Johnson v. Kent, County of et al
Filing
8
OPINION ; signed by Judge Robert J. Jonker (Judge Robert J. Jonker, ymc)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
DOUGLAS T. JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 1:12-cv-935
v.
Honorable Robert J. Jonker
COUNTY OF KENT et al.,
Defendants.
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OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a county prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff has paid the civil action filing fee. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. NO.
104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under
federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A;
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly
irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these
standards, Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff Douglas T. Johnson presently is detained at the Kent County Correctional
Facility. He sues the County of Kent, the Kent County Sheriff’s Department, and an unknown health
care provider.
Plaintiff alleges that he was detained at the Kent County Correctional Facility on
August 14, 2012. At the time he was booked, he told unidentified officers that he had multiple
sclerosis. Plaintiff was asked to list the names of his health care providers, the medications he was
taking and the pharmacy he used. Plaintiff provided the requested information, and he believes that
the jail contacted the pharmacy. On August 27, 2012, Plaintiff received one of his prescribed
medications, Avonex, but he claims that the medication was not kept refrigerated and was therefore
unsafe to use. He did not receive other unspecified medications. Plaintiff therefore asserts that
Defendants have been deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.
As a result of Defendants’ failure to provide necessary medication, Plaintiff allegedly
experienced severe and painful muscle spasms, lower extremity pain, numbness, blurred vision,
weight loss, and sleep deprivation. Plaintiff also alleges that, as a result of the stress, his wife has
experienced repeated seizures, which he has witnessed. He seeks injunctive relief and compensatory
damages.
Discussion
I.
Failure to state a claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if “‘it fails to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
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While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include
more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for
more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); see also
Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility
standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)
and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v. Corr.
Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal
rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
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Plaintiff sues the Kent County Sheriff Department. The sheriff department does not
exist as a separate legal entity; it is simply an agent of the county. Vine v. Cnty. of Ingham, 884 F.
Supp. 1153, 1158 (W.D. Mich. 1995) (citing Hughson v. Cnty. of Antrim, 707 F. Supp. 304, 306
(W.D. Mich. 1988) and Bayer v. Almstadt, 185 N.W.2d 40, 44 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970)). Accordingly,
the Court will dismiss the Berrien County Sheriff Department.
Plaintiff also sues Kent County. His allegations essentially rest on the theory that the
county is vicariously liable for the actions of an unnamed health care provider employed by the
county. Kent County may not be held vicariously liable for the actions of its employees under
§ 1983. See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.
378, 392 (1989); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Instead, a county is liable
only when its official policy or custom causes the injury.
To the extent that Plaintiff suggests the existence of a custom of unlawful deprivation
of medical attention, his allegations fall far short of supporting such a claim. As the Supreme Court
has instructed, to demonstrate that a municipality had an unlawful custom, a plaintiff must allege and
show that the municipality was deliberately indifferent to “practices so persistent and widespread
as to practically have the force of law.” Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1359. Plaintiff cites no prior
incidents demonstrating a widespread pattern. He merely implies that such a pattern exists.
Conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct without specific factual allegations fail to state
a claim under § 1983. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (2007). Plaintiff
therefore fails to state a claim against Kent County.
As his final Defendant, Plaintiff names an unknown health care provider. It is a basic
pleading essential that a plaintiff attribute factual allegations to particular defendants. See Twombly,
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550 U.S. at 544 (holding that, in order to state a claim, Plaintiff must make sufficient allegations to
give a defendant fair notice of the claim). Where a person is named as a defendant without an
allegation of specific conduct, the complaint is subject to dismissal, even under the liberal
construction afforded to pro se complaints. See Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir.
2002) (dismissing Plaintiff’s claims where the complaint did not allege with any degree of specificity
which of the named defendants were personally involved in or responsible for each alleged violation
of rights); Griffin v. Montgomery, No. 00-3402, 2000 WL 1800569, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 2000)
(requiring allegations of personal involvement against each defendant)); Rodriguez v. Jabe, No. 901010, 1990 WL 82722, at *1 (6th Cir. June 19, 1990) (“Plaintiff’s claims against those individuals
are without a basis in law as the complaint is totally devoid of allegations as to them which would
suggest their involvement in the events leading to his injuries.”). Plaintiff fails entirely to allege any
fact about any specific individual, much less that any individual was both aware of Plaintiff’s serious
medical need for treatment and deliberately failed to provide that treatment. See Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 102, 103-04 (1976) (to state a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must allege
acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs);
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (the deliberate-indifference standard has both an
objective and a subjective component). Plaintiff’s allegations therefore fall far short of the minimal
pleading standards under FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (requiring “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”).
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Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated:
October 3, 2012
/s/ Robert J. Jonker
ROBERT J. JONKER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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