Sine #725312 v. Pandya et al

Filing 9

OPINION ; signed by Judge Robert J. Jonker (Judge Robert J. Jonker, ymc)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

GIOVANNA MONET SINE,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:12-cv-344

v.

Honorable Robert J. Jonker

HARESH PANDYA et al.,
Defendants.
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OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any
prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro
se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s
allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504
U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure
to state a claim against Defendant Pandya. The Court will serve the complaint against Defendants
Hammond, Schultz, Jones, Owen and Collier.

Discussion
I.

Factual allegations

Plaintiff presently is incarcerated at the Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility but
complains of events that occurred at “MRI Correctional Facility, Ionia,” G. Robert Cotton
Correctional Facility and Parnall Correctional Facility.1 (Compl., docket #1, Page ID#4.) In his pro
se complaint, Plaintiff sues Regional Medical Officer Haresh Pandya, Pyschologists/Psychiatrists
Valerie Hammond, Alison Jones and Unknown Collier, and Nurses Donna Owen and Michelle
Schultz.
Plaintiff, a male prisoner, complains that he was wrongly classified with a Gender
Identity Disorder under Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) Policy Directive 04.06.184
(effective Dec. 20, 2010).2 Plaintiff specifically alleges the following (verbatim):
I have been subjected to long-term isolation, confinement, housed in protective
custody for 23 hours of isolation, weight loss, anxiety, depression, harassment, crossgender patdowns, sexual harassment, unnecessary strip searches, prurient viewing;
shower and strip search incidents, discrimination against sex, gender identity, sexual
orientation, disability, size and/or characteristics. The isolation and idleness of G.I.D
combined with the squalor, poor hygiene, temperatures, sexual harassment, hate
speech from civil servants and noise of extremely psychotic prisoners has created an
environment ‘toxic’ to my physical and mental health, suicide thoughts, weight loss,
anxiety-depression, hopelessness. From the beginning of my incarceration at RGC
reception center in Jackson, M.I., I clearly insisted to all medical personnel like
Psych. Mr. Collier, RN Michelle L. Schultz, RN Donna J. Owen, Psych. Allison
Jones and Psych. Valerie Hammond, that I have been an entertainer, female
impersonator, drag queen-show girl as a career/job that is a few hours on the
weekends at bars and clubs in Las Vegas and Phoenix, AZ. Professional medical
officials should know the difference between “Transgender/Transexual” and “Drag
1

The MDOC does not list an “MRI Correctional Facility” in Ionia County. Because Plaintiff lists Defendant
Valerie Hammond from Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility (IBC) in Ionia County, the Court assumes that Plaintiff is
referring to IBC. See http://www.michigan.gov/corrections/0,4551,7-119-1381_1385---,00.html.
2

Plaintiff is listed as a male prisoner on the Michigan Department of Corrections’ website.
http://mdocweb.state.mi.us/OTIS2/otis2profile.aspx?mdocNumber=725312.

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See

queen/female impersonator.” I have been classified as G.I.D., and forced to abide by
the G.I.D. policy 04.06.184 along with its hurtful and harmful accommodations: bra,
single-cell (isolation) - protective custody. I never participated in the creation of
policy 04.06.184, I never asked for the imposements of the accommodations. Policy
04.06.184 states: “generally” single-cell housing. I do not struggle with a gender
identity or role. I am a male in a man’s prison. I do not have breasts nor am I on
hormone therapy.
(Compl., docket #1, Page ID#4.)
Plaintiff requests declaratory and injunctive relief.
II.

Failure to state a claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if “‘it fails to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include
more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1949 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at
1949. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’
– that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2));
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see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal
plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal
rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
A.

Insufficient Allegations

Beyond naming him as a Defendant, Plaintiff does not provide any allegations against
Defendant Pandya in the body of his complaint. It is a basic pleading essential that a plaintiff
attribute factual allegations to particular defendants. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544 (holding that,
in order to state a claim, a plaintiff must make sufficient allegations to give a defendant fair notice
of the claim). Where a person is named as a defendant without an allegation of specific conduct, the
complaint is subject to dismissal, even under the liberal construction afforded to pro se complaints.
See Gilmore v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 92 F. App’x 188, 190 (6th Cir. 2004) (dismissing complaint
where plaintiff failed to allege how any named defendant was involved in the violation of his rights);
Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims where the
complaint did not allege with any degree of specificity which of the named defendants were
personally involved in or responsible for each alleged violation of rights); Griffin v. Montgomery,
No. 00-3402, 2000 WL 1800569, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 2000) (requiring allegations of personal
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involvement against each defendant); Rodriguez v. Jabe, No. 90-1010, 1990 WL 82722, at *1 (6th
Cir. June 19, 1990) (“Plaintiff’s claims against those individuals are without a basis in law as the
complaint is totally devoid of allegations as to them which would suggest their involvement in the
events leading to his injuries”). Because Plaintiff’s claims fall far short of the minimal pleading
standards under FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (requiring “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief”), his complaint must be dismissed against Defendant Pandya.
Moreover, Defendant Pandya is not liable for his role as a supervisor. Government
officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory
of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009); Monell
v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691(1978); Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 495
(6th Cir. 2009). A claimed constitutional violation must be based upon active unconstitutional
behavior. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575 (6th Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899
(6th Cir. 2002). The acts of one’s subordinates are not enough, nor can supervisory liability be based
upon the mere failure to act. Grinter, 532 F.3d at 575; Greene, 310 F.3d at 899; Summers v. Leis,
368 F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir. 2004). Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because
a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained
in a grievance. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). “[A] plaintiff must plead
that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated
the Constitution.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948.
In summary, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant Pandya.

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B.

Service

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendants Hammond, Schultz,
Jones, Owen and Collier are sufficient to state a claim.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Defendant Pandya will be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court will serve the complaint against
the Defendants Hammond, Schultz, Jones, Owen and Collier.
An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

Dated:

July 13, 2012

/s/ Robert J. Jonker
ROBERT J. JONKER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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