Williams et al v. Maurer et al

Filing 33

OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 22 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting in part and denying in part 23 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (WBar)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
James Williams and Marconia
Mitchell,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Brian Maurer, Russell Gartha,
Eric Jachym, Tyler Fegreus,
Patrick McCormick, Cole Armil,
and Trevor Elliott,

Case No. 19-10850
Judith E. Levy
United States District Judge
Mag. Judge Anthony P. Patti

Defendants.
________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [23]
AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [22]
Before the Court are cross-motions for partial summary judgment.
(ECF Nos. 22, 23.) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs James
Williams and Marconia Mitchell’s motion is granted in part and denied
in part and Defendants Brian Maurer, Russell Gartha, Eric Jachym,
Tyler Fegreus, Patrick McCormick, Cole Armil, and Trevor Elliot’s
motion is granted in part and denied in part.

Case 5:19-cv-10850-JEL-APP ECF No. 33 filed 09/09/20

I.

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Background1

This is a case of alleged excessive use of police force. On December
28, 2018 at 4:36 a.m., the Southfield Police Department received an
anonymous 911 call reporting that “somebody just busted in my
neighbor’s [apartment].” (ECF No. 23-2.) The caller identified the
apartment where the disturbance arose as number 103, which,
unbeknownst to Defendants at the time, belonged to Mitchell. The caller
stated that she heard a male and a female screaming and glass breaking,
but that she did not know anyone’s identities. The dispatch operator
indicated that there was a “possible domestic” and that the caller believed
“the door was kicked in before the screaming started.” 2 (Id.)

The parties provided the Court with a file with a body-camera audio recording
of the encounter captured from Fegreus’ body microphone, along with an in-car video
recording from his police vehicle. (ECF No. 22-3.) There is also a 911 dispatch call
recording. (ECF No. 23-2.) These recordings form the basis of the facts set forth unless
otherwise indicated.
1

The Court considers the audio-video recordings of the underlying facts to be
essential in understanding the background of this case. The Court attempted to
embed this media into the opinion, but court technology is currently unable to
accommodate a mixed-media filing. In the event that the Court becomes able to
include the mixed media in a docket entry, it will issue an amended opinion and order.
The police report indicates that Defendants were dispatched for a “possible
home invasion in progress.” (ECF No. 22-2, PageID.123.)
2

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The apartment complex consists of several smaller multi-unit twostory buildings. (ECF. No. 22-11, PageID.458; 22-10, PageID.433.) The
building at issue has a main front door with a glass-paned lobby and
stairs leading to the second floor. (Id.) Apartment 103 is on the ground
floor, and there several other units in the building. (Id.)
Defendant police officers Fegreus and McCormick3 arrived on the
scene at 4:42 a.m, which was approximately the same time as Defendant
police officers Elliott and Armil arrived. (ECF No. 23-5, PageID.598.)
Fegreus and Armil testified that when they arrived at the apartment
complex, they heard a female scream but could not precisely identify
which apartment it came from. (ECF No. 23-5, PageID.598; ECF No. 236, PageID.611.) Additionally, the officers saw no signs of forced entry at
apartment 103 and heard no noise coming from the apartment. (Id. at
598–99.)
Fegreus and McCormick knocked on the door of apartment 103 for
several minutes, but no one answered. During that time, Armil

Fegreus testified that he was also acting as a field training officer for
McCormick on the night of the incident. McCormick had been in training for
approximately one week before the incident. McCormick drafted the police report,
which Fegreus reviewed before submitting it. (ECF No. 23-5, PageID.597.)
3

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discovered a broken window outside of apartment 103; the outer glass
pane was broken, but the inner pane remained intact. (ECF No. 23-6,
PageID.611; ECF No. 23-4, PageID.588.) Armil testified that the broken
window could not have been a point of entry into the apartment, and he
stated that he could not see any people or criminal activity in the
apartment through the window. (ECF No. 23-6, PageID.611.) He also
observed a grate on the window. (Id.; see also ECF No. 22-11 (photos of
the window).)
Fegreus and the other Defendants then discussed their efforts to
identify the source of the screaming that they heard when they arrived.
(ECF No. 23-3.) Fegreus said, “We don’t think it’s in 103,” and, “Trevor
[Elliott] said he heard it upstairs. I don’t know where it’s from.” (Id.) At
approximately 4:45 a.m., Defendants requested that dispatch confirm the
apartment number, because apartment 103 was “locked and there’s no
answer and it’s all quiet as of now.” (ECF No. 23-2.)
Dispatch contacted the anonymous 911 caller again to confirm the
apartment number, and, at approximately 4:47 a.m., the dispatch
operator told Defendants that the 911 caller “could not be positive what

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apartment it was coming from” but that she had heard glass breaking
and people screaming. (Id.)
While Defendants continued to knock on apartment 103 and
announce that they were from the police department, one of the
Defendants4 is asked whether they should “boot the door.” (ECF No. 233.) Another Defendant responded that they would have to “check with the
boss first,” causing at least one Defendant to laugh. (Id.) Around this
time, Defendant police officers Jachym, Maurer, and Gartha arrived at
the scene. (ECF No. 23-5, PageID.598.) During the approximately five to
six minutes of knocking, the officers did not hear screaming or any other
noise coming from inside apartment 103. (ECF No. 22-7, PageID.311.)
After about five minutes of knocking, Mitchell answered the door
and partially opened it. (ECF No. 23-5, PageID.599.) Defendants testified
that they did not observe any visible injuries on Mitchell. (See ECF No.
22-5, PageID.191; ECF No.22-6, PageID.260; ECF No. 22-7, PageID.313;
ECF No. 22-8. PageID.360.) Mitchell testified that, although Defendants
could not see her full body, she “cracked [the door] enough for them to see

