Thompson #261144 v. Dodge D350 1986 et al
Filing
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OPINION; Judgment to enter; signed by Judge Janet T. Neff (Judge Janet T. Neff, clb)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER BURNELL THOMPSON,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 1:11-cv-479
v.
Honorable Janet T. Neff
DODGE D350 1986 et al.,
Defendants.
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OPINION
This is a civil action brought by a state prisoner. The action purports to be an
international commercial complaint, subject to maritime and admiralty law and governed by the
U.C.C. Plaintiff alleges that the proceeding is both in rem and in personam. The Court has granted
Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and Plaintiff has been directed to pay the initial partial
filing fee when funds become available. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under
federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint
indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as
true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33
(1992). Applying these standards, Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed as frivolous and for failure
to state a claim.
Factual Allegations
Christopher Burnell Thompson presently is incarcerated at the Parnall Correctional
Facility. He names as Defendants in the action a lengthy list of personal property, including
automobiles, automobile parts, tools, and household items. He also names the following people and
municipalities as Defendants: Michelle Weiers; Sally Thompson; Russell Stevens; Robert Wilber;
Mecosta County; Mecosta County Detective Drew Neilsen; Mecosta County Sheriff Todd Purcell,
and an unknown surety bond insurance company.
Plaintiff purports to invoke the admiralty jurisdiction of this Court. He also asserts
jurisdiction over his claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, alleging diversity of citizenship. He describes
himself as the “libelant” in the action, which he defines as “Christopher Burnell Thompson / a living
flesh and blood actual man / non legal fiction / creditor and secured party / injured party / Libelant /
American national / in and for Himself.” (Compl. at 5, Page ID#5.) Plaintiff alleges that he was
unlawfully incarcerated under his name written in capital letters, which is “an artificial and fictitious
name” and an “organization.”
Plaintiff alleges that the instant action arises out of a civil case filed by Plaintiff in
Mecosta County against Defendants Weiers, Wilber, Stevens. Apparently, a bench trial was held
in the matter on February 2, 2010. Plaintiff was a prisoner at the time of the civil trial, and he
complains that the presiding judge, who is not a named Defendant in this action, improperly
practiced law, subjected him to threat, duress and coercion, and kept him shackled during trial.
Plaintiff contends that, after he was sent to prison, Defendants Weiers, Wilber, Stevens and
Thompson assumed possession over his property and exercised rights of ownership by selling or
otherwise disposing of the property, in violation of his commercial and contractual rights.
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In his complaint, Plaintiff raises a series of state-law claims. First, he alleges that
Defendant Thompson tortiously interfered with Plaintiff’s rental lease contract with Defendant
Weiers. Second, he alleges that Defendants Thompson, Weiers, Stevens, and Wilber committed the
common-law tort of conversion by exercising the right to control Plaintiff’s personal property.
Third, he alleges that the same Defendants committed statutory conversion under MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 600.2919a. Fourth, he alleges that Defendants Detective Neilsen and Sheriff Purcell were
accessories after the fact to conversion when they failed to investigate Plaintiff’s criminal complaints
about Defendants Weiers, Stevens, Wilber and Thompson. Fifth, he complains that Defendants
Neilsen and Purcell breached their duties to protect by refusing to investigate Plaintiff’s complaints.
Sixth, he alleges that Defendant Neilsen conspired with Defendant Purcell to obstruct justice by
failing to perform an independent investigation of Plaintiff’s complaint, ostensibly in violation of
the Michigan Constitution. Seventh, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Neilsen conspired to commit
misconduct in office by refusing to properly investigate Plaintiff’s complaints. Plaintiff also alleges
that Judge Scott Hill-Kennedy, who is not listed as a Defendant in the action, improperly tried
Plaintiff’s civil case, violated his oath of office, was deliberately indifferent to the damage to
Plaintiff’s case caused by shackling, was biased in his decisionmaking, conspired with Defendants
Neilsen and Purcell to oppress Plaintiff and impede justice, and was an accessory after the fact to
conversion. Plaintiff contends that Hill-Kennedy’s violations of his oath of office amount to treason
punishable by death. Finally, Plaintiff contends that Mecosta County, through its employees,
committed the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
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Discussion
I.
