Jackson #272196 v. Trierweiler et al
OPINION; Judgment to issue; signed by Judge Janet T. Neff (Judge Janet T. Neff, clb)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
LEON M. JACKSON,
Case No. 1:12-cv-577
Honorable Janet T. Neff
TONY TRIERWEILER et al.,
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any
prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s
pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s
allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504
U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state
Plaintiff is incarcerated in the Carson City Correctional Facility. In his pro se
complaint, he sues Deputy Warden Trierweiler and Regular Unit Manager (Unknown) Dunigan.
On February 9, 2012, plaintiff was charged with Class II misconducts for Disobeying
a Direct Order and Insolence arising from an incident that occurred during a substance abuse group
therapy session. The reporting staff member, Mr. Wilcox, provided the following description of the
I observed Jackson writing a personal letter during my Phase I Substance Abuse
group, which was not allowed per group rules. I walked to the table where the
prisoner was sitting and gave him a direct order to give me the paper he was writing
on and he refused and put the paper back in his folder so I could not see it. He was
“red faced” and was yelling, “who the fuck do you think you are?” “That’s my shit,
don’t touch it.” I gave him a direct order to leave the room and he did not respond.
I left the room to have the school officers escort him back to his unit.
(Compl. 3, docket #1, Page ID#3.)
Plaintiff was convicted of the charges following an
administrative hearing held by Defendant Trierweiler on February 22, 2012. Plaintiff filed a request
for rehearing, which was denied by Trierweiler on February 24, 2012.
Plaintiff disputes Wilcox’s version of the events and claims that he was not provided
with witnesses or an investigator to assist in his defense. Plaintiff alleges that he was denied
disciplinary credits as a result of the convictions, which will affect his release date. Plaintiff seeks
damages of $10,000 from each of the Defendants and to have the misconduct charges expunged
from his record.
Failure to state a claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if “‘it fails to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include
more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for
more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); see also
Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility
standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a
right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed
by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v.
Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
Plaintiff appears to allege a violation of the procedural protections of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. A prisoner’s ability to challenge a prison misconduct conviction
depends on whether the convictions implicated any liberty interest. A prisoner does not have a
protected liberty interest in prison disciplinary proceedings unless the sanction “will inevitably
affect the duration of his sentence” or the resulting restraint imposes an “atypical and significant
hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” See Sandin v. Conner,
515 U.S. 472, 486-87 (1995). Under Michigan Department of Corrections Policy Directive
03.03.105, ¶ B, a Class I misconduct is a “major” misconduct and Class II and III misconducts are
“minor” misconducts. The policy further provides that prisoners are deprived of good time or
disciplinary credits only when they are found guilty of a Class I misconduct. (See Policy Directive
03.03.105, ¶ AAAA). Therefore, contrary to the assertion in his complaint, Plaintiff should not have
been denied good time or disciplinary credits as a result of his Class II misconduct convictions. The
Sixth Circuit routinely has held that misconduct convictions that do not result in the loss of good
time are not atypical and significant deprivations and therefore do not implicate due process. See,
e.g., Ingram v. Jewell, 94 F. App’x 271, 273 (6th Cir. 2004); Carter v. Tucker, 69 F. App’x 678, 680
(6th Cir. 2003); Green v. Waldren, No. 99-1561, 2000 WL 876765, at *2 (6th Cir. June 23, 2000);
Staffney v. Allen, No. 98-1880, 1999 WL 617967, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 12, 1999). Plaintiff, therefore,
fails to state a due process claim arising from his Class II misconduct convictions.
Even if Plaintiff was convicted of Class I misconducts, he fails to state a due process
claim. In the seminal case in this area, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the Court
prescribed certain minimal procedural safeguards that prison officials must follow before depriving
a prisoner of good-time credits on account of alleged misbehavior. The Wolff Court did not create
a free-floating right to process that attaches to all prison disciplinary proceedings; rather the right
to process arises only when the prisoner faces a loss of liberty, in the form of a longer prison
sentence caused by forfeiture of good-time credits:
It is true that the Constitution itself does not guarantee good-time credit for
satisfactory behavior while in prison. But here the State itself has not only provided
a statutory right to good time but also specifies that it is to be forfeited only for
serious misbehavior. Nebraska may have the authority to create, or not, a right to a
shortened prison sentence through the accumulation of credits for good behavior, and
it is true that the Due Process Clause does not require a hearing “in every
conceivable case of government impairment of private interest.” But the State
having created the right to good time and itself recognizing that its deprivation is a
sanction authorized for major misconduct, the prisoner’s interest has real substance
and is sufficiently embraced within Fourteenth Amendment “liberty” to entitle him
to those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by
the Due Process Clause to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily
Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557 (citations omitted).
The Sixth Circuit has examined Michigan statutory law, as it relates to the creation
and forfeiture of disciplinary credits1 for prisoners convicted for crimes occurring after April 1,
1987. In Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434 (6th Cir. 2007), the court determined that loss of disciplinary
credits does not necessarily affect the duration of a prisoner’s sentence. Rather, it merely affects
parole eligibility, which remains discretionary with the parole board. 481 F.3d at 440. Building on
this ruling, in Nali v. Ekman, 355 F. App’x 909 (6th Cir. 2009), the court held that a misconduct
citation in the Michigan prison system does not affect a prisoner’s constitutionally protected liberty
interests, because it does not necessarily affect the length of confinement. 355 F. App’x at 912;
For crimes committed after April 1, 1987, Michigan prisoners earn “disciplinary credits” under a statute that abolished
the former good-time system. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 800.33(5).
accord, Wilson v. Rapelje, No. 09-13030, 2010 WL 5491196, at * 4 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 24, 2010)
(Report & Recommendation) (holding that “plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing and major misconduct
sanction does not implicate the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause”), adopted as judgment
of court, 2011 WL 5491196 (Jan. 4, 2011). In the absence of a demonstrated liberty interest,
Plaintiff has no due-process claim based on the loss of disciplinary credits. See Bell v. Anderson,
301 F. App’x 459, 461-62 (6th Cir. 2008).
Even in the absence of a protectible liberty interest in disciplinary credits, a prisoner
may be able to raise a due-process challenge to prison misconduct convictions that result in a
significant, atypical deprivation. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 472; see also Ingram v. Jewell, 94 F.
App’x 271, 273 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that unless a prison misconduct conviction results in an
extension of the duration of a prisoner’s sentence or some other atypical hardship, a due-process
claim fails). Plaintiff has not identified any significant deprivation arising from his misconduct
convictions. Accordingly, he fails to state a viable due process claim.
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611
(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no
good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the
$455.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless
Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g).
If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $455.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated: July 12, 2012
/s/ Janet T. Neff
Janet T. Neff
United States District Judge
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