Langford #156621 v. Klee
Filing
55
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 53 re 22 : Petitioner's Amended Petition 22 is DENIED and Petitioner's Objection 54 is OVERRULED; case closed; signed by Judge Gordon J. Quist (Judge Gordon J. Quist, jmt)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
__________________________
ROBERT LANGFORD,
Petitioner,
v.
Case No. 1:12-CV-311
PAUL KLEE,
HON. GORDON J. QUIST
Respondent.
_________________________/
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner, Robert Langford, has filed Objections to Magistrate Judge Hugh Brenneman’s
March 23, 2015 Report and Recommendation (R & R) (dkt. # 53), in which the magistrate judge
recommends that the Court deny the habeas corpus petition. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1),
upon receiving objections to a report and recommendation, the district judge “shall make a de novo
determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to
which objection is made.” After conducting a de novo review of the R & R, the Court will adopt
the R & R and overrule Petitioner’s Objections.
Petitioner appears to object to the magistrate judge’s description of the evidence, which
merely summarized the witness testimony and other evidence presented at trial. While Petitioner
may not agree with the substance of that evidence, that is not a proper objection for this Court.
Accordingly, Petitioner’s objection is overruled.
Petitioner argues that his due process rights were violated by the trial court’s failure to
provide a jury instruction on non-deadly force. As the Michigan Court of Appeals explained,
Petitioner waived such claim by failing to object to the jury instructions at trial. Thus, the state court
analyzed Petitioner’s claim for plain error and determined that that the trial court’s failure to give
the instruction did not affect Petitioner’s substantial rights. That conclusion was not contrary to, nor
did it involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. See Horton v. Warden,
Trumbull Corr. Inst., 498 F. App’x 515, 523-24 (6th Cir. 2012) (concluding that the state court did
not unreasonably apply federal law in concluding that the petitioner’s due process rights were not
violated by the failure to provide a self-defense instruction); Grimes v. Wells, No. 91-1532, 1991
WL 270830, at *3 (6th Cir. Dec. 17, 1991) (per curiam) (concluding that “the trial judge’s failure
to sua sponte instruct the jury as to a possible defense did not prejudice petitioner’s due process
rights”). Moreover, Petitioner’s claim was procedurally defaulted because he failed to object to the
instruction at trial, and the Michigan Court of Appeals enforced the contemporaneous objection rule
by reviewing only for plain error.1 See Goodwin v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 301, 315 (6th Cir. 2011)
(finding that the petitioner procedurally defaulted his claim related to a jury instruction because his
attorney did not object at trial and the state court conducted only a plain error review); Lancaster
v. Adams, 324 F.3d 423, 437 (6th Cir. 2003) (same). Accordingly, this objection is overruled.
Petitioner argues that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to convict him of carrying
a weapon with unlawful intent, arguing that he purchased the box cutter intending to use it for a job.
The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected that argument, explaining that it was irrelevant that
Petitioner may have intended to use the box cutter in a lawful matter when he obtained it. The state
court thus concluded that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Petitioner had the
1
To the extent that Petitioner claims that ineffective assistance of counsel caused him to procedurally default
his claim, this argument fails. In order to qualify as cause for a procedural default, a petitioner must demonstrate an
independent claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. See Goodwin, 632 F.3d at 316. Because Petitioner cannot
demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel’s performance, however, he cannot make out a claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel.
2
requisite intent. The state court’s interpretation of state law is binding on this Court. See Bradshaw
v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76, 126 S. Ct. 602, 604 (2005). Moreover, the state court’s conclusion that
there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that Petitioner intended to use the box cutter as
a weapon was entirely reasonable. Accordingly, Petitioner’s objection is overruled.
Petitioner objects to the magistrate judge’s conclusion that Petitioner’s constitutional rights
were not violated when the trial court judge denied his for-cause challenge to a juror. Petitioner
appears to argue that his attorney made the decision not to exercise a peremptory challenge for the
juror, and that Petitioner should not be held responsible for such decision. However, “it is a wellaccepted principle that, except in a few carefully defined circumstances, a criminal defendant is
bound by his attorney’s tactical decisions unless the attorney provided constitutionally ineffective
assistance.” Dist. Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 86, 129 S. Ct.
2308, 2330 (2009). Accordingly, this objection is overruled.2
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), the Court must also determine whether a certificate of
appealability should be granted. A certificate should issue if a petitioner has demonstrated “a
substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right.” Id. The Sixth Circuit has disapproved
issuance of blanket denials of a certificate of appealability. Murphy v. Ohio, 263 F.3d 466, 467 (6th
Cir. 2001). Rather, the district court must “engage in a reasoned assessment of each claim” to
determine whether a certificate is warranted. Id. at 467. Each issue must be considered under the
standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 120 S. Ct. 1595
2
To the extent that Petitioner has raised other objections that are not detailed in this Order, the Court overrules
those objections.
3
(2000). Murphy, 263 F.3d at 467. Consequently, this Court has examined Petitioner’s claims under
the Slack standard.
Under Slack, 529 U.S. at 484, 120 S. Ct. at 1604, to warrant a grant of the certificate, “[t]he
petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that
reasonable jurists could not find that this Court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s claims was debatable or
wrong. Thus, the Court will deny Petitioner a certificate of appealability.
Therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (dkt. #53) is ADOPTED
as the Opinion of the Court, and Petitioner’s Amended Petition (dkt. # 22) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Objection to the R & R (dkt. #54) is
OVERRULED.
This case is concluded.
A separate judgment will issue.
Dated: June 26, 2015
/s/ Gordon J. Quist
GORDON J. QUIST
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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