Bridges v. United States of America

Filing 7

OPINION ; signed by Judge Robert Holmes Bell (Judge Robert Holmes Bell, kcb)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F O R THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN S O U T H E R N DIVISION J O H N ARTHUR BRIDGES, JR., M o v a n t, File No. 1:08-CV-569 v. H O N . ROBERT HOLMES BELL U N IT E D STATES OF AMERICA, R e sp o n d e n t. / OPINION T h is matter is before the Court on Movant John Arthur Bridges, Jr.'s motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence imposed upon him by this C o u rt. (Dkt. No. 1.) The government has filed a motion to dismiss Movant's § 2255 motion. (D k t. No. 4.) For the reasons that follow, the government's motion to dismiss will be g ra n te d , and Movant's § 2255 motion will be denied. I. M o v an t was indicted on January 25, 2007, for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). (File No. 1:07-CR-18, Dkt. No. 1.) M o v a n t pleaded guilty on March 2, 2007, pursuant to a written plea agreement in which he a g re e d to waive the right to challenge his sentence, for any reason, by collateral attack. (Id., D k t. No. 19.) On June 8, 2007, this Court sentenced Movant to eighty-four months of inca rce ratio n and three years of supervised release. (Id., Dkt. No. 25.) Movant did not a p p e a l his conviction or sentence, and filed his § 2255 motion on June 16, 2008. (Dkt. N o . 1.) The government filed a motion to dismiss Movant's § 2255 motion on December 3, 2 0 0 8 . (Dkt. No. 4.) II. T o prevail on a § 2255 motion "`a petitioner must demonstrate the existence of an e rro r of constitutional magnitude which had a substantial and injurious effect or influence o n the guilty plea or the jury's verdict.'" Humphress v. United States, 398 F.3d 855, 858 (6th C ir. 2005) (quoting Griffin v. United States, 330 F.3d 733, 736 (6th Cir. 2003)). Nonc o n s titu tio n a l errors are generally outside the scope of § 2255 relief. United States v. C o field , 233 F.3d 405, 407 (6th Cir. 2000). A movant can prevail on a § 2255 motion a lle g in g non-constitutional error only by establishing a "`fundamental defect which in h e re n tly results in a complete miscarriage of justice, or, an error so egregious that it a m o u n ts to a violation of due process.'" Watson v. United States, 165 F.3d 486, 488 (6th Cir. 1 9 9 9 ) (quoting United States v. Ferguson, 918 F.2d 627, 630 (6th Cir. 1990) (internal q u o ta tio n marks omitted)). As a general rule, claims not raised on direct appeal are procedurally defaulted and m a y not be raised on collateral review unless the petitioner shows either: (1) "cause" and " a ctu a l prejudice"; or (2) "actual innocence." Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2 0 0 3 ); Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621-22 (1998); United States v. Frady, 456 U .S . 152, 167-68 (1982). An ineffective assistance of counsel claim, however, is not subject 2 to the procedural default rule. Massaro, 538 U.S. at 504. An ineffective assistance of c o u n s e l claim may be raised in a collateral proceeding under § 2255, whether or not the m o v a n t could have raised the claim on direct appeal. Id. A court is required to grant a hearing to determine the issues and make findings of fact a n d conclusions of law on a § 2255 motion "[u]nless the motion and the files and records of th e case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). III. M o v an t seeks relief based on three distinct grounds: (1) the sentencing court e rro n e o u sly applied Movant's criminal history points; (2) counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a Sixth Amendment challenge at sentencing; (3) the sentencing court erroneously a p p lie d a four-level enhancement for possession of a firearm during the commission of a f e lo n y. (Dkt. No. 1.) T h e Court must first address whether Movant's § 2255 motion is barred by his plea a g re e m e n t. "A defendant may waive any right in a plea agreement, including a constitutional rig h t, if the waiver is made knowingly and voluntarily." United States v. Fleming, 239 F.3d 7 6 1 , 763-64 (6th Cir. 2001). The Sixth Circuit has held, in particular, that a movant's waiver b y plea agreement of his right to collaterally attack his sentence is generally enforceable. In