Dayson #213123 v. McMichael et al

Filing 8

OPINION ; signed by Judge Robert Holmes Bell (Judge Robert Holmes Bell, kcb)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

JAMES MICHAEL DAYSON,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:12-cv-1304

v.

Honorable Robert Holmes Bell

TODD McMICHAEL et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, PUB. L. NO . 104-134, 110 STAT . 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any
prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A. The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint
indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as
true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33
(1992). Applying these standards, Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Factual Allegations
Plaintiff James Michael Dayson presently is incarcerated with the Michigan
Department of Corrections at the Kinross Correctional Facility. Plaintiff sues Cass County Chief
Assistant Prosecