Vanburen v. Balcarcel

Filing 14

OPINION and ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 1 , DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY AND DENYING LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS, Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (WBar)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
Lawrence VanBuren,
Petitioner,
v.

Case No. 17 -13819
Judith E. Levy
United States District Judge

Erick Balcarcel,
Respondent.
________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS [1], DENYING CERTIFICATE OF
APPEALABILITY AND DENYING LEAVE TO APPEAL IN
FORMA PAUPERIS
This is a habeas case brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Michigan prisoner Lawrence VanBuren (“Petitioner”) was convicted of
torture and assault with intent to rob while unarmed following a jury
trial in the Ingham County Circuit Court, and was sentenced as a fourth
habitual offender to concurrent terms of 25 to 40 years imprisonment and
20 to 30 years imprisonment in 2015. In his pro se habeas petition, he
raises claims concerning the sufficiency of the evidence and the validity
of his sentence. For the reasons set forth below, the petition for a writ of

habeas corpus is denied. The Court also denies a certificate of
appealability and denies Petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis on
appeal.
I.

Background
Petitioner’s convictions arise from his physical assault and robbery

of Samuel Janecke at the home of Jessica Farias in Ingham County,
Michigan on July 20, 2014. The Court adopts the detailed summary of
the trial testimony set forth by Petitioner’s defense counsel on direct
appeal to the extent those facts are consistent with the record. (See ECF
No. 8-8, PageID.381–403 (Pet. App. Brf.).)
Following his convictions and sentencing, Petitioner filed an appeal
of right with the Michigan Court of Appeals raising the same claims
presented on habeas review. The court denied relief on those claims and
affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. People v. VanBuren, No.
327622, 2016 WL 4467317, *1–4 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2016).
Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal with the Michigan
Supreme Court, which was denied in a standard order. People v.
VanBuren, 500 Mich. 935 (2017).
Petitioner then filed his federal habeas petition raising the

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following claims:
I.

The prosecution presented insufficient evidence to support his

convictions.
II.

His sentences constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

Respondent filed an answer to the petition contending that it should
be denied because the sentencing claim is procedurally defaulted, and
both claims lack merit.
II.

Legal Standard
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq., sets forth the standard of
review that federal courts must use when considering habeas petitions
brought by prisoners challenging their state court convictions. The
AEDPA provides in relevant part:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State
court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States; or
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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. §2254(d) (1996).
“A state court’s decision is ‘contrary to’ ... clearly established law if
it ‘applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme
Court cases]’ or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that are materially
indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and
nevertheless arrives at a result different from [that] precedent.’” Mitchell
v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15–16 (2003) (per curiam) (quoting Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685,
694 (2002). “[T]he ‘unreasonable application’ prong of § 2254(d)(1)
permits a federal habeas court to ‘grant the writ if the state court
identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court
but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of petitioner’s case.”
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S.
at 413); see also Bell, 535 U.S. at 694. However, “[i]n order for a federal
court to find a state court’s application of [Supreme Court] precedent
‘unreasonable,’ the state court’s decision must have been more than
incorrect or erroneous. The state court’s application must have been

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‘objectively unreasonable.’” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520–21 (citations
omitted); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. The “AEDPA thus imposes
a ‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,’ and
‘demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.’”
Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333,
n. 7); Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)).
A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit “precludes
federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the
correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.
86, 101 (2011) (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).
The Supreme Court has emphasized “that even a strong case for relief
does not mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was unreasonable.”
Id. at 102 (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). Pursuant
to § 2254(d), “a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories
supported or ... could have supported, the state court’s decision; and then
it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that
those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior
decision” of the Supreme Court. Id. Thus, in order to obtain habeas relief
in federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s

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rejection of his claim “was so lacking in justification that there was an
error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any
possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id; see also White v. Woodall,
572 U.S. 415, 419–20 (2014). Federal judges “are required to afford state
courts due respect by overturning their decisions only when there could
be no reasonable dispute that they were wrong.” Woods v. Donald, 575
U.S. 312, 316 (2015). A habeas petitioner cannot prevail if it is within the
“realm of possibility” that fairminded jurists could find the state court
decision to be reasonable. Woods v. Etherton, 136 S. Ct. 1149, 1152 (2016).
Section 2254(d)(1) limits a federal habeas court’s review to a
determination of whether the state court’s decision comports with clearly
established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court at the time
the state court renders its decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412; see also
Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122 (2009) (noting that the
Supreme Court “has held on numerous occasions that it is not ‘an
unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law’ for a state
court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely
established by this Court”) (quoting Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120,
125–26 (2008) (per curiam)); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71–72

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(2003). Section 2254(d) “does not require a state court to give reasons
before its decision can be deemed to have been ‘adjudicated on the
merits.’” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 100. Furthermore, it “does not require
citation of [Supreme Court] cases–indeed, it does not even require
awareness of [Supreme Court] cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor
the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.” Early v. Packer,
537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002); see also Mitchell, 540 U.S. at 16. The requirements
of clearly established law are to be determined solely by Supreme Court
precedent.
A state court’s factual determinations are presumed correct on
federal habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A habeas petitioner
may rebut this presumption only with clear and convincing evidence.
Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d 358, 360–61 (6th Cir. 1998). Moreover, habeas
review is “limited to the record that was before the state court.” Cullen v.
Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011).
III. Discussion
A.

