Goodwill #622432 v. Palmer

Filing 28

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 25 ; signed by Judge Robert J. Jonker (Judge Robert J. Jonker, ymc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

DAVID AARON GOODWILL,
Petitioner,

Case No. 1:10-CV-821

v.

HON. ROBERT J. JONKER

CARMEN PALMER,
Respondent.
/
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner, David Goodwill, has filed an Objection (docket #26) to Magistrate Judge Hugh
W. Brenneman’s Report and Recommendation issued August 30, 2013 (docket #25). The Report
and Recommendation recommends that this Court deny Goodwill’s habeas corpus petition. When
a party objects to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the “district judge must determine
de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to. The district
judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return
the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). De novo review in
these circumstances requires at least a review of the evidence before the magistrate judge that is
relevant to the findings under attack. Hill v. Duriron Co., 656 F.2d 1208, 1215 (6th Cir. 1981).
After conducting a de novo review of the Report and Recommendation, Goodwill’s objections, and
the pertinent portions of the record, the Court will adopt the Report and Recommendation.
I. Factual Background
Following a jury trial, Goodwill was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, Mich.
Comp. Laws § 750.316(1)(a), for the death of Jason Fontenot. (People v. Goodwill, No. 275244,

docket #17, at 1.) The disputed issue at trial was whether Goodwill acted in self-defense. (Id.) The
trial court sentenced Goodwill to a life sentence. (Sentencing Tr., docket #16, at 5.)
II. Goodwill’s Objections
Goodwill presents five objections. He argues that the magistrate judge erred in concluding
that (1) Goodwill’s trial did not violate the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment or his
right to present a defense, (2) the trial court’s admission of a knife did not violate his due process
right to a fair trial, (3) the trial court’s admission of opinion testimony regarding Goodwill’s guilt
did not violate his due process right to a fair trial, (4) there was sufficient evidence for conviction,
and (5) Goodwill’s trial counsel did not render constitutionally ineffective assistance.
A.

Confrontation Clause and Presentation of a Defense (Issue I)

First, Goodwill argues that the magistrate judge erred in concluding that Goodwill’s trial
neither violated his Confrontation Clause rights nor his right to present a defense. Goodwill
contends that the trial court denied him the right to confront witnesses and present a defense when
it refused to admit the testimony of Elizabeth Parish. In the Report and Recommendation, the
magistrate judge noted that the state court addressed Goodwill’s argument as a state law evidentiary
issue, but not a federal constitutional issue. (Docket #25, Page ID 261.) The Michigan Court of
Appeals observed that the trial court took Parish’s testimony outside the presence of the jury but
determined that the testimony was of questionable value to either side and excluded the evidence as
being more prejudicial than probative. (Goodwill, No. 275244, docket #17, at 1–2.) Defense
counsel did not object to its exclusion. (Id.; Trial Tr. III, docket #14, at 671–72.) The Court of
Appeals rejected Goodwill’s argument on a state law evidentiary basis because (1) although defense
counsel had several opportunities to request that references to “Liz” (Parish) be omitted from
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Goodwill’s taped statement, defense counsel never requested omission; (2) any attempt to use
Parish’s relationships with the victim and Goodwill as a possible motive for killing the victim was
introduced into the trial by Goodwill, not the prosecution; and (3) the jury is presumed to have
followed the trial court’s instruction that any testimony by Parish had been ruled irrelevant and the
jury should decide the case based only on the relevant, admissible evidence. (Goodwill, No. 275244,
docket #17, at 1–2.)
The magistrate judge then addressed Goodwill’s argument as a federal constitutional
challenge on two grounds: the Confrontation Clause and the right to present a defense. “[E]ven
relevant evidence may constitutionally be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.” Alley v. Bell, 307
F.3d 380, 396 (6th Cir. 2002). The magistrate judge concluded that the state court’s application of
the Michigan Rules of Evidence did not violate Goodwill’s constitutional rights because Goodwill’s
case is not one in which “the state court applied an arbitrary, mechanistic, per se, or disproportionate
rule that would have been contrary to clearly established Supreme Court case law.” (Report and
Recommendation, docket #26, Page ID 263 (citing Alley, 307 F.3d at 396) (internal quotation marks
omitted).) Rather, “the state court excluded evidence after it weighed the value of the evidence
against its potential for confusion and unreliability.” (Id. (citing Alley, 307 F.3d at 396) (internal
quotation marks omitted).)
Goodwill now objects that questions of credibility and reliability are issues for the jury to
decide, citing Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 688 (1986). In Crane, the United States Supreme
Court held that a defendant was denied a fair trial where the trial court excluded testimony relevant
to the voluntariness of a defendant’s confession. 476 U.S. at 691. Specifically, the Court observed
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that evidence about the manner in which a confession was obtained is often “especially relevant” to
a confession’s reliability and credibility, particularly where the defense was that there was no
physical evidence to link the defendant to the crime and that the defendant’s earlier admission of
guilt was not to be believed. Id. In this case, however, the trial court’s exclusion of Parish’s
testimony does not violate the precepts of Crane. The trial court excluded Parish’s evidence as more
prejudicial than probative and because Parish’s answers were minimally relevant and equivocal, not
because Parish lacked credibility as a witness. (Trial Tr., docket #14, at 671–72.) Therefore, the
Court will overrule Goodwill’s objection regarding Issue I.
B.

