Jones v. Michigan Department of Corrections et al

Filing 45

OPINION ; signed by Judge Robert Holmes Bell (Judge Robert Holmes Bell, kcb)

J o n e s v. Michigan Department of Corrections et al

D o c . 45

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT W E S T E R N DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

ROSE M. JONES, Plaintiff, File No: 1:09-CV-508 v. HON. ROBERT HOLMES BELL M IC H IG A N DEPARTMENT OF C O R R E C T IO N S , et al., Defendants. /

O P IN IO N T h is matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended C o m p lain t (Dkt. No. 31) filed by Defendants Michigan Department of Corrections, Patricia C a ru s o , Mary Berghuis, and Michael Singleton. (Dkt. No. 32.) For the reasons discussed h e re in , the motion will be granted in part and denied in part. I. Claims P la in tif f Rose M. Jones brings this action against her employer, the Michigan D e p a rtm e n t of Corrections ("MDOC"), and against Patricia Caruso, Mary Berghuis, and M ic h a el Singleton, employees of the Michigan Department of Corrections. Plaintiff alleges civil rights violations arising out of her employment with the MDOC pursuant to Title VII o f the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., 42 U .S .C . § 2000e-3(a); Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), as amended,

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4 2 U.S.C. § 12101; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983; the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 (" F M L A " ), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.; and Section 301 of the Labor Management Relation A c t of 1947 ("LMRA"), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq.; as well as pursuant to several M ic h ig a n statutes: the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act ("PWDCRA"), Mich. C o m p . Laws § 37.1201 et seq.; the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act ("ELCRA"), Mich. Comp. L aw s § 37.2102 et seq.; and the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Act ("MIOSHA"), M ic h . Comp. Laws § 408.1001 et seq. II. Background T h e following facts are taken from the allegations in Plaintiff's complaint. (Dkt. No. 3 1 .) Plaintiff, an African-American female, has been employed by MDOC since 1998. She a lle g e s that on March 2, 2007, she filed a written request for "set days off" with Defendant D ep u ty Warden Michael Singleton in order to complete educational requirements for a m a ste r's degree. Some time later, she was informed by Singleton that he had submitted her req u est to Defendant Warden Mary Berghuis, and that Berghuis had denied Plaintiff's re q u e st. Plaintiff later discovered that Singleton had never submitted the request. T h e following January, Plaintiff discovered that another request for the same purpose h a d been granted to a white female employee who worked in the same capacity as Plaintiff. P la in tif f filed the present cause of action on June 3, 2009, and filed her Second A m e n d e d Complaint on January 21, 2010. In that complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant M D O C violated her rights under Title VII, § 1981, ELCRA, ADA, PWDCRA, MIOSHA,

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F M L A , LMRA, and the Fourteenth Amendment (Dkt. No. 31, 2d. Am. Compl., Counts I-V). S h e alleges that Defendants Caruso, Berghuis, and Singleton violated her rights under Title V II , LMRA, § 1981, and the Fourteenth Amendment (Count V). Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Rules12(b)(1) and 1 2 (b )(6 ) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Dkt. No. 32.) Defendants submit that P la in tif f 's claims under the FMLA, ELCRA, PWDCRA, and ADA are barred by the E lev e n th Amendment; that Plaintiff's §1983 claims against MDOC and MDOC officials in th e ir official capacities are also barred by the Eleventh Amendment; that Plaintiff's § 1983 claim s against Defendant Caruso are barred for lack of personal involvement; that Plaintiff's T itle VII claims against Defendants in their individual capacities are barred by federal law; a n d that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for retaliation under the ADA or Title VII. Plaintiff h a s not responded to this motion. III. Legal Standards A . Rule 12(b)(1) " R u le 12(b)(1) motions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction generally c o m e in two varieties: a facial attack or a factual attack." Gentek Bldg. Prods. v.

S h e rw in -W illia m s Co., 491 F.3d 320, 330 (6th Cir. 2007). This matter is before the Court o n a facial attack. See id. (stating that "[a] facial attack on the subject-matter jurisdiction a lle g e d in the complaint questions merely the sufficiency of the pleading."). "When

re v ie w in g a facial attack, a district court takes the allegations in the complaint as true . . . .

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If those allegations establish federal claims, jurisdiction exists." Id. (citation omitted). H o w e v e r, "conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions w ill not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss." Mezibov v. Allen, 411 F.3d 712, 716 (6th C ir. 2005). B. Rule 12(b)(6) T h e Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for a liberal system of notice pleading. F e d . R. Civ. P. 8(a). Still, "more than bare assertions of legal conclusions [are] ordinarily re q u ire d to satisfy federal notice pleading requirements." Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 5 7 7 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6 th Cir. 1988)). "[I]n practice, a complaint . . . must contain either direct or inferential alleg atio n s respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some v ia b le legal theory" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562 (2007) (quoting Ascon P r o p s ., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1155 (9th Cir. 1989)). A motion brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for which relief m a y be granted tests the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff's claims. In reviewing such a motion, th e Court must accept all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). As w i t h Rule 12(b)(1), to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) a complaint must c o n tain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory. See Allard v. Weitzman (In re DeLorean Motor

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C o .), 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1993). "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) m o tio n to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide th e grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a f o rm u la ic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 5 5 5 (citations omitted). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported b y mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2 0 0 9 ). Moreover, the denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim does not p re c lu d e a later summary judgment motion arguing that the plaintiff in fact cannot show e v id e n c e to support the claim. Stemler v. Florence, 350 F.3d 578, 590 (6th Cir. 2003). C . Eleventh Amendment Immunity T h e Eleventh Amendment states that "[t]he Judicial Power of the United States shall n o t be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one o f the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign S tate ." But as the Supreme Court has indicated: Despite the narrowness of its terms, since Hans v. Louisiana we have u n d e rs to o d the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but f o r the presupposition of our constitutional structure which it confirms: that the S ta te s entered the federal system with their sovereignty intact; that the judicial a u th o r it y in Article III is limited by this sovereignty; and that a State will th e re f o re not be subject to suit in federal court unless it has consented to suit, e ith e r expressly or in the "plan of the convention." B la tc h fo r d v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) (internal citations omitted). A suit against state officials in their official capacity is a suit against their office, and may

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lik e w is e be barred by the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the state. Grinter, 532 F.3d at 572. Yet the Eleventh Amendment is not an absolute bar to suits against states in federal c o u rt. States may consent to suit in federal court and, in some cases, Congress may abrogate a state's sovereign immunity. See Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 3 0 4 (1990). But the Supreme Court has established strict standards to determine both a C o n g re s s io n a l abrogation and a state's waiver of sovereign immunity. See id. at 305. A f e d era l court will find waiver of sovereign immunity only where that is the state's clear in te n t. See Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Fla. Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 1 5 0 (1981) (stating that "we will find waiver only where stated by the most express language o r by such overwhelming implications from the text as [will] leave no room for any other re a so n a b le construction.") (internal quotations omitted). A state does not waive its immunity m e re ly by consenting to be sued in its own courts; "in order for a state statute or c o n s titu t io n a l provision to constitute a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity, it must s p e c if y the State's intention to subject itself to suit in federal court." Atascadero State Hosp. v . Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985) (emphasis in original). The MDOC is an "arm of the state" entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, see T u rn b o e v. Stegall, No. 00-1182, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 27967, at *6 (6th Cir. Nov. 1, 2 0 0 0 ), and Michigan has not waived immunity or consented to suit. See Abick v. Michigan, 8 0 3 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986).

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IV . Analysis A . Count I - Race Discrimintation In Count I of Plaintiff's complaint, she alleges that Defendant MDOC, in violation of T itle VII and ELCRA, denied her the same opportunities and privileges allowed to similarly s itu a te d white employees and that she would have been allowed these opportunities and p riv ileg e s had she been white. Defendants did not directly address Plaintiff's Title VII claim a g a in s t MDOC in their motion to dismiss, and, indeed, arguments to dismiss Title VII claims a g a in s t the state on Eleventh Amendment grounds would be unavailing. See Fitzpatrick v. B itz e r, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). This claim will not be dismissed. Plaintiff's ELCRA claim s against MDOC will be addressed below with the state law claims from Count II. B . Count II - Disability Discrimination In Count II of Plaintiff's complaint, she alleges that Defendant MDOC, in violation o f the ADA, PWDCRA, and MIOSHA, ignored her communications that she suffered from a latex allergy and refused her request for reasonable accommodation for her latex allergy. P la in tif f 's ADA claim will be dismissed as barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Since th is action is brought in an employment context, it is clear that Plaintiff intended to bring her c laim under Title I of the ADA: "the statutory framework of the ADA expressly limits d is c rim in a tio n in employment practices to Title I of the ADA." Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. C o ., 121 F.3d 1006, 1014 (6th Cir. 1997). The Supreme Court has held that Congress may n o t validly abrogate state sovereign immunity to make Title I of the ADA applicable to