Procedural Default

As an initial matter, Respondent contends that Petitioner’s
sentencing claim is barred by procedural default. The Court declines to

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address that defense as it is not a jurisdictional bar to review of the
merits. See, e.g., Howard v. Bouchard, 405 F.3d 459, 476 (6th Cir. 2005).
Moreover, federal courts on habeas review “are not required to address a
procedural-default issue before deciding against the petitioner on the
merits.” Hudson v. Jones, 351 F.3d 212, 215 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing
Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525 (1997)). The Supreme Court has
explained the rationale behind such a policy: “Judicial economy might
counsel giving the [other] question priority, for example, if it were easily
resolvable against the habeas petitioner, whereas the procedural-bar
issue involved complicated issues of state law.” Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 525.
Such is the case here. Accordingly, the Court will proceed to the merits
of Petitioner’s claims.
B.

Merits
1.

Sufficiency of the Evidence Claim

Petitioner first asserts that he is entitled to habeas relief because
the prosecutor failed to present sufficient evidence to support his
convictions for torture and assault with intent to rob while unarmed. In
particular, he alleges that the prosecution failed to establish the requisite
intent for the crimes. Respondent contends that this claim lacks merit.

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The Due Process Clause “protects the accused against conviction
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 364 (1970). The relevant question is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979)
(internal citation and footnote omitted). The sufficiency of the evidence
standard “must be applied with explicit reference to the substantive
elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law,” Jackson, 443
U.S. at 324 n. 16, and through the framework of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Martin v. Mitchell, 280 F.3d 594, 617 (6th Cir. 2002). Thus, under the
AEDPA, challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence “must survive two
layers of deference to groups who might view facts differently” than a
reviewing court on habeas review– the factfinder at trial and the state
court on appellate review– as long as those determinations are
reasonable. Brown v. Konteh, 567 F.3d 191, 205 (6th Cir. 2009).
Additionally, “it is the responsibility of the jury– not the court– to
decide what conclusions should be drawn from the evidence admitted at

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trial.” Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 2 (2011) (per curiam). A federal
habeas court may not re-weigh the evidence or re-determine the
credibility of the witnesses. Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434
(1983); Matthews v. Abramajtys, 319 F.3d 780, 788 (6th Cir. 2003).
Rather, a federal habeas court must defer to the factfinder at trial for its
assessment of the credibility of witnesses. Id.
Under Michigan law, a defendant commits the felony offense of
torture if he or she, “with the intent to cause cruel or extreme physical or
mental pain and suffering, inflicts great bodily injury or severe mental
pain or suffering upon another person within his or her custody or
physical control....” Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.85(1). Cruel is defined as
“brutal, inhuman, sadistic, or that which torments.” Mich. Comp. Laws §
750.85(2)(a). The elements of assault with intent to rob while unarmed
are: “(1) an assault with force and violence, (2) an intent to rob and steal,
and (3) defendant being unarmed.” People v. Chandler, 201 Mich. App.
611, 614 (1993); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.88.
As with any crime, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the charged offenses. People v.
Oliphant, 399 Mich. 472, 489 (1976); People v. Yost, 278 Mich. App. 341,

