Maat v. Ottawa, County of et al
Filing
61
OPINION; Order to issue; signed by Judge Janet T. Neff (Judge Janet T. Neff, clb)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
RENEE MAAT,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 1:12-cv-1194
v.
HON. JANET T. NEFF
COUNTY OF OTTAWA and
58TH DISTRICT COURT,
Defendants.
____________________________________/
OPINION
Plaintiff Renee Maat filed this disability discrimination action against Defendants Ottawa
County and 58th District Court after her request for medical leave was denied and her employment
as a court recorder in the 58th District Court was terminated. Pending before the Court are 58th
District Court’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss (Dkt 43) and Defendant
Ottawa County’s Motion for Summary Disposition (sic, motion to dismiss or motion for summary
judgment) (Dkt 47). Plaintiff has filed responses to the respective motions, and Defendants have
filed replies. For the reasons set forth in this Opinion, the Court grants 58th District Court’s motion.
The Court denies Ottawa County’s motion to dismiss and denies without prejudice the motion for
summary judgment. Having fully considered the parties’ written submissions, the Court concludes
that oral argument would not assist in the disposition of the issues presented. See W.D. Mich.
LCivR 7.2(d) (the Court has discretion to schedule oral argument or dispose of a dispositive motion
without argument at the end of briefing).
I. Factual Background
Plaintiff began working at the 58th District Court in 2007 as a traffic clerk and, on December
19, 2008, was promoted to a court recorder position assigned to work in Judge Susan Jonas’
courtroom1 (Dkt 49 ¶ 1; Dkt 45 ¶ 2). In November 2010, she was hospitalized for three days for
pulmonary embolism and a cerebral vein clot, and subsequently suffered from dizziness, headaches
and anxiety attacks (First Am. Compl. (FAC), Dkt 7, ¶¶ 10-12; Pl. Aff., Dkt 53-1, ¶¶ 7-8). In
January 2011, Plaintiff began working part-time hours pursuant to her doctor’s restrictions; she took
leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 28 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., for the remaining
hours (FAC ¶ 11; Dkt 53-1 ¶ 9). Due to her part-time hours, Plaintiff was reassigned to a court clerk
position (FAC ¶ 12; Dkt 53-1 ¶ 10).
After her continuing medical problems, in June 2011, a conflict arose over Plaintiff’s
continued employment and potential short term disability, and she was informed she could not return
to work (FAC ¶¶ 13-19). Her employment was terminated as of June 20, 2011 on the grounds that
she had exhausted her FMLA leave and her leave of absence would result in an undue hardship (Dkt
45 ¶ 3; FAC ¶¶ 15-19; Dkt 53-1, ¶ 15, Ex. 4).
Plaintiff’s FAC alleges three counts: Count 1—Violations of the Rehabilitation Act2 by
Defendants Ottawa County and the 58th District Court; Count 2—Violations of the Persons with
Disabilities Civil Rights Act3 by Defendants Ottawa County and the 58th District Court; and Count
1
The parties have filed a Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts for each motion (“JSF,” Dkts
45, 49), relied on by the Court as cited herein.
2
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq.
3
“PWDCRA,” MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.1101, et seq.
2
3—Violations of Americans With Disabilities Act4 by Defendant Ottawa County. Each count is
premised on Defendants’ alleged termination of Plaintiff’s employment and denial of a reasonable
accommodation based on disability.
II. Legal Standards
A. Motion to Dismiss
In deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure
to state a claim, the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and draws all
reasonable inferences from those allegations in favor of the nonmoving party. Bennett v. MIS Corp.,
607 F.3d 1076, 1091 (6th Cir. 2010); Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 439 (6th Cir. 2008). “A
claim survives this motion where its ‘[f]actual allegations [are] enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint’s allegations are true.’” Zaluski v.
United Am. Healthcare Corp., 527 F.3d 564, 570 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007)).
Stated differently, the complaint must present “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “The complaint should give the defendant fair
notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” German Free State of
Bavaria v. Toyobo Co, Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 2d 958, 963 (W.D. Mich. 2007); see also Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). Accordingly, the complaint must contain either direct
or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain recovery under a viable legal
theory. Bavaria, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 963; see also Lillard v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F. 3d 716,
726 (6th Cir. 1996). Further, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment]
4
“ADA,” 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
3
to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action will not do ….” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
B. Motion for Summary Judgment
A moving party is entitled to a grant of its motion for summary judgment “if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
247-48 (1986). The court must consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party. U.S. S.E.C. v. Sierra Brokerage Servs., Inc., 712 F.3d 321, 327 (6th Cir. 2013)
(citing Tysinger v. Police Dep’t of City of Zanesville, 463 F.3d 569, 572 (6th Cir. 2006)).
The moving party has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Jakubowski v. Christ Hosp., Inc., 627 F.3d 195, 200 (6th Cir. 2010). The burden then
“shifts to the nonmoving party, who must present some ‘specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.’” Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). “A genuine dispute concerns
evidence ‘upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party.’
A factual dispute is material only if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”
Fuhr v. Hazel Park Sch. Dist., 710 F.3d 668, 673 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Tysinger, 463 F.3d at
572). “The ultimate question is ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’”
Back v. Nestlé USA, Inc., 694 F.3d 571, 575 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52).
III. 58th District Court Motion
58th District Court has filed a Motion to Dismiss under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) and Motion
for Summary Judgment under FED. R. CIV. P. 56, on the ground that Plaintiff’s claim under the
4
Rehabilitation Act (Count 1) fails because she cannot show the Court is a recipient of federal
financial assistance, which is an essential element of her claim.5 58th District Court asserts that the
undisputed facts establish that 58th District Court is locally funded by Ottawa County and in 2011,
the year relevant to this case, did not receive federal funds directly from the federal government or
indirectly through Ottawa County or the State Court Administrative Office (SCAO). Further, if
Plaintiff’s federal claim under the Rehabilitation Act is dismissed, this Court should decline
supplemental jurisdiction over the PWDCRA state law claim, and it should be dismissed pursuant
to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).