Admission of the Knife (Issue II)

Second, Goodwill objects to the magistrate judge’s conclusion that Goodwill’s claim that a
knife, the suspected murder weapon, was wrongly admitted into evidence is not cognizable on
federal habeas review. In his Report and Recommendation, the magistrate judge observed that the
Michigan Court of Appeals addressed Goodwill’s argument as a state law evidentiary issue, not a
federal constitutional issue. After reviewing the Court of Appeals’s reasoning for affirming the trial
court, the magistrate judge addressed the constitutional argument. (Docket #25, Page ID 265.) “In
general, alleged errors in evidentiary rulings by state courts are not cognizable in federal habeas
review.” Moreland v. Bradshaw, 699 F.3d 908, 923 (6th Cir. 2012). “Trial court errors in state
procedure and/or evidentiary law do not rise to the level of federal constitutional claims warranting
relief in a habeas action unless the error renders the proceedings so fundamentally unfair as to
deprive the petitioner of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.” McAdoo v. Elo, 365 F.3d
487, 494 (6th Cir. 2004). “To show a due process violation under the AEDPA [Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996] rooted in an evidentiary ruling, this court has typically required
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a Supreme Court case establishing a due process right with regard to that specific kind of evidence.”
Moreland, 699 F.3d at 923.
In objection, Goodwill argues that the Supreme Court case Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S.
284, 289–90 (1973), is sufficient precedent to establish a due process right with respect to admission
of a knife. Although Chambers establishes that the rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses
are essential to due process, id. at 294–95, it does not address when the admission of physical
evidence violates due process. Moreover, as his first objection, Goodwill’s case is not one in which
the state court applied an “arbitrary, mechanistic, per se, or disproportionate” rule that would have
been contrary to clearly established Supreme Court case law. See Alley, 307 F.3d at 396. Rather,
as the Court of Appeals noted on direct appeal, it was up to the jury to decide how much weight to
give the knife, which was not necessary to place Goodwill at the scene of the crime nor prove his
involvement—he had admitted such and his claim was one of self-defense—nor was the existence
of the knife inconsistent with self-defense. (Goodwill, No. 275244, docket #17, at 3.) The Court
agrees that admission of the knife at Goodwill’s trial did not violate Goodwill’s due process right
to a fair trial.
C.

Opinion Testimony (Issue III)

Third, Goodwill objects that he was denied a fair trial because the trial court admitted opinion
testimony from a forensic pathologist regarding whether Goodwill acted in self-defense. At issue
is the forensic pathologist’s testimony about whether the wounds on Goodwill’s hands were more
likely offensive or defensive wounds. The magistrate judge concluded that Goodwill’s evidentiary
argument was not cognizable on habeas relief absent Supreme Court precedent “establishing a due
process right with regard to that specific kind of evidence.” Moreland, 699 F.3d at 923. Goodwill
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now concedes that there is no clearly established Supreme Court precedent on whether a forensic
pathologist can give opinion evidence regarding offensive or defensive wounds. (Objection, docket
#26, Page ID 286.) However, Goodwill argues that his case “would be a good test case” to establish
this issue. (Id.) The AEDPA limits this Court on habeas review to granting habeas writs where the
adjudication of a petitioner’s case “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). This “highly deferential standard,” Renico v. Lett,
559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010), thus prohibits this Court from granting Goodwill’s requested relief.
D.

