Luna #234955 v. Palmer
Filing
37
OPINION AND ORDER APPROVING AND ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 35 ; denying objections 36 ; denying petition 1 ; denying a certificate of appealability as to each issue asserted; Judgment to issue; signed by Judge Janet T. Neff (Judge Janet T. Neff, rmw)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ALFREDO JAVIER LUNA,
Petitioner,
Case No. 1:11-cv-1018
v.
HON. JANET T. NEFF
CARMEN D. PALMER,
Respondent.
_______________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER
This is a habeas corpus petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter was referred
to the Magistrate Judge, who issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R) recommending that this
Court deny the petition. The matter is presently before the Court on Petitioner’s objections to the
Report and Recommendation. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and FED. R. CIV. P.
72(b)(3), the Court has performed de novo consideration of those portions of the Report and
Recommendation to which objections have been made. The Court denies the objections and issues
this Opinion and Order. The Court will also issue a Judgment in this § 2254 proceeding. See Gillis
v. United States, 729 F.3d 641, 643 (6th Cir. 2013) (requiring a separate judgment in habeas
proceedings).
I.
Procedural Default
Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that his Confrontation Clause claims
(Grounds II and III) are procedurally defaulted and may not be reviewed by this Court. Petitioner
fails to demonstrate any error in the Magistrate Judge’s analysis or conclusion. Moreover,
Petitioner’s disjointed series of bare assertions lack merit because Petitioner fails to address, much
less satisfy, the relevant legal tests for relief.
First, Petitioner appears to assert that this Court, by denying his motion to stay these
proceedings, has impeded his ability to demonstrate cause excusing his procedural default of his
Confrontation Clause claims. It is true that this Court denied Petitioner’s motions to stay the
proceedings for Petitioner to return to state court to exhaust his ineffective assistance of counsel
claims. However, Petitioner’s objection disregards the fact that the motions were denied due to
Petitioner’s own failure, on two separate occasions, to satisfy the requirements necessary under
Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277-78 (2005) for a stay to be granted (R&R, Dkt 35 at 31 n.5).
Thus, contrary to Petitioner’s argument, the fault rests wholly with Petitioner, not with this Court,
and the Magistrate Judge properly concluded that Petitioner did not demonstrate cause excusing his
procedural default (see R&R, Dkt 35 at 31).1
Second, Petitioner contends that “it would be manifestly unjust to now deny him de novo
review of Grounds II and III” (Pet’r Obj., Dkt 36 at 4). Petitioner’s bare, conclusory assertion again
fails to satisfy the appropriate legal standard. Petitioner can overcome the procedural default under
the miscarriage-of-justice exception only by showing that, “in light of new evidence, it is more likely
than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
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Additionally, with respect to the procedural posture of the case, Petitioner “objects to the
Magistrate’s statement that ‘he has not explained his failure to object’” and contends that this Court
prevented him from showing ineffective assistance of counsel (Pet’r Obj., Dkt 36 at 2). As the Court
has stated multiple times throughout this proceeding, Petitioner has failed to show that his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim is even potentially meritorious (see Dkt 10 at 2-3; Dkt 11;
R&R, Dkt 35 at 31 n.5). Here again, Petitioner merely alleges that trial and appellate counsel were
ineffective, without providing any analysis. Considered in context, the Magistrate Judge’s statement
was not inaccurate. Regardless, the objection to the Magistrate Judge’s statement is immaterial to
the merits of Petitioner’s claims.
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(R&R, Dkt 35 at 29, citing House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536 (2006)). Here, Petitioner has not
provided any new evidence. In his objection, Petitioner merely reasserts that his procedurally
defaulted Confrontation Clause claims are meritorious (Pet’r Obj., Dkt 36 at 4). Petitioner’s
objections fail to demonstrate any error in the Magistrate Judge’s analysis or conclusion. Therefore,
the Magistrate Judge properly concluded that Petitioner “cannot demonstrate manifest injustice
caused by the procedural default” (R&R, Dkt 35 at 31).
In sum, the Magistrate Judge properly concluded that Petitioner’s claims for relief under
Grounds II and III were procedurally defaulted.
II.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Petitioner argues that the Magistrate Judge improperly concluded that there was sufficient
evidence to sustain Petitioner’s convictions (Pet’r Obj., Dkt 36 at 4).
Petitioner’s argument is without merit. In Petitioner’s view, “[t]he evidence against him was
characterized by uncertainties and discrepancies, was patently incredible and in some instances
impossible” (id. at 5). Petitioner contends that the evidence tells the story of an impulsive killing
rather than a premeditated murder. Petitioner’s argument demonstrates only that the evidence at trial
may have been susceptible to more than one interpretation. But as the Magistrate Judge properly
stated, the Jackson standard “recognizes the trier of fact’s responsibility to resolve reasonable
conflicts in testimony, to weigh evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to
ultimate facts” (R&R, Dkt 35 at 20, citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).
Petitioner’s assertion that “the modicum of evidence necessary to satisfy the Due Process
Clause is itself a federal question” (Pet’r Obj., Dkt 36 at 4, citing Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S. Ct.
