Moore et al v. Menasha Corporation

Filing 63

OPINION ; signed by Judge Robert Holmes Bell (Judge Robert Holmes Bell, kcb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT W E S T E R N DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN S O U T H E R N DIVISION

R O B E R T MOORE, et al., P l a i n t if f s , v. M E N A S H A CORPORATION, D e f e n d a n t. _________________________/ O P IN IO N T h is matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of the C o u rt's July 15, 2010, opinion and order granting Defendant Menasha Corporation's motion f o r summary judgment on the claims of Plaintiffs Marjorie Moore, Lorraine Peppel, and N a o m i Adams ("spouse Plaintiffs"). (Dkt. No. 43.) For the reasons that follow, this motion w ill be denied. T o warrant the grant of a motion for reconsideration, "[t]he movant shall not only d e m o n s tr a te a palpable defect by which the Court and the parties have been misled, but also s h o w that a different disposition of the case must result from a correction thereof." W.D. M ic h . LCivR 7.4. In granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the claims of th e spouse Plaintiffs, the Court determined that "the express terms of the two CBAs indicate th a t retiree coverage does not cover spouses." (Dkt. No. 39, at 17-18.) Because the express te rm s of the two CBAs do not extend retiree coverage to spouses, the Court determined that C A S E NO. 1:08-CV-1167 H O N . ROBERT HOLMES BELL

it was precluded from considering extrinsic evidence, such as the SPDs, in assessing whether c o v e r a g e is available to the spouse Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs claim that, for a variety of reasons, the two CBAs do expressly extend retiree coverage to spouses, or, at the very least, they are a m b ig u o u s as to whether they extend retiree coverage to spouses, and that the Court should thu s consider the extrinsic evidence and vacate its previous opinion and order. In support of their argument that the express terms of the two CBAs do extend retiree c o v e r a g e to spouses, Plaintiffs first argue that the title of Section 3(b) of the two CBAs -- " E m p lo ye e and Dependant Coverage" (emphasis added) -- means that Section 7(a) of the 1 9 9 4 CBA and Section 7 of the 1997 CBA are intended to cover spouses as well as retired e m p lo ye e s. In the course of briefing its motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs adamantly a rg u e d to the Court that "Sections 1, 2, and 3(b) [of the 1994 CBA] apply to active e m p lo ye e s , and Section 7(a) applies to retiring employees." (Dkt. No. 34, Pls.' Reply 2.) T h e Court agreed, and held that Article XV was bifurcated into sections addressing active e m p lo ye e s , and sections addressing retired and retiring employees. (See Dkt. No. 39, Op. 101 1 .) Plaintiffs' present argument that the heading from Section 3(b) should carry over and a p p ly to Section 7(a) offends Plaintiffs' previous argument in favor of distinct application a n d treatment of those two provisions, as well as the Court's endorsement of that argument. In addition, the fact that Section 3(b) expressly extends benefits to dependants of active e m p lo ye e s, while Section 7(a) fails to mention dependants when extending benefits to retired em p loyee s, evidences an intent to exclude dependants from coverage upon an employee's

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retirem en t. Under the plain terms of the two CBAs, dependants are entitled to welfare b en ef its while an employee is active under Section 3(a), but they are not entitled to welfare b e n e f its upon employee retirement under Section 7(a) and Section 7, respectively. P la in tif f s next argue that the two CBAs expressly extend coverage to retirees' spouses b e c au s e the two CBAs expressly incorporate the terms of a multitude of documents that a lle g e d ly constitute the insurance agreement between Menasha and its insurance provider (c o llec tiv e ly "insurance documents"), and the insurance documents extend coverage to d e p e n d an ts , including spouses. Plaintiffs raise this argument for the first time in their motion f o r reconsideration. At no point throughout the course of the summary judgment briefing did P l a in t if f s reference the terms of the insurance documents, or even provide the insurance d o c u m e n ts for the Court's review. 1 "`A motion for reconsideration may not generally be u s e d to raise issues that could have been raised in the previous motion,' and the Court finds th is reason alone to be a sufficient basis on which to deny [Plaintiffs'] present motion." W h ite se ll Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 1:05-CV-679, 2009 WL 3672753, at *1 (W.D. Mich. O c t. 30, 2009) (quoting ITT Corp. v. Borgwarner, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-674, 2009 WL 2611210 (W .D . Mich. Aug. 24, 2009)). In any event, the Court finds Plaintiffs' argument to be m e ritle ss . Even if the insurance documents are incorporated into the CBA, they cannot be r e a d to create a right to lifetime health insurance benefits in favor of the spouse Plaintiffs.
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Defendant did submit the insurance documents as an attachment to its summary judgment motion, but the Court is not required to "search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact." Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1480 (6th Cir. 1989). 3