Sufficiency of the Evidence (Issue V)

Fourth, Goodwill objects that the magistrate judge erred in finding that there was sufficient
evidence to support Goodwill’s conviction. In support of his objection, Goodwill lists evidence
supporting his self-defense theory. (Objection, docket #26, Page ID 287–90.) Under Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979), sufficient evidence supports a conviction if “after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” However, Goodwill’s arguments
present only one narrative of the evidence, an account in the light most favorable to Goodwill’s
theory of self-defense, not the prosecution’s theory. Thus, Goodwill’s argument is without merit and
the Court will overrule his objections.
E.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (Issue VI)

Finally, Goodwill objects to the magistrate judge’s conclusion that Goodwill has failed to
establish that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Goodwill presents two reasons

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his counsel was ineffective: he failed to move for a change of venue and failed to call an expert
witness.
1.

Change of Venue

The magistrate judge concluded that Goodwill had failed to demonstrate either actual or
presumed prejudice due to pretrial publicity. Goodwill’s prejudice argument is based on his
speculation that his jury was biased. However, Goodwill has not offered any evidence of actual
prejudice or media coverage to support presumptive prejudice. On objection, Goodwill merely
restates the case law supporting presumed prejudice. Absent some proof of prejudice, Goodwill’s
counsel was not ineffective for failing to move for a change of venue.
2.

Expert Witness

At issue in this objection is defense counsel’s decision not to call an expert witness to rebut
the testimony of Dr. Start, the pathologist called by the prosecution. Defense counsel addressed this
issue before the trial court:
Before the jury comes out, Your Honor, I just want to make a record. I know I filed
a witness list including an expert witness, Dr. Mihalakis, and just so the record is
clear, the Court off the record during one of our discussions last week, indicated that
it would allow me to call Dr. Mihalakis but ultimately I concluded that there would
not be any need to call him, number one, I wanted to save the family money, and,
number two, based upon my discussions, Dr. Mihalakis is basically consistent with
what Dr. Start said, so I just wanted to make it clear because there was a motion filed
by the Prosecution to strike my witnesses.
(Trial Tr. II, docket #13, at 394.) Counsel further explained that it “was a strategy decision” because
it would be “redundant” to introduce Dr. Mihalakis’s testimony. (Id.) Based on the record, the
magistrate judge concluded that counsel’s strategy was to undercut Dr. Start’s testimony regarding
Goodwill’s wounds by having Dr. Start admit that some of the wounds could have been defensive,

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not offensive. (Docket #25, Page ID 274.) Defense counsel obtained that admission during crossexamination. (Trial Tr. II, docket #13, at 427.)
Goodwill now objects that aspects of Mihalakis’s testimony may have supported his selfdefense theory. (Objection, docket #26, Page ID 291.) The Court finds that Goodwill has merely
restated his prior argument without offering any substantive objection to the magistrate judge’s
analysis for recommending that the Court deny Goodwill habeas relief on the basis of this argument.
Goodwill has not presented any argument to overcome the “strong presumption” that trial counsel’s
reliance on Dr. Start’s concession and decision not to introduce redundant expert testimony “falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” See Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 689 (1984). Therefore, Goodwill is not entitled to habeas relief on the basis of this
argument.
III. Certificate of Appealability
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), the Court must also determine whether a certificate of
appealability should be granted. A certificate should issue if a petitioner has demonstrated “a
substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right.” Id. The Sixth Circuit has disapproved
issuance of blanket denials of a certificate of appealability. Murphy v. Ohio, 263 F.3d 466, 467 (6th
Cir. 2001). Rather, the district court must “engage in a reasoned assessment of each claim” to
determine whether a certificate is warranted. Id. at 467. Each issue must be considered under the
standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000). Murphy, 263
F.3d at 467. Consequently, this Court has examined Goodwill’s claims under the Slack standard.
Under Slack, to warrant a grant of the certificate, “[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that
reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable
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or wrong.” 529 U.S. at 484. For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that reasonable jurists
could not find that this Court’s dismissal of Goodwill’s claims was debatable or wrong. Thus, the
Court will deny Goodwill a certificate of appealability.
Therefore, the Court will adopt the recommendation of the Report and Recommendation.
A separate judgment will issue.

Dated: September 30, 2013

/s/ Robert J. Jonker
ROBERT J. JONKER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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