2060 (2012)) misunderstands the standard of review that the habeas court must apply. In Coleman,
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the Supreme Court reversed a Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision to overturn the petitioner’s
conviction. 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2065 (2012). The Supreme Court stated that “[u]nder the deferential
federal standard, the approach taken by the Court of Appeals was flawed because it unduly impinged
on the jury’s role as factfinder …. This deferential standard does not permit the type of fine-grained
factual parsing in which the Court of Appeals engaged.” Id. at 2064.
Here, Petitioner expressly asks this Court to take the approach that the Supreme Court found
to be flawed in Coleman: to interfere with the jury’s role as factfinder and resolve discrepancies that
were already resolved by the jury at Petitioner’s trial. The Supreme Court has been clear about the
role of the habeas court:
[T]he critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
criminal conviction must be . . . to determine whether the record evidence could
reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But this inquiry
does not require a court to “ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial
established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19 (quoting Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 282 (1966)).
Petitioner’s contention that the Court “must conduct a ‘meticulous review of the record’ in
order to determine if there was sufficient evidence presented in the case” (Pet’r Obj., Dkt 36 at 4,
citing Nash v. Oberlin, 437 F.3d 519 (6th Cir. 2006)) similarly fails to demonstrate any factual or
legal error in the Magistrate Judge’s analysis or conclusion. First, the Magistrate Judge reviewed
both the record and the state courts’ decisions under the proper standard of review, noting that
deference is accorded to both the trier-of-fact’s verdict, under Jackson, and to the state court’s
consideration of the verdict, under the AEDPA (R&R, Dkt 35 at 20-21, quoting Davis v. Lafler, 658,
F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 2011)). And second, the Magistrate Judge cited specific evidence from the
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trial court record that supported both the jury’s verdict and the Michigan Court of Appeals’ rejection
of Petitioner’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim (R&R, Dkt 35 at 23-24).
In sum, the Magistrate Judge properly concluded that it was not unreasonable for the
Michigan Court of Appeals to determine that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt (R&R, Dkt 35 at 20, 24, citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319).
III.
Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause
Lastly, Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that his claimed entitlement
to free Spanish translation of his trial transcripts, under the Equal Protection and Due Process
clauses, did not warrant habeas relief (Pet’r Obj., Dkt 36 at 5). Petitioner in essence asserts that he
was at a disadvantage during his appeal because he did not understand his trial transcripts, which
were in English and provided to him at no cost. He argues that his rights to equal protection and due
process were violated because could not afford to have his transcripts translated from English into
Spanish, his native language, and the state did not provide him with free translation services.
Petitioner insists that, under Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), he was entitled to free translation
of his trial transcripts into his native language because “[t]he whole purpose of Griffin was to ensure
that all prisoners were on equal footing when taking an authorized state court appeal” (Pet’r Obj.,
Dkt 36 at 6).
Petitioner fails to demonstrate any legal or factual error in the Magistrate Judge’s analysis
or conclusion. Only a state court’s violation or unreasonable application of a clearly established
holding of the Supreme Court can justify habeas relief (R&R, Dkt 35 at 32, citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d): Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). Griffin does not discuss transcript-
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translation services. Petitioner’s focus on analyzing the intent of the Griffin Court in an attempt to
demonstrate that Griffin should be extended to translation services (see Pet’r Obj., Dkt 36 at 6)
underscores that the clearly established holding of Griffin does not require transcripts to be
translated into an indigent defendant’s native language. Petitioner has not pointed to any clearly
established Supreme Court holding that was violated or unreasonably applied in this case.
Therefore, the Magistrate Judge properly concluded that the Michigan Court of Appeals did
not violate or unreasonably apply a clearly established holding of the Supreme Court by deciding
that the constitution did not guarantee Petitioner free translation of his trial transcripts.
IV.
Conclusion
Having determined Petitioner’s objections lack merit, the Court must further determine
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) whether to grant a certificate of appealability as to the issues raised.
See RULES GOVERNING § 2254 CASES, Rule 11 (requiring the district court to “issue or deny a
certificate of appealability when it enters a final order”). The Court must review the issues
individually. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000); Murphy v. Ohio, 263 F.3d 466, 466-67 (6th
Cir. 2001).
“Where a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing
required to satisfy § 2253(c) is straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable
jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.”
Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. Upon review, this Court finds that reasonable jurists would not find the
Court’s assessment of Petitioner’s claims debatable or wrong. A certificate of appealability will
therefore be denied as to Petitioner’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence, equal protection, and due process
claims.
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“When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the
prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a certificate of appealability should issue when the
prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a
valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable
whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. Where a plain
procedural bar is present and the district court is correct to invoke it to dispose of the case, a
reasonable jurist could not conclude either that the district court erred in dismissing the petition or
that the petitioner should be allowed to proceed further.” Id. Upon review, this Court finds that
reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s procedural ruling debatable as to each issue asserted.
A certificate of appealability will therefore also be denied as to Petitioner’s procedurally defaulted
Confrontation Clause claims.
Accordingly:
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s Objections (Dkt 36) are DENIED, and
the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (Dkt 35) is APPROVED and ADOPTED
as the Opinion of the Court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petition for habeas corpus relief (Dkt 1) is DENIED
for the reasons stated in the Report and Recommendation.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a certificate of appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c) is DENIED as to each issue asserted.
Dated: December 1, 2014
/s/ Janet T. Neff
JANET T. NEFF
United States District Judge
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