Sandy-Crowell et al v. Verspeeten Cartage, Ltd. et al

Filing 25

OPINION; signed by Judge Gordon J. Quist (Judge Gordon J. Quist, jmt)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
__________________________

SUSAN ANNETTE SANDY-CROWELL,
JILLIAN LEE CROWELL, and JAMES
CROWELL,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Case No. 1:12-CV-198

VERSPEETEN CARTAGE, LTD., and
STANISLAW-LESEK WOJNAS,

HON. GORDON J. QUIST

Defendants.
__________________________________/

OPINION
On March 2, 2012, Plaintiffs, Susan Annette Sandy-Crowell, Jillian Crowell, and James
Crowell, filed a complaint against Defendants, Verspeeten Cartage, Ltd. (Verspeeten) and
Stanislaw-Lesek Wojnas. The complaint stems from an accident between a vehicle containing two
Plaintiffs, Susan and Jillian, and a vehicle driven by Wojnas, who is Verspeeten’s employee. The
four-count complaint alleges: negligence (Count I); loss of consortium (Count II); statutory and
vicarious liability (Count III); and, willful and wanton misconduct, and gross negligence (Count
IV).1
Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss Count IV of Plaintiffs’ Complaint. (Docket no.
10.) Plaintiffs have filed a response, to which Defendants have filed a reply. (Docket nos. 15 &18.)
The parties requested oral argument, but the Court does not think that oral argument would be
helpful. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion will be granted in part and denied in

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Besides numerically, none of the Counts are labeled. From what this Court can tell, these are the labels that
Plaintiffs would have attached to each Count.

part. The motion will be granted insofar as Plaintiffs seek to recover exemplary damages.
Defendants’ motion will be denied as to Count IV.
I. ALLEGATIONS
In July, 2010, Susan Crowell was driving her vehicle westbound on Interstate 94 (I-94) near
Battle Creek, Michigan. Jillian Crowell, Susan’s sixteen-year-old daughter, was in the passenger
seat next to her mother. Wojnas, Verspeeten’s employee, was driving a semi-truck on I-94 in the
same direction as Susan and Jillian were traveling.
At the time, I-94, just east of Battle Creek, was under construction. The construction zone
was appropriately marked and signed. The Crowells’ vehicle came to a stop in the construction
zone. While the Crowells were stopped, Wojnas crashed his vehicle into the rear of the Crowells’
vehicle causing a “violent and disastrous” collision. (Compl. ¶ 14.) Both Susan and Jillian suffered
severe injuries.
Defendants’ instant motion seeks to dismiss solely Count IV. In Count IV, Plaintiffs allege:
27.
The actions of Defendant Wojnas were so outrageous, willful and wanton,
and grossly negligent that compensatory damages alone are not sufficient to
compensate Plaintiffs.
28.
The willful and wanton, grossly negligent and reckless behavior of
Defendant Wojnas was exhibited through his failure to pay attention and failure to
keep his vehicle under control in spite of many warnings and the knowledge, actual
or imputed, that vehicles ahead of him were slowing or stopped because of the
construction zone.
(Id. ¶¶ 27 & 28.)
II. MOTION STANDARD
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails to give the defendant fair
notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual
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allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1964-65; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949
(2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S. Ct. at
1974. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft,
556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Availability of Exemplary Damages
Exemplary damages are awarded to compensate for mental anguish, humiliation, outrage,
or increased injury to a person’s feelings that he or she suffered due to the defendant’s willful,
malicious, or wanton conduct or reckless disregard for the plaintiff’s rights. Peisner v. Detroit Free
Press, 421 Mich. 125, 136, 364 N.W.2d 600, 606 (1984). “To establish that they are entitled to
exemplary damages, plaintiffs must establish that the act giving rise to the damages is voluntary, that
the voluntary act inspired feelings of humiliation, outrage, and indignity, and that the conduct was
malicious or so willful and wanton as to demonstrate a reckless disregard of plaintiffs’ rights.”
Ramik v. Darling Int’l, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 2d 680, 684-85 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (citing Veselenak v.
Smith, 414 Mich. 567, 574, 327 N.W.2d 261, 264 (1982)). “When compensatory damages can make
the injured party whole, [the Michigan Supreme Court] has denied exemplary damages.” HayesAlbion Corp. v. Kuberski, 421 Mich. 170, 187, 364 N.W.2d 609, 617 (1984).
“A plaintiff claiming damages for mental and emotional distress will not be entitled to
exemplary damages if mental and emotional damages are included as part of compensatory
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damages.” Phillips v. Butterball Farms Co., 448 Mich. 239, 251 n.32, 531 N.W.2d 144, 149 n.32
(1995). The key to recovering exemplary damages in addition to compensatory damages for mental
anguish is explicit language in a statute providing for exemplary damages. See Peisner, 421 Mich.
at 134 n.10, 364 N.W.2d at 605 n.10.
Here, Plaintiffs cite no statutory authority that would allow them to recover exemplary
damages in addition to compensatory damages for mental anguish and suffering. In addition,
Plaintiffs allege no facts, besides speculation that facts may be uncovered, to show that they could
recover non-duplicative exemplary damages. Hence, the complaint does not contain facts to show
that Plaintiffs could plausibly recover non-duplicative exemplary damages. See Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570, 127 S. Ct. at 1974. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ claim for exemplary damages will be dismissed.
See Sweitzer v. Pinnacle Airlines, Inc., 2010 WL 1949613, at *4 (W.D. Mich. May 13, 2010)
(granting summary judgment on a claim for exemplary damages because the plaintiffs “may recover
damages for mental distress and anguish as part of their compensatory damage claim, and they fail
to address why exemplary damages would not be duplicative in this case”).2
Although Plaintiffs cannot recover duplicative exemplary damages, this is not a reason to
dismiss Count IV. Count IV is a claim for willful and wanton misconduct and gross negligence.
Therefore, Defendants’ motion to dismiss – insofar as Plaintiffs seeks to recover exemplary damages
– will be granted, but Count IV will not be dismissed.
B. Willful and Wanton Misconduct and Gross Negligence
Count IV states that Wojnas’ actions were “willful and wanton, and grossly negligent.”
(Compl. ¶ 27.) Plaintiffs allege that the construction zone where the accident occurred was