The Court cannot discern from the audio recording which Defendant made
these statements.
4

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that everything was okay and intact, but not [to give] them access to my
apartment.” (ECF No. 22-12, PageID.514.)
Defendants’ testimony regarding the conversation that ensued
differs from the audio recording. For example, Fegreus testified that,
after Mitchell opened the door, “I ask[ed] what was going on saying that
we heard a male and female screaming and that your window’s broken.”
(ECF No. 22-7, PageID.312.) Elliott testified that “I remember explaining
to her why we were there and why we were forcing entry in there, because
we had exigent circumstances to go in there to confirm the safety of her,
if there was possibly anybody else in there.” (ECF No. 22-6, PageID.261.)
Armil testified,
[a]fter knocking for a period of time and announcing our
presence as Southfield Police, the door opened. Ms. Mitchell
was the one who opened the door. We stated why we were
there. We tried to explain to her that we wanted to check the
safety of the occupants inside the apartment. We told her that
we heard—or someone called regarding screaming and glass
breaking.
(ECF No. 22-5, PageID.190.) However, the audio recording of the
encounter demonstrates that Defendants did not explain to Mitchell why
they were at her door; instead, when Mitchell answered the door, one
Defendant said, “Hey how you doing? What happened to your window?”
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(ECF No. 22-3.) The closest that Defendants came to explaining the
situation to Mitchell was when one Defendant told her, “Because we got
that people were fighting and then there was a glass break.” (ECF No.
22, PageID.96.)
Mitchell stated that she thought someone threw a rock at her
window and ran off but that she was “fine.” (Id.) She later testified that
she initially thought the police were at her residence because of her
broken window, which had been broken the week before. (ECF No. 22-12,
PageID.511.) She stated that she made up the story about the rock
because she was afraid that she had damaged property that belonged to
her landlord:
They were banging on my door. It was like four or five police
officers. When I opened the door, I was scared, like they—the
way they looked like they were coming to do something. So I
felt like, I mean, it’s not my property. If I broke my own
window, I could have been sent to jail, so that’s—it—I was
terrified.
(Id.)
Defendants asked her if someone was “screaming and yelling,” and
Mitchell denied it, saying “I’m ok.” (ECF No. 22-3.) She also explained
that it took her some time to answer the door because she had been
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asleep. (Id.) Mitchell then attempted to close the door. (ECF No. 22-7,
PageID.316.) She was unable to close the door, however, because
McCormick had placed his boot in the door frame, blocking her ability to
do so. (Id. at PageID.600–01.) McCormick testified, “I had my foot in the
door. And then [Mitchell] proceeded to try and to shut the door on my
foot. And eventually myself and other officers went inside the
apartment.” (ECF No. 22-8, PageID.359.) Fegreus described Defendants’
entry as follows, “I placed my shoulder into the door to open it, because
it was—it wasn’t closed. The door wasn’t closed, but while it was closing
and hit Pat’s [McCormick’s] foot, I placed my shoulder into the door
causing it to open, and I walked inside the apartment.” (ECF No. 22-7,
PageID.337.)
At about this point in the audio recording, Mitchell said, “excuse
me, you don’t have anything to–. . .,” “no, no, no. . . you can’t just bust in
my door.” (ECF No. 22-3.) Defendants responded to her, saying, “relax,
relax,” and, “we’ve got exigent circumstances.” (Id.) As Fegreus,
McCormick, Armil, Gartha, and Elliott entered the apartment, Mitchell
alleges they hit her leg with the door, causing it to bleed and leaving a
permanent scar. (ECF No. 22-12, PageID.515.)
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Defendants observed Williams for the first time after they entered
the apartment. (ECF No. 23-2, PageID.605.) Armil described Williams as
“standing still” in the hallway. (ECF No. 23-6, PageID.613.) McCormick
described Williams as having “bloodshot eyes and slurred speech.” (ECF
No.22-8, PageID.375.) Fegreus testified that Williams was wearing only
boxer shorts. (ECF No. 23-2, PageID.602.) Fegreus and Armil testified
that Williams began to take a step back into the bedroom. (ECF No. 234, PageID.592; ECF No. 23-6, PageID.613.)
At this point in the audio recording, the Defendants shouted, “Get
down on the ground!”; “You’re gonna get tased!”; “Roll on your stomach!”;
and “Put your hands behind your back!” (ECF No. 22-3.) Mitchell is
recorded shouting, “Are you going to kill us?”; “Oh my god, somebody
help!”; and “Oh my god, what are you all doing?” (Id.) Williams is recorded
shouting, “I’m not doing nothing!”; “I’m putting my hands like this!”; and,
“What are they doing to me?” (Id.)
Armil testified that Williams had one of his hands obscured behind
his back and, since he could not tell whether Williams had a weapon in
his hand, Armil felt he had probable cause to arrest Williams. (ECF No.
23-6, PageID.613.) Fegreus testified that he saw Armil grab Williams by
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the shoulders. (ECF No.22-7, PageID.323.) Although Fegreus testified
that his view was obstructed, he stated that he saw Armil force Williams
to the ground. (Id.) Fegreus testified that Williams did not try to punch
or kick the officers while Defendants handcuffed him. (Id.)
At about this point in the audio recording, Mitchell said that she
did not understand why Defendants were in her apartment without a
warrant. Defendants did not answer her questions or explain why they
were in the apartment. Mitchell told Defendants that she had a lawyer,
and one of the Defendants responded, “then call a lawyer, I don’t care!”
(ECF No. 22-3.) Mitchell also told Defendants that she had rights and
that Defendants should not be in her apartment; one of the Defendants
responded, “oh, oh, ok . . . [inaudible] so did you learn all the laws?” When
she responded, “no,” that Defendant then said, “Ok, so now you don’t
know?” Mitchell again stated that she thought Defendants should not be
in her apartment, to which one Defendant replied, “oh, oh, oh, you
do?”(ECF No. 22-3.) Mitchell testified that,
[t]hey came—two officers were in my bedroom, came in my
bedroom—well, walked into my bedroom. And I asked them
what they were in my bedroom for, and they asked can they
search [Williams’] jeans, and I told them no, they carried him
out the house, there was no reason for them to be in my
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apartment. They started laughing, and I told them I was
going to call my lawyer if they didn’t leave, and then they left.
(ECF No. 22-12, PageID.524–525.)
Fegreus testified that he and other Defendants began to remove
Williams from the apartment but at some point, Williams fell, so they
carried him out. (ECF No. 23-6, PageID.603.) Williams is recorded telling
Mitchell to call the sheriff, and one of the Defendants responds, “we are
the police, idiot.” (ECF No. 22-3.)
Fegreus’ dashboard video camera recorded Defendants carrying
Williams, wearing only his boxer shorts, to the police vehicle, while he
said, “oh my god you all are treating me like I’m a f-__ing criminal.” (Id.)
One Defendant responded, “well you are now.” (Id.) The dashboard
camera recording of Williams in the squad car shows that he was silent
for the entire ride to the station. (Id.)
Armil testified that he conducted a search of the apartment after
Williams was arrested and that he found no contraband, weapons, or
drugs. (ECF No. 23-6, PageID.619.) The police report indicates that
Williams was arrested for resisting arrest and obstruction of the police.
(ECF No. 22-2, PageID.120.) Criminal charges against Williams were
later dropped. (ECF No. 23.)
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In their complaint, Plaintiffs deny that the initial disturbance
originated from Mitchell’s apartment. They argue that Defendants never
should have entered the apartment or arrested Williams. Plaintiffs bring
counts against Defendants as follows: Plaintiffs both allege that all
Defendants are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful entry;
Williams-only alleges that all defendants are liable under § 1983 for
excessive force; Mitchell-only alleges that Fegreus, McCormick, Elliott,
and Armil are liable under § 1983 for excessive force; Williams alleges
that all Defendants are liable under § 1983 for false arrest; Williams
alleges that Maurer, McCormick, Gartha, Fegreus, Armil and Elliott-only
(but not Jachym) are liable under § 1983 for malicious prosecution. (See
ECF Nos. 1, 31.)
In their summary judgment motion, Plaintiffs move for partial
summary judgment as to Defendants’ unlawful entry, excessive force,
and Williams’ false arrest count only (but not Williams’ malicious
prosecution count). (ECF No. 23.) In their cross-motion for summary
judgment, Defendants contend that qualified immunity shields them
from liability on Plaintiffs’ unlawful entry and Mitchell’s excessive force