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356 (2008); People v. Kern, 6 Mich. App. 406, 409 (1967). Direct or
circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from that
evidence may constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of an offense,
People v. Nowack, 462 Mich. 392, 399–400 (2000); People v. Jolly, 442
Mich. 458, 466 (1993), including the identity of the perpetrator, Dell v.
Straub, 194 F. Supp. 2d 629, 647 (E.D. Mich. 2002); Kern, 6 Mich. App.
at 409, and intent or state of mind. People v. Dumas, 454 Mich. 390, 398
(1997). With regard to intent, “minimal circumstantial evidence is
sufficient” due to the difficulty of proving a defendant’s state of mind.
People v. McRunels, 237 Mich. App. 168, 181 (1999).
Applying the Jackson standard, the Michigan Court of Appeals
denied relief on this claim. The court explained in relevant part:
Here, there was evidence giving rise to an inference that
defendant’s intent was to inflict cruel or extreme physical or
mental pain and suffering on the victim. As the trial court
noted in denying defendant’s motion for a directed verdict, the
victim suffered a severe facial injury during the first attack in
the kitchen, but defendant continued the assault at the top of
the stairs, in the basement, in the bathroom, and outside the
house. These multiple and repeated assaults evidence an
intent to cause the victim extreme pain. We also note that the
victim testified that defendant attempted to tie his hands
behind his back during the assault in the basement, an action
which would likely cause a person to have severe mental pain
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and suffering, rightfully fearing for one’s life. Accordingly, we
conclude that the evidence was sufficient to establish intent
to cause cruel or extreme physical or mental pain and
suffering. Likewise, because the prosecutor introduced
sufficient evidence which could justify a trier of fact in
reasonably concluding that defendant was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of torture, defendant’s conviction for that
offense did not deny him due process of law.
***
Here, there was ample evidence giving rise to an inference
that defendant’s intent was to rob and steal. As the trial court
noted in denying defendant’s motion for a directed verdict, the
victim testified that hands were going through his pockets as
he was being assaulted on the couch. And, in fact, the victim’s
wallet and car keys were stolen from him during the assault
on the couch and the car was driven away shortly thereafter.
Additionally, there was evidence that defendant’s accomplice
invited the victim into the house under the guise of receiving
money for gas merely as a ruse for her and defendant to rob
him. Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence was
sufficient to establish an intent to rob and steal and
accordingly, that there was no due process violation.
VanBuren, 2016 WL 4467317 at *1-2.
The state court’s decision is neither contrary to Supreme Court
precedent nor an unreasonable application of federal law or the facts. The
testimony of the victim, Samuel Janecke, provided sufficient evidence to
establish that Petitioner committed torture and assault with intent to

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rob while unarmed. Janecke identified Petitioner as one of the
perpetrators who physically beat and robbed him.
As to torture, Janecke testified that Petitioner initially struck him
in the face resulting in a broken jaw and broken teeth, that he was
thrown down the stairs twice, that Petitioner threw him on a couch,
ripped his shirt, and struck him in the head and face several times, that
Petitioner and Farias tried to tie his hands and put a sock in his mouth,
that he was knocked down when he tried to flee, that Petitioner tackled
him in the bathroom and choked him, that Farias threatened to cut him,
that Petitioner hit him in the head, arm, and ribs with a wooden object
when he ran outside to flee the home, causing bruised ribs and a
laceration to his head. (See, ECF No. 8-5, PageID.265–273, 276–77
(3/24/15 Trial Tr., pp. 91–107, 119–22.).)
As to assault with intent to rob while unarmed, Janecke testified
that Petitioner and Farias were the people near him during the assault,
that he felt hands going through his pockets at one point during the
attack, and that his wallet and keys were missing following the incident.
(Id. at Trial Tr. p. 103.) A neighbor saw a Black man drive away with
Farias in the passenger seat in the car Janecke had driven to Farias’s

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home. The car was found parked on Petitioner’s street the next day, and
Petitioner’s fingerprint was found on the exterior of the driver’s side door.
(Id. at PageID.272 (3/24/15 Trial Tr. pp. 168–74, 176–79, 205)); (ECF No.
8-6, PageID.307 (3/26/15 Trial Tr., pp. 9–11).)
Such testimony, and reasonable inferences that may be drawn
therefrom, establishes that Petitioner committed the crimes of torture
and assault with intent to rob while unarmed and that he acted with the
requisite intent. To be sure, a victim’s testimony alone can be
constitutionally sufficient to sustain a conviction. See Tucker v. Palmer,
541 F.3d 652, 658 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing cases).
To the extent that Petitioner contests the Michigan Court of
Appeals’ interpretation of state law regarding the elements of the
offenses, he is not entitled to relief. It is well-settled that “a state court’s
interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct appeal of
the challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.”
Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005); Sanford v. Yukins, 288 F.3d
855, 860 (6th Cir. 2002). State courts are the final arbiters of state law
and federal courts will not intervene in such matters. Lewis v. Jeffers,
497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); Oviedo v. Jago, 809 F.2d 326, 328 (6th Cir.

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1987). Habeas relief is not available for perceived errors of state law.
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991).
Similarly, to the extent Petitioner challenges the credibility
determinations and inferences the jury drew from the testimony at trial,
he is not entitled to relief. It is the job of the fact-finder at trial, not a
federal habeas court, to resolve evidentiary conflicts. Cavazos, 565 U.S.
at 7; Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Martin, 280 F.3d at 618; see also Walker
v. Engle, 703 F.2d 959, 969–70 (6th Cir. 1983) (“A federal habeas corpus
court faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting
inferences must presume—even if it does not affirmatively appear in the
record—that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the
prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.”). The jury’s verdict is
supported by the record. The evidence presented at trial, viewed in a light
favorable to the prosecution, establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that
Petitioner committed torture and assault with intent to rob while
unarmed. More importantly, for purposes of habeas review, the Michigan
Court of Appeals’ decision to that affect is reasonable. Habeas relief is
not warranted on this claim.
2.