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Plaintiffs can move to amend if they uncover a factual and legal basis to support non-duplicative exemplary

damages.

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“appropriately marked, signed and appropriate warnings were posted.” (Id. ¶ 9.) Further, Plaintiffs
allege that Wojnas “fail[ed] to pay attention and fail[ed] to keep his vehicle under control in spite
of many warnings and the knowledge, actual or imputed, that vehicles ahead of him were slowing
or stopped because of the construction zone.” (Id. ¶ 28.)
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs do not plead sufficient facts to state a claim for gross
negligence or for willful and wanton misconduct. Gross negligence is “conduct so reckless as to
demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results.” M.C.L.A. § 600.2945(d);
Xu v. Gay, 257 Mich. App. 263, 269, 668 N.W.2d 166, 169-70 (citing Jennings v. Southwood, 446
Mich. 125, 136, 521 N.W.2d 230, 235 (1994)). To state a claim for willful and wanton misconduct,
Plaintiffs must allege “an intent to harm or, if not that, such indifference to whether harm will result
as to be the equivalent of a willingness that it does.” Jennings, 446 Mich. at 138, 521 N.W.2d at 236
(quotation omitted).
Defendants’ motion will be denied because, taking Plaintiffs’ factual allegations are true, it
is plausible that Wojnas’ actions amounted to gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct.
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S. Ct. at 1974. Contrary to what Defendants argue, the
allegations amount to more than a moment of inattentiveness. Plaintiffs allege that Wojnas failed
to pay attention to “many” warnings and failed to control his vehicle despite knowing of stopped
cars ahead of him. A reasonable juror might conclude, especially in the light of the fact that Wojnas
drove the vehicle as his job, that ignoring many construction signs and stopped cars on a highway
could amount to a “substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results,” see M.C.L.A. §
600.2945(d), or “such indifference to whether harm will result as to be the equivalent of a
willingness that it does.” See Jennings, 446 Mich. at 138, 521 N.W.2d at 236 (quotation omitted).
Therefore, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count IV will be denied.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be granted insofar as Plaintiffs’ complaint seeks
exemplary damages. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count IV will be denied because Count IV
states a claim for gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct.
A separate Order will issue.

Dated: August 13, 2012

/s/ Gordon J. Quist
GORDON J. QUIST
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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