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counts only.5 (ECF No. 22, 28.) They also argue that Williams’ false arrest
argument ignores certain testimony that creates a material factual
dispute. (ECF No. 28.) Defendants do not cross-move or assert qualified
immunity as to Williams’ excessive force count or malicious prosecution
count. (Id.)
II.

Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper when “the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court may not
grant summary judgment if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court “views the evidence, all
facts, and any inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Pure Tech Sys., Inc. v. Mt.
Hawley Ins. Co., 95 F. App’x 132, 135 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Skousen v.
Brighton High Sch., 305 F.3d 520, 526 (6th Cir. 2002)).
III. Analysis

Plaintiffs stipulated that summary judgment should be granted for
Defendants as to Mitchell’s excessive force count against Maurer, Gartha, and
Jachym only. (ECF No. 27, PageID.850.)
5

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A. Unlawful Entry
1.

Standing

As an initial matter, both Plaintiffs have standing to bring an
unlawful entry claim under the Fourth Amendment. Both had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in Mitchell’s apartment. Mitchell was
renting the apartment and residing in it, and Williams was a regular
visitor who stayed overnight four to five nights per week. (ECF No. 2212, PageID.496–97.) Mitchell, as an apartment renter, had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in her home under the Fourth Amendment. See
United States v. King, 227 F.3d 732, 743–45 (6th Cir. 2000). Williams, as
a regular houseguest, shared those rights. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495
U.S. 91, 98–100 (1990) (holding that houseguests are not excluded from
Fourth Amendment protection).
Plaintiffs do not make individualized arguments with respect to
each Defendant on their unlawful entry claim. Although McCormick was
the first to place his boot in the threshold of the door, McCormick,
Fegreus, Elliot, and Armil entered the apartment at approximately the
same time followed soon after by Gartha, Jachym and Maurer.
Accordingly, the same analysis applies to all Defendants.
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2. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment: Qualified
Immunity
Defendants argue that qualified immunity protects them from
Plaintiffs’ unlawful entry claim. (ECF No. 22, PageID.111–113.)
Qualified immunity shields public officials “from undue interference with
their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.” Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982). It provides protection to government
officials who make reasonable yet mistaken decisions that involve open
questions of law. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011).
There is two-prong inquiry for resolving qualified immunity claims.
First, the Court “must decide whether the facts that a plaintiff has
alleged (see Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6), (c)) or shown (see Rules 50, 56)
are a violation of a constitutional right; and second, the court must decide
whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of
defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232
(2009). The “clearly established” inquiry turns on the “objective legal
reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were
clearly established at the time it was taken.” Id. at 244. The law is
“clearly established” when the officers reasonably believed their conduct
complied with the law in place at the time, including existing lower court
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cases. Id. at 244–45. The Court may determine these inquiries in any
order it deems fair and efficient. Id. at 236–243.
It is well-established that an officer may not enter a home absent a
warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement. Barton v. Martin,
949 F.3d 938, 949 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S.
731, 741 (2011)). Because “warrantless entry into a home without an
exception to the warrant requirement violate[s] clearly established law,”
id., the relevant inquiry becomes whether the facts viewed in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party demonstrate that there was an
exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at 947.
Here, Defendants argue that they had a lawful right to enter the
apartment under the “exigent circumstances” exception to the warrant
requirement. Exigent circumstances are situations where “‘real
immediate and serious consequences’” will “certainly occur” if the police
officer postpones action to obtain a warrant. Thacker v. City of Columbus,
328 F.3d 244, 253 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Ewolski v. City of Brunswick,
287 F.3d 492, 501 (6th Cir. 2002)).
There are four situations where the exigent circumstances
exception to a warrant may apply: “(1) hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, (2)
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imminent destruction of evidence, (3) the need to prevent a suspect’s
escape, and (4) a risk of danger to the police or others.” Thacker, 328 F.3d
at 253 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 674, 680 (6th Cir.
1994)). Defendants argue that the “risk of danger to the police or others”
circumstance applies here because they (1) heard signs of violent or
suspicious activity on arrival; and (2) had indications that someone in the
apartment may be in distress, particularly with “known dangers
associated with domestic disturbances.” (Id. at PageID.111–112.). (ECF
No. 22, PageID.102–103.) The fact that the 911 caller reported
screaming, glass breaking, and the apartment door being kicked in—all
of which the caller believed came from apartment 103 supports this
position.
However, whether Defendants’ belief was reasonable at the time of
entry into Mitchell’s apartment is a different matter. When the facts are
viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, no exigency existed at the
time the officers entered Mitchell’s apartment.
Upon arrival, several Defendants testified that they heard a female
scream. However, none of the Defendants were able to identify the origin
of the scream, much less to determine that it came from Mitchell’s
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apartment. Despite the 911 caller’s statement to the police that
“somebody just busted into my neighbors’ [apartment],” there were no
signs of any disturbance outside of apartment 103, and the door was
intact and closed. While Armil observed a broken double-paned window
to apartment 103, the fact that it was double paned glass, and only the
outer pane was broken weigh against Defendants’ assertion that he
believed there was an intruder. Also, the window had a grate on it that
would have made a forced entry obvious.
As set forth above, Defendants’ uncertainty is clear from the audio
recording. Fegreus is recorded saying, “we don’t think it’s coming from
103.” He also stated that Elliott, “thought [the screaming] was coming
from upstairs;” and, “I don’t know where it’s coming from.” Fegreus and
the other Defendants were so uncertain of the location of the alleged
disturbance that Fegreus called dispatch to confirm the apartment
number. However, rather than affirm that the disturbance came from
Mitchell’s apartment, the 911 caller stated that she was “not positive”
which apartment the disturbance came from.
The fact that Defendants laughed as they discussed the possibility
of booting the door to apartment 103 and checking with the boss first also
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cuts against Defendants. Defendants themselves did not appear to
believe that exigent circumstances existed at the time, given that they
were laughing about calling their boss to boot the door open.
Further cutting against Defendants’

