Price v. Coney et al

Filing 10

OPINION and ORDER Dismissing 1 Complaint, Signed by District Judge Judith E. Levy. (WBar)

Case 5:22-cv-10884-JEL-DRG ECF No. 10, PageID.64 Filed 01/18/23 Page 1 of 13

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
Derione O. Price,

Case No. 22-cv-10884
Plaintiff,

v.

Judith E. Levy
United States District Judge

Brett Coney, et al.,

Mag. Judge David R. Grand
Defendants.

________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT
Michigan state prisoner Derione O. Price filed a pro se civil rights
complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He is proceeding without prepayment
of the filing fee under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Plaintiff names as
Defendants eight Michigan Department of Corrections employees. He
alleges violations of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §
12131, et seq. (ADA), the Eighth Amendment, and his right to privacy.
Plaintiff seeks injunctive and monetary relief.
As explained further below, the Court dismisses the complaint
because it is frivolous and fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.

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I.

Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint set

forth “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief,” as well as “a demand for the relief sought.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2), (3). The purpose of this rule is to “give the defendant fair
notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). While this notice
pleading standard does not require “detailed” factual allegations,
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, it does require more than the bare assertion
of legal conclusions or “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmedme accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A pleading
that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555).
Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed without prepayment of
the filing fee for this action. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”), the Court is required to, on its own, dismiss an in forma
pauperis complaint before service on a defendant if it determines that the
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action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law
or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
To state a federal civil rights claim, a plaintiff must allege that: (1)
he was deprived of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the federal
Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) the deprivation was
caused by a person acting under color of state law. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks,
436 U.S. 149, 155–57 (1978). A pro se civil rights complaint is to be
construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972).
II.

Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at the Saginaw Correctional

Facility in Freeland, Michigan. (ECF No. 9, PageID.62.) The events about
which he complains occurred at the Macomb Correctional Facility (MRF)
in Lenox Township, Michigan.
Plaintiff sues the following MRF employees: unit chief Brett Coney,
assistant deputy warden Kristopher Steece, assistant mental health
director David Stanifer, psychologist Karen Solgot, and mental health
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providers Max Albeman, Andrea Owens, Cateeva Johnson, and FNU
McCoy. He alleges that these Defendants failed to protect his rights
under the Americans With Disabilities Act and the Eighth Amendment,
and that they violated his right to privacy while he was in segregation.
Plaintiff’s allegations focus on his treatment while housed in MRF’s
segregation unit. He alleges that several Defendants “coerced” him into
speaking through the cell door about his mental health issues within
earshot of other prisoners. (ECF No. 1, PageID.9.) Plaintiff’s claims
include that:
 On September 8, 2020, Defendant Ableman “coerced” Plaintiff into
speaking with him about mental health issue, even though other
inmates could hear them. (Id.)
 On October 26 and 28, 2021, while Plaintiff was in segregation on
suicide watch, Defendant Owens, a mental health professional,
ignored his request to speak to Owens in private about his mental
health issues. (Id.) Plaintiff was removed from suicide watch on
October 28, 2021.
 On February 11, 2022, Defendant B. Coney, a unit chief, spoke to
Plaintiff while he was in segregation. Coney declined Plaintiff’s
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request to speak to him privately. Coney told Plaintiff he would
send Plaintiff’s therapist, Defendant McCoy, to speak to Plaintiff.
(Id.)
 On February 17, 2022, Plaintiff told Defendant Cateeva Johnson
that he needed to see his doctor because his medications were not
working. Johnson said she would contact Plaintiff’s therapist, but
Plaintiff’s therapist did not come to see him. (Id. at 10.)
 On February 22, 2022, Plaintiff again told Johnson that he needed
to be seen by his therapist. Johnson declined to pull Plaintiff from
his cell because of “the misconduct that [Plaintiff] had against her
which is why [Plaintiff] was placed in segregation.” (Id.) Johnson
said she would let someone know Plaintiff needed to speak to a
therapist, but no therapist came.
 On March 10, 2022, Defendant Albeman conducted rounds in the
segregation unit. He declined to pull Plaintiff from his cell to allow
Plaintiff to speak privately, but said he would return for a private
consultation. Albeman did not return. (Id. at 11.)
 Plaintiff was without a private mental health consultation for more
than thirty days when he was confined in segregation.
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III. Discussion
A. Americans With Disabilities Act
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his rights under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12132 et seq.
Plaintiff appears to allege a violation of Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§
12131–12165, which applies to public entities.
In order to state a claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must
establish: (1) that he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that
he was excluded from participation in or was denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity; and (3) that such
discrimination was because of his disability, See 42 U.S.C. § 12132. In
the ADA, the term “disability” is defined as follows: “[1] a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual; [2] a record of such an impairment; or [3]
being regarded as having such an impairment ....” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
Assuming that Plaintiff is disabled under the statute, his
allegations do not state a claim under the ADA. Plaintiff alleges that he
was denied mental health treatment in violation of the ADA but does not
“allege that he was denied treatment because of his disability.” Centaurs
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v. Haslam, No. 14-5348, 2014 WL 12972238, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 2, 2014)
(emphasis in original). A claim of inadequate medical care by a disabled
prisoner does not necessarily raise a discrimination claim under the
ADA. See Cannon v. Eleby, No. 98-1546, 1999 WL 507006, at *1 (6th Cir.
June 10, 1999) (“[M]ere allegations of inadequate medical care do not
raise a viable discrimination claim.”); Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246,
249 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[The ADA] would not be violated by a prison’s simply
failing to attend to the medical needs of its disabled prisoners.”).
Plaintiff does not state a claim under the ADA because he fails to
allege facts from which it could be inferred that the was because of his
alleged disability.
B. Right to Privacy
Plaintiff also argues that Defendants violated his right to privacy
by repeatedly coercing him to speak about his mental health in a setting
where he could be heard by other prisoners. “[T]he Constitution does not
encompass a general right to nondisclosure of private information.” J.P.
v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090 (6th Cir. 1981). Only when
“fundamental” rights are implicated does a privacy concern take on
constitutional dimensions. Id. The Sixth Circuit “has recognized an
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informational-privacy interest of constitutional dimension in only two
instances: (1) where the release of personal information could lead to
bodily harm, and (2) where the information released was of a sexual,
personal, and humiliating nature.” Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433,
440 (6th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted)). The Sixth Circuit reasoned that
constitutionalizing a harm that does not implicate a fundamental right
“would be to open a Pandora’s box of claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a

