Cribbs #715114 et al v. Case et al
Filing
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OPINION; Order to issue; signed by Judge Janet T. Neff (Judge Janet T. Neff, clb)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
COREY J. CRIBBS, II et al.,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 1:11-cv-713
v.
Honorable Janet T. Neff
JOEL CASE et al.,
Defendants.
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OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner and his mother pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted both Plaintiffs leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under
the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required
to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious,
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A. The Court must read Plaintiffs’ pro se
complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiffs’
allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504
U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint for failure
to state a claim against Defendants Stephen Bush, Calhoun County Prosecutor Unknown Party #2
and Steven E. Parks. The Court will serve the complaint against Defendants Joel Case and the Battle
Creek Police Department.
Discussion
I.
Factual allegations
Plaintiff Corey J. Cribbs, II, and his mother, Kameaka Tate, brought this civil rights
action. Plaintiff Cribbs presently is incarcerated at the Oaks Correctional Facility.1 Plaintiff Tate
lives in Battle Creek, Michigan. In their pro se complaint, Plaintiffs sue Officers Joel Case and
Stephen Bush, the Battle Creek Police Department, the Chief of the Battle Creek Police Department
Unknown Party #1, the Calhoun County Prosecutor Unknown Party #2 and Attorney Steven E.
Parks.
The following are Plaintiffs’ allegations (verbatim):
1.
Officer Joel Case did shoot and injure Plaintiff without justifiable probable
cause violating the juveniles right to be free from excessive force.
2.
Officer Stephen Bush did file false police report and covered up facts relating
to said shooting of Plaintiff Corey J. Cribbs II.
3.
Battle Creek Police Department did not properly train gang task force
officers by federal fourth amendment standards, engaged in cover up of
shooting incident.
4.
Calhoun County Prosecutor did maliciously prosecute juvenile denying
Plaintiff due process rights subsequently recommend that Plaintiff by sent to
prison after he turned 17 yrs of age.
5.
Attorney Parks represented juvenile knowing he was being charged and
sentenced as an adult and was not qualified to represent the juvenile in circuit
court proceedings.
6.
Complaint is solely base on Plaintiff’s right to be of excessive force.
(Compl., docket #1, Page ID#4.)
1
According to the Michigan Department of Corrections Offender Tracking Information System, Plaintiff Cribbs
was convicted of two counts of assault with a dangerous weapon, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.82, and one count of
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.227b, on May 3, 2010.
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For relief, Plaintiff Cribbs requests to be released from prison, monetary damages of
five million dollars for pain and suffering and injunctive and declaratory relief. Plaintiff Tate
requests monetary damages of two million dollars for pain and suffering.
II.
Failure to state a claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if “‘it fails to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include
more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1949 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
at 1949. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at
1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court
to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not
‘show[n]’ – that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P.
8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the
Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
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To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a
right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed
by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal
rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
A.
Conclusory Allegations
Plaintiffs fail to state a claim against Defendant Chief of the Battle Creek Police
Department Unknown Party #1 because the complaint does not allege any conduct on his or her part,
much less unconstitutional conduct. It is a basic pleading essential that a plaintiff attribute factual
allegations to particular defendants. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544 (holding that, in order to state
a claim, a plaintiff must make sufficient allegations to give a defendant fair notice of the claim).
Where a person is named as a defendant without an allegation of specific conduct, the complaint is
subject to dismissal, even under the liberal construction afforded to pro se complaints. See Gilmore
v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 92 F. App’x 188, 190 (6th Cir. 2004) (dismissing complaint where plaintiff
failed to allege how any named defendant was involved in the violation of his rights); Frazier v.
Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims where the complaint
did not allege with any degree of specificity which of the named defendants were personally
involved in or responsible for each alleged violation of rights); Griffin v. Montgomery, No. 00-3402,
2000 WL 1800569, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 2000) (requiring allegations of personal involvement
against each defendant); Rodriguez v. Jabe, No. 90-1010, 1990 WL 82722, at *1 (6th Cir. June 19,
1990) (“Plaintiff’s claims against those individuals are without a basis in law as the complaint is
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totally devoid of allegations as to them which would suggest their involvement in the events leading
to his injuries”). Because Plaintiffs’ claims fall far short of the minimal pleading standards under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (requiring “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief”), their complaint must be dismissed against Defendant Chief of the Battle Creek
Police Department Unknown Party #1.
B.
