Graham v. Floyd

Filing 14

OPINION AND ORDER denying 10 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (WBar)

Case 5:20-cv-12828-JEL-KGA ECF No. 14, PageID.58 Filed 09/27/23 Page 1 of 6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
Fard Rahman Graham,
Petitioner,
v.

Case No. 20-12828
Judith E. Levy
United States District Judge

Michele Floyd,
Respondent.

Mag. Judge Kimberly G. Altman

________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION [10]
Petitioner Fard Rahman Graham, who is currently confined at the
Cooper Street Correctional Facility in Jackson, Michigan, filed a pro se
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF
No. 1.) In his petition, Petitioner alleged that the Michigan Department
of Corrections (“MDOC”) refuses to enforce the Governor of Michigan’s
Executive Order to prevent the spread of COVID-19 by requiring
adequate social distancing at the prison or to provide adequate cleaning
supplies. (Id. at PageID.6–7.) On January 18, 2023, the Court summarily
denied the petition. (ECF No. 8.) In that opinion and order, the Court

Case 5:20-cv-12828-JEL-KGA ECF No. 14, PageID.59 Filed 09/27/23 Page 2 of 6

concluded that Petitioner’s claims were not cognizable in habeas because
the petition did not allege that no set of conditions would remedy the risk
caused by COVID-19. (ECF No. 8.) On January 27, 2023, Petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Local Rule 7.1. (ECF No. 10.)
For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.
I.

Legal Standard

As an initial matter, motions for reconsideration of final orders and
judgments are no longer permitted under Eastern District of Michigan
Local Rule 7.1 and must be brought under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 59(e) or 60(b). See Ackerman v. Washington, No. 13-14137,
2021 WL 5782896, at * 1, n. 1 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 7, 2021) (citing E.D. Mich.
LR 7.1(h)(1)).1 Because Petitioner is proceeding pro se and filed his
motion within twenty-eight days of the entry of judgment, the Court
construes Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration as a motion under Rule
59(e). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (“A motion to alter or amend a judgment
must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.”);

As of December 1, 2022, Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(h)(1)
provides, in relevant part: “Parties seeking reconsideration of final orders or
judgments must file a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or 60(b).
The court will not grant reconsideration of such an order or judgment under this
rule.”
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Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (holding that documents filed
by parties proceeding pro se must be liberally construed).
Pursuant to Rule 59(e), “[a] district court may alter or amend its
judgment based on ‘(1) a clear error of law; (2) newly discovered evidence;
(3) an intervening change in controlling law; or (4) a need to prevent
manifest injustice.’” Brumley v. UPS, 909 F.3d 834, 841 (6th Cir. 2018)
(quoting Leisure Caviar, LLC v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 616 F.3d 612,
615 (6th Cir. 2010)). “A Rule 59 motion ‘may not be used to relitigate old
matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been
raised prior to the entry of judgment.’” Id. (quoting Exxon Shipping Co.
v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 486, n. 5 (2008)).
II.

Analysis

Petitioner’s first argument is that this Court erred in considering
Petitioner’s incarceration at the “Cotton Correctional Facility,” when he
was, in fact, incarcerated at the Cooper Street Correctional Facility. (ECF
No. 10, PageID.44.) Petitioner is correct that the Court erroneously
referenced the “Cotton Correctional Facility” in its January 18, 2023

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opinion and order.2 (See ECF No. 8, PageID.36, 38.) While the Court
apologizes to Petitioner for this typographical error, the Court correctly
noted at the beginning of the opinion that Petitioner was incarcerated at
the Cooper Street Correctional Facility. (See id. at PageID.35.) More
importantly, the Court did not base its decision to deny habeas relief on
the specific prison facility where Petitioner was incarcerated. Instead,
the Court held that Petitioner’s claims were not cognizable in a habeas
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (See id. at PageID.37–38.)
Petitioner also argues that the Court erred in denying him habeas
relief because none of the prisons in Michigan are properly implementing
social distancing policies or providing adequate cleaning supplies to
prevent the spread of COVID-19. (See ECF No. 10, PageID.44–45.)
Additionally, Petitioner asserts that Cooper Street Correctional Facility
has “not made the proper adjustments to retrofit the facility and stop the
spread of [COVID]-19.” (Id. at PageID.46.) While such allegations are
concerning, they are the same issues raised in Petitioner’s petition and
previously addressed by the Court, and therefore do not warrant relief

Like the Cooper Street Correctional Facility, the G. Robert Cotton
Correctional Facility is an MDOC facility located in Jackson, Michigan.
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under Rule 59(e). See Brumley, 909 F.3d at 841 Moreover, the Court did
not err in concluding that Petitioner’s claim was not cognizable in a
federal habeas petition under § 2241.
The Sixth Circuit has explained that “claims seeking relief in the
form of improvement of prison conditions . . . are not properly brought
under § 2241.” Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 838 (6th Cir. 2020)
(citing Luedtke v. Berkebile, 704 F.3d 465, 466 (6th Cir. 2013)). Instead,
a habeas petition under § 2241 must “challeng[e] the fact or extent,
rather than the conditions, of the confinement.” Id. (citing Adams v.
Bradshaw, 644 F.3d 481, 483 (6th Cir. 2011); Terrell v. United States, 564
F.3d 442, 446–48 (6th Cir. 2009)). To do so, a § 2241 claim related to
prison conditions must assert that no set of conditions of confinement
would be constitutionally sufficient. Id. Petitioner has made no such
showing here. As the Court indicated previously, Petitioner’s arguments
imply that if the facility was properly implementing the Governor’s
executive orders regarding social distancing and cleaning supplies or
making the appropriate modification to the facility, then the risks
imposed by COVID-19 would be mitigated. (See ECF No. 8, PageID.38.)
Thus, Petitioner has not demonstrated that there is no set of conditions

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of confinement that would be sufficient to mitigate the risks imposed by
COVID-19, and his claim is not cognizable under § 2241.3 Accordingly,
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, construed as a motion to alter or
amend the judgment under Rule 59(e), is denied.
III.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration (ECF No. 10) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 27, 2023
Ann Arbor, Michigan

s/Judith E. Levy
JUDITH E. LEVY
United States District Judge

As the Court noted in its previous order, the appropriate mechanism for
challenging conditions of confinement is a civil rights complaint brought pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See ECF No. 8, PageID.39.)
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