Haynes v. Gidley

Filing 10

OPINION and ORDER (1) Granting Respondent's 7 MOTION for Summary Judgment, (2) Denying Petitioner's 9 MOTION for Equitable Tolling, (3) Denying Certificate of Appealability, (4) and Denying Permission to Appeal In Forma Pauperis. Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (SBur)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
Timothy Haynes,
Petitioner,

Case No. 17-cv-11442

v.

Judith E. Levy
United States District Judge

Lori Gidley,
Mag. Judge Anthony P. Patti
Respondent.
________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER (1) GRANTING RESPONDENT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [7], (2) DENYING
PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR EQUITABLE TOLLING [9], (3)
DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, (4) AND
DENYING PERMISSION TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS
Petitioner

Timothy

Haynes,

a

Michigan

Department

of

Corrections prisoner, filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

The petition challenges his Oakland

Circuit Court jury trial conviction for first-degree home invasion, MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 750.110a(2), for which he is serving a term of 10-to-40
years’ imprisonment.
The petition raises eleven claims: (1) insufficient evidence was
presented at trial to sustain petitioner’s conviction, (2) the trial court

erroneously failed to instruct the jury on self-defense, (3) the trial court
erred in allowing admission of petitioner’s prior conviction, (4) the state
district court erred in binding petitioner over for trial, (5) the prosecutor
violated the trial court’s discovery order, (6) petitioner was denied the
effective assistance of counsel at trial, (7) petitioner’s acts were justified
by self-defense, (8) the prosecutor failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that petitioner committed an assault inside a dwelling, (9) the
prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument, (10)
petitioner was improperly sentenced as a habitual felony offender, and
(11) petitioner was denied the effective assistance of trial and appellate
counsel with respect to sentencing.
Before the Court is respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition on
the basis that it was filed after expiration of the one-year statute of
limitations. (Dkt. 7.); See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitioner has filed a
response to the motion he labels as a “motion for equitable tolling,”
asserting that prison conditions excuse his untimely filing. (Dkt. 9.)
The Court will grant respondent’s motion and dismiss the case. The
Court will also deny petitioner a certificate of appealability, and it will
deny permission to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis.
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I.

Background
Petitioner filed an appeal following his conviction and sentence.

On April 23, 2013, the Michigan Court of Appeals denied petitioner
relief. People v. Haynes, 2013 WL 1748588, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr.
23, 2013).

The Michigan Supreme Court subsequently denied

petitioner’s appeal on October 28, 2013. People v. Haynes, 838 N.W.2d
546 (Mich. 2013) (table).
For purposes of calculating the starting point of the one-year
deadline for filing his federal habeas petition, petitioner’s conviction
became final 90 days later—on Monday, January 26, 2014—the last day
petitioner could have filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the
United States Supreme Court. See Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327,
332–33 (2007); Bronaugh v. Ohio, 235 F.3d 280, 283 (6th Cir. 2000).
Nearly a year later, on December 19, 2014, petitioner filed a
motion for relief from judgment in the state trial court.

As will be

discussed below, the filing of this motion acted to stop the one-year
clock. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The trial court denied the motion on
February 6, 2015. (Dkt. 8-10.) Petitioner appealed this decision, but on
November 4, 2015, the Michigan Court of Appeals denied his
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application for leave to appeal. People v. Haynes, No. 147283 (Mich. Ct.
App. Nov. 4, 2015). Petitioner then appealed to the Michigan Supreme
Court, but that court denied his appeal on December 28, 2016. People v.
Haynes, 888 N.W.2d 62 (Mich. 2016) (table). The one-year clock started
running again the next day from the point at which it stopped.
Petitioner did not date his federal habeas petition, but the
envelope shows that it was placed in the mail on May 2, 2017, several
months after the one-year time limit expired.
II.

Standard of Review
Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss. (Dkt. 7.) However,

because the motion and the record before the Court includes a number
of documents outside of the pleadings, the Court will treat the motion
as a motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.

In considering a motion for summary

judgment, the Court will construe all facts in a light most favorable to
the non-moving party, here the petitioner. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). There are no genuine issues
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of material fact when “the record taken as a whole could not lead a
rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party.” Id. If the movant
carries its burden of showing an absence of evidence to support a claim,
then the non-movant must demonstrate by affidavits, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions that a genuine issue of
material fact exists.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324–25

(1986). This standard of review may be applied to habeas proceedings.
Redmond v. Jackson, 295 F. Supp. 2d 767, 770 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
III. Analysis
As set forth above, there is a one-year period of limitation for a
habeas petition filed by a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief
from a state-court judgment. § 2244(d)(1). The limitation runs from the
latest of four possible starting points, but only one of them is implicated
by the current petition.1 The starting point relevant here is the date
the state court judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review
or when the time for seeking such review expires.

§ 2244(d)(1)(A).

Here, the expiration of time for seeking direct review was on January

Petitioner does not allege that state action prevented him from filing his petition,
that his claims are based on a newly-recognized constitutional right, or that his
claims are based on newly discovered evidence. See §§2244(d)(1)(B), (C), and (D).
1

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27, 2014, the day after the 90-day time limit for filing a petition for a
writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court expired following
the denial of relief by the Michigan Supreme Court during petitioner’s
appeal of right. Lawrence, 549 U.S. at 332–33; Bronaugh, 235 F.3d at
283.
The limitations period ran from January 27, 2014, until December
18, 2014, the day before petitioner filed a motion for relief from
judgment in the state trial court. During this interval 326 days elapsed
on the limitations period. On December 19, 2014, the limitations period
stopped running and started to toll for “[t]he time during which a
properly filed application for State collateral or other collateral review
with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending. . . .” 28
U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

Petitioner’s state collateral review proceeding

ended on December 28, 2016, when the Michigan Supreme Court denied
his application for leave to appeal. After that date, petitioner no longer
had a state collateral review proceeding pending, so the limitations
period resumed running. The period ran from December 29, 2016, the
day after the Michigan Supreme Court denied relief, until May 2, 2017,
when petitioner placed his pro se federal petition in the mail – a period
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of 125 days. See Rule 3(d) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in
the United States District Courts. Adding the two periods of time in
which the limitations period ran together, a total of 451 days elapsed,
meaning the petition was filed after expiration of the 1-year deadline.
The

petition

is

therefore

time-barred

demonstrates grounds for equitable tolling.

unless

petitioner

Holland v. Florida, 560

U.S. 631, 649 (2010). A petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling if he
shows “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that
some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely
filing.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

The party seeking

equitable tolling bears the burden of proving that he is entitled to it.
Robertson v. Simpson, 624 F.3d 781, 784 (6th Cir. 2010).
Petitioner’s “motion for equitable tolling” asserts that he is
entitled to equitable tolling because as a prisoner he is required to signup for law library access “which could end-up taking weeks, maybe a
month to be placed in what you[’re] signing up for.”

(Dkt. 9 at 4.)

Petitioner also asserts that he was transferred from the Oaks
Correctional Facility to the Pugsley Facility and then to the Central
Michigan Facility, but he does not provide dates for the transfers. (Id.)
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Finally, Petitioner asserts that he has a busy work schedule in prison
and that it took time for him to learn about the appellate process. (Id.)
None of these factors constitute grounds for equitably tolling the
statute of limitations. Under controlling case law, the fact that
petitioner has a limited education and is untrained in the law, is
proceeding without a lawyer or other legal assistance, or may have been
unaware of the statute of limitations for a period of time does not
warrant tolling. See Keeling v. Warden, Lebanon Corr. Inst., 673 F.3d
452, 464 (6th Cir. 2012) (pro se status is not an extraordinary
circumstance); Cobas v. Burgess, 306 F.3d 441, 444 (6th Cir. 2002)
(illiteracy is not a basis for equitable tolling); Rodriguez v. Elo, 195 F.
Supp. 2d 934, 936 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (the law is “replete with instances
which firmly establish that ignorance of the law, despite a litigant's pro
se status, is no excuse” for failure to follow legal requirements).
Nor do the usual hardships or restrictions to one’s liberty
incidental to life in prison described by petitioner provide grounds for
equitable tolling. See Hall v. Warden, Lebanon Corr. Inst., 662 F.3d
745, 752 (6th Cir. 2011) (ruling that pro se status and inability to access
transcripts for a period of time did not justify equitable tolling); Maclin
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v. Robinson, 74 F. App’x 587, 589 (6th Cir. 2003) (limited access to
prison law library does not constitute a state impediment under 28
U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)); Arriaga v. Gonzales, 2014 WL 5661023, *12
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2014) (reliance on jailhouse lawyers is not an
extraordinary circumstance).

For these reasons, petitioner has not

alleged the existence of “extraordinary circumstances” justifying
equitable tolling for the months between the expiration of the one-year
deadline and the date he placed his petition in the mail.
Accordingly, the Court will grant respondent’s motion for
summary judgment (Dkt. 7), deny petitioner’s motion for equitable
tolling (Dkt. 9), and dismiss the petition (Dkt. 1) because there are no
genuine issues of material fact whether it was filed after expiration of
the one-year statute of limitations or whether petitioner is entitled to
equitable tolling.
IV.

Certificate of Appealability

Before petitioner may appeal, a certificate of appealability must
issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(a); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). A certificate
of appealability may issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
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When a court denies relief on the merits, the substantial showing
threshold is met if the petitioner demonstrates that reasonable jurists
would find the court’s assessment of the claim debatable or wrong. See
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484–85 (2000). When a court denies
relief on procedural grounds without addressing the merits, a certificate
of appealability should issue if it is shown that jurists of reason would
find it debatable whether the petitioner states a valid claim of the
denial of a constitutional right, and that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural
ruling.

Id.

Having undertaken the requisite review, the Court

concludes that jurists of reason could not debate the procedural ruling
in the present case. A certificate of appealability will therefore be
denied. Leave to appeal in forma pauperis is denied because an appeal
of this order could not be taken in good faith. 18 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).
V.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above respondent’s motion to dismiss the

petition (Dkt. 7) is GRANTED and the petition for writ of habeas corpus
(Dkt. 1) is DENIED.

Additionally, petitioner’s motion for equitable

tolling (Dkt. 9) is DENIED.
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Finally, a certificate of appealability and permission for leave to
appeal in forma pauperis are DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 26, 2018
Ann Arbor, Michigan

s/Judith E. Levy
JUDITH E. LEVY
United States District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served
upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s
ECF System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail addresses
disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on February 26, 2018.
s/Shawna Burns
SHAWNA BURNS
Case Manager

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