Batson v. Hoover et al

Filing 33

OPINION and ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' 24 MOTION to Amend/Correct 15 Amended Answer to Complaint - Signed by Magistrate Judge R. Steven Whalen. (CCie)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
OMAR BATSON,
Plaintiff,

No. 17-12214

v.

District Judge John Corbett O’Meara
Magistrate Judge R. Steven Whalen

GENESEE COUNTY SHERIFF’S
DEPUTY HOOVER, ET AL.,
Defendant.
/
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Amend Answer to Allege Affirmative
Defense of Failure to Exhaust Remedies Required by the PLRA [Doc. #24]. For the
reasons discussed below, the motion will be DENIED.
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges violations of his federal constitutional rights, as
well as claims under Michigan law, arising out of his incarceration in the Genesee County
Jail “on or about June, 2014.” Complaint [Doc. #1], ¶ 10. He alleges that he arrived at the
Genesee County Jail on or about June 3, 2014, and was released on July 14, 2014.
Id. ¶¶ 11, 45.
In this motion, Defendants seek to amend their answer to raise the affirmative
defense of Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit, as
required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Under
that section, “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under §
1983...by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” (Emphasis added). This
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exhaustion requirement does not apply to former prisoners, such as Plaintiff, who file
their civil cases after they have been released. In Mabry v. Freeman, 489 F.Supp.2d 782,
785 (E.D.Mich. 2007), the Court stated:
“While the Sixth Circuit has not specifically decided this issue, every
federal court of appeals that has addressed this issue has held that the
PLRA's exhaustion requirement does not apply to suits brought by former
inmates. See Michau v. Charleston County, 434 F.3d 725, 727 (4th
Cir.2006) (holding that the PLRA's exhaustion requirement does not apply
to a plaintiff who is not a prisoner as defined in the Act when the suit is
filed); Nerness v. Johnson, 401 F.3d 874, 876 (8th Cir.2005) (same); Norton
v. City of Marietta, 432 F.3d 1145, 1150 (10th Cir.2005) (finding that a
former inmate does not have to satisfy the PLRA's exhaustion requirement
before bringing suit); Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 210 (3d Cir.2002)
(same); Janes v. Hernandez, 215 F.3d 541, 543 (5th Cir.2000) (same); Page
v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir.2000) (same); Harris v. Garner,
216 F.3d 970, 979-80 (11th Cir.2000) (determining PLRA not applicable to
complaints filed by former prisoners for complaints regarding prison
conditions prior to release); Greig v. Goord, 169 F.3d 165, 167 (2d
Cir.1999) (holding that ‘litigants ... who file prison condition actions after
release from confinement are no longer prisoners for purposes of § 1997e(a)
and, therefore, need not satisfy the exhaustion requirements of this
provision’); Kerr v. Puckett, 138 F.3d 321, 323 (7th Cir.1998) (finding
person who has been released from prison is not a prisoner under the
PLRA).”
In Rose v. Saginaw County, 232 F.R.D. 267, 277 (E.D.Mich. 2005), the Court
held:
“This Court is convinced that the plain language of section 1997e(a)
compels the conclusion that its requirements apply to prisoners who are
confined when they file their lawsuits, and not to former inmates who bring
actions after their release from custody. That construction of the statute is
consistent with the purposes and goals of the Act and tracks the legislative
history.”
Rose observed that the opposing view was clearly a minority position. I agree.
Based on the great weight of authority, as well as the clear language of § 1997e(a), this
Plaintiff, who filed his lawsuit on July 6, 2017, well after he was released from the jail,
was not required to first exhaust his administrative remedies.
To permit these Defendants to amend their answer to raise the affirmative defense
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of non-exhaustion would therefore be futile. Accordingly, their motion [Doc. #24] is
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 14, 2018

s/R. Steven Whalen
R. STEVEN WHALEN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify on June 14, 2018 that I electronically filed the foregoing paper with
the Clerk of the Court sending notification of such filing to all counsel registered
electronically. I hereby certify that a copy of this paper was mailed to non-registered ECF
participants on June 14, 2018.
s/Carolyn M. Ciesla
Case Manager for the
Honorable R. Steven Whalen

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