Easley v. Dietrich et al

Filing 11

OPINION ; signed by Judge Robert J. Jonker (Judge Robert J. Jonker, ymc)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

JOHN EASLEY,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:11-cv-299

v.

Honorable Robert J. Jonker

RICH DIETRICH,
Defendants.
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OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation Reform
Act, PUB. L. NO . 104-134, 110 STAT . 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner
action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A. The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they
are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying
these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim against
Defendant Lambert. The Court also will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages against
Defendants Church and Krause. The Court will serve Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages and
injunctive relief against Defendants Dietrich and McCulloch and only Plaintiff’s claims for
injunctive relief against Defendants Church and Krause.

Factual Allegation
Plaintiff is incarcerated in the Ingham County Jail. In his pro se complaint, he sues
Police Officers Rich Dietrich and Darryl McCulloch; Melinda Lambert; Assistant Prosecutor Russel
Church and Ingham County Judge Amy Krause. Plaintiff claims that Defendants subjected him to
a false arrest and malicious prosecution. His complaint consists of the following factual allegations
(verbatim):
(OFC) Officer Rich Dietrich arrested me illegally 4612 South Martin Luther
Kimg Apt #15 Aug 17-10 without reasonable cause, no call to this apt. number 8-1710. He use malice statements of race nergger humiliate me in from of witness and
neighborhood. He refuse to show up in court Nov. 23-10 and tell the truth He send
a new police officer to tell lie’s that he arrested me Aug. 17-2010 He arrested me to
persecuted me and conspire with Russel Church P-70786 Prosecutor Attorney and
Judge Krause P-4113 They gave me another false record.
***
I John Earl Easley wouls also like to sue Officer Daryl McCulloch, Lansing
Police Officer, Witness, on Police Report. Also Melissa Lambert 4612 South Martin
Luther King Street Lansing Michigan. Witness who lied seeing me with Blanche
Hayward and I had to go to jail 15 days for breaking no contacted order I also would
like to sue assist Prosecutor Russel Church P-70786 who told me he was retaliating
for case’s that were dismiss in Jackson Michigan 49201 zip code around 2007. Plus
2009 Judge Amy Krause P-4113 was conspiring with him because she dismisss
domestic violence case 2009 against same Plaintiff. He also made race’s slur in the
court hall-ways Nov-23-2010.
(Compl. Page ID##3-4.) For relief, Plaintiff seeks immediate release from jail, to have his criminal
case expunged and monetary damages of $200,000. If his criminal case is successfully expunged,
Plaintiff requests damages of only $100,000.
Standard of Review
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if “‘it fails to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic
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Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include
more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1949 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at
1949. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’
– that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (quoting FED . R. CIV . P. 8(a)(2));
see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal
plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
Discussion
Plaintiff sues Defendant Lambert, a private citizen, because she acted as witness in
criminal proceedings against him. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege
the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,
48 (1988); Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). In order for a
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private party’s conduct to be under color of state law, it must be “fairly attributable to the State.”
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982); Street, 102 F.3d at 814. There must be “a
sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of [the defendant] so that the
action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Skelton v. Pri-Cor, Inc., 963 F.2d
100, 102 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)).
Individuals who report crimes and testify as witnesses are not state actors for the purpose of § 1983
claims. See Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 399 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Providing information
to the police, responding to questions about a crime, and offering witness testimony at a criminal trial
does not expose a private individual to liability for actions taken ‘under color of law.’”). Because
Plaintiff cannot maintain an action against Defendant Lambert under §1983, the Court will dismiss
her from this action.
Plaintiff brings claims of malicious prosecution, conspiracy and retaliation against
Defendants Church and Krause arising from the criminal proceedings that followed his arrest by
Defendant Dietrich. Generally, a judge is absolutely immune from a suit for monetary damages.
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991) (“[I]t is a general principle of the highest importance to
the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him,
shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of person consequences to
himself.”) (internal quotations omitted); Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246, 254 (6th Cir. 1997);
Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1115 (6th Cir. 1997). Absolute judicial immunity may be
overcome in only two instances. First, a judge is not immune from liability for non-judicial actions,
i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11. Second, a judge is
not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in complete absence of all jurisdiction. Id.
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at 12. Plaintiff’s allegations against Judge Krause clearly fail to implicate either of the exceptions
to judicial immunity. Thus, Judge Krause is entitled to absolute judicial immunity.
Defendant Church also entitled to absolute immunity for his actions in bringing
criminal charges against Plaintiff.

The Supreme Court embraces a functional approach to

determining whether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118,
127 (1997); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988);
accord Koubriti v. Convertino, 593 F.3d 459, 467 (6th Cir. 2010); Lomaz v. Hennosy, 151 F.3d 493,
497 (6th Cir. 1998). Under a functional analysis, a prosecutor is absolutely immune when
performing the traditional functions of an advocate. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 130; Spurlock v. Thompson,
330 F.3d 791, 797 (6th Cir. 2003); Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1137 (6th Cir. 1989). The
Supreme Court has held that a prosecutor is absolutely immune for the initiation and pursuit of a
criminal prosecution. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976); Lomaz, 151 F.3d at 497. Acts
which occur in the course of the prosecutor’s role as advocate are entitled to protection of absolute
immunity in contrast to investigatory or administrative functions that are normally performed by a
detective or police officer. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273, 276-78 (1993); Grant, 870
F.2d at 1137. In the Sixth Circuit, the focus of the inquiry is how closely related the prosecutor’s
conduct is to his role of an advocate intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal
process. Spurlock, 330 F.3d at 797; Ireland v. Tunis, 113 F.3d 1435, 1443 (6th Cir. 1997).
Obviously, bringing criminal charges against Plaintiff is part of the prosecutor’s role as an advocate.
Accordingly, Defendant Church is entitled to immunity. Because Defendants Church and Krause
clearly are immune from liability in this case, Plaintiff may not maintain an action for monetary
damages against him. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).
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At this stage of the proceedings, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims for monetary
damages and injunctive relief against Defendants Deitrch and McCulloch, and Plaintiff’s claims for
injunctive relief against Defendants Church and Krause, are not subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2) or § 1915A.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review now required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the
Court determines that Plaintiff’s action against Defendant Lambert will be dismissed for failure to
state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). The Court also will dismiss Plaintiff’s
claims for monetary damages against Defendants Church and Krause. The Court will serve
Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages and injunctive relief against Defendants Dietrich and
McCulloch and only Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief against Defendants Church and Krause.
An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

Dated:

May 12, 2011

/s/ Robert J. Jonker
ROBERT J. JONKER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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