position

is

Mitchell’s

demeanor when she answered the door. Defendants knocked on
apartment 103 for approximately six minutes. After Mitchell answered
the door, she stated she was “fine,” and that the delay was because she
was asleep. It was, after all, approximately 4:50 a.m. Defendants did not
observe any illegal activity or signs that Mitchell was injured or in any
distress. Given the facts set forth above, and the uncertainty surrounding
the location of the alleged disturbance, Mitchell’s response that the
disturbance was not at her apartment was plausible. Moreover, Mitchell,
though fearful, was cooperative with Defendants before McCormick put
his boot in the threshold and Defendants forced the door open.
When viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the only
evidence that Defendants had linking Mitchell’s apartment to any
potentially exigent circumstance was the first anonymous 911 call.
However, the 911 caller refused to provide any information about herself,
including a description of the occupants of apartment 103. Although
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anonymous 911 callers are considered to have greater reliability than
that of non-emergency anonymous tipsters, see Robinson v. Howes, 663
F.3d 819, 830 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Hicks, 531 F.3d 555,
559 (7th Cir. 2008) (listing circuit decisions affording greater reliability
to emergency calls than to anonymous tips concerning general
criminality)), the caller here provided only minimal information, and
then back-pedaled regarding the location of the disturbance minutes
later.
For these reasons, a reasonable juror could find that Defendants
violated Plaintiffs’ clearly established constitutional right against
unlawful entry, and that no exigent circumstances existed..
Defendants nevertheless argue that this case is similar to Thacker
v. City of Columbus, 328 F.3d 244 (6th Cir. 2003). In Thacker, Gallagher
and her fiancé Thacker went out for the evening drinking and then
continued to drink after returning to Gallagher’s home. Id. at 249. Once
back at home, Thacker dropped a glass bottle on the floor, slipped and
fell on it, and cut his wrist. Id. Finding blood on Thacker’s hands, legs,
and shorts, Gallagher called 911 and reported an emergency: that her
fiancé’s wrist was cut and bleeding and that she did not know how it
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happened. When Thacker answered the door, the paramedics and police
could see broken glass on the floor behind Thacker, along with an
indentation in the wall with a liquid stain beneath it. Thacker’s hand was
bleeding profusely, and blood was on his body. Officers could also discern
that Thacker was intoxicated. Thacker gave paramedics, but not the
police, permission to enter.
Nonetheless, the police made a warrantless entry into the
apartment to investigate a possible crime, assist Thacker and any other
injured persons, and determine whether it was safe for paramedics to
enter. Afterwards, Thacker sued the officers for, among other things,
unlawful entry. The defendant officers raised qualified immunity in their
defense and argued that their warrantless entry into the home was
permissible due to a “risk of danger” under the “exigent circumstances”
exception to the warrant requirement.
On review, the Sixth Circuit found that “the totality of the
circumstances, including the 911 emergency call, Thacker’s conduct, and
the uncertainty of the situation, justified entry to secure the safety of the
police, paramedics, and other people possibly inside the home.” Id. at 254.
The Court cited the 911 call, which specifically reported a cut or stab,
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Thacker’s bloodied appearance and profuse bleeding when he answered
the door, his belligerent and intoxicated state, his failure to explain his
injury, and the fact that police could see the broken glass on the floor and
hole in the wall behind him at the door. Id. The Sixth Circuit found these
circumstances to present “a close question” and ruled in favor of the
officers. Id.
This case, on the other hand, is not a “close question.” The 911 caller
here was not a resident of apartment 103 and did not report seeing
anything specific in the apartment. When Mitchell answered the door,
Defendants testified that they did not see any signs of injury on her at
all, much less bleeding which was the case in Thacker. Nor did
Defendants see any signs of disturbance or illegal activity behind
Mitchell when she answered the door, nor was she apparently intoxicated
or belligerent. And contrary to the anonymous caller’s description, the
door was not bashed in as the anonymous caller had described. While
Defendants may have had reason to be concerned for whoever was
screaming in the multi-unit dwelling, Defendants have not set forth an
adequate connection between the screaming and Mitchell or her
apartment. There is no showing that an exigency prevented them from
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obtaining a warrant before entering Mitchell’s apartment. Moreover, the
uncertainty about which apartment had a disturbance in this case
further distinguishes it from Thacker, where there was no doubt that an
incident had occurred in the unit the officers entered. This case is very
different from Thacker.
Defendants also argue that their case is similar to Michigan v.
Fisher, 558 U.S. 45 (2009). Fisher is not a § 1983 qualified immunity case,
but the standard used is the same. In Fisher, officers were called to a