Frivolous Claims
A.
Admiralty
Plaintiff asserts that this Court has jurisdiction over his complaint under its admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction conferred by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1333, 1337, and 2461. An action may be
dismissed as frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). Claims that lack
an arguable or rational basis in law include claims for which the defendants are clearly entitled to
immunity and claims of infringement of a legal interest which clearly does not exist. See Neitzke,
490 U.S. at 327-28; Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199. The Court cannot discern any possible claim against
any Defendant over which this Court could exercise its admiralty or maritime jurisdiction. Thus,
to the extent that Plaintiff asserts jurisdiction under admiralty, the complaint will be dismissed as
frivolous.
B.
Diversity of Citizenship
Plaintiff next asserts that the Court has jurisdiction to hear his state-law claims under
28 U.S.C. § 1332, which grants federal district courts original jurisdiction over civil actions in which
the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00 and the case is between citizens of different states
or between citizens of a state and foreign nationals or sovereigns. Here, Plaintiff alleges that he is
an “American National” who resides in the Western District of Michigan and that each of the named
Defendants are United States citizens who reside in the Western District of Michigan. (Compl.,
docket #1, Page ID#2.) In a convoluted and legally frivolous series of propositions, Plaintiff asserts
that he is a citizen of the Republic of Michigan, where he admittedly was born, though he declares
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that he is not a citizen of the United States. Plaintiff has signed a “Declaration of Allegiance to the
Michigan Republic,” in which he states that he is not a party to the United States Constitution and
that his United States citizenship would conflict with his allegiance to the Republic of Michigan
(Id., Page ID#27.) It therefore appears that Plaintiff intends to assert diversity of citizenship based
on the notion that he is a foreign national who is suing United States citizens who are residents of
the State of Michigan.
Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s legally frivolous Declaration of Allegiance to the
Michigan Republic and his assertion that he is not subject to the United States Constitution, Plaintiff
became a United States citizen by operation of law at the time of his birth. See U.S. CONST. amend.
14, sec. 1, cl. 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”). As a consequence,
because Plaintiff is a United States citizen and a Michigan resident, as are all Defendants, the Court
lacks diversity jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff’s state-law claims.
II.
Failure to State a Claim
Although Plaintiff does not purport to bring his action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the
Court must construe his petition indulgently. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. The Court therefore will
consider whether Plaintiff’s complaint states a claim under § 1983.
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if “‘it fails to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include
more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
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1949 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
at 1949. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at
1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court
to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not
‘show[n]’ – that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P.
8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the
Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a
right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed
by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v.
Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994).
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A.
State-law claims
Plaintiff’s complaint is limited to seven state-law claims against the named
Defendants. Section 1983 does not provide redress for a violation of a state law. Pyles v. Raisor,
60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995); Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1166 (6th Cir. 1994).
Plaintiff’s challenge to the enforcement of state law therefore fails to state a claim under § 1983.
B.
Private individuals
Even assuming that Plaintiff could identify a violation of federal law, he fails to state
a claim against Defendants Weiers, Thompson, Stevens and Wilber, the four private citizens named
as the principals in the alleged conversion of Plaintiff’s property. In order for a private party’s
conduct to be under color of state law, it must be “fairly attributable to the State.” Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th
Cir. 1996). There must be “a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action
of [the defendant] so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.”
Skelton v. Pri-Cor, Inc., 963 F.2d 100, 102 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419
U.S. 345, 351 (1974)). Plaintiff has not presented any allegations by which these Defendants’
conduct could be fairly attributed to the State. Accordingly, he fails to state a § 1983 claim against
Defendants Weiers, Thompson, Stevens and Wilber.
C.