A. Rehabilitation Act Claim
An essential element of a claim under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is that the
relevant program or activity is receiving federal financial assistance. Sandison v. Mich. High Sch.
Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 64 F.3d 1026, 1030-31 (6th Cir. 1995). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
provides in relevant part:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States, as
defined in section 705(20) of this title, shall, solely by reason of her or his disability,
be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance
….
29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
“Program or activity” is further defined as “all of the operations of”:
5
“[W]hen a document is referred to in the pleadings and is integral to the claims, it may be
considered without converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.” Commercial
Money Ctr., Inc. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 335-36 (6th Cir. 2007). However, because
here the parties rely on documents outside the pleadings, this Court considers the motion under the
summary judgment standard rather than the motion to dismiss standard.
5
(A)
a department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality
of a State or of a local government; or
(B)
the entity of such State or local government that distributes such
assistance and each such department or agency (and each other State or local
government entity) to which the assistance is extended, in the case of assistance to
a State or local government.
29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(1).
Plaintiff does not dispute 58th District Court’s evidence that it did not directly receive federal
funding in 2011. In this regard, 58th District Court has presented affidavits stating that in 2011 no
federal funds received by Ottawa County were expended for 58th District Court operations, and the
Court did not receive any federal funds from the SCAO, as a grantee from any federal agency, as
a subgrantee of Ottawa County, or as a subgrantee through the State of Michigan.6
Plaintiff nonetheless argues that 58th District Court is part of the larger “State district court”
that was extended federal financial assistance in 2011, and if any part of a department receives
financial assistance, the whole department is deemed a recipient of federal assistance (Dkt 54 at 8-9).
Further, a state entity is not required to receive federal assistance; “extending” such funding is
sufficient (id. at 14). That is, the mere availability of federal grant funds from the SCAO constituted
“extending” federal financial assistance to 58th District Court, even though 58th District Court was
not one of the local district courts that received the grant funds. Plaintiff thus argues that there can
be no dispute that federal financial assistance was “indirectly extended” to 58th District Court under
the language of § 794(b)(1) (id. at 15).
6
Affidavits of 58th District Court Chief Judge Bradley Knoll (Dkt 45-1), Dawn Scholten
(Ottawa County Accountant II) (Dkt 45-2), and Dawn Monk (Deputy State Court Administrator for
SCAO) (Dkt 45-3).
6
Plaintiff’s reasoning is vulnerable at several junctures and does not support a conclusion that
58th District Court was an indirect recipient of federal financial assistance. While there admittedly
is scant, if any, legal authority directly on point, the authority addressing § 794 makes it clear § 504
of the Rehabilitation Act is not without legislated limits on liability. Plaintiff’s reasoning effectively
eviscerates those limits and is contrary to the intent and language of § 794. Plaintiff cites no case
law to support this reasoning, and it is in fact undermined by Plaintiff’s own citation to case law
examining the legislative history of § 794.
1.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s premise that 58th District Court is a component of one “state
district court” or Michigan’s “One Court of Justice,” and therefore, one “department” for purposes
of § 504 is questionable. Plaintiff first cites Judges of the 74th Judicial District v. Bay County, 190
N.W.2d 219, 224 (Mich. 1971), for the basic proposition that “ Michigan has but one district court.
For the administration of the district court, the state is divided into judicial districts” (Dkt 54 at 8).
Plaintiff then cites Pucci v. Nineteenth District Court, 628 F.3d 752 (6th Cir. 2010), as holding that
“the 19th District Court was a subdivision of the larger one district court and the unified judicial
system” (Dkt 54 at 8-9).
Plaintiff is correct that in Pucci, 628 F.3d at 763, the Sixth Circuit determined that “there can
be no doubt that all of Michigan’s courts, including those trial-level courts funded by local funding
units, are part of one, unified judicial branch of the state.” “Consistent with the unitary nature of
Michigan’s judicial power, the Nineteenth District Court is itself only a subdivision of the ‘one
district court’ of Michigan.” Id. at 763 n.9 (citing Judges of the 74th Judicial Dist., 190 N.W.2d at
7
224). However, these cases addressed entirely different legal contexts, not § 504 or the language
or reasoning under 29 U.S.C. § 794.
In Pucci, the question addressed was whether the 19th District Court and its chief judge were
entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity from a former deputy court administrator’s
§ 1983 action alleging her termination violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Pucci, 628
F.3d at 755-56. Applying the four context-specific factors for sovereign immunity,7 the Sixth
Circuit concluded that “Michigan’s district courts, including the Nineteenth District Court, are arms
of the state [as opposed to political subdivisions] for sovereign-immunity purposes.” Id. at 760-62
(emphasis added).
This Court finds Pucci inapposite for purposes of determining liability under § 794 of the
Rehabilitation Act. Because it was integral to the analysis of the sovereign immunity factors, the
Sixth Circuit expounded on Michigan’s state court structure and administration:
The Michigan Constitution unquestionably establishes a unified state judicial
system, of which the Nineteenth District Court is a subdivision, under the control and
administration of the Michigan Supreme Court. Thus, the second factor identified
in Ernst—“the language by which state statutes and state courts refer to the entity
and the degree of state control and veto power over the entity’s actions”—favors
granting sovereign immunity. Ernst, 427 F.3d at 359.
Michigan’s Constitution vests the state’s judicial power “exclusively in one
court of justice which shall be divided into one supreme court, one court of appeals,
one trial court of general jurisdiction known as the circuit court, one probate court,
and courts of limited jurisdiction that the legislature may establish,” MICH. CONST.
art. VI, § 1 (emphasis added), and vests in the Supreme Court “general
7
The factors, known as the Ernst factors, are: (1) the State’s potential liability for a judgment
against the entity; (2) the language by which state statutes and state courts refer to the entity and the
degree of state control and veto power over the entity’s actions; (3) whether state or local officials
appoint the board members of the entity; and (4) whether the entity’s functions fall within the
traditional purview of state or local government. Pucci, 628 F.3d at 760 (quoting Ernst v. Rising,
427 F.3d 351, 359 (6th Cir. 2005) (en banc)).
8
superintending control over all courts,” MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (emphasis added).
