Jones #707629 v. Jensen et al
Filing
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OPINION ; signed by Judge Robert J. Jonker (Judge Robert J. Jonker, mil)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JAMES JONES #707629,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 1:11-cv-514
v.
Honorable Robert J. Jonker
UNKNOWN JENSEN et al.,
Defendants.
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OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis and he has paid the initial partial
filing fee. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. NO . 104-134, 110 STAT . 1321 (1996),
the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly
incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will
dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim against Defendants Huss, Lahner, Norwood,
Prelesnik and Wood. The Court will serve the complaint against Defendants Jameason and Jensen.
Discussion
I.
Factual allegations
Plaintiff is incarcerated at Ionia Maximum Correctional Facility (ICF). He sues the
following employees of the Michigan Department of Corrections: Officers (unknown) Jensen,
(unknown) Jameason, (unknown) Wood, and (unknown) Lahner; Warden John Prelesnik; E. Huss
and N. Norwood.
According to the complaint, on May 2, 2010, Plaintiff was in his cell when
Defendants Jensen, Jameason and other officers, took him to the “b-wing” shower. After Plaintiff
was placed in the shower, Jensen began “assaulting” and “abusing” Plaintiff, kicking and hitting him.
(Compl. at 3, docket #1, Page ID#3.) Jensen told Plaintiff that he “better be gone by (2 to 10) or (10
to 6) by the [n]ext [d]ay [b]ecause when they get back [Plaintiff] will get even more of [an] A-S-S
kicking.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends that Jensen “continually” puts inmates into handcuffs and assaults
them. (Id.)
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Wood puts her fingers in prisoners’ food and will
spit in food provided to prisoners. In particular, on March 30, 2011, at 10:00 am, Defendant Wood
spit in Plaintiff’s food tray while she was passing out the trays. Defendant Lahner, who was helping
Wood distribute the trays, saw Wood’s actions but did not stop her or report her conduct to other
officials.
Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Plaintiff seeks damages and a temporary restraining order against all Defendants
“with an affidavit for any officials retaliating against . . . Plaintiff.” (Id.) He also seeks an order
discharging officers that assault prisoners or “misuse” prisoner food.
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II.
Failure to state a claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if “‘it fails to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include
more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1949 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at
1949. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’
– that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (quoting FED . R. CIV . P. 8(a)(2));
see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal
plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
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Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996).
A.
Defendants Huss, Norwood, Prelesnik
Defendants Huss, Norwood and Prelesnik will be dismissed because Plaintiff fails
to allege that any of them actively engaged in any unconstitutional conduct. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct at
1948. Indeed, Huss, Norwood and Prelesnik are not even mentioned in the body of the complaint.
It is a basic pleading essential that a plaintiff attribute factual allegations to particular defendants.
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544 (holding that, in order to state a claim, Plaintiff must make sufficient
allegations to give a defendant fair notice of the claim). Where a person is named as a defendant
without an allegation of specific conduct, the complaint is subject to dismissal, even under the liberal
construction afforded to pro se complaints. See Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir.
2002) (dismissing Plaintiff’s claims where complaint did not allege with any degree of specificity
which of the named defendants were personally involved in or responsible for each alleged violation
of rights); Griffin v. Montgomery, No. 00-3402, 2000 WL 1800569, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 2000)
(requiring allegations of personal involvement against each defendant)); Rodriguez v. Jabe, No. 901010, 1990 WL 82722, at *1 (6th Cir. June 19, 1990) (“Plaintiff’s claims against those individuals
are without a basis in law as the complaint is totally devoid of allegations as to them which would
suggest their involvement in the events leading to his injuries.”). Thus, Plaintiff’s claims against
Huss, Norwood and Prelesnik will be dismissed because the complaint fails to allege that any of
these defendants, through their own actions, violated the constitution.
Moreover, Warden Prelesnik cannot be liable merely because has supervisory
authority over other individuals that allegedly engaged in unconstitutional conduct or because he
failed to act based on information that he received. Government officials may not be held liable for
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the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious
liability. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009); Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691(1978); Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009). A claimed
constitutional violation must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior. Grinter v. Knight, 532
F.3d 567, 575 (6th Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002). The acts of
one’s subordinates are not enough, nor can supervisory liability be based upon the mere failure to
act. Grinter, 532 F.3d at 575; Greene, 310 F.3d at 899; Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir.
