Bruemmer et al v. Reardon et al
Filing
117
OPINION ; signed by Judge Robert Holmes Bell (Judge Robert Holmes Bell, kcb)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
MARLA M. BRUEMMER and
DESIGN EVOLUTIONS, INC.,
Plaintiffs,
File No. 1:11-CV-988
v.
HON. ROBERT HOLMES BELL
TOM SCOTT d/b/a T.A. SCOTT
CONSTRUCTION, INC. and
DON CHAPMAN,
Defendants.
/
OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion to alter or amend judgment based
on an allegedly inconsistent jury verdict. (Dkt. No. 113.)
The jury in this copyright infringement case returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs
and against Defendant Chapman in the amount of $5,600, and a verdict of “no cause” in
favor of Defendant Tom Scott, d/b/a T.A. Scott Construction, Inc. (Dkt. No. 109, Verdict;
Dkt. No. 110, J.) Plaintiffs contend that it was inconsistent for the jury to find that the
designer infringed, but that the builder did not. Plaintiffs request the Court to amend the
judgment to find Defendant Scott responsible for infringement and to award $77,565.01,
Defendant Scott’s profit from the infringement, as damages. In the alternative, Plaintiffs
request the Court to grant a new trial on all issues.
Plaintiffs’ motion will be denied. As a preliminary matter, Plaintiffs waived the right
to challenge the verdict by failing to raise the issue of inconsistency before the jury was
excused. See Nolfi v. Oh. Ky. Oil Corp., 675 F.3d 538, 551 (6th Cir. 2012) (affirming the
finding that the plaintiffs waived their right to challenge the verdict as inconsistent because
they did not move under Rule 49(b) to have the jury further consider its answers); Radvansky
v. City of Olmsted Falls, 496 F.3d 609, 618 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that the purpose of
requiring a party to make its Rule 49(b) objection prior to the discharge of the jury is to allow
the original jury to eliminate any inconsistencies without the need to present the evidence to
a new jury). Moreover, even if the issue of inconsistent verdicts is properly before this
Court, Plaintiffs’ motion must be denied for lack of merit.
“[A] district court may alter a judgment under Rule 59 based on (1) a clear error of
law; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) an intervening change in controlling law; or (4) a
need to prevent manifest injustice.” Nolfi, 675 F.3d at 551-52 (citing Leisure Caviar, LLC
v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 616 F.3d 612, 615 (6th Cir. 2010)). Plaintiffs contend that the
judgment in this case should be amended because of a clear error of law and a need to
prevent manifest injustice.
Plaintiffs’ alleged error of law is based on this Court’s answer to a jury question.
During deliberations the jury asked: “If it is reasonable to infer that an individual knowingly
creates (or has created) a structure based on an infringed copyright, should said individual
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be held liable?” The Court responded: “Please review jury instructions 17.3 1 and 17.13 2 .”
Plaintiffs contend that the jury was looking for an instruction “that a building can be an
1
Instruction 17.3 provided as follows:
Copyright law allows the author of an original work to prevent others
from copying the way or form the author used to express the ideas in the
author’s work. Only the particular expression of an idea can be copyrighted.
Copyright law does not give the author the right to prevent others from
copying or using the underlying ideas contained in the work, such as any
procedures, processes, systems, methods of operation, concepts, principles or
discoveries.
The right to exclude others from copying extends only to how the
author expressed the ideas in the copyrighted work. The copyright is not
violated when someone uses an idea from a copyrighted work, as long as the
particular expression of that idea in the work is not copied.
2
Instruction 17.13 provided as follows:
A copyright owner is entitled to exclude others from creating derivative
works based upon the owner’s copyrighted work. The term derivative work
refers to a work based on one or more pre-existing works, such as a
reproduction, abridgement, condensation, or any other form in which the
pre-existing work is recast, transformed, or adapted. Accordingly, the owner
of a copyrighted work is entitled to exclude others from recasting,
transforming or adapting the copyrighted work without the owner’s
permission.
If the copyright owner exercises the right to create or allow others to
create a derivative work based upon the copyrighted work, this derivative work
may also be copyrighted. Only what was newly created, such as the editorial
revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications to the pre-existing
work, is considered to be the derivative work.