residence where a man was reportedly “going crazy.” Id. at 45. Upon
arrival, they saw a pickup truck in the driveway with its front smashed,
damaged fenceposts along the side of the property, and three broken
house windows with glass on the ground outside. Id. at 45–46. They saw
blood on the hood of the pickup and on the clothes inside of it, as well as
on the door to the house. Id. at 46. They could also see an individual,
Fisher, inside the house through a window, screaming and throwing
things. Fisher refused to answer the door, and officers saw a cut on his
hand. They entered the house. Fisher argued that this entry violated his
Fourth Amendment rights and sought to have the evidence seized
suppressed in his criminal case.
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Under the totality of the circumstances set forth above, the
Supreme Court found that the emergency aid exemption applied. It found
that “[o]fficers do not need ironclad proof of ‘a likely serious, lifethreatening’ injury to invoke the emergency aid exception.” Id. at 49.
Instead, the officers need only show that there was “an objectively
reasonable basis for believing” that entry was lawful. Id.
The circumstances in this case are not at all like those in Fisher,
where there was literally a bloody trail leading to Fisher’s door and
Fisher could be seen acting erratically through the window. Defendants
here could not see any signs of disturbance on Mitchell’s body or in her
apartment, and they had no idea which apartment in the multi-unit
dwelling the disturbance came from.
Similarly, Defendants comparisons to Brigham City, Utah v.
Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) and United States v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 674
(6th Cir. 1994) are unhelpful. Brigham City involved a house party where
the officers could plainly see illegal activity upon their arrival. And
Johnson involved a kidnapping victim who answered the door and told
officers she was the missing person they were looking for. These cases
are not applicable.
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Finally, Defendants point to Gibson v. O’Donnell, 254 F. Supp. 3d.
913 (E.D. Mich. 2017) (Lawson, J.), In Gibson, the defendant officers
responded to a neighbor’s complaint about an argument in progress at
Gibson’s apartment. No one answered the door after about 40 minutes,
despite the obvious presence of occupants inside the residence. The officer
broke through the door to investigate and found two occupants in the
shower. They denied that a disturbance had occurred in their apartment.
There, Judge Lawson found that a constitutional violation occurred with
the entry, but that the Fourth Amendment right the defendants violated
by breaking down the door and entering the plaintiff’s apartment was not
clearly established at the time of the conduct.
Unlike here, in Gibson there were no facts that set forth any
confusion about whether the residence was the correct source of the
reported disturbance. And unlike Gibson, where no one answered the
door and left officers wondering whether the occupants of the apartment
were safe, Mitchell answered the door, denied a disturbance, and showed
no signs of injury or distress. Accordingly, like Gibson, a constitutional
violation occurred with the entry. But unlike Gibson, the violation in this
case was clearly established because Defendants had significantly more
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information that contradicted a reasonable belief of exigency inside
Mitchell’s apartment than the officers had in Gibson.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, qualified immunity
does not shield Defendants from liability on Plaintiffs’ unlawful entry
claim. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is denied.
3. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment: Unlawful Entry
Plaintiffs cross-move for summary judgment against all Defendants
on this claim. Even though qualified immunity does not shield
Defendants from liability, this does not automatically confer summary
judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. Rather, when the facts are viewed in the
light most favorable to the Defendants, there are genuine disputes as to
issues of material fact such that a jury could decide that they entered the
apartment lawfully.
For example, Elliot testified that when Mitchell opened the door,
she did so “very hesitantly. I noticed she was looking through, and kind
of giving short answers. And I remember officers asking questions and
she was being very short and vague.” (ECF No. 22-6, PageID.252.).
Fegreus testified that the broken glass found outside the apartment
(though, the inner windowpane was intact and there was no indication
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that the window had been broken recently) was a potential source of
concern. When Mitchell attempted to shut the door, Fegreus testified, “I
could not see inside the apartment to make sure everybody was safe and
okay due to the glass break, the dispatch call saying that a male and
female were screaming, so in order to make sure everybody was safe, I
entered the apartment.” (ECF No. 22-7, PageID.316.) A reasonable juror
could determine that Defendants had a reasonable exigent cause to
investigate further and enter the apartment.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not met their burden to show that
summary judgment should be granted in their favor when viewing the
facts in the light most favorable to Defendants.6 Accordingly, Plaintiffs’
motion is denied.
B.

