Northport Public School v. Gerald Woods, et al

Filing 76

OPINION; Order to issue; signed by Judge Janet T. Neff (Judge Janet T. Neff, clb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

NORTHPORT PUBLIC SCHOOL and
NORTHPORT PUBLIC SCHOOL
BOARD OF EDUCATION,

Case No. 1:11-cv-982
HON. JANET T. NEFF

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,
v
GERALD WOODS and PATRICIA
WOODS, on their own behalf and on
behalf of their minor child, T.W.,
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
_______________________________/
OPINION

This is another installment in litigation under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., between Defendants/Counter-Claimants Gerald and Patricia
Woods (hereinafter collectively “the Woods”) and Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants Northport Public
School and Northport Public School Board of Education (hereinafter collectively “Northport”), the
school district where the Woods’ son, T.W., has been intermittently enrolled.1 Pending before the
Court is Northport’s Motion to Dismiss the Woods’ Counterclaim (Dkt 71). The Woods filed a
Response to the motion (Dkt 73), and Northport filed a Reply (Dkt 74). For the reasons that follow,
the Court determines that it does not possess jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Woods’
Counterclaim; therefore, this Court grants Northport’s Motion to Dismiss.

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The prior cases between these parties in this Court are Gerald & Patricia Woods v.
Northport Public Schools, et al., No. 1:09-cv-243, aff’d in part & vacated in part, 487 F. App’x 968
(6th Cir. 2012); and Gerald & Patricia Woods v. Northport Public School, et al., 1:09-cv-855.

I. BACKGROUND
Few facts are necessary for resolving the motion at bar. T.W., the son born to the Woods on
September 30, 1998, was diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder and cerebral palsy, disabilities that
qualify him for special education and related services under the IDEA, a Spending Clause statute that
seeks to ensure that “all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public
education” (FAPE), 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). “[T]he core of the statute ... is the cooperative
process that it establishes between parents and schools,” and the “central vehicle for this collaboration
is the [Individualized Education Program] IEP process.” Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S.
49, 53 (2005).
In May 2010, the Woods filed a due process hearing request in the Michigan Administrative
Hearing System (MAHS), challenging the June 2008 IEP and alleging that T.W. had not been
afforded FAPE because Northport refused to create an IEP for the summers of 2009 and 2010 and
the 2009-10 and 2010-11 school years. On June 16, 2011, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued
a Decision and Order, denying in part and granting in part the Woods’ complaint (Dkt 1-1, Compl.,
Ex. 1). Specifically, the ALJ reached the following four conclusions: (1) the June 2008 IEP afforded
T.W. a FAPE, and as such, the Woods were not entitled to a remedy on this issue; (2) Northport’s
evaluations were “appropriate” and the Woods were not entitled to be reimbursed for an Independent
Educational Evaluation (IEE) not obtained; (3) Northport’s failure to create an IEP for the summer
of 2009 and the 2009-10 school year, up until February 2, 2010, was not a denial of FAPE; and (4)
Northport’s failure to create an IEP effective from February 2, 2010 until September 10, 2010,
excluding June, July and August of that year, deprived T.W. of a FAPE, but no reimbursement of the