step we are unwilling to take.” Id. at 445. The Sixth Circuit has rejected
claims asserting a constitutional right to nondisclosure of personal
information that does not fall within the two limited categories. See e.g.,
Lee v. City of Columbus, 636 F.3d 245, 261 (6th Cir. 2011) (city’s
requirement that employees returning from sick leave disclose the nature
of their illness to their immediate supervisors does not implicate a
fundamental right); Barber v. Overton, 496 F.3d 449, 455–57 (6th Cir.
2007) (release of guards’ birth dates and social security numbers did not
rise to constitutional level); Coleman v. Martin, 63 F. App’x 791, 793 (6th
Cir. 2003) (distribution of prisoner’s mental health records to parole
board was not a constitutional violation).
Plaintiff does not claim that discussing his mental health within
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earshot of other prisoners placed him in danger of physical harm or that
the information was sexual and humiliating in nature. His allegations,
then, do not raise an informational privacy concern of a constitutional
dimension.
C. Eighth Amendment
Plaintiff next argues that Defendants violated the Eighth
Amendment by failing to treat his mental illness in a non-negligent
manner.
“[T]he Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments which, although
not physically barbarous, involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain, or are grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime.”
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The deprivation alleged must result in the
denial of the “minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.” Id. at 348.
“‘Not every unpleasant experience a prisoner might endure while
incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment.’” Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954
(6th Cir. 1987)).
An Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim has both a
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subjective and objective component. Id. The objective component requires
a plaintiff to show that the deprivations to which he has been subjected
deprived him of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.”
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347 (1981). The subjective component requires the
plaintiff to demonstrate that the prison officials acted wantonly, with
deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s serious needs. Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
The Sixth Circuit has held that “[a] detainee’s psychological needs
may constitute serious medical needs, especially when they result in
suicidal tendencies.” Horn by Parks, 22 F.3d at 660 (6th Cir. 1994). For
the purposes of this analysis, the Court will assume that Plaintiff’s
mental health issues satisfy the objective component of his Eighth
Amendment claim.
When a plaintiff satisfies the objective component, he must then
demonstrate that the defendant possessed a sufficiently culpable state of
mind:
[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth
Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of
confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must
both be aware of facts from which the inference could be
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drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he
must also draw the inference.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (1994). To satisfy this part of the analysis,
Plaintiff must demonstrate that Defendants acted with “deliberateness
tantamount to intent to punish.” Miller v. Calhoun County, 408 F.3d 803,
813 (6th Cir. 2005). Negligence will not suffice, Perez v. Oakland County,
466 F.3d 416, 431 (6th Cir. 2006), and an “[a]n official’s failure to alleviate
a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no
cause for commendation,” will not support a claim of deliberate
indifference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838.
The Sixth Circuit distinguishes between cases where a prisoner
alleges the complete denial of medical care and cases where a prisoner
received treatment which he alleges was inadequate. Alspaugh v.
McConnell, 643 F.3d 162, 169 (6th Cir. 2001). Where medical treatment
has been provided, a prisoner must show that his treatment was “so
woefully inadequate as to amount to no treatment at all.” Id.
It is clear from his complaint that Plaintiff received treatment. He
was given medication for his mental health issues, confined in
segregation so he could be placed on suicide watch, and visited by mental
health providers. Plaintiff disagrees with the manner and degree of
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treatment provided, but this is insufficient to show that his treatment
amounted to no treatment at all. Even if the treatment Plaintiff received
was negligent, this does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim.
Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir. 2001) (“When a
[medical

professional]

provides

treatment,

albeit

carelessly

or

inefficaciously, to a prisoner, he has not displayed a deliberate
indifference to the prisoner’s needs, but merely a degree of incompetence
which does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim
upon which relief may be granted.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the complaint
with prejudice. The Court also concludes that an appeal from this order
cannot be taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Coppedge v. United
States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 18, 2023
Ann Arbor, Michigan

s/Judith E. Levy
JUDITH E. LEVY
United States District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served
upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s
ECF System to their respective email or first-class U.S. mail addresses
disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on January 18, 2023.
s/William Barkholz
WILLIAM BARKHOLZ
Case Manager

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