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s ta te s . Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001). As discussed a b o v e , Defendant MDOC is an arm of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment protection, a n d there is no indication that the State of Michigan has waived that immunity. The claim m u s t accordingly be dismissed. P lain tiff 's several state claims against the MDOC will be likewise dismissed. In C o u n t I, Plaintiff alleged that the MDOC violated ELCRA, and in Count II, Plaintiff alleged that the MDOC violated PWDCRA and MIOSHA. Plaintiff has not proffered and the Court is not aware of any indication that the State of Michigan has expressly or by overwhelming im p lic a t i o n consented to be sued under any of these statutes in federal court. See Fla. N u rsing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. at 150. Thus, Plaintiff's claims against the MDOC under the E L C R A , PWDCRA, and MIOSHA will be dismissed. Cf. White v. Mich. Dep't of Human S e r v s ., No. 09-14631, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79694, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 5, 2010) (h o ld in g likewise that the Eleventh Amendment would bar PWDCRA and ELCRA claims a g a in s t the State of Michigan in federal court). C. Count III - Violations of the FMLA In Count III of Plaintiff's complaint, she alleges that Defendant MDOC, in violation o f the FMLA, cancelled, without notice, her insurance benefits. Without offering an opinion re g a rd in g Defendants' Eleventh Amendment arguments, this claim will be dismissed for f a ilu re to state a claim. "The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, as amended, (FMLA or Act) allows

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`e lig ib le' employees of a covered employer to take job-protected, unpaid leave, or to s u b s titu te appropriate paid leave if the employee has earned or accrued it." 29 C.F.R. § 825.100. More specifically, the FMLA affords an eligible employee up to twelve weeks o f leave within a twelve-month period because of the birth or adoption of a child, in order to care for a close relative, because of the employee's serious health condition, or because o f exigencies arising out of a close relative's covered active duty in the Armed Forces. See 2 9 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). There are two ways in which an employer can run afoul of the F M L A : (1) by interfering with, restraining, or denying the exercise of or the attempt to e x e rc ise the right to such leave (unlawful denial of FMLA leave) or (2) by discharging or in a n y other manner discriminating against any individual for opposing any practice made u n la w f u l by the FMLA (unlawful retaliation under the FMLA). See id. § 2615(a)(1)-(2), and G ip s o n v. Vought Aircraft Indus., Inc., No. 09-6026, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 14383 (6th Cir. J u ly 13, 2010). In order to establish a case of unlawful retaliation under the FMLA, plaintiff m u st prove "(1) [t]hat he engaged in any activity protected by the FMLA; (2) [t]hat this e x e rc is e of his protected rights was known to Defendant; (3) [t]hat Defendant thereafter took a n employment action adverse to Plaintiff; and (4) [t]hat there was a causal connection b e tw e e n the protected activity and the adverse employment action." Weimer v. Honda of Am. M fg ., 356 F.App'x 812, 816 (6th Cir. 2009). With regard to unlawful denial of leave, Plaintiff does not allege any facts to suggest th a t she requested the type of leave protected by the FMLA, or, if she did request it, that such

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le a v e was denied. The facts alleged reflect merely a denial of "set days off" to pursue a m as te r's degree. Pursuit of higher education is not a circumstance covered by the FMLA. S e e 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). As such, Plaintiff's factual allegations cannot sustain a claim f o r unlawful denial of leave under the FMLA. With regard to unlawful retaliation under the FMLA, Plaintiff alleges in a separate s e c tio n of her complaint that the MDOC "[c]ancell[ed], without notice, [her] insurance b e n e fits and thereby violated [her] rights under the FMLA." While cancellation of insurance b e n e f its is certainly an adverse employment action, Plaintiff has failed to allege any activity p ro te c te d by the FMLA; that is, she does not allege that she either requested or took any F M L A protected leave. She has also given no indication that Defendant MDOC knew or had a n y reason to know of her exercise of protected rights. Without any FMLA protected a c tiv ity, Defendant's knowledge, and a causal connection between the protected activity and th e adverse employment action, there can be no claim for unlawful retaliation under the F M L A . See Weimer, 356 F.App'x at 816. As noted above, to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must c o n tain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery. See Allard, 991 F.2d at 1240. Here, the Plaintiff has failed to state any a lle g a tio n s respecting key material elements required to state a claim under the FMLA. T h u s , her FMLA claims will be dismissed.

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D . Count IV - Retaliation In Count IV, Plaintiff alleges that a Defendant1 , in violation of Title VII and the ADA, re ta lia te d against her for having complained about the alleged discriminatory employment p ra c tic e s . This too will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. In order to make a prima facie case for retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must s h o w that: "(1) she engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) this exercise of protected r i g h t s was known to defendant; (3) defendant thereafter took adverse employment action ag ains t the plaintiff, or the plaintiff was subjected to severe or pervasive retaliatory h a ra ss m e n t by a supervisor; and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected a c tivity and the adverse employment action or harassment." Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal C t., 201 F.3d 784, 792 (6th Cir. 2000). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under th e ADA, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) she suffered a d v e rs e employment action; and (3) a causal connection existed between the protected a c tiv ity and the adverse action. See Penny v. United Parcel Service, 128 F.3d 408, 417 (6th C ir. 1997). Plaintiff's complaint recounts a single chain of events with regards to the Defendants: sh e requested set days off to complete her master's degree and was denied, while a white c o l le a g u e had the same request granted. Examining the allegations in the light most

Plaintiff does not specify which of the Defendants in this case is being accused of retaliation. Context leads the Court to believe that Plaintiff is referring to Defendant MDOC, but the analysis and result herein are the same regardless of which Defendant is targeted. 11

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f a v o ra b le to the Plaintiff and accepting them as true, this allegation may establish a prima f a c ie case for race discrimination. Plaintiff has alleged in separate sections of her complaint, a n d this Court will accept as true for the purposes of this motion, that the MDOC ignored her c o m m u n ica tio n s that she suffered from a latex allergy and refused her reasonable a c co m m o d a tio n for her latex condition. She has also alleged that the MDOC cancelled, w ith o u t notice, her insurance benefits. In Count IV, Plaintiff alleges simply that "[d]efendant re ta lia te d against [her] for having complained about Defendant's discriminatory employment p ra c tic e s described above," and "[d]efendant's actions were intentional, with reckless in d if f e re n c e ." In general, complaining about allegedly unlawful practices is a protected activity. See J o h n so n v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 579 (6th Cir. 2000). Accepting Plaintiff's w ell-plea d ed allegations as true, she has established adverse employment action. However, P la in tif f has failed to supply even the most meager facts to indicate that there is a causal c o n n e ctio n between the protected activity and the adverse employment action, or even that th e adverse employment action occurred after the protected activity, as is required to state a claim for retaliation under either Title VII or the ADA. While Plaintiff has alleged re ta lia tio n , "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires m o re than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of a c tio n will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Here, Plaintiff has provided only labels and c o n c lu s io n s in a formulaic recitation of some of the elements of retaliation. She has not

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p ro v id e d any facts to support this claim. Accordingly, Plaintiff's retaliation claims under T itle VII and the ADA will be dismissed. E. Count V - 42 U.S.C. §1983 In Count V, Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants deprived her of her due process and e q u a l protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. §1981, and the LMRA. T h e basis for these claims is 42 U.S.C. §1983, which allows that: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, o r usage, of any State . . . , subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of th e United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities s e c u re d by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured. T w o questions must be addressed in deciding Defendants' motion to dismiss: (1) what " p e rs o n s " can be sued under §1983, and (2) what"rights, privileges, or immunities"§1983 c a n protect here. 1. § 1983 Claims Against the MDOC and Officials in their Official Capacities T h e Supreme Court has held that a state is not a "person" within the meaning of § 1 9 8 3 . Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Likewise, state agencies a n d state officials in their official capacities cannot be sued for money damages under §1983. Id. Here, Plaintiff is seeking money damages. (See Dkt. No. 31, 2d Am. Compl., at 10.) A c c o rd in g ly, Plaintiff's §1983 claims against Defendant MDOC and Defendants Caruso, B e rg h u is , and Singleton in their official capacities will be dismissed. 2. § 1983 Claims Against Patricia Caruso in her Individual Capacity P la in t if f has also named Patricia Caruso in her individual capacity, apparently because 13

s h e is the Director of the MDOC. It is not alleged that she was personally involved in any o n the occurrences at issue in this case or had personal knowledge of the circumstances s u r ro u n d in g those issues. A l le g a tio n s of respondeat superior do not sustain a §1983 claim against state e m p lo ye e s in their individual capacities. Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 292 (6th Cir. 2 0 1 0 ). Rather, "officials should be personally liable in damages only for their own

u n c o n stitu tio n a l behavior." Leach v. Shelby County Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1 9 8 9 ). "[E]ven if a plaintiff can prove a violation of his constitutional rights, his § 1983 c laim must fail against a supervisory official unless the supervisor encouraged the specific in c id e n t of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it." Cardinal v. Metrish, 5 6 4 F.3d 794, 803 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted). "At a minimum a plaintiff m u s t show that the official at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers." Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 3 0 0 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Hays v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir. 1982)). H e re , Plaintiff has not alleged any direct, personal involvement on the part of Defendant C a ru s o . Plaintiff has also not alleged that adverse actions taken against her were authorized, a p p ro v e d , or knowingly acquiesced in by Defendant Caruso. Accordingly, Plaintiff's § 1983 c la im s against Defendant Caruso in her individual capacity will be dismissed for lack of p e rs o n a l involvement.