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Woods’ expenses was ordered, “as the private placement was not found to be appropriate” (id. at 112).
On September 14, 2011, Northport initiated this case, presenting the following four counts:
“Appeal of the ALJ Decision under § 1415 of IDEA” (Count I); “Claim for Reimbursement of
Reasonable Attorney’s Fees, Costs and Pre and Post Judgment Interest against John F. Brower
Individually and in his Official Capacity with the Law Office of John F. Brower, PLC under 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(i)(3)(B)(II)” (Count II); “Claim for Reimbursement of Reasonable Attorney’s Fees, Costs and
Pre and Post Judgment Interest against Parents under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(III)” (Count III);
and “Claim for Reimbursement of Reasonable Attorney’s Fees, Costs and Pre and Post Judgment
Interest against John F. Brower, Individually and in his Official Capacity with the Law Office of John
F. Brower, PLC under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(III)” (Count IV).
On January 24, 2012, the Woods filed an Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and a Counterclaim
Complaint for Declaratory, Equitable and Monetary Relief (Dkt 23). In their Counterclaim, the
Woods present the following four counts: “Partial Appeal of ALJ Harris Decision and Order Parents’
Hearing Request (Hearing A)” (Count I); “Appeal of ALJ Harris Decision and Order Northport’s IEE
Hearing Request (Hearing B)” (Count II); “Claim for Reimbursement of Prevailing Parents’
Attorney’s Fees, Costs and Interest for the Hearing They Requested (Hearing A) and Preservation
of Rights to Claim Reimbursement of the Parents’ Attorney’s Fees, Costs and Interest for the Hearing
Northport Requested (Hearing B)” (Count III); and “Request for Declaratory Judgment” (Count IV).
Following this Court’s Pre-Motion Conference on February 28, 2012, this Court issued an
Order permitting the parties to brief Northport’s proposed dispositive motion to dismiss the Woods’
Counterclaim (Dkt 43). The parties filed the instant motion papers in September 2012 (Dkts 71-75).
Having conducted a Pre-Motion Conference in this matter and having now fully considered the
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parties’ written briefs and accompanying exhibits, the Court finds that the relevant facts and
arguments are adequately presented in these materials and that oral argument would not aid the
decisional process. See W.D. Mich. LCivR 7.2(d).
II. ANALYSIS
According to Northport, the Woods’ “Counterclaim” is, in reality, a time-barred appeal of the
ALJ’s June 16, 2011 Decision and Order (Dkt 72 at 5). Northport requests that this Court therefore
dismiss the Counterclaim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) and/or for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) (id.).
The Court turns first to Northport’s argument under FED . R. CIV . P. 12(b)(1) that this Court
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the Woods’ Counterclaim. “Federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction.” Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
701 (1982). Indeed, the Court is obliged to dismiss an action “at any time” it decides that “it lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction.” FED . R. CIV . P. 12(h)(3). “When the defendant challenges subject matter
jurisdiction through a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction.”
Angel v. Kentucky, 314 F.3d 262, 264 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Hedgepeth v. Tennessee, 215 F.3d
608, 611 (6th Cir. 2000)). “In reviewing a 12(b)(1) motion, the court may consider evidence outside
the pleadings to resolve factual disputes concerning jurisdiction, and both parties are free to
supplement the record by affidavits.” Nichols v. Muskingum Coll., 318 F.3d 674, 677 (6th Cir.
2003).
This Court has original jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The IDEA provides, in pertinent part, that an
aggrieved party “shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint presented
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pursuant to this section, which action may be brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction or
in a district court of the United States, without regard to the amount in controversy.” 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(i)(2)(A). The IDEA further provides that “[t]he party bringing the action shall have 90 days
from the date of the decision of the hearing officer to bring such an action, or, if the State has an
explicit time limitation for bringing such action under this subchapter, in such time as the State law
allows.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B). Michigan promulgated a time limitation for bringing such an
action, similarly providing that “[a]ny party who is aggrieved by the final decision in a hearing
conducted under this rule may appeal to a court of competent jurisdiction within 90 days after the
mailing date of the final decision.” MICH. ADMIN . CODE R. 340.1724f(7).
Northport’s argument for dismissal is therefore quite straightforward: dismissal of the
Woods’ Counterclaim is warranted because the Counterclaim was filed 222 days after the ALJ’s
Decision and Order was issued, i.e., 122 days too late (Dkt 71 at ¶ 6). In an attempt to avoid the
conclusion that they were required to file their own appeal within 90 days from the ALJ’s Decision
and Order in order to preserve any claims they wished to present, the Woods seek to characterize
