Daniel #182290 v. Carore et al

Filing 4

OPINION ; signed by Judge Robert Holmes Bell (Judge Robert Holmes Bell, kcb)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

ARTHUR DANIEL,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:11-cv-435

v.

Honorable Robert Holmes Bell

UNKNOWN CARORE et al.,
Defendants.
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OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, PUB. L. NO . 104-134, 110 STAT . 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any
prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro
se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s
allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504
U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state
a claim.

Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is incarcerated in the Oaks Correctional Facility, but the events giving rise
to his complaint occurred at the RCG Center in Jackson, MI. In his pro se complaint, he sues the
Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) and the following individuals: (unknown) King,
(unknown) Gardon, (unknown) Howell, (unknown) Carore, and (unknown) Schitnel.
Plaintiff alleges that on June 26, 2010, his bunk bed collapsed on top of him. The
supporting bracket of the bunk bed was bent in such a way that the bed tipped over when Plaintiff’s
cell mate climbed up to his bunk. Plaintiff fell on his back with the bunk bed, which weighed
approximately 150 pounds, on top of him. According to Plaintiff, the RCG Center is the only place
within the MDOC at security level II and up where the bunk beds are not bolted to the floor to
prevent tipping. Plaintiff was taken to a local emergency room where he was diagnosed with a disc
separation in his back. Upon his return from the hospital, prison staff sent Plaintiff back to the same
cell. Staff further instructed two prisoners to use a crow bar to bend the supporting bracket back in
place and re-assemble the broken bunk bed. Plaintiff contends that staff altered the scene of the
accident in order to limit their liability for his injuries. Plaintiff initially refused to go back to the
same cell, but complied rather than suffer the consequences of disobeying a direct order.
Plaintiff claims that he has been in constant pain since the incident and also is
experiencing numbness. He contends that the pain pills he was prescribed are doing more harm than
good. Plaintiff further alleges that he never received the bone scan that was recommended by the
emergency room doctor. Plaintiff seeks appropriate medical evaluation testing for his injury, as well
as compensatory and punitive damages.

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Discussion
I.

Immunity

As an initial matter, Plaintiff may not maintain a § 1983 action against the MDOC.
Regardless of the form of relief requested, the states and their departments are immune under the
Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts, unless the state has waived immunity or
Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782
(1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1993). Congress has not expressly
abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979),
and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. Abick v. Michigan,
803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). In numerous unpublished opinions, the Sixth Circuit has
specifically held that the MDOC is absolutely immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.
See, e.g., McCoy v. Michigan, 369 F. App’x 646, 653-54 (6th Cir. Mar. 12, 2010); Turnboe v.
Stegall, No. 00-1182, 2000 WL1679478, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 1, 2000). In addition, the State of
Michigan (acting through the Michigan Department of Corrections) is not a “person” who may be
sued under § 1983 for money damages. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613 (2002) (citing
Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989)). Therefore, the Court will dismiss the
MDOC.
II.

Failure to state a claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if “‘it fails to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
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While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include
more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1949 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at
1949. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’
– that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (quoting FED . R. CIV . P. 8(a)(2));
see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal
plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v. Corr.
Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal
rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).

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Plaintiff’s allegations generally implicate his Eighth Amendment right against cruel
and unusual punishment, but he fails to make any specific factual allegations whatsoever against the
individual Defendants named in the complaint. It is a basic pleading essential that a plaintiff
attribute factual allegations to particular defendants. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544 (holding that,
in order to state a claim, Plaintiff must make sufficient allegations to give a defendant fair notice of
the claim). Where a person is named as a defendant without an allegation of specific conduct, the
complaint is subject to dismissal, even under the liberal construction afforded to pro se complaints.
See Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (dismissing Plaintiff’s claims where
complaint did not allege with any degree of specificity which of the named defendants were
personally involved in or responsible for each alleged violation of rights); Griffin v. Montgomery,
No. 00-3402, 2000 WL 1800569, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 2000) (requiring allegations of personal
involvement against each defendant)); Rodriguez v. Jabe, No. 90-1010, 1990 WL 82722, at *1 (6th
Cir. June 19, 1990) (“Plaintiff’s claims against those individuals are without a basis in law as the
complaint is totally devoid of allegations as to them which would suggest their involvement in the
events leading to his injuries”); see also Eckford-El v. Toombs, 760 F. Supp. 1267, 1272-73 (W.D.
Mich. 1991). Because Plaintiff fails to even mention the named Defendants in the body of his
complaint, his allegations fall far short of the minimal pleading standards under FED . R. CIV . P. 8
(requiring “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”).
Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to plead facts from which the Court could draw a reasonable inference
that the named Defendants are liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
Consequently, Plaintiff’s action must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

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Conclusion
Having conducted the review now required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the
Court determines that Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611
(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no
good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the
$455.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless
Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g).
If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $455.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

Dated: May 17, 2011

/s/ Robert Holmes Bell
ROBERT HOLMES BELL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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