Lewis v. Teamsters Local 406

Filing 24

OPINION AND ORDER APPROVING AND ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [14, 21], Motion to Dismiss 6 is granted; Motion for Summary Judgment 15 is denied; Judgment to issue; signed by Judge Janet T. Neff (Judge Janet T. Neff, clb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

TIRAM LEWIS,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:11-cv-499

v

HON. JANET T. NEFF

TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 406,
Defendant.
_______________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER
This is a labor dispute filed pursuant to Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) § 301,
29 U.S.C. § 185, involving Defendant’s alleged breach of its duty of fair representation. Defendant
filed a Motion to Dismiss under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that Plaintiff’s complaint was
time-barred. Plaintiff subsequently filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The matter was referred
to the Magistrate Judge, who issued a Report and Recommendation (R & R) on each motion. The
Magistrate Judge recommended that this Court grant Defendant’s motion and deny Plaintiff’s
motion. The matter is presently before the Court on Plaintiff’s separate objections to each Report
and Recommendation. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3), the
Court has performed de novo consideration of those portions of the Reports and Recommendations
to which objections have been made. The Court denies the objections and issues this Opinion and
Order.

I. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
The Magistrate Judge recommended that this Court grant Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for
failure to state a claim (R & R, Dkt 14 at 6). Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that
his state-law breach of contract claim is preempted by LMRA § 301 (Pl. Obj., Dkt 18 at 1; R & R,
Dkt 14 at 4). Plaintiff further argues that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim
under Rule 12(b)(6) should be converted into a Motion for Summary Judgment under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 56 (Pl. Obj., Dkt 18 at 1-2). Finally, Plaintiff argues that § 301’s preemptive
effect does not bar other state-law actions (id. at 2).
A.

Preemption
LMRA § 301 grants jurisdiction to United States district courts “for violation of contracts

between an employer and a labor organization . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Section 301 preempts state
law unless a claim (1) arises under state law, and (2) does not require interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement. Alongi v. Ford Motor Co., 386 F.3d 716, 724 (6th Cir. 2004). In his first
Objection, Plaintiff repeats his argument that “relief and damages are warranted to Plaintiff due to
an [sic] violation of tort or contractual obligation which is beyond the preemptive jurisdiction of the
NLRB” (Pl. Obj., Dkt 18 at 1).
Plaintiff characterizes his dispute with Defendant as arising from his termination that took
place more than seven days after his misconduct, timing that would constitute a violation of the
collective bargaining agreement in force at the time (Compl., Dkt 1 at 2). In reality, the dispute in
this case is Defendant’s alleged “breach of contract resulting in the wrongful termination of the
Plaintiff” (id.) (emphasis added). The Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that this case is

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properly cast as a claim for violation of Defendant’s duty of fair representation, resolution of which
requires interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement (R & R, Dkt 14 at 4).
Therefore, § 301 preempts any state-law breach of contract claims Plaintiff may have against
Defendant and the six-month statute of limitations set forth in the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) § 10(b) applies. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (2006); see also DelCostello v Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters,
462 U.S. 151, 163-65, 169 (1983); Martin v. Lake County Sewer Co., 269 F.3d 673, 677 (6th Cir.
2001). The Magistrate Judge was correct in finding that Plaintiff’s claim is time-barred and
recommending that this Court grant Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (R & R, Dkt 14 at 5). Plaintiff’s
argument to the contrary is without merit, and his objection is therefore denied.
B.

Conversion
Second, Plaintiff argues for the first time that “Federal rule and civil procedure 12(b)(6)

requires the recommendation and response, motion for dismissal, to be treated as summary
judgment” (Pl. Obj., Dkt 18 at 1). Plaintiff quotes from the portion of the Advisory Committee
Notes suggesting that when a court entertains extraneous matter on a motion to dismiss, the motion
should be treated as a Rule 56 motion (id.). Plaintiff also states, “Considering the aforementioned
. . . dismissal for failure to state an [sic] claim in which relief can be sought should then be treated
as a motion for summary judgments [sic] . . .” (id. at 2).
Plaintiff filed a memorandum in response to Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Pl. Resp., Dkt
9). Nowhere in his response does Plaintiff raise the issue of treating the motion to dismiss as a
motion for summary judgment. Parties may not “raise at the district court stage new arguments or
issues that were not presented to the magistrate.” Murr v. United States, 200 F.3d 895, 902 n.1 (6th
Cir. 2000). Issues not raised in the petition to the Magistrate Judge are deemed waived. Id.; United

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States v. Waters, 158 F.3d 933, 936 (6th Cir. 1998). The issue of conversion is therefore deemed
waived, and Plaintiff cannot raise the issue now. Even if the issue were not waived, the argument
is without merit on its face, inasmuch as no extraneous materials appear in the record with regard
to the motion to dismiss. Plaintiff’s objection is denied.
C.