Excessive Force

Next, Mitchell moves for summary judgment on her excessive force
claim against Fegreus, McCormick, Elliott, and Armil, and Williams
moves for summary judgment on his excessive force claim against all
Defendants. The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from excessive

The denial of summary judgment does not preclude a motion for directed
verdict once the evidence has been presented at trial. This issue may be appropriate
for a directed verdict at that time.
6

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force “in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop. . .” Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 294 (1989).
1.

Mitchell v. Fegreus, McCormick, Elliott, and Armil

As set already forth above, Mitchell moves for summary judgment
on her excessive force claim against Defendants Fegreus, McCormick,
Elliott, and Armil-only. Defendants cross-move for summary judgment
against Mitchell on this claim asserting that they are protected by
qualified immunity. The Court will first analyze whether Mitchell has
provided evidence from which a jury could find that Defendants used
excessive force against her, and then whether the right was clearly
established at the time it was violated. See Judd v. City of Baxter, Tenn.,
780 F. App’x 345, 348 (6th Cir. 2019). As set forth above, the test is
“whether there was clearly established law at a sufficient level of
specificity to put a reasonable officer on notice that the conduct at issue
was unconstitutional.” Id.
As an initial matter, Mitchell has set forth evidence from which a
reasonable jury could find that Fegreus, McCormick, Elliott, and Armil
violated her constitutional right against the use of excessive force, and
that the right was clearly established at the time of the conduct. Here,
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the parties do not dispute that Plaintiff was trying to close her door when
Defendants pushed it open and hit her with it, causing pain, a bleeding
cut on her leg, and a permanent scar.
Defendants argue that the force here was nothing more than de
minimus. “[A]n excessive-force claimant must show something more than
de minimis force.” Leary v. Livingston County, 528 F.3d 438, 443 (6th Cir.
2008) (citations omitted). Leary measures force in part by looking at the
nature of the injury. When analyzing the level of force and finding it
nothing more than de minimis, the Court noted that “[t]here was no
hospital visit after the encounter, no doctor’s visit, no bruise, nothing in
short to indicate that the encounter rose above a ‘negligible [use of] force’
or caused anything more than a ‘trifling injury.’” Id. (citing Riley v.
Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159, 1167 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc)).
Yet, another factor set forth in Leary to determine the
reasonableness of force is whether the victim experienced pain. In finding
the force de minimus, the Sixth Circuit emphasized that Leary admitted
that the officer’s actions did not hurt him. Id. However, in Carlton v.
Turner, the Court stated that even a minor injury with minimal pain can

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result in recovery where the force “drew blood.” No. 05-1009, 2006 WL
955886, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 12, 2006).
Here, Mitchell’s allegations involve a single incident of force: the
door hitting her knee when Defendants pushed it open. (ECF No. 23,
PageID.575.) Although she refused medical attention at the time of the
incident (ECF No. 23-4, PageID.589), she testified that the blow from the
door caused “a little cut on my knee and it started bleeding.” (ECF No.
23-12, PageID.722.) She also testified, “I don’t think it needed stitches,
but it was big enough to continue to bleed the rest of the night.” (Id.)
Accordingly, Mitchell has set forth evidence to show that the injury was
more than de minimus and was caused by one or more of the Defendants
forcing the door to her apartment open. It therefore rises to the level of a
constitutional violation that was clearly established at the time
Defendants acted. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment based on qualified immunity is denied.
Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on this claim is also
denied. Based on the facts set forth above, including Mitchell’s admission
that her injury did not require medical attention, a reasonable jury could
find in favor of Defendants. Accordingly, both parties’ motions are denied.
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2.

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Williams v. McCormick and Armil

While Williams’ complaint alleges excessive force against all
Defendants, he moves for summary judgment with respect to McCormick
and Armil-only. Defendants do not cross-move asserting qualified
immunity on this claim. Williams argues that the excessive force at issue
occurred when McCormick handcuffed him and when Armil took him to
the ground. (ECF No. 23, PageID.576.) He concedes that that there are
genuine issues of material fact as to whether the other Defendants used
excessive force against him and/or failed to intervene and prevent others
from doing so. (Id. at fn. 3.)
a.

