Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Meaney et al

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting in part 7 motion for attorney fees ; signed by Judge Robert Holmes Bell (Judge Robert Holmes Bell, kcb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F O R THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN S O U T H E R N DIVISION

W E L L S FARGO BANK, N.A., P l a in tif f , F ile No. 1:09-CV-140 v. H O N . ROBERT HOLMES BELL C H R IS T O P H E R MEANEY and D O N N A MORGAN, D e f e n d a n ts . / M E M O R A N D U M OPINION AND ORDER T h is matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's counsel's affidavit and itemized statem en t of fees and costs. (Dkt. No. 16.) The affidavit is filed pursuant to this Court's a w a rd of attorney fees and costs incurred as a result of Defendants' bad faith removal of this e v ic tio n action from state court. (Dkt. No. 13, Order of Remand.) Defendants had fourteen d a ys to respond to the affidavit. (Id.) More than fourteen days have elapsed, and Defendants h a v e not filed a response. This matter is ripe for determination. A n award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) falls "squarely w ith in the discretion of the district court . . . ." Warthman v. Genoa Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 5 4 9 F.3d 1055, 1059 (6th Cir. 2008). The award is subject, however, to the guidance set f o rth by the Supreme Court in Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132 (2005). W a r th m a n , 549 F.3d at 1059. Martin instructs that Congress designed the costs-and-fees

p ro v is io n in § 1447(c) to permit removal in appropriate cases, while simultaneously reducing th e attractiveness of removal as a method for delaying litigation and imposing costs on the p l a in t if f , and that district courts should consider this underlying purpose when they exercise th e ir discretion under § 1447(c). Warthman, 549 F.3d at 1060 (citing Martin, 546 U.S. at 1 4 0 -4 1 (internal quotations omitted)). Plaintiff has requested fees and costs in the amount of $7,122.50. "The primary co n ce rn in evaluating a request for attorney fees `is that the fee awarded be reasonable.'" P a s c h a l v. Flagstar Bank, 297 F.3d 431, 434 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Reed v. Rhodes, 179 F .3 d 453, 471 (6th Cir. 1999)). Counsel's affidavit and the billing statements adequately su p p o rt the hours claimed and the hourly rate. However, in order to insure that the fee award a ls o serves the underlying purpose of § 1447(c) as articulated in Martin, the Court must c o n sid e r whether the hours were spent on matters relating to the remand, rather than on other asp ec ts of the litigation. Upon review of the time sheets submitted, it appears that the hours c la im e d include time spent on matters extraneous to the motion to remand, including d is m is s a l on abstention grounds, settlement, bankruptcy, and the merits of the eviction p ro c e ed in g . Although no precise calculation can be made, the Court estimates that

a p p ro x im a te ly half of the time reported is attributable on extraneous matters. The requested f e es and costs will accordingly be reduced by half to account for time spent on matters not d ire c tly related to the removal and remand. Accordingly,

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I T IS HEREBY ORDERED that, Plaintiff's motion for attorney fees and costs p u r su a n t to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (Dkt. No. 7) is GRANTED IN PART. I T IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is AWARDED fees and costs incurred a s a result of the removal in the amount of $3,561.25. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Christopher Meaney and Donna M o rg a n SHALL PAY Plaintiff $3,561.25 within 30 days of this order.

Dated: June 25, 2009

/s/ Robert Holmes Bell ROBERT HOLMES BELL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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