Copyright protection of a derivative work covers only the contribution
made by the author of the derivative work. If the derivative work incorporates
pre-existing work by others, or work in the public domain, the derivative
author’s protection is limited to elements added by the derivative author to the
pre-existing work.
The owner of a derivative work may enforce the right to exclude others
in an action for copyright infringement.
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infringement of a copyright,” and that because the Court did not clearly instruct that a
building can be an infringement of a copyright, the jury was improperly left to speculate on
the law.
Plaintiffs have not shown a clear error of law. First, Plaintiffs do not contend that the
Court misstated the law. Second, it is presumptuous for Plaintiffs to suggest that they know
what the jury wanted in response to the question. Third, Plaintiffs approved the Court’s jury
instructions as well as the Court’s response to this jury question. Fourth, the jury instructions
taken as a whole, together with the manner in which the case was tried, adequately informed
the jury that a building can be an infringement of a copyright.
In the alternative, Plaintiffs contend that because the jury found that Chapman
infringed, and because it was uncontested that Scott used Chapman’s plans to build the home,
the finding that Scott did not infringe is manifestly unjust.
Where the alleged manifest injustice is based on inconsistencies in a jury verdict, the
court has an “obligation to attempt to reconcile the alleged inconsistent jury verdicts.”
Frohmuth v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 101 F. App’x 56, 59 (6th
Cir. 2004); see also Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines. Ltd., 369 U.S. 355,
364 (1962) (“Where there is a view of the case that makes the jury’s answers to special
interrogatories consistent, they must be resolved that way.”); Morales v. Am. Honda Motor
Co., Inc., 151 F.3d 500, 509 (6th Cir. 1998) (“When faced with a claim that a verdict is
inconsistent, ‘we look for a reasonable way to read the answers to interrogatories as
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expressing a coherent and reasonable view of the case.’” (quoting Tipton v. Michelin Tire
Co., 101 F.3d 1145, 1148 (6th Cir.1996))).
There are many ways to reconcile the jury’s finding of infringement as to Chapman
but not as to Scott. The evidence included substantial testimony and exhibits comparing
Plaintiffs’ drawings to Dunn’s drawings, Chapman’s drawings, other constructed homes, and
to the house that was finally constructed by Scott on behalf of the Reardons. There are any
number of explanations that might account for the jury’s conclusion that Scott’s construction
did not infringe. The jury may have concluded that Scott’s construction differed substantially
from the Chapman design such that there was no infringement. The jury may have found that
the homeowners were entitled under their unwritten contract with Plaintiffs to use the work
they paid for to build one home. The jury may have found that Scott ultimately relied on
something other than the Chapman design to build the home. Any one of these explanations
would support the verdict. There is no inherent inconsistency or manifest injustice in
allowing this verdict to stand.
In the alternative, Plaintiffs have requested a new trial. The Court is authorized to
grant a new trial “for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an
action at law in federal court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). According to the Sixth Circuit:
a new trial is warranted when a jury has reached a “seriously erroneous result”
as evidenced by: (1) the verdict being against the weight of the evidence; (2)
the damages being excessive; or (3) the trial being unfair to the moving party
in some fashion, i.e., the proceedings being influenced by prejudice or bias.
Chiaverini, Inc. v. Frenchie’s Fine Jewelry, Coins & Stamps, Inc., 345 F. App’x 58, 60-61
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(6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Holmes v. City of Massillon, 78 F.3d 1041, 1045-46 (6th Cir. 1996)).
There is no need for a new trial. The Court is not convinced that the jury reached a
“seriously erroneous result.” Plaintiffs had their day in court. The verdict was not against
the weight of the evidence and there is no showing that the trial was unfair to Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs were not prevented from arguing their theory of the case, and the jury instructions
largely mirrored those requested by Plaintiffs. Finally, the Court was impressed with the
exceptional education, intelligence, and thoughtfulness of the jury that was empaneled to
hear this case. For all these reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion to alter or amend judgment or for new
trial (Dkt. No. 113) will be denied.
An order consistent with this opinion will be entered.
Dated: April 10, 2013
/s/ Robert Holmes Bell
ROBERT HOLMES BELL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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