McMurry #223416 v. Caruso, et al
Filing
86
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 81 re 30 , 61 : Defendants' Motions 30 , 61 For Summary Judgment are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART; signed by Judge Gordon J. Quist (Judge Gordon J. Quist, jmt)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
__________________________
JOHN HENRY McMURRY,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 1:10-CV-1206
PATRICIA CARUSO, et al.,
HON. GORDON J. QUIST
Defendants.
________________________________/
ORDER ADOPTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Defendants Gardon,1 Pull, and Samulak have filed Objections to the magistrate judge’s
report and recommendation issued December 29, 2011, in which Magistrate Judge Carmody
recommended that the Court grant in part and deny in part Defendants’ motions for summary
judgement. In particular, the magistrate judge recommended that the Court deny the motions on
Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims and grant the motions on Plaintiff’s official capacity claims
for monetary damages.
With regard to the individual capacity claim against Defendant Gardon, the magistrate judge
concluded that Plaintiff’s allegations sufficed to create a genuine issue of material fact. The
magistrate judge noted that Plaintiff alleged that, after being informed that Defendant Gardon would
have to approve a ground floor/bottom bunk accommodation, he submitted several kites to
Defendant Gardon, but she never responded to Plaintiff’s requests. The magistrate judge further
noted that Plaintiff alleged that on November 13 2009, several months later, Mary Wilson told
Plaintiff that Defendant Gardon refused to approve his request for a bottom bunk accommodation
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Defendant Gardon is apparently now known as Gardon-Howell.
because Plaintiff was young enough to climb into a top bunk. The magistrate judge observed that
Plaintiff’s allegations showed that Defendant Gardon did nothing in response to Plaintiff’s requests
and ultimately denied the accommodation.
As for the individual capacity claims against Defendants Pull and Samulak,, the magistrate
judge concluded that Plaintiff’s allegations created genuine issues of material fact as to both aspects
of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim consisting of Defendants’: (1) refusal to honor Plaintiff’s
bottom bunk accommodation issued by a medical professional; and (2) failure or refusal to help him
off the floor after he fell while trying to climb into the top bunk. Regarding Defendants’ refusal to
honor the accommodation, the magistrate judge observed that Plaintiff presented evidence that he
had a valid accommodation and Defendants refused to honor it. As for Defendants’ refusal to assist
Plaintiff, the magistrate judge observed that Plaintiff’s evidence shows that he fell while trying to
climb into his bunk and that Defendants refused to help him up, leaving Plaintiff to lay on the floor
overnight in his own urine.
After conducting a de novo review of the report and recommendation and having considered
Defendants’ Objections and the pertinent portions of the record, the Court concludes that the report
and recommendation should be adopted.
Defendant Gardon
Defendant Gardon argues that Plaintiff’s only allegation implicating her in denying his
request for a bottom bunk accommodation is his claim that he sent kites to her on May 18, 2009, and
May 24, 2009, both of which went unanswered. Defendant Gardon argues, however, that the
magistrate judge engaged in speculation by stating that she failed to act and eventually denied
Plaintiff’s requested accommodation because Plaintiff admits that Resident Unit Supervisor O’Dell
obtained a temporary ground floor/bottom bunk assignment for Plaintiff on May 25, 2009, or
shortly thereafter. But there is no indication that Defendant Gardon was responsible for the
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temporary assignment, and Plaintiff’s allegations show that even after the temporary
accommodation ended he continued to pursue a bottom bunk accommodation. The temporary
assignment thus does not undercut Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim.
Defendant Gardon also asserts that Plaintiff’s reference to what Mary Wilson told him about
Defendant Gardon’s refusal to approve his requested accommodation is inadmissible hearsay. The
comment may or may not be hearsay. It appears that Mary Wilson was a health unit employee and
was reporting Gardon’s reason for denying Plaintiff’s request. If Mary Wilson was Defendant
Gardon’s subordinate, her statement may well be admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2)(D) if Wilson’s statement concerned a matter within the scope of her employment. See
Abrams v. Lightolier Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1216 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Where a supervisor is authorized to
speak with subordinates about the employer’s employment practices, a subordinate’s account of an
explanation of the supervisor’s understanding regarding the criteria utilized by management in
making decisions . . . is admissible against the employer.”); Hybert v. Hearst Corp., 900 F.2d 1050,
1053 (7th Cir. 1990) (statements by the plaintiff’s supervisor, who was himself a member of
management, regarding the attitude and intentions of upper management toward older employees
was admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(D)).
Defendants Pull and Samulak
Defendants Pull and Samulak again argue that they had nothing to do with the cell transfer
decision, that they had no authority to approve a cell move, and that they were simply following
procedure and procedure in executing the order to move Plaintiff. The Court concurs with the
magistrate judge that these arguments miss the point. The issue is not whether Defendants made the
decision to move Plaintiff, but whether they were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious
medical need. As the magistrate judge concluded, a genuine issue of material fact remains on this
claim. In this regard, Defendants’ reliance on Babcock v. Roe, No. 97-2128, 1999 WL 96988 (6th
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Cir. Feb. 2, 1999), is not only misplaced, but tends to support the denial of summary judgment. The
Sixth Circuit addressed Babcock following a trial by the district court, in which the plaintiff did not
testify and the defendants had no recollection of the events. Id. at *1. The district court found that
the failure to immediately assign the plaintiff a lower bunk likely resulted from “bureaucratic
inflexibility.”
Id. Unlike the instant case, however, there is no indication that the plaintiff
presented evidence that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff’s serious medical
condition by refusing to honor his lower bunk accommodation.
Defendants repeat essentially the same arguments they made to the magistrate judge
regarding the failure to assist portion of Plaintiff’s claim. The magistrate judge adequately
addressed these arguments, and Defendants have failed to persuade the Court that the magistrate
judge’s conclusion should be rejected.
Therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation
issued December 29, 2011 (docket no.81) is APPROVED AND ADOPTED as the Opinion of this
Court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motions For Summary Judgment (docket
nos. 30 and 61) are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The motions are granted
with respect to Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against Defendants Gardon, Pull, and Samulak for
monetary relief and denied with respect to Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in their individual
capacities.
Dated: February 17, 2012
/s/ Gordon J. Quist
GORDON J. QUIST
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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