P la in tif f s cite three provisions in the insurance documents in support of their argument th a t the CBAs extend benefits to spouses of retired employees. First, the 1994 Group E n ro llm e n t and Coverage Agreement between Blue Cross Blue Shield ("BCBS") and M e n a s h a states: "newly acquired dependants must be added within 30 days of the event, e.g., sp o u se by marriage, newborn." (Dkt. No. 28, Ex. 5 at 112.) The Court fails to see how this p ro v isio n extends lifetime health insurance benefits to the spouses of retirees. Though it d o e s address the procedure surrounding the addition of dependants to the plan, it certainly d o e s not create the right of dependants to be added to the plan. In addition, because, as d is c u ss e d above, the 1994 and 1997 CBAs do extend coverage to spouses of active e m p lo ye e s , there are no inconsistencies between the inclusion of this provision in the i n s u r a n c e contract and the CBAs' clear exclusion of spouses from the scope of benefits p ro v id e d by Sections 7(a) and 7. In other words, the 1994 CBA and BCBS contract, read in c o m b in a t io n , require that newly acquired dependants of active employees, not retired e m p lo ye e s , be added to the plan within thirty days. Next, Plaintiffs cite to the 1998 2 "Blue Cross and Clue Shield of Michigan Addendum to Group Enrollment & Coverage Agreement" ("Addendum"). (Dkt. No. 28, Ex. 5, at 140.) T h e Addendum states that "[s]ubscriber contracts enrolled under [the Addendum] are limited to qualified retirees and survivors eligible under the Group's Retirement Program." (Id.)

The Court also notes that, even if a document from 1998 did extend rights to benefits to spouses of retirees, it could not be read to retroactively extend rights to spouses of retirees that retired under the 1994 CBA. 4

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A g a in , the Court fails to see how this provision extends lifetime health insurance benefits to th e spouses of retirees. First, the use of the term "survivors" is problematic for Plaintiffs' a rg u m e n t. "Survivors" implies a category that is much narrower than "spouses." None of th e spouse Plaintiffs are "survivors" of a retiree, as all the retirees are still living. In addition, the provision itself acknowledges that only "survivors" that are "eligible under the Group's R e tire m e n t Program" are entitled to benefits. As discussed above, neither Sections 7, Section 7 (a ), or any other provision of the 1994 or 1997 CBAs make "survivors," or any other d e p e n d a n t s of retirees, eligible for coverage under the group's retirement program. F in a lly, Plaintiffs cite to the 1998 "Request for Retiree Segment," which is part of the 1 9 9 8 Group Enrollment and Coverage Agreement. The Request for Retiree Segment in d icates that the "surviving spouse option [is] available." (Dkt. No. 28, Ex. 5 at 142.) A g a in , the use of the phrase "surviving spouse option" is problematic to Plaintiffs argument, a s none of the spouse Plaintiffs are currently "surviving" spouses. Even more problematic to Plaintiffs' argument, however, is the fact that the 1998 Group Enrollment and Coverage A g re e m e n t itself states that if the surviving spouse option is available, it "must be supported b y a formal retirement program." (Id. at 148.) No provision of the 1994 or 1997 CBAs, w h ic h constitute the "formal retirement program," can be read to support Plaintiffs' argument th a t spouses of retirees are entitled to lifetime health benefits. Finally, Plaintiffs implore the Court to consider the SPDs, admissions of Menasha re p re se n ta tiv e s, and the Defendants' prior practice, which all suggest that spouses of retired

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e m p lo ye e s are entitled to benefits on the same terms as the employees. (See Dkt. No. 28, Ex. 3 , at 17.) However, as the Court made clear in its previous opinion, this evidence is extrinsic e v id e n c e, and the Court may not consider it when there is no ambiguity in the terms of the C B A s themselves. (See Dkt. No. 39, Op. 17-18.) Because there is no basis for the Court to c o n c lu d e that the terms of the CBAs themselves extend lifetime health benefits to retirees' s p o u s e s , there was no palpable defect in the Court's July 15, 2010, opinion and order. An order consistent with this opinion shall be entered.

Dated: August 10, 2010

/s/ Robert Holmes Bell ROBERT HOLMES BELL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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