Sentencing Claim

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Petitioner next asserts that he is entitled to habeas relief because
his sentences constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Respondent
contends that this claim lacks merit.
A sentence imposed within the statutory limits is generally not
subject to federal habeas review. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741
(1948); Cook v. Stegall, 56 F. Supp. 2d 788, 797 (E.D. Mich. 1999). Claims
which arise out of a state trial court’s sentencing decision are not
normally cognizable upon habeas review unless the petitioner can show
that the sentence imposed exceeded the statutory limits or is wholly
unauthorized by law. Lucey v. Lavigne, 185 F. Supp. 2d 741, 745 (E.D.
Mich. 2001). Petitioner’s sentences are within the statutory maximums
for his offenses. See Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 750.85 (authorizing a
maximum sentence of life imprisonment for torture); 750.88 (authorizing
a maximum sentence of 15 years imprisonment for assault with intent
to rob while unarmed); 769.12 (authorizing a maximum sentence of life
imprisonment for a fourth habitual offender convicted of a crime
punishable by a maximum term of 5 years or more). Consequently, his
sentences are insulated from habeas review absent a federal
constitutional violation.

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Petitioner asserts that his sentences constitute cruel and unusual
punishment. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied relief on this claim
finding that

Petitioner’s sentences

are

within

the

guidelines,

proportionate, and constitutionally valid. VanBuren, 2016 WL 4467317
at *2-3.
The state court’s decision is neither contrary to Supreme Court
precedent nor an unreasonable application of federal law or the facts.
Petitioner’s assertion that his sentences are disproportionate is not
cognizable on federal habeas review because it is a state law claim. See
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991) (ruling that the Eighth
Amendment does not require strict proportionality and that Michigan
prisoner’s claim that his sentence is disproportionate is not cognizable
on habeas review).
The same is true to the extent that Petitioner asserts that his
sentences violate the Michigan Constitution’s prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment. Such a claim is not cognizable on federal
habeas review because it is a state law claim. See Austin v. Jackson, 213
F.3d 298, 300 (6th Cir. 2000); Broadnax v. Rapelje, No. 08-12158, 2010
WL 1880922, *3 (E.D. Mich. May 11, 2010); Baker v. McKee, No. 06-

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12860, 2009 WL 1269628, *6 (E.D. Mich. April 30, 2009). State courts
are the final arbiters of state law and the federal courts will not
intervene in such matters. Lewis, 497 U.S. at 780; Oviedo, 809 F.2d at
328; see also Bradshaw, 546 U.S. at 76; Sanford, 288 F.3d at 860. Habeas
relief does not lie for perceived errors of state law. Estelle, 502 U.S. at
67–68. Petitioner fails to state a claim upon which federal habeas relief
may be granted as to this issue.
Petitioner also fails to establish that his sentences constitute cruel
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. As noted, the United States Constitution does not
require strict proportionality between a crime and its punishment.
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 965. A sentence that falls within the maximum
penalty authorized by statute “generally does not constitute ‘cruel and
unusual punishment.’” Austin, 213 F.3d at 302 (internal citation
omitted). Petitioner’s sentences are within the statutory maximums for
his offenses as a fourth habitual offender. The state trial court acted
within its discretion in imposing his sentences and there is no excessive
disparity between his crimes and sentences so as to offend the Eighth
Amendment. Petitioner fails to establish that his sentences are

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unconstitutional. Habeas relief is not warranted on this claim.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s
claims lack merit and that he is not entitled to federal habeas relief.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE
the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Before Petitioner may appeal, a certificate of appealability must
issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(a); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). A certificate of
appealability may issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
When a court denies relief on the merits, the substantial showing
threshold is met if the petitioner demonstrates that reasonable jurists
would find the court’s assessment of the claim debatable or wrong. Slack
v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484–85 (2000). “A petitioner satisfies this
standard by demonstrating that . . . jurists could conclude the issues
presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.”
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). Having conducted the
requisite review, the Court concludes that Petitioner fails to make a

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substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right as to his habeas
claims. Accordingly, the Court DENIES a certificate of appealability.
Lastly, the Court concludes that an appeal from the Court’s decision
cannot be taken in good faith. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a). Accordingly, the
Court DENIES Petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
This case is CLOSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 14, 2021
Ann Arbor, Michigan

s/Judith E. Levy
JUDITH E. LEVY
United States District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served
upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s
ECF System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail addresses
disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on April 14, 2021.
s/William Barkholz
WILLIAM BARKHOLZ

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