2004). Thus, section 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an
administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance. See
Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each
Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948.
B.
Defendants Wood and Lahner
Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive
rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right
allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). Plaintiff alleges that, on one
occasion in March of 2011, Wood spit in Plaintiff’s food while Lahner watched. The complaint
states that Defendants violated Plaintiff's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, but the Court
discerns no viable Fourteenth Amendment claim in the allegations against Defendants Wood and
Lahner. Accordingly, the Court will treat Plaintiff's claim against Wood and Lahner as an Eighth
Amendment claim.
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The Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional limitation on the power of the states
to punish those convicted of crimes. Punishment may not be “barbarous” nor may it contravene
society’s “evolving standards of decency.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345-46 (1981). The
Amendment, therefore, prohibits conduct by prison officials that involves the “unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain.” Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346). The deprivation alleged must result in the denial of the “minimal civilized
measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; see also Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596,
600-01 (6th Cir. 1998). The Eighth Amendment is only concerned with “deprivations of essential
food, medical care, or sanitation” or “other conditions intolerable for prison confinement.” Rhodes,
452 U.S. at 348 (citation omitted). Moreover, “[n]ot every unpleasant experience a prisoner might
endure while incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment.” Ivey, 832 F.2d at 954.
In order for a prisoner to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, he must show that
he faced a sufficiently serious risk to his health or safety and that the defendant official acted with
“‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety.” Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 479-80 (6th
Cir. 2010) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (applying deliberate indifference
standard to medical claims); see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (applying
deliberate indifference standard to conditions of confinement claims)). Plaintiff does not allege any
injury or harm resulting from Wood’s conduct, nor does he allege that Wood’s conduct posed an
objectively serious risk to Plaintiff’s health or safety. Thus, he fails to state an Eighth Amendment
claim against Wood. See Mulazim v. Corrigan, 7 F. App’x 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2001) (affirming
dismissal of an Eighth Amendment claim for, inter alia, failure to allege that defendants disregarded
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a risk of serious harm to the plaintiff).
To the extent Plaintiff was aware of Wood’s conduct when he received the food tray,
and then chose not to eat the food, Wood’s conduct merely would have deprived Plaintiff of a single
meal.1 The deprivation of a single meal, however, is not a sufficiently serious risk to an inmate’s
health to invoke a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights. See White v. Gregory, 1 F.3d 267, 269 (4th
Cir.1993) (affirming dismissal of Eighth Amendment claim about missing one meal as frivolous and
indisputably meritless); Davis v. Putnam, No. 1:10–CV–01655, 2011 WL 1298117, at *2 (E.D. Cal.
Mar. 31, 2011) (“Spitting in a person’s food does not rise to the level of a serious harm in violation
of the Eighth Amendment. . . . [Moreover,] Plaintiff has failed to allege how taking of rations on one
day created a substantial risk of serious harm.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim against Wood will
be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Similarly, Plaintiff’s claim against Lahner will be dismissed
because it is based upon Lahner’s failure to stop or report Wood’s actions. If Plaintiff fails to state
a claim against Wood, then Plaintiff also fails to state a claim against Lahner.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review now required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the
Court determines that Defendants Huss, Norwood, Prelesnik, Wood and Lahner will be dismissed
for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C.
§1997e(c). The Court will serve the complaint against Defendants Jensen and Jameason.
An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
/s/Robert J. Jonker
Robert J. Jonker
United States District Judge
Dated: July 19, 2011
1
The complaint suggests that W ood regularly spits in prisoners’ food, but it refers to only one instance involving
Plaintiff. To the extent Plaintiff challenges W ood’s conduct, he may only bring a claim on his own behalf. Plaintiff lacks
standing to bring a claim asserting the constitutional rights of other prisoners. See Newsom v Norris, 888 F.2d 371, 381
(6th Cir. 1989); Corn v. Sparkman, No. 95-5494, 1996 W L 185753, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 17, 1996) (citing Weaver v.
Wilcox, 650 F.2d 22, 27 (3d Cir. 1981)).
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