Additionally, state statutes establish “judicial districts of the district court each of
which is an administrative unit subject to the superintending control of the supreme
court.” MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.8101(1) (emphasis added); see also MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 600.8221 (granting “full authority and control [in district judges] subject to
the supervision of the supreme court” (emphasis added)). Thus it is the state
legislature that establishes and defines the authority of the district courts, and it is the
state supreme court that exercises supervisory and administrative control over those
district courts. The local funding units have no such influence.
The Michigan Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the unitary nature of
the state’s judicial power and the Michigan Supreme Court’s exclusive role as
supervisor and administrator of all of the subunits of that “one court” system. The
Michigan Supreme Court held: “Despite the complications of the trial court
environment, the case law, taken as a whole, has come to strongly affirm that the
fundamental and ultimate responsibility for all aspects of court administration,
including operations and personnel matters within the trial courts, resides within the
inherent authority of the judicial branch [of the State of Michigan].” Judicial
Attorneys Ass’n v. State, 459 Mich. 291, 586 N.W.2d 894, 897 (1998) (emphasis
added). Thus, “[t]he judicial branch is constitutionally accountable for the operation
of the courts and for those who provide court services.” Id. at 899. Additionally,
“the expenses of justice are incurred for the benefit of the State and only charged
against the counties in accordance with old usage, as a proper method of distributing
the burden.” Grand Traverse Cnty. v. State, 450 Mich. 457, 538 N.W.2d 1, 9 (1995)
(quoting Stowell v. Jackson Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 57 Mich. 31, 23 N.W. 557, 558
(1885)) (emphasis added). Given these circumstances, there can be no doubt that all
of Michigan’s courts, including those trial-level courts funded by local funding units,
are part of one, unified judicial branch of the state.9 Consequently, just as the
Michigan Supreme Court is an arm of the state, so is its Nineteenth District Court.
9. Consistent with the unitary nature of Michigan’s judicial power, the
Nineteenth District Court is itself only a subdivision of the “one district court” of
Michigan. See Judges of 74th Judicial Dist. v. Cnty. of Bay, 385 Mich. 710, 190
N.W.2d 219, 224 (1971) (“Michigan has but one district court. For the administration
of the district court, the state is divided into judicial districts.”).
Pucci, 628 F.3d at 762-63.
The Pucci Court thus concluded that Michigan’s district courts were an arm of the state
rather than of the municipal or county entities, entitling the courts to sovereign immunity. This
9
reasoning does not support Plaintiff’s conclusion that liability is compelled under § 504, particularly
given the much different tests applied by the courts based on the purpose and language of § 794.
2.
“To determine the extent of application of § 504, it is necessary to determine two interrelated
questions: (1) whether the person or entity charged with discrimination is the ‘recipient’ of federal
assistance, and, if so (2) whether discrimination occurred within the ‘program or activity’ receiving
assistance.” James Lockhart, Annotation, Who is Recipient Of, and What Constitutes Program or
Activity Receiving, Federal Financial Assistance for Purposes of § 504 of Rehabilitation Act (29
U.S.C. § 794), Which Prohibits Any Program or Activity Receiving Financial Assistance From
Discriminating on Basis of Disability, 160 A.L.R. FED. 297, § 2(a) (2000). “In a 1986 opinion
dealing with the first of these questions, the United States Supreme Court held that § 504 applies to
both direct and indirect ‘recipients’ of federal financial assistance, but not to ‘beneficiaries.’” Id.
(citing U.S. Dept. of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597 (1986)). “The Court found
that the intent of Congress was to impose § 504 responsibilities on those who, by their choice to
accept or reject federal financial assistance, were in a position to accept or reject the
antidiscrimination responsibilities that acceptance of the assistance entailed.” Id. “This test
continues to be applied, as does the rule that § 504 applies to both direct and indirect recipients of
financial assistance.” 160 A.L.R. FED. 297, §§ 2(a), 10.
There appears to be no generally accepted analytical framework for determining whether an
entity sued qualifies as a “program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance” under § 794.
The applicability of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to the courts under § 794 has been addressed in
only a handful of cases, none of which address circumstances analogous to those presented in this
10
case. See 160 A.L.R. FED. 297, § 19 (discussing cases). Courts have found or suggested that a state
or local court or judicial system was a recipient or a program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance for purposes of applying § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act where: (1) discrimination was
alleged in the county court system and the county received federal revenue-sharing funds that were
used in part to defray court expenses, DeLong v. Brumbaugh, 703 F. Supp. 399 (W.D. Pa. 1989);
(2) a county court system received grants from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Greater Los Angeles Council of Deafness, Inc. v.
Zolin, 607 F. Supp. 175 (C.D. Cal. 1984), aff’d in part & rev’d in part on other grds, 812 F.2d 1103
(9th Cir. 1987); and (3) the court received federal financial assistance in the form of grants from the
United States Department of Justice, Galloway v. Superior Court of Dist. of Columbia, 816 F. Supp.
12 (D. D.C. 1993). See 160 A.L.R. FED. 297, § 19. No liability under § 504 was found in Soto v.
City of Newark, No. Civ. A. 98–5582, 1999 WL 987385 (D. N.J. Oct. 29, 1999), where the
defendants offered proof that the municipal court received no federal funding and the plaintiffs
provided no evidence refuting the defendants’ contention. See id.
In contexts other than the courts or judicial system, the analysis under § 794 has
distinguished between government and other contexts, such as education.
Under § 504(b), an entire public school system or institution of higher
education is considered a program or activity receiving federal assistance if any part
of it receives such assistance. However, an entire state or local government is not
such a program or activity. Rather, § 504 covers only the governmental department,
agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality to which federal assistance
is extended, and even in the case of assistance to a state or local government as a
whole, § 504 still covers only the governmental entity that distributes the assistance
and any governmental entity to which the assistance is extended.