re Acosta, 480 F.3d 421, 422 (6th Cir. 2007). However, waiver of collateral attack may be u n e n f o rc e a b le "in cases where a defendant argues that his plea was not knowing or voluntary, 3 o r was the product of ineffective assistance of counsel" because: [ I]t would be entirely circular for the government to argue that the defendant h a s waived his right to an appeal or a collateral attack when the substance of h is claim challenges the very validity of the waiver itself. Id. In paragraph ten of his plea agreement, Movant agreed to waive the right "to c h a lle n g e [his] sentence and the manner in which it was determined in any collateral attack, in c lu d in g but not limited to, a motion brought under Title 28 United States Code, § 2255." (F ile No. 1:07-CR-18, Dkt. No. 14.) At his plea hearing before the Magistrate Judge, M o v a n t stated under oath that he understood that he was waiving his right of collateral a ttac k : THE COURT: Then this goes on to say that you give up any right to bring w h a t's called a collateral attack against your sentence or your conviction. U n d e r federal law, after an appeal is done, right after the time to appeal is over a n d the defendant hasn't appealed, the defendant would have the right to raise c e r t a in constitutional challenges by a collateral attack, which is generally a m o t io n under Section 2255. This says that you understand that, but you are g iv in g up your right to bring any such collateral attack. So first of all, do you u n d e rsta n d that? D E F E N D A N T BRIDGES: Yes, sir. T H E COURT: And is that what you've decided to do? D E F E N D A N T BRIDGES: Yes, sir. (Id ., Dkt. No. 19, at 20-21.) Furthermore, Movant asserted that he was voluntarily pleading g u i l t y: T H E COURT: Is anybody forcing you to plead guilty? 4 D E F E N D A N T BRIDGES: No, sir. T H E COURT: Is your guilty plea the result of any threats or intimidation? D E F E N D A N T BRIDGES: No, sir. T H E COURT: Are you pleading guilty because you truly believe you're guilty o f this crime? D E F E N D A N T BRIDGES: Yes, sir. T H E COURT: Are you pleading guilty of your own free will? D E F E N D A N T BRIDGES: Yes, sir. (Id . at 25-26.) Movant does not claim anywhere in his § 2255 motion that his plea was u n k n o w in g or involuntary. Further, although Movant claims that his counsel was ineffective d u rin g sentencing, Movant does not argue that his plea was "the product of ineffective a ss is ta n c e of counsel." In re Acosta, 480 F.3d 421, 422 (6th Cir. 2007). Therefore, the Court f in d s that Movant's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, and that he has waived the right to challenge his sentence through a § 2255 motion. T h e files and records in this case conclusively show that Movant is entitled to no relief u n d e r § 2255. Accordingly, no evidentiary hearing is required to resolve the merits of the p e n d in g motion. For the reasons stated herein, Movant's motion to vacate, set aside, or co rrect his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 will be denied, and the government's m o tio n to dismiss will be granted. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), the Court must also assess whether to issue a c e rtif ic a te of appealability to Movant. To warrant a grant of a certificate of appealability, 5 Movant "must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment o f the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2 0 0 0 ). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has disapproved of the issuance of blanket d e n ia ls of a certificate of appealability. Murphy v. Ohio, 263 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2001). R a th e r, the district court must "engage in a reasoned assessment of each claim" to determine w h e th e r a certificate is warranted. Id. at 467. The Court does not believe that a reasonable ju rist would find that Movant's claims are not barred by the waiver in his plea agreement. A c c o rd in g ly, a certificate of appealability will also be denied. A n order and judgment consistent with this opinion shall be entered. Dated: June 16, 2010 /s/ Robert Holmes Bell ROBERT HOLMES BELL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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