Handcuffs

As to Williams’ handcuffs claim, he argues that the handcuffs
caused an injury to his hand. (ECF No. 23, PageID.576.) To prevail at the
summary judgment stage, on a handcuffs-based excessive force claim a
plaintiff must show that there is no genuine issue of material fact that:
(1) the plaintiff complained the handcuffs were too tight; (2) the officer
ignored those complaints; and (3) the plaintiff experienced some physical
injury resulting from the handcuffing. Baynes v. Cleland, 799 F.3d 600,
608 (6th Cir. 2015).
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Williams has not set forth evidence of the first element: that he
complained that the handcuffs were too tight. Additionally, the audio
recording of the incident never captures a complaint regarding the
handcuffs, nor is there any allegation that he complained but it was not
captured on the recording. It follows, therefore, that he has not met his
burden on summary judgment on the second element—that McCormick
or other Defendants ignored his complaint—because he never set forth
evidence that he complained. Finally, other than his general argument
that his hand was injured, Williams has not presented any other evidence
of injury as required by the third element. Accordingly, Williams’ motion
for summary judgment on his handcuffs-based excessive force claim is
denied.
b.

Takedown

Next, Williams argues that Armil used excessive force when he took
Williams down to the ground. In cases of excessive force involving a
takedown, the Court must apply an “an objective reasonableness test,
looking to the reasonableness of the force in light of the totality of the
circumstances confronting the defendants, and not to the underlying
intent or motivation of the defendants.” Dunigan v. Noble, 390 F.3d 486,
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493 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97
(1989).
There is a three-factor test for this analysis: “[ (1) ] the severity of
the crime at issue, [ (2) ] whether the suspect poses an immediate threat
to the safety of the officers or others, and [ (3) ] whether he is actively
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Burgess v.
Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 472–73 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Martin v. City of
Broadview Heights, 712 F.3d 951, 958 (6th Cir. 2013)). Further, “[t]hese
factors are assessed from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the
scene making a split-second judgment under tense, uncertain, and
rapidly evolving circumstances without the advantage of 20/20
hindsight.” Id. at 473 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97).
As set forth above, Defendants were initially dispatched to
Plaintiffs’ apartment complex because of a suspected robbery or domestic
violence crime. After Mitchell answered the door and indicated that she
was fine, Defendants entered her apartment (the lawfulness of which is
to be determined by a jury as set forth above). They saw Williams emerge
from the bedroom wearing only boxer shorts, with bleary eyes, and
slurred speech. When he took a step back into the bedroom, Defendants
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ordered him to “Get down on the ground!”; “Roll on your stomach!”; and
“Put your hands behind your back!” (ECF No. 22-3.) Defendants also
shouted, “You’re gonna get tased!” (Id.) In response, Williams said, “I’m
not doing nothing!”; “I’m putting my hands like this!”; and, “What are
they doing to me?” (Id.) Armil took Williams to the ground at about this
point. Other Defendants testified that Williams was not punching,
kicking, or the like. However, he did fall after he was handcuffed.
Defendants carried him out of the apartment and into the squad car. The
police report indicates that Williams was arrested for resisting arrest and
obstruction of the police. (ECF No. 22-2, PageID.120.)
Defendants argue that, from their perspective, they were “entering
a dimly lit apartment to inspect for signs of violence and/or injured
persons.” They argue it was reasonable, making a split-second judgment,
to ask Williams to step into the living room to complete their
investigation but that, “when Mr. Williams refused to follow these lawful
commands, he was resisting and obstructing Ofc. Armil.” (ECF No. 28,
PageID.905–906.)
In applying the three-factor test, the Court is left to sort out what
the first factor–the severity of the crime at issue–was in this case. While
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the encounter may have started off as a suspected robbery or domestic
violence situation, Defendants were not faced with any evidence of either
crime at the time they encountered Williams. In Kent v. Oakland County,
810 F.3d 384 (6th Cir. 2016) the Sixth Circuit held that facts such as
whether the individual was charged with any crime and whether the
individual was told at any time that they were under arrest are
considerations for the first excessive force factor. Id. at 390. All a
reasonable officer would have known when encountering Williams was
that an unknown sleepy man stepped into the living room, and then took
a step back. While both robbery and domestic violence are serious crimes,
Williams was not a suspect in or arrested for either. Rather, he was
arrested for violating a resistance and obstruction ordinance, and
charges against him were later dropped.
As to the second factor– whether the suspect poses an immediate
threat to the safety of the officers or others– the facts construed in the
light most favorable to Armil show that Williams may have had a hand
behind his back and that Armil wanted to “ensure there was no weapon
in it for his own safety and that of everyone around him.” (ECF No. 28,