Northport’s initial pleading in this case not as an appeal from an administrative ruling but as an
“original” civil action, in other words, a pleading to which the Woods argue a counterclaim would
then be permitted under MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5823 (Counterclaims) and FED . R. CIV . P. 13(a)
(Compulsory Counterclaim) (Dkt 73 at 11-16).
As an initial matter, the Woods’ characterization of the pleadings is belied by the relief the
parties seek from this Court. Northport seeks to appeal the ALJ’s decision (Count I) and obtain
reimbursement for attorney’s fees and costs associated with the administrative action (Counts II-IV).
Likewise, the Woods seek to appeal the ALJ’s decision (Counts I & II), obtain reimbursement for
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attorney’s fees and costs associated with the administrative action (Count III), and have this Court
enter a declaratory judgment that the Woods are the prevailing party as to the hearings requested in
the administrative action (Count IV). This is not an “original” civil action. To the contrary, given
their claims for relief, these are parties “aggrieved” by the administrative action within the meaning
of IDEA § 1415(i)(2)(A), parties who would have no claims at all absent the underlying
administrative action and Decision and Order by the ALJ.
Moreover, the Woods’ argument in avoidance of dismissal has been previously rejected by
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. In Cleveland Heights-Univ. Heights City Sch. Dist. v. Boss By
& Through Boss, 144 F.3d 391, 396 (6th Cir. 1998), after the school district filed an appeal from a
decision of the State Level Review Officer (SLRO), the parents—the Bosses—filed a cross-appeal
challenging the SLRO’s denial of reimbursement. Like Northport’s argument for dismissal here, the
school district argued that the Bosses’ Cross-Appeal was time-barred because it was filed
seventy-eight days after the SLRO’s ruling and, under the applicable Ohio statute, was required to
be filed within forty-five days. Id. The district court denied the school district’s motion to dismiss,
but the Sixth Circuit reversed the decision. Employing the same straightforward analysis that
Northport advocates here, the Sixth Circuit succinctly reasoned that “[b]ecause the Bosses’
cross-appeal of the SLRO’s ruling regarding the 1993-94 school year was filed in the district court
seventy-eight days after the decision was issued, it was indeed untimely. Therefore, the district court
did not, and we do not, have jurisdiction to review the SLRO’s ruling denying the Bosses
reimbursement for the 1993-94 school year.” Id. at 397.
It is clear from the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Boss that if a party does not comply with the
applicable deadlines for filing an IDEA appeal, then the district court must dismiss the case for a lack
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of subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Horen v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Toledo Pub. Sch. Dist., No.
3:12CV00187, 2012 WL 3808902, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 8, 2012) (declining to grant the plaintiff
“a reprieve from [the deadline’s] constraints because the appeal was merely a day late”); Children’s
Ctr. for Developmental Enrichment v. Machle, No. 2:08-CV-817, 2009 WL 585817, at *5 (S.D.
Ohio Mar. 6, 2009) )(granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s appeal and its request
for attorney fees for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction where the plaintiff filed its action 169 days
after entry of the SLRO’s Final Decision) aff’d, 612 F.3d 518 (6th Cir. 2010). Like these district
courts, this Court is bound by the holding in Boss, not the holdings in the out-of-circuit cases to
which the Woods direct this Court.
Last, as for the Woods’ “fairness” argument—that barring a purported related-back
counterclaim penalizes them and “rewards aggressive litigation” (Dkt 73 at 17-19), the relevant
inquiry is not fairness, but merely timing. See Horen, 2012 WL 3808902, at *2 (observing that
“[t]here is no indication in either the authorizing statute or in any case law that the procedural
deadline here is flexible depending on whether it caused prejudice to the opposing party”). In any
event, the Court does not agree that the result is unfair. Each party to an administrative action has
a responsibility to independently determine the strengths or weaknesses of its position and the
strategic or tactical advantages in either appealing or accepting the ALJ’s decision. The Woods chose
not to file an appeal within 90 days from the ALJ’s June 16, 2011 decision, and the Woods, who bear
the burden of establishing this Court’s jurisdiction over their Counterclaim, have not shown that their
January 24, 2012 Counterclaim was timely filed.

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Having decided that dismissal under FED . R. CIV . P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction is proper, the Court declines to address Northport’s alternative argument for dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court determines that Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs’ Counterclaim (Dkt 71) is properly granted. An Order
will be entered consistent with this Opinion.

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Date: February __, 2013

/s/ Janet T. Neff
JANET T. NEFF
United States District Judge

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