Preservation of State-Law Causes of Action
Plaintiff’s last objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation on

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss consists of lengthy quotes from two Supreme Court cases and an
Eastern District of Pennsylvania case addressing disputes between employees and unions (Pl. Obj.,
Dkt 18 at 2). Plaintiff seems to be quoting the cases for the proposition that LMRA § 301
preemption does not deprive employees of other state-law causes of action (id.). Even assuming that
this interpretation is correct, the Court fails to see how these cases advance Plaintiff’s argument that
the instant case is not preempted. The only cause of action Plaintiff’s complaint articulates is
“breach of contract resulting in . . . wrongful termination . . .” (Compl., Dkt. 1 at 2). Plaintiff does
not allege a tort or any other state-law civil claim against Defendant in his complaint. This argument
is without merit, and Plaintiff’s objection is denied.
II. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
The Magistrate Judge recommended that this Court deny Plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment (R & R, Dkt 21 at 5). In his Objection, Plaintiff (1) reiterates his belief that LMRA § 301
does not preempt his breach of contract claim (Pl. Obj., Dkt 23 at 2); (2) asserts that his first
objection satisfies the evidentiary requirements of his own motion for summary judgment (id.); (3)
argues that the Magistrate Judge is without authority to issue Reports and Recommendations for the

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motions at issue here (id. at 3-4); and (4) argues that a “denial of the right to appeal violates United
States Code: Title 28a, Rule 3” (id.).
A.

Preemption
Plaintiff again objects to his claim being time-barred as a result of the shorter limitations

period imposed by NLRA § 10(b) (Pl. Obj., Dkt 23 at 2). As explained supra, there is no question
that Plaintiff’s “breach of contract” claim is correctly cast as a breach of the duty of fair
representation. As such, Plaintiff’s claim is preempted by LMRA § 301 and subject to the statute
of limitations imposed by NLRA § 10(b). See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 163-65, 169; Martin, 269
F.3d at 677. Plaintiff’s argument is without merit, and his objection is denied.
B.

Summary Judgment Standard
Plaintiff next argues that the Magistrate Judge erred in recommending his motion for

summary judgment be denied. According to Plaintiff, “Docket # 19 Objection provides sufficient
evidence and adequate references to support a ruling in favor of Plaintiff’s for summary judgment
[sic]” (Pl. Obj., Dkt 23 at 2). To the contrary, Plaintiff, who carries the burden of proof, has
proffered no evidence in support of his motion, as the Magistrate Judge correctly noted he is
required to do under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (R & R, Dkt 21 at 3-4).
Even if Plaintiff had produced evidence in support of his claim, his argument is without
merit. As noted supra, and in the Report and Recommendation (id. at 4), Plaintiff is time-barred
from bringing this claim in the first instance. Therefore, in addition to his failure to meet his burden
in showing he deserves summary judgment, Plaintiff is not entitled to any judgment because he has
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff’s argument is without merit, and
his objection is denied.

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C.

Validity of Reports and Recommendations
In what he styles a “Masters Order,” Plaintiff states that “it is ordered that further reports

and recommendations are prohibited” (Pl. Obj., Dkt 23 at 4). Plaintiff’s objection stems from his
incomplete reading of 28 U.S.C. § 636. Plaintiff quotes the language of § 636(b)(1)(A) that restrains
a magistrate judge from deciding a dispositive pretrial motion, but he ignores § 636(b)(1)(B), which
authorizes a magistrate judge to hear arguments on a dispositive motion and issue a Report and
Recommendation to the district court (Pl. Obj., Dkt 23 at 3-4). Plaintiff’s argument is without
merit, and his objection is denied.
D.

Appeal in Good Faith
Finally, Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation for this Court to indicate

that an appeal would not be taken in good faith (Pl. Obj., Dkt 23 at 3-4; R & R, Dkt 23 at 5).
Plaintiff elaborates, stating “denial of the right to appeal violates United States Code: Title 28a, Rule
3” (Pl. Obj., Dkt 3-4). 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) provides this Court with discretion to certify that an
appeal will not be taken in good faith when a party is proceeding in forma pauperis. Plaintiff’s
argument is without merit, and his objection is denied.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, this Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation as the Opinion of this Court. A Judgment will be entered consistent with this
Opinion and Order. See FED. R. CIV. P. 58. Because this action was filed in forma pauperis, this
Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal of this decision would not be
taken in good faith. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 610 (6th Cir. 1997).

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Therefore:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Objections (Dkts 18, 23) are DENIED and that each
Report and Recommendation (Dkts 14, 21) is APPROVED and ADOPTED as the Opinion of the
Court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt 6) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt 15) is
DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) that
an appeal of the Judgment would not be taken in good faith.

Dated: February 9, 2012

/s/ Janet T. Neff
JANET T. NEFF
United States District Judge

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