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3 . § 1983 Claims Against Other Officials in their Individual Capacities P la in tif f has also brought §1983 claims against Defendants Berghuis and Singleton i n their individual capacities. Defendants have not addressed these claims in their motion to dismiss. Such a motion would likely be unavailing in any case - individuals may remain p e rs o n a lly liable under §1983 even if their acts are of an official nature. See Hafer v. Melo, 5 0 2 U.S. 21, 27 (1991). However, not all of Plaintiff's alleged claims can stand against these d e f e n d a n ts . Again, Plaintiff is suing Defendants Caruso, Berghuis, and Singleton for deprivation o f rights arising out of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. §1981, and the LMRA. With r e g a rd to these Defendants, Plaintiff can have no rights arising out of the LMRA. The D e f en d a n ts are associated with the only relevant employer in this case, the MDOC, which is a political subdivision of the state of Michigan. Political subdivisions of states are s p e c if ic a lly exempted from the definition of "employer" for purposes of Section 301 of the L M R A . See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2). This is not a matter of who can be sued, but a matter of w h ic h employer/employee relationships can give rise to a suit. Thus, it is of no moment that it is individuals who are being sued. Plaintiff's employment relationship with the MDOC c a n n o t in itself give rise to rights under the LMRA, and to the extent that Plaintiff is basing h e r §1983 claims against Defendants Berghuis and Singleton on the LMRA, those claims w ill be dismissed. Accord Simpson v. United Auto Workers Local 6000, 394 F. Supp. 2d 9 9 1 , 999 (E.D. Mich. 2005) ("The fact that Plaintiff would be suing individuals rather than

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M D O C directly has no bearing on the LMRA issue. . . . [I]f the contract in question is with th e State or a political subdivision, the employee cannot assert a LMRA claim, regardless of w h o m is being sued."). Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against Defendants Berghuis and Singleton in their individual capacities for rights arising out of the Fourteenth Amendment and §1981, h o w e v e r, remain and are not being dismissed. 4 . Title VII Claims Against Defendants in their Individual Capacities P lain tiff also alleges in Count V that all Defendants deprived her of constitutional, s ta tu t o ry, and/or contractual rights contrary to Title VII. In their motion to dismiss,

D e f e n d a n ts read this as a claim against Defendants Caruso, Berghuis, and Singleton as well a s against the MDOC. Title VII is directed at employers. Individuals cannot be held p e rs o n a lly liable if they are not employers. See Wathen v. Gen. Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400, 405 (6 th Cir. 1997) ("[A]n individual employee/supervisor, who does not otherwise qualify as a n `employer,' may not be held personally liable under Title VII."). Thus, to the extent that P la in tif f is attempting to assert a Title VII claim against Defendants Caruso, Berghuis, and S in g le to n in their individual capacities, this claim will be dismissed. Defendants do not a d d re ss Plaintiff's Title VII claim against Defendants Caruso, Berghuis, and Singleton in th e ir official capacities, and, indeed, Title VII claims can be brought against state officials in their official capacities. See McCoy v. Michigan, No. 08-1641, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 5 2 8 3 , at *22 (6th Cir. March 12, 2010). \

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V . Conclusion F o r the reasons stated herein, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's ELCRA claims in C o u n t I; will dismiss the claims in Counts II, III, and IV; will dismiss the § 1983 claims in C o u n t V against the MDOC, against Defendant Caruso in all capacities, and against D e f e n d a n ts Berghuis and Singleton in their official capacities; will dismiss the § 1983 claims in Count V as regard rights arising under the LMRA; and will dismiss the Title VII claims in Count V against Defendants Caruso, Berghuis, and Singleton in their individual capacities. C o u n t I (Title VII) remains pending as to Defendant MDOC; Count V (§ 1983 claims for d e p riv a tio n of rights arising under the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1981) remains pending a s to Defendants Berghuis and Singleton in their individual capacities; and Count V (Title V II) remains pending as to Defendants Caruso, Berghuis, and Singleton in their official c a p a c itie s . An order will be entered that is consistent with this opinion.

Dated: September 10, 2010

/s/ Robert Holmes Bell ROBERT HOLMES BELL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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