Failure to investigate
Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendants Neilsen and Purcell involve their alleged
refusal or failure to conduct an adequate investigation of the ostensibly criminal acts of Defendants
Weiers, Thompson, Stevens and Wilber in disposing of Plaintiff’s property. A private citizen “lacks
a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” Diamond v.
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Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 63 (1986). The law is equally clear that there exists no “‘constitutional,
statutory, or common law right that a private citizen has to require a public official to investigate or
prosecute a crime.’” White v. City of Toledo, 217 F. Supp. 2d 838, 841 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (quoting
Doe v. Mayor and City Council of Pocomoke City, 745 F. Supp. 1137, 1138 (D. Md. 1990)). “Such
‘discretionary public duties . . . are enforced by public opinion, policy, and the ballot,’ not litigation
against individual officers and their civic employers.” Id.; see also Sattler v. Johnson, 857 F.2d
224, 226 (4th Cir. 1988) (individual did not have a constitutional right under the Equal Protection
Clause to be presented with information to enable a civil suit or to have a crime prosecuted); Walker
v. Schmoke, 962 F. Supp. 732, 733 (D. Md. 1997) (“[N]o federal appellate court, including the
Supreme Court . . . has recognized that there is a federally enforceable right for the victim to have
criminal charges investigated at all, let alone with vigor or competence.”); Fulson v. City of
Columbus, 801 F. Supp. 1, 6 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (“A public official charged with the duty to
investigate or prosecute a crime does not owe that duty to any one member of the public, and thus
no one member of the public has a right to compel a public official to act.”). As a consequence,
Plaintiff fails to state a federal claim against Defendants Neilsen and Purcell.
D.
Municipal liability
Plaintiff names Mecosta County as a Defendant in this action. A municipality may
only be liable under § 1983 when its policy or custom causes the injury, regardless of the form of
relief sought by the plaintiff. Los Angeles County v. Humphries, 131 S. Ct. 447, 453-54 (2010)
(citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1974)). In a municipal liability claim, the
finding of a policy or custom is the initial determination to be made. Doe v. Claiborne County, 103
F.3d 495, 509 (6th Cir. 1996). The policy or custom must be the moving force behind the
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constitutional injury, and a plaintiff must identify the policy, connect the policy to the governmental
entity and show that the particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy.
Turner v. City of Taylor, 412 F.3d 629, 639 (6th Cir. 2005); Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th
Cir. 2003); Doe, 103 F.3d at 508-509. It is the Court’s task to identify the officials or governmental
bodies which speak with final policymaking authority for the local government in a particular area
or on a particular issue. McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 784-85 (1997). Plaintiff’s
complaint fails entirely to allege that he was harmed by a policy or custom of Mecosta County. He
therefore fails to state a municipal liability claim under § 1983.
E.
Unknown Insurance Company
Plaintiff seeks treble damages from the unknown insurance company that issued the
surety bonds for Defendants Neilsen and Purcell. Inasmuch as Plaintiff fails to state a claim against
Neilsen and Purcell, he is not entitled to recover damages from any bonding company.
F.
Supplemental Jurisdiction
“Generally, once a federal court has dismissed a plaintiff’s federal law claim, it
should not reach state law claims.” Experimental Holdings, Inc. v. Farris 503 F.3d 514, 521 (6th
Cir. 2007) (citing United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966)). Where, as here,
a district court has exercised jurisdiction over a state-law claim solely by virtue of supplemental
jurisdiction and the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, the state-law claims should be
dismissed without reaching their merits. See Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., 994 F.2d 1178, 1182
(6th Cir. 1993); Faughender v. City of N. Olmsted, 927 F.2d 909, 917 (6th Cir. 1991); Coleman v.
Huff, No. 97-1916, 1998 WL 476226, at *1 (6th Cir. Aug. 3, 1998). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s statelaw claims are dismissed without prejudice.
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Conclusion
Having conducted the review now required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the
Court determines that Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed as frivolous and for failure to state a claim
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611
(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no
good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the
$455.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless
Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g).
If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $455.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated: June 14, 2011
/s/ Janet T. Neff
Janet T. Neff
United States District Judge
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