Thomas v. Bernstein et al
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER denying 4 Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. Signed by District Judge John Corbett O'Meara. (WBar)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
MICHAEL RAY THOMAS,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 5:18-cv-10297
HONORABLE JOHN C. O’MEARA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
RICHARD BERNSTEIN, et al,
Defendants.
_______________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO ALTER OR
AMEND JUDGMENT (ECF NO. 4)
Plaintiff, Michael Ray Thomas, a state inmate who is proceeding without the
assistance of counsel, filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On January
31, 2018, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint following a screen pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A. Now before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend judgment.
(ECF No. 4.) For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.
I.
Background
The factual background of this case is set out fully in the Court’s January 31, 2018
Order of Summary Dismissal. The Court adopts the factual background as set out in that
order.
II.
Standard
Motions to alter or amend judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 may
be granted if there is a clear error of law, newly discovered evidence, an intervening
change in controlling law or to prevent manifest injustice. GenCorp., Inc. v. American
Int’l Underwriters, 178 F.3d 804, 834 (6th Cir. 1999). “A motion under Rule 59(e) is not
an opportunity to re-argue a case.” Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler,
146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir. 1998). “Parties should not use them to raise arguments which
could, and should, have been made before judgment issued. Motions under Rule 59(e)
must either clearly establish a manifest error of law or must present newly discovered
evidence.” Id. (citing FDIC v. World Univ. Inc., 978 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1992)).
III.
Analysis
A.
Attorney Grievance Commission Defendants
Plaintiff disagrees with the Court’s conclusion that the Attorney Grievance
Commission (“AGC”) is absolutely immune for the acts or omissions performed within
its official capacity. He cites to Grievance Administrator, Attorney Grievance
Commission, Michigan v. Fieger, 409 F. Supp. 2d 858 (E.D. Mich. 2005), to support his
position that a suit can be brought against a grievance administrator provided the
challenge is “based upon the Constitution or federal laws.” Id. at 866.
Plaintiff misreads the holding of the case. In Feiger, the AGC filed a formal
complaint against the defendant, who moved to remove the case to federal court. The
court held that he could not remove the case to federal court because he did not state a
federal claim. It noted only hypothetically that such a suit could be filed in federal court
if it raised issues of constitutional or federal law. It made no comment about the success
of such a suit. Nor did it discuss the absolute immunity afforded to the AGC for acts or
omissions performed in its official capacity. Eston v. Van Bolt, 728 F. Supp. 1336, 1338
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(E.D. Mich. 1990) (citing M.C.R. 9.108(A)). Moreover, even if Plaintiff’s reading of the
case was correct, it still does not support his position, as his entire complaint was
predicated on matters of state law, not federal or constitutional law. Plaintiff is not
entitled to relief under Rule 59 on this basis.
B.
Michigan Supreme Court
Plaintiff next argues that the Michigan Supreme Court can be held liable for its
enforcement role related to attorney discipline. As support for this position, he cites to
Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 44 U.S. 719 (1980). In that
case, the United States Supreme Court held that the Virginia Supreme Court was not
absolutely immune from suits involving its enforcement authority over attorney
discipline. It described this enforcement authority as “beyond that of adjudicating
complaints filed by others and beyond the normal authority of the courts to punish
attorneys for contempt.” Id. at 724. Here, Plaintiff takes issue with how the Michigan
Supreme Court handled the complaint he filed against an attorney. His complaint does
not describe anything beyond the duty of the Michigan Supreme Court to adjudicate
complaints filed by others, and therefore the holding in Consumers is inapposite. The
Michigan Supreme Court is immune in the instant action and Plaintiff is not entitled to
relief on this basis.
C.
Michigan Supreme Court Justices
Finally, Plaintiff asserts that the Michigan Supreme Court justices are not immune
in this action because he filed it to seek prospective relief to end a continuing violation of
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federal law. In his motion, Plaintiff contends that he is attempting to compel the
Michigan Supreme Court justices to comply with the First Amendment right to redress
grievances, and the Due Process clause. However, his complaint merely takes issue with
the Michigan Supreme Court’s handling of his grievance. He has no constitutional right
to win his case at the Michigan Supreme Court. Nor do his allegations that the Michigan
Supreme Court Justices failed to follow state law by allowing the AGC to file an
untimely motion rise to the level of a constitutional violation. He is not entitled to relief
under Rule 59 on this basis.
IV.
Conclusion
In sum, Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under Rule 59. His motion (ECF No. 4.) is
therefore DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: June 22, 2018
s/John Corbett O’Meara
United States District Judge
I hereby certify that a copy of this opinion and order was served upon Plaintiff on
June 22, 2018, using first-class U.S. mail.
s/William Barkholz
Case Manager
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