Heck Bar
In his claim for relief, Plaintiff Cribbs requests to be released from prison. Plaintiffs
allege that Officer Bush filed a false police report against Plaintiff Cribbs, Calhoun County
Prosecutor Unknown Party #1 maliciously prosecuted Plaintiff Cribbs and Attorney Parks was not
qualified to represent Plaintiff Cribbs in Cribbs’ trial court proceedings. Plaintiffs are essentially
challenging Cribbs’ incarceration by the State of Michigan. A challenge to the fact or duration of
confinement should be brought as a petition for habeas corpus and is not the proper subject of a civil
rights action brought pursuant to § 1983. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973) (the
essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody and
the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody). Therefore, to the extent
that Plaintiffs’ complaint challenges the fact or duration of Cribbs’s incarceration, it must be
dismissed. See Barnes v. Lewis, No. 93-5698, 1993 WL 515483, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 10, 1993)
(dismissal is appropriate where § 1983 action seeks equitable relief and challenges fact or duration
of confinement); see also Moore v. Pemberton, 110 F.3d 22, 23-24 (7th Cir. 1997) (reasons for not
construing a § 1983 action as one seeking habeas relief include (1) potential application of Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), (2) differing defendants, (3) differing standards of § 1915(a)(3)
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and § 2253(c), (4) differing fee requirements, (5) potential application of second or successive
petition doctrine or three-strikes rules of § 1915(g)).
To the extent Plaintiffs seeks injunctive, declaratory and monetary relief for alleged
violations of Cribbs’s constitutional rights, his claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,
486-87 (1994), which held that “in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render
a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has
been [overturned].” See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646 (1997) (emphasis in original). In
Heck, the Supreme Court held that a state prisoner cannot make a cognizable claim under § 1983
for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or for “harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness
would render a conviction or sentence invalid” unless a prisoner shows that the conviction or
sentence has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a
state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 486-87 (footnote omitted). The holding in Heck has
been extended to actions seeking injunctive or declaratory relief. See Edwards, 520 U.S. at 646-48
(declaratory relief); Clarke v. Stalder, 154 F.3d 186, 189-90 (5th Cir. 1998) (claim for injunctive
relief intertwined with request for damages); Wilson v. Kinkela, No. 97-4035, 1998 WL 246401,
at *1 (6th Cir. May 5, 1998) (injunctive relief). Plaintiffs’ allegations clearly call into question the
validity of Cribbs’ conviction. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ action against Officer Bush, Calhoun County
Prosecutor Unknown Party #1 and Attorney Parks is barred under Heck until Cribbs’ criminal
conviction has been invalidated.
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Moreover, Plaintiff cannot show that his court-appointed attorney acted under color
of state law. In Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981), the Supreme Court held that defense
counsel perform a private, not an official, function:
In our system[,] a defense lawyer characteristically opposes the designated
representatives of the State. The system assumes that adversarial testing will
ultimately advance the public interest in truth and fairness. But it posits that a
defense lawyer best serves the public, not by acting on behalf of the State or in
concert with it, but rather by advancing “the undivided interest of his client.” This
is essentially a private function, traditionally filled by retained counsel, for which
state office and authority are not needed.
454 U.S. at 318-19 (footnotes omitted). The Polk County Court further held that this is true even
of the state-appointed and state-paid public defender. Id. at 321. The Court said that, once a lawyer
undertakes the representation of an accused, the duties and obligations are the same whether the
lawyer is privately retained, appointed, or serves in a legal aid or defender program. Id. at 323. The
Court held that, even though a public defender is paid by the state, he or she does not act under color
of state law in representing the accused. Id. at 325. Rather, defense counsel—whether privately
retained or paid by the state—acts purely on behalf of the client and free from state control. Id. The
Sixth Circuit has adhered to the holding in Polk County in numerous unpublished decisions. See,
e.g., Carswell v. Hughes, No. 99-1795, 2000 WL 658043, at *1 (6th Cir. May 9, 2000); Blake v.
Kane, No. 98-4386, 2000 WL 302980, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 14, 2000); Rodgers v. Stacey, No. 993408, 2000 WL 190100, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 7, 2000); Watson v. Carreer, No. 99-5319, 1999
WL1282433, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 27, 1999); Pagani-Gallego v.Escobedo, No. 97-1640, 1998 WL
381562, at *1 (6th Cir. June 23, 1998); Carson v. Giovanni, No. 88-1412, 1988 WL 107376, at *1
(6th Cir. Oct. 14, 1988). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s court-appointed attorney does not act under color
of state law, and no claim under § 1983 can be maintained against him.
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To the extent that Plaintiff asserts claims of fraud and legal malpractice, these claims
arise solely under state law. Section 1983 does not provide redress for a violation of a state law.
Pyles v. Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995); Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1166 (6th Cir.
1994). The Sixth Circuit has stated that district courts should generally decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims under these circumstances. See Landefeld v. Marion
Gen. Hosp., 994 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1993); Hawley v. Burke, No. 97-1853, 1998 WL 384557,
at *1-2 (6th Cir. June 18, 1998). Accordingly, these claims will be dismissed without prejudice.
C.
Service
At this stage of the proceedings, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ allegations are
sufficient to state a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendants Joel Case and the
Battle Creek Police Department. Accordingly, the Court will order service of the complaint against
them.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review now required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the
Court determines that Defendants Stephen Bush, Chief of Battle Creek Police Department Unknown
Party #1, Calhoun County Prosecutor Unknown Party #2 and Steven E. Parks will be dismissed for
failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). The Court will serve the
complaint against Defendants Joel Case and the Battle Creek Police Department.
An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated: December 6, 2011
/s/ Janet T. Neff
Janet T. Neff
United States District Judge
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