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PageID.909.) However, there is inconsistent testimony about whether
Williams had one hand behind his back. Elliott testified as follows:
[O]nce we get him in the bedroom, he’s still fighting us, he’s
getting a wide base, so to say, and he’s got his arms and his fists
clinched close to his chest, so his fists are close to his chest at
this point. He’s got a wide base, you know, he’s crouched down,
attempting—you know, wrestling with us because we’re trying
to get him down and he clearly does not want to get down on the
ground, even though we are trying to get him down on the
ground.
(ECF No. 22-6, PageID.269.) Accordingly, the facts Armil relies upon for
the takedown are in dispute, and the Court cannot find that Williams
posed an immediate threat to the officers.
Finally, as to the third factor– whether Williams was actively
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight– the evidence
before the Court is that Williams took a step back towards the bedroom
after he saw Defendants in the living room. The audio recording shows
that when Defendants began yelling commands at Williams, he
responded saying, “I’m not doing nothing!”; “I’m putting my hands like
this!”; and, “What are they doing to me?” (ECF No. 22-3.) He was taken
down almost immediately. If the officers relied only on his single step
backwards, that alone does not justify a finding that Williams was
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actively resisting or evading by flight. Although Armil and Elliott’s
testimony at trial may indicate otherwise, the record before the Court
now shows that Williams was not actively resisting arrest or attempting
to evade arrest. Indeed, his words that can be heard on the audio
recording as set forth above indicate that he feared for his life as the
encounter unfolded. He yelled, “What are they doing to me? Record them!
Record them!” (ECF No. 22-3.)
The Court must consider the totality of the circumstances when
considering the three factors. Significantly, the time period between
Williams stepping into the living room, stepping back, and his takedown
was very short. When listening to the audio recording of the encounter,
it appears that approximately only one minute passed before Williams
was on the ground. Defendants are not recorded asking questions of
Williams, thus, any investigation before the takedown was cursory, at
best. There were no obvious signs of injury on Mitchell or Williams nor
were there visible weapons or other obvious threats.
For the reasons set forth above, whether Armil’s takedown of
Williams was excessive presents a factual dispute—namely, whether
Williams had his hand behind his back—that is material to the
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reasonableness inquiry, which precludes summary judgment for
Williams.7 Accordingly, Williams’ motion for summary judgment on his
excessive force claim related to Armil’s takedown is denied.
C.

False Arrest

Finally, Williams moves for summary judgment on his false arrest
claim. As set forth by the Sixth Circuit,
In order for a wrongful arrest claim to succeed under § 1983,
a plaintiff must prove that the police lacked probable cause.
Painter v. Robertson, 185 F.3d 557, 569 (6th Cir. 1999). A
police officer has probable cause if there is a “‘fair probability’”
that the individual to be arrested has either committed or
intends to commit a crime. Northrop v. Trippett, 265 F.3d 372,
379 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490
U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989)), cert. denied,
535 U.S. 955, 122 S.Ct. 1358, 152 L.Ed.2d 354 (2002). A police
officer determines the existence of probable cause by
examining the facts and circumstances within his knowledge
that are sufficient to inform “a prudent person, or one of
reasonable caution,” that the suspect “has committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense.” Michigan v.
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37, 99 S.Ct. 2627, 61 L.Ed.2d 343
(1979). “In general, the existence of probable cause in a § 1983
action presents a jury question, unless there is only one

The denial of summary judgment does not preclude a motion for directed
verdict once the evidence has been presented at trial. This issue may be appropriate
for a directed verdict at that time.
7

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reasonable determination possible.” Pyles v. Raisor, 60 F.3d
1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995).
Fridley v. Horrighs, 291 F.3d 867, 872 (6th Cir. 2002).
Although most false arrest cases should be determined by a jury,
this case presents a situation where summary judgment must be granted
in favor of Williams as a matter of law. Williams was arrested for
resisting and obstruction.8 Defendants do not specify which provision of
the Michigan obstruction statute Williams was allegedly arrested for, but
it would appear that perhaps subsection (1) applies:
an individual who assaults, batters, wounds, resists, obstructs,
opposes, or endangers a person who the individual knows or has
reason to know is performing his or her duties is guilty of a felony
punishable by imprisonment for not more than 2 years or a fine
of not more than $2,000.00, or both.
Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.81d(1). “Obstruct” is defined as “the use or
threatened use of physical interference or force or a knowing failure to
comply with a lawful command.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.81d(7)(a).

Defendants’ position is that Williams was arrested under the Michigan
statute for obstruction, which is a felony, rather than the Southfield city ordinance
for obstruction, which is a misdemeanor. (See ECF No. 28, PageID.909 (citing City of
Southfield Ord. § 9.141).) It is notable that Williams had so little information
regarding his arrest that he appears to have believed the local ordinance was
applicable. (See ECF No. 23, PageID.578.)
8

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As set forth above, the probable cause analysis requires a “fair
probability” that Williams committed obstruction. All that the evidence
shows here is that Williams stepped into the living room from the
bedroom, paused, and then took one or two steps back. There is no
evidence that he failed to comply with a lawful command. The audio
recording reveals that the events resulting in his arrest and removal from
the home transpired in a very short period of time. Any investigation that
could have resulted in probable cause for an arrest for obstruction was
cursory, if it occurred at all. There is no question of fact on resistance.
Additionally, the case cited by Defendants in support of their position,
Saad v. City of Dearborn, No. 10-12635, 2011 WL 3112517 (E.D. Mich.
July 26, 2011) is not applicable to this case, nor is it persuasive. Saad
regards a traffic violation stop where the police officer followed the
defendant to his house and had to call for backup when the driver did not
pull over when the police car’s lights were flashing, nor did he follow
commands.
Accordingly, the officers did not have probable cause that Williams
was obstructing or resisting. Williams’ motion for summary judgment is
granted on his false arrest claim.
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IV.

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Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’
motion for summary judgement as to Williams’ false arrest claim and
DENIES the remainder of Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. The
Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment only as to
Williams handcuffs-based excessive force claim and DENIES the
remainder of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 9, 2020
Ann Arbor, Michigan

s/Judith E. Levy
JUDITH E. LEVY
United States District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served
upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s
ECF System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail addresses
disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on September 9, 2020.
s/William Barkholz
WILLIAM BARKHOLZ
Case Manager

41