160 A.L.R. FED. 297, § 2(a) (footnotes omitted). See also Alford v. City of Cannon Beach, No.
CV–00–303, 2000 WL 33200554, at *26 (D. Or. Jan. 17, 2000) (noting that the courts are split as
11
to whether a state or local government itself is a proper defendant in a § 504 Rehabilitation Act
claim (citing 160 A.L.R. FED. 297, § 16) (“compare Innovative Health Sys., Inc. v. City of White
Plains, 931 F. Supp. 222, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (allegation that City received federal financial
assistance was sufficient to sustain claim that the zoning and planning boards discriminated under
Rehabilitation Act), aff’d, 117 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1997); with Schroeder v. City of Chicago, 715 F.
Supp. 222, 225 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (allegation that City received federal financial assistance insufficient
to sustain Rehabilitation Act claim because City does not meet statutory definition of ‘program or
activity’), aff’d, 927 F.2d 957 (7th Cir. 1991) (amendments to Rehabilitation Act’s ‘program or
activity’ not intended to ‘sweep in the whole state or local government[.]’)”).
In light of the above considerations, Plaintiff’s argument—that because the SCAO receives
federal financial assistance, the entire state court system should be covered in all its operations—is
not persuasive. First, although Michigan’s district courts may be considered part of one, unified
judicial branch of the state, and one larger state district court, for some purposes, e.g., sovereign
immunity, the local district courts are clearly independent units rather than one “department”
encompassing the entire state judicial system. The district trial court is “a subdivision of the ‘one
district court’ of Michigan.” Pucci, 628 F.3d at 763 n.9 (quoting Judges of the 74th Judicial Dist.,
190 N.W.2d at 224). “For the administration of the district court, the state is divided into judicial
districts.” Id. Administratively, and operationally, 58th District Court should not be considered a
recipient of federal financial assistance merely because the SCAO receives federal funds. To the
extent Plaintiff argues that 58th District Court is an arm of the state, the case law counsels against
a conclusion that federal assistance to SCAO renders 58th District Court a recipient of federal
assistance on that basis, because Ҥ 504 covers only the governmental department, agency, special
12
purpose district, or other instrumentality to which federal assistance is extended, and even in the
case of assistance to a state or local government as a whole, § 504 still covers only the governmental
entity that distributes the assistance and any governmental entity to which the assistance is
extended.” See 160 A.L.R. FED. 297, § 2(a).
The cases cited by Plaintiff do not hold to the contrary. In fact, as 58th District Court points
out in its Reply brief (Dkt 46 at 4-5), Plaintiff cites Huber v. Howard County, 849 F. Supp. 407, 415
(D. Md. 1994) for its holding that “[w]hile such assistance to one department does not subject
another department to the requirements of §504, if one part of a department receives federal
financial assistance, the whole department is considered to receive federal assistance so as to be
subject to §504” (Dkt 54 at 11). However, Plaintiff disregards the Huber Court’s additional and
immediately preceding portion of that sentence: “While the receipt of federal financial assistance
by one department or agency of a county does not render the entire county subject to the provisions
of § 504 ….” (emphasis added). Id.
The cases cited by Plaintiff holding that sub-units of municipal government or entire
departments of an entity are covered if a segment received federal assistance are not based on
analogous contexts. For instance, in Huber, in a suit by a firefighter, even though the Howard
County Department of Fire and Rescue Services, which employed and discharged the plaintiff, did
not receive federal financial assistance, the Court found liability because the County Office of
Emergency Management and Civil Defense, which was a part of the County Department of Fire and
Rescue Services, did receive assistance, and moreover, the salary of the person who served as both
Director of the Department of Fire and Rescue Services and Director of the Office of Emergency
Management and Civil Defense, was partially funded by federal money. Huber, 849 F. Supp. at 415.
13
In Tanberg, also cited by Plaintiff (Dkt 54 at 10), the Court’s brief analysis of the federal financial
assistance issue found the County Sheriff’s Department liable under § 504 in an action by a
volunteer reserve deputy because there was uncontroverted evidence that the Department received
federal grants. Tanberg v.Weld Cnty. Sheriff, 787 F. Supp. 970, 974 (D. Colo. 1992).
Such holdings simply do not support the broad proposition that Michigan’s entire judicial
system is one “department” for purposes of determining federal financial assistance under § 794.
Holding that every local district court in Michigan received federal financial assistance by virtue of
the SCAO’s receipt of federal funds would eviscerate any intended limit under the language of
§ 794. Virtually every entity under the umbrella of a state unit or agency would be subject to
liability, entirely contrary to Congress’s intent to limit “the application of § 504 to recipients of
‘federal financial assistance,’ and ‘impose § 504 coverage as a form of contractual cost of the
recipient’s agreement to accept the federal funds.’” See Moreno v. Consol. Rail, 99 F.3d 782, 788
(6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Paralyzed Veterans, 477 U.S. at 605). See also Bentley v. Cleveland Cnty
.Bd. of Cnty. Com’rs, 41 F.3d 600, 603-04 (10th Cir. 1994) (giving examples of the proper limits
of § 794).
Finally, this Court finds no merit in Plaintiff’s argument that 58th District Court is liable
under § 504 merely because SCAO offered or made grants available based on the dictionary
definition of the word “extended” as “to make the offer of; to make available” (Dkt 54 at 14). To
hold every entity liable under § 794 merely on the basis that federal financial assistance is made
available would render the statutory language devoid of any meaningful limits since the offer of
federal assistance is virtually universal.
14
Plaintiff cites no authority or reasoning by any court that provides a basis for finding liability
based on the mere offer or availability of federal funding (Dkt 54 at 14-15). And this reasoning runs
counter to the analysis and legislative intent recognized by the courts, including that in Bentley, 41
F.3d 600, cited by Plaintiff (Dkt 54 at 12-13).
Congress added the language in § 794(b)(1) when it passed the Civil Rights Restoration Act
of 1987 (“Restoration Act”), amending the Rehabilitation Act. Bentley, 41 F.3d at 603. The
legislative history of the Restoration Act explains how the amendment affects the coverage of state
and local governments:
“A. State and Local Governments.
The bill provides that when any part of a state or local government department or
agency is extended federal financial assistance, the entire agency or department is
covered. If a unit of a state or local government is extended federal aid and
distributes such aid to another governmental entity, all of the operations of the entity
which distributes the funds and all of the operations of the department or agency to
which the funds are distributed are covered.
Examples: If federal health assistance is extended to a part of a state health
department, the entire health department would be covered in all of its operations.
If the office of a mayor receives federal financial assistance and distributes it to local
departments or agencies, all of the operations of the mayor’s office are covered along
with the departments or agencies which actually get the aid.”
Id. at 603-04 (quoting S. Rep. No. 64, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1987), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 18. (second emphasis added)). The above explanation clearly recognizes that liability
is incurred under § 794 when funds are distributed to an entity as opposed to “offered” to an entity.
Additionally, the Bentley Court noted that in Paralyzed Veterans, the court “expressed its
concern that coverage of the federal civil rights laws would be extended to those that were not in a
position ‘to accept or reject those obligations as a part of the decision whether or not to ‘receive’
15
federal funds.’” Id. at 604 (quoting Paralyzed Veterans, 477 U.S. at 606). This recognition further
undermines Plaintiff’s argument here. In Bentley, the court noted that each of the commissioners
on the Cleveland County Board of County Commissioners signed an agreement with the Oklahoma
Department of Transportation that expressly sought federal funds. Id. “Thus, the Board knowingly
requested and accepted federal funds and cannot avoid the accompanying obligation to comply with
federal civil rights laws.” Id. (emphasis added). See also Moreno, 99 F.3d at 788 (quoting
Paralyzed Veterans, 477 U.S. at 605) (Congress “limited the application of § 504 to recipients of
‘federal financial assistance’ for the reason that ‘it sought to impose § 504 coverage as a form of
contractual cost of the recipient’s agreement to accept the federal funds.’”)
Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, this Court concludes that the term “extend” cannot be
construed as simply “to make available” or “to offer.” It is clear that liability under § 794 hinges
on the actual receipt of federal funding, as opposed to an offer of funding.
B. Disposition
Having considered Plaintiff’s contentions in light of the authority presented and the
applicability of § 504 in other contexts, the Court finds no persuasive argument for holding 58th
District Court liable as a recipient of federal financial assistance. Defendant 58th District Court’s
motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to Plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act claim.8
IV. Ottawa County Motion
Defendant Ottawa County moves for dismissal on three bases under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure: (1) Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, (2) Rule 12(b)(6) for
8
The Court declines at this time, however, to grant dismissal of the PWDCRA state law claim
by declining supplemental jurisdiction as requested by 58th District Court, in light of the denial of
Ottawa County’s motion and Plaintiff’s remaining federal claims in this case.
16
failure to state a claim, and (3) Rule 21 for misjoinder.9 Alternatively, Ottawa County moves for
summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule Civil Procedure 56. In its motion, Ottawa County
contends that “the FAC should be dismissed against Ottawa and the 58th District Court on the basis
of the Eleventh Amendment and the fact that there is no federal funding of the 58th District Court
that would otherwise possibly subject the Defendants to the Rehabilitation Act” (Dkt 47 at 2).
A. Preliminary Matters
In its brief in support of its motion (Dkt 48 at 2), Ottawa County sets forth three questions
of law for decision:
1. Is the question of whether Ottawa County is a “joint employer” a matter
of federal or state law?
2. Is the question of whether Ottawa County is the “joint employer” of the
Plaintiff with respect to her termination as a court reporter for the 58th
District Court a question of law?
3. Alternatively, do the undisputed facts demonstrate that the Ottawa [sic,
County] does not fund the 58th District Court with federal funds such
that the Rehabilitation Act count must be dismissed against it and the
58th District Court?
As an initial matter, as Plaintiff points out (Dkt 52 at 6), this Court strictly limited
Defendants’ preliminary dispositive motions to two issues, as discussed at the Rule 16 Conference:
(1)
whether Defendant 58th District Court received any federal funding during the
relevant time period; and
(2)
with regard to determining the co-employer issue, whether state or federal law
applies.
9
Ottawa County moves for “summary disposition,” which is a misnomer under federal court
rules; the County in effect moves for dismissal or alternatively for “summary judgment.”
17
(Order, Dkt 34). The first issue has been resolved above with respect to 58th District Court’s
motion. With respect to the second issue, Ottawa County’s motion and brief far exceed the issue
circumscribed by the Court.10
The Court declines to decide the specific questions presented by Ottawa County.11 This case
appears to involve questions of first impression in the Sixth Circuit, and the dispositive issues and
legal framework have been a “moving target.” Having fully considered the parties’ arguments, the
Court finds no basis for granting dismissal or summary judgment with respect to Ottawa County
based on the present briefing.
B. Legal Framework
Plaintiff’s three claims against Ottawa County are premised on the County’s alleged status
as a “co-employer or joint employer” of Plaintiff with 58th District Court (FAC ¶ 4). Ottawa
County contests this status, and maintains that the County is not a co- or joint employer of a district
court employee as a matter of law. There appears to be no settled law or legal framework to resolve
this issue, and the courts that have addressed this issue have reached conflicting outcomes with little
or no analysis.
Ottawa County asserts that the “joint employer” question under the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act is “structurally a federal question, [and] federal law on this issue turns on
‘control’ and recognizes as a matter of law that the state of Michigan law does not permit a
10
The Court framed these issues based on pre-motion conference filings (Dkts 8, 10, 13-14),
a status conference (Dkt 16) and a Rule 16 conference (Dkt 33) in which counsel represented that
these preliminary issues should be decided to properly position this case for further proceedings.
11
Ottawa County’s argument does not follow or directly answer the questions stated. The
County’s foremost argument is that the Eleventh Amendment precludes the joint employer theory
with respect to the termination of a Michigan district court recorder.
18
Michigan county to control the hiring or firing of a district court-reporter …” (Dkt 48 at 3).
Accordingly, Ottawa County cannot be the joint employer of Plaintiff and has no liability with
respect to her termination (id.). This Court agrees that the “joint employer issue” is governed by
federal law, although this determination may be informed by Michigan law to the extent it is on
point and appropriately considered.
Proceeding on this basis, Ottawa County advances a series of arguments in support of
dismissal from this case. The County first contends that it is entitled to essentially derivative
sovereign immunity pursuant to cases that have found Michigan courts entitled to immunity as an
arm of the state. The Court does not find this argument persuasive based on the authority cited and
given Plaintiff’s joint employer argument, which was not the basis of the cited decisions.
The County cites Pucci (Dkt 48 at 4), and the Sixth Circuit’s reliance on the Michigan
Supreme Court’s pronouncement that case law “‘has come to strongly affirm that the fundamental
and ultimate responsibility for all aspects of court administration, including operations and
personnel matters within the trial courts, resides within the inherent authority of the judicial branch
[of the State of Michigan].’” 628 F.3d at 763 (quoting Judicial Attorneys Ass’n v State, 586 N.W.
2d 894, 897 (Mich. 1998) (emphasis in Pucci))]. However, in Pucci the Sixth Circuit further
acknowledged that [t]he City of Dearborn oversees the employment of the Nineteenth District
Court’s staff ….” Id. The court then noted:
Even the extent of the local funding unit’s authority over court staff is not
unchallenged. In Judicial Attorney’s Association, the Michigan Supreme Court
“declared unconstitutional a number of Michigan statutory provisions that designated
the local funding unit, and not the State, as the employer of Michigan circuit, district,
and probate court employees.” Dolan [v. City of Ann Arbor], 666 F. Supp. 2d [754,]
761 n.8 [E.D. Mich. 2009] (citing Judicial Attorneys Ass’n, 586 N.W.2d at 899).
19
Id. at 764 n.10. Pucci focuses on sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and provides
no definitive resolution of the joint employer issue presented in this employment discrimination
case.
Ottawa County also relies on Dolan v. City of Ann Arbor, 407 F. App’x 45, 46 (6th Cir.
2011), involving an FMLA claim, and contends that the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
conclusion that a liability finding against the Fifteenth District Court would be a ‘necessary
precondition to the liability of the city,’” and therefore, the plaintiff’s claim against the City was
precluded by the district court’s Eleventh Amendment protections (Dkt 48 at 5). However, neither
the district court nor the Sixth Circuit’s opinion provides any factual or legal basis for this
conclusion, and Ottawa County provides no further support for extending the conclusion in Dolan
to Plaintiff’s claim against Ottawa County in this case.
Finally, the County cites Housey ex rel. Housey v. Macomb County, No. 10–11445, 2012 WL
1694629 (E.D. Mich. May 15, 2012), as the only more recent case in which a plaintiff/court staff
person (probate register) attempted to hold a Michigan municipality liable on a “joint employer”
theory, and the case was dismissed as a matter of law “on the basis that ‘Macomb County does not
hire, fire, or supervise the probate court register; that function is reserved by statute for the chief
judge’” (Dkt 48 at 5, quoting Housey, at *9). This Court does not find Housey controlling here,
however, because it was a suit by a probate register, and the matter of employment is expressly
governed by statute. Id. (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 600.833 et seq.). Ottawa County
acknowledges that no similar statute governs the employment of district court employees.12
12
The Court recognizes that in Housey, the court stated that “[t]he co-employer theory
articulated in Turppa [v. County of Montmorency, 724 F. Supp. 2d 783, 790 (E.D. Mich. 2010),]
appears to depart from Michigan Supreme Court precedent.” 2012 WL 1694629, at *9. Regardless,
20
The Court is not persuaded that the cited authority conclusively establishes Ottawa County’s
nonliablity. As pointed out by Plaintiff (Dkt 52 at 15-16), the cases cited by the County are
distinguishable by their facts, did not reach the joint-employer issue specifically, or failed to analyze
the issue in any depth. Ottawa County is not entitled to dismissal or summary judgment on the
preliminary grounds presented. The Court thus rejects Ottawa County’s apparent contention that
Michigan law exclusively controls the outcome of the co- or joint employer issue with respect to
Plaintiff’s federal discrimination claims.
Ottawa County argues that even if the initial specific precedent (discussed above) does not
compel dismissal or summary judgment, such would be compelled by a fair view of broader federal
precedent concerning joint employment (Dkt 48 at 6). The County asserts that the Sixth Circuit
recognizes three “indirect” employer relationships in federal civil rights employment cases, namely,
a “single employer,” “joint-employer” or “agency theory” (id.). Initially, the County argues that
these concepts are “analytically distinct,” and Plaintiff could not assert either the single employer
or agency theory because of “obvious Eleventh Amendment problems” since both would implicate
the 58th District Court’s sovereign power (id.).13
Plaintiff specifically asserts that federal law governs the joint employer issue, citing United
States v. Consumers Scrap Iron Corp., 384 F.2d 62 (6th Cir. 1967) (Dkt 52 at 9). The parties’
the Court declines to resolve this case solely on the basis of the limited statement in Housey, given
that Housey involved a state statute that governs the appointment and termination of the probate
register, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.833(1); that other district court decisions have taken a contrary
view, and this appears to be an issue of first impression in the Sixth Circuit. (See Ottawa County’s
Reply brief, discussing the statutory distinction, Dkt 50 at 8).
13
As discussed infra, Ottawa County abandons its “joint employer” arguments in its reply
brief, contending that the facts in this case support only an agency theory based on the relationship
between 58th District Court and the County.
21
positions on the governing law at this juncture do not appear to conflict. Regardless, as a general
matter, “federal statutes of nationwide application are subject to interpretation by federal law.”
Consumers Scrap Iron, 384 F.2d at 64. Thus, the joint employer issue is properly resolved in light
of federal law with respect to Plaintiff’s federal claims, i.e., her ADA and Rehabilitation claims.14
C. Co- or Joint Employer Theory
Although the controlling law issue is resolved, the parties proceed with additional argument,
which the Court will address for the benefit of any further proceedings in this case. With respect
to a “joint employer” relationship, Ottawa County again cites to the conflicting federal district court
opinions on the issue of sovereign immunity, and essentially reiterates its arguments above to
contend that liability based on the “joint employer” theory is precluded by sovereign immunity. See
Pucci, 628 F.3d 752; compare Turppa v. Cnty. of Montmorency (Turppa I), 724 F. Supp. 2d 783,
790 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (Ludington, J.) with Dolan v. City of Ann Arbor, 666 F. Supp. 2d 754, 764-65
(E.D. Mich. 2009) (Rosen, C.J.). The County argues that “the clear import of Dolan and Pucci is
that even if the Plaintiff in the present case were right and Ottawa County and the 58th District Court
‘shared’ the decision to terminate her, that very allegation—the intertwinement of the
decision-making—is fatal because it cannot be challenged without impairing the dignity of the 58th
District Court in contravention of the Eleventh Amendment” (Dkt 48 at 10).
Ottawa County argues further that based on the above case law addressing sovereign
immunity, the joint employer premise is “legally impossible” because a local government cannot
legally share in the decision to terminate a court reporter (Dkt 48 at 10-11). Thus, Plaintiff’s claim
14
There appears to be no dispute that state law governs whether the county was a coemployer under the PWDCRA. See Turppa, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 789.
22
fails.15 For the reasons discussed above, the Court does not find these arguments conclusive on the
joint employer issue.
Plaintiff contends that federal courts have looked to federal law when interpreting the
definition of “employer” under federal discrimination laws. Plaintiff cites a trio of decisions by
Judge Ludington in Turppa, in which he (1) determined that the decision in Judicial Attorneys
Association was not conclusive on the issue whether the county and the probate court were coemployers, Turppa I, 710 F. Supp. 2d at 630; (2) after additional briefing, found that the additional
facts did not change the conclusion reached in the last Opinion and Order: “the most logical
inference that can be drawn from the circumstances surrounding Plaintiff’s employment is that
Plaintiff may have been a co-employee of both the county and the probate court,” Turppa v. Cnty.
of Montmorency (Turppa II), 724 F. Supp. 2d 783, 788 (E.D. Mich. July 14, 2010); and (3) denied
reconsideration, Turppa v. Cnty. of Montmorency (Turppa III), No. 09-12974-BC, 2011 WL
1042262 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 18, 2011)16 (Dkt 52 at 9-12).
15
Ottawa County again conflates the applicable federal rules, contending that it is entitled to
dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 56 (Dkt 48 at 12). Such confusion only renders
the County’s arguments more vulnerable for failure to cogently meet the applicable standards for
dismissal or summary judgment under the federal rules.
16
To the extent Ottawa County argues that Turppa III was wrongly decided and that Judge
Ludington would have reached a different conclusion based on the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Pucci,
the argument has no merit. Plaintiff correctly notes that in denying reconsideration, Judge
Ludington acknowledged the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Pucci and nonethless concluded that the
county may be responsible for age discrimination because “there is some evidence that [the county]
had some degree of administrative control over the terms and conditions of Plaintiff’s employment.”
2011 WL 1042262, at *5. In ultimately granting summary judgment on the merits, Judge Ludington
declined to reach the county’s alternative argument that it could not be held liable under the ADEA
because it was not the plaintiff’s employer. Turppa v. Montmorency Cnty. (Turppa IV), No.
09–12974–BC, 2011 WL 10940989, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 26, 2011).
23
In its reply brief, Ottawa County changes tack on the joint employer issue, and takes the new
position that this case is properly decided on agency theory not a joint employer relationship. The
County attributes this change in position/problem in part to the “loose language” used by the state
courts, counties, federal courts, and the plaintiffs in describing and applying the “indirect” liability
concepts—including the language used in this case by Ottawa County and 58th District Court in
their collective bargaining agreement and in the termination letter17 (Dkt 50 at 2). The County
asserts that a Michigan county has no legal right upon which a joint employer finding could be
premised, and at most, a county operates in the court’s personnel arena based on a court delegation
that is only consistent with an agency theory of indirect liability (id.). The County argues that under
agency law, an agent assumes no individual liability, and instead, only binds the principal;
accordingly, the Eleventh Amendment applies regardless of any role Ottawa County is alleged to
have played in Plaintiff’s termination (id.).
Also in reply, Ottawa County belatedly challenges Plaintiff’s argument that the County and
58th District Court are “co-employers,” asserting that is not an option under Sixth Circuit law (Dkt
50 at 4, emphasis in original). The County asserts that what Plaintiff means to argue is that the
County and 58th District Court are “joint-employers” or what Judge Rosen functionally described
as the “joint administration” theory in Dolan, 666 F. Supp. 2d 754, which “although legally
imprecise, is descriptive of the way the status works” (Dkt 50 at 4, n.3).
17
The collective bargaining agreement between Ottawa County Employees Association and
the Judges of the 58th Judicial District of Michigan and the County of Ottawa, refers to the Judges
of the 58th District Court and Ottawa County collectively as the “Employer” (Plaintiff’s Statement
of Material Facts (PSMF), Dkt 53, ¶ 6; Dkt 53-3 at 5). The termination letter was sent by officials
of Ottawa County and stated that Plaintiff’s “employment with Ottawa County is terminated”
(PSMF ¶ 16; Dkt 53-4).
24
Ottawa County notes that the parties agree that the Sixth Circuit recognizes three “indirect”
employer relationships in federal civil rights employment cases, a “single employer,” jointemployer,” or “agency theory,” Swallows v. Barnes & Noble Book Stores, Inc., 128 F.3d 990, 993
(6th Cir. 1997).18 The County observes that pursuant to Swallows, the “joint employer” status
involves two separate entities that legally share the decision-making:
“The basis of the [joint employer] finding is simply that one employer while
contracting in good faith with an otherwise independent company, has retained for
itself sufficient control of the terms and conditions of employment of the employees
who are employed by the other employer. Thus, the “joint employer” concept
recognizes that the business entities involved are in fact separate but that they share
or co-determine those matters governing the essential terms and conditions of
employment.”
Id. n.4 (citations omitted). Ottawa County contends that Plaintiff does not dispute that under
Michigan law, 58th District Court may not legally share employment decision-making with Ottawa
County; therefore, their cooperation, at most, constitutes 58th District Court designating the County
as an agent (Dkt 50 at 5). Thus, because it is black-letter law that an agent is not personally liable
when acting on behalf of a known principal, Ottawa County cannot be held independently liable
even though it sent the termination letter to Plaintiff (id.). Ottawa County asserts that Plaintiff’s
failure to appreciate this distinction is a fundamental flaw in her argument, as well as in Judge
Ludington’s analysis in the Turppa decisions (id. at 6). Accordingly, even though Judge Ludington
recognized the potential for the delegation of some employment decisions, he was clearly describing
an “agency theory,” not a “joint administration” or “joint-employer” concept in stating:
18
“‘Because Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA define ‘employer’ essentially the same way,”
we rely on case law developed under all three statutes.’” Swallows, 128 F.3d at 993 n.2 (citation
omitted).
25
[I]ndividual judges may delegate some of the managerial and administrative
duties related to hiring, firing, and compensating judicial workers to local
administrators for the sake of convenience and efficiency. Indeed, the judges are
encouraged by the Michigan Supreme Court to adopt the counties’ personnel policies
concerning compensation, benefits, holidays, and pensions unless there is a good
reason to deviate. This is a reflection of the “hybrid” nature of Michigan’s courts.
Turppa I, 710 F. Supp. 2d at 628.
Ottawa County states that in the above quote, Judge Ludington may be portending this case
(Dkt 50 at 6). But the County argues that even if Plaintiff’s termination letter loosely referred to
“county” employment as terminating, “what it really meant to say was that the chief judge or the
court administrator had tasked the Ottawa personnel department as its personnel agent with the
responsibility of communicating [Plaintiff’s] termination from the 58th District Court, her sole
employer” (Dkt 50 at 7, citing Geller v. Washtenaw Cnty., No. 04-CV-72947, 2006 WL 2726965
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 22, 2006)).
Since Ottawa County raises these new arguments only in its reply brief, the Court has no
responsive argument from Plaintiff. It is the Court’s observation that the arguments in this case,
with respect to Ottawa County’s motion in particular, seem to be a “work in progress,” which
provides a precarious foundation for ruling on what appears to be a complicated issue not yet
decided by the Sixth Circuit. The Court is not persuaded that the legal framework or the factual
record before the Court is sufficiently developed to apply the legal principles now espoused. As
Judge Ludington observed in Turrpa I, for most employees seeking to bring a claim under the
ADEA or ELCRA, identifying their “employer or employers” is a simple task, but for administrative
staff of the Michigan Judiciary, the question is complicated by the relationship between the state’s
trial courts and the local government units that fund their operation. Turppa I, 710 F. Supp. 2d at
620.
26
Further, as the court’s analysis in Turppa bears out, the co-employment issue likely must
take into account the specific facts and circumstances of the case:
“[T]he additional facts provided by the county at the Court’s request do not
change the conclusion reached in the last Opinion and Order: the most logical
inference that can be drawn from the circumstances surrounding Plaintiff's
employment is that Plaintiff may have been a co-employee of both the county and
the probate court. Although the chief probate judge exercises sole managerial
control over the Montmorency County probate register’s performance of judicial
responsibilities, over time, some employment oversight duties were also being
performed by the county. The county’s personnel policies, for example, were
adopted by the probate court and the county board made the determination, pursuant
to those policies, of whether Plaintiff should be paid for unused vacation time when
her employment ended. Indeed, it is undisputed that the county was also responsible
for funding Plaintiff’s position, was identified as Plaintiff’s employer on the W–2
issued for federal income tax purposes and submitted to the Internal Revenue
Service, and responded as Plaintiff’s employer to unemployment inquiries. Plaintiff
has demonstrated that the county and the probate court may well have served as
coemployers.”
Turppa III, 2011 WL 1042262, at *1 (quoting Turppa II, 724 F. Supp. 2d 788). Accordingly,
Ottawa County’s motion to dismiss based on Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, and Rule 21 for misjoinder, based on its contentions that
the County has no legal liability and is not a proper defendant, is denied.
With regard to summary judgment, at a minimum, there is preliminary evidence supporting
Plaintiff’s co-employer contention:
For example, in the collective bargaining agreement between Ottawa County
Employees Association and the Judges of the 58th Judicial District of Michigan and
the County of Ottawa, the Judges of the 58th District Court and Ottawa County are
referred to as collectively as the “Employer.” (SMF, ¶ [6]). The employment
agreement that plaintiff signed stated that she was an employee of Ottawa County.
(SMF, ¶ [3]). Plaintiff’s W-2’s and pay check were issued by Ottawa County (SMF,
¶ 2). Plaintiff’s termination letter was sent by officials of Ottawa County and stated
that plaintiff’s employment with Ottawa County was being terminated. (SMF, ¶ 15).
It was Ottawa County that communicated with the plaintiff regarding the length of
her medical leaves of absence. (SMF, ¶¶ 15,16).
27
(Dkt 52 at 19-20; PSMF, Dkt 53). Thus, as with the defendant Montmorency County in Turppa,
Ottawa County as the movant, has not met its burden of proving the absence of a material issue of
fact as to whether the county is Plaintiff’s employer or co-employer. See Turppa III, 2011 WL
1042262, at *2. The Court is not, however, persuaded that summary judgment is entirely foreclosed.
That is a matter to be decided once the proper legal framework is determined and considered in light
of the full factual record. Therefore, Ottawa County’s motion for summary judgment, in the
alternative, is denied without prejudice.
V. Conclusion
The Court finds no basis for holding 58th District Court liable as a recipient of federal
financial assistance. Defendant 58th District Court’s motion for summary judgment with respect
to the Rehabilitation Act is granted.
The Court is not persuaded that the legal framework or the factual record before the Court
is sufficiently developed to decide liability with regard to Ottawa County. The co- or joint
employment issue likely must take into account the specific facts and circumstances of the case.
Accordingly, Ottawa County’s motion to dismiss based on Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, and Rule 21 for misjoinder, is denied. Ottawa
County’s motion for summary judgment, in the alternative, is denied without prejudice.
An Order will be entered consistent with this Opinion.
Dated: March ___, 2014
26
/s/ Janet T. Neff
JANET T. NEFF
United States District Judge
28
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?