination. The state court reasonably concluded that the jury was
adequately cautioned about the nature of the victim’s injuries. Petitioner
has not shown that allowing the victim to testify rendered his trial
fundamentally unfair. Habeas relief is denied.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Petitioner’s argument that counsel was ineffective in failing to
cross-examine the victim about the nature of her unrelated injuries is
also unsuccessful. To establish that a petitioner received ineffective
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assistance of counsel, they must show, first, that counsel’s performance
was deficient and, second, that counsel’s deficient performance
prejudiced the petitioner. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984). For an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland,
the standard of review under AEDPA is “doubly” deferential. Harrington,
562 U.S. at 105 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “[T]he
question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable[,] . . . [but]
whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied
Strickland’s deferential standard.” Id. Petitioner fails to overcome this
doubly deferential standard.
The victim testified on direct examination that her facial injuries
were unrelated to the incident for which Petitioner was charged. The
Michigan Court of Appeals held that counsel could have reasonably
concluded that because the victim’s testimony was clear and concise
nothing could be gained from cross-examining her on this point. Stokes,
2015 WL 849039 at *2. Petitioner has not identified any questions
defense counsel should have asked on cross-examination, nor has he
advanced any argument that the Michigan Court of Appeals
unreasonably applied or reached a conclusion contrary to Strickland. The
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explanatory statements offered to the jury during voir dire and clarifying
direct examination testimony provide a reasonable argument that trial
counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard here. Harrington, 562
U.S. at 105. Petitioner’s claim is denied.
IV. Certificate of Appealability and IFP on Appeal
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b)(1) provides that an
appeal may not proceed unless a certificate of appealability is issued
under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254
Cases requires the Court to “issue or deny a certificate of appealability
when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.”
To obtain a certificate of appealability, a prisoner must make a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2). Section 2253(c)(2) is satisfied only if reasonable jurists could
find either that the district court’s assessment is debatable or wrong or
that the issues presented deserve encouragement to proceed further.
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483–84 (2000).
For the reasons set forth above, reasonable jurists could not find
this Court’s assessment of Petitioner’s claims to be debatable or wrong.
Nor would reasonable jurists conclude that the issues presented are
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adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. See Millender v.
Adams, 187 F. Supp.2d 852, 880 (E.D. Mich. 2002). Consequently,
Petitioner is not entitled to a certificate of appealability.
Further, an appeal from this decision would be frivolous and could
not be taken in good faith. See Coppedge v. U.S., 369 U.S. 438, 444 (1962).
Therefore, Petitioner may not proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. Fed.
R. App. P. 24(a)(3)(A).
V. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES the petition for a
writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1), DENIES a certificate of appealability,
and DENIES permission to appeal in forma pauperis.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 18, 2020
Ann Arbor, Michigan
s/Judith E. Levy
JUDITH E. LEVY
United States District Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served
upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s
ECF System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail addresses
disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on February 18, 2020.
s/William Barkholz
WILLIAM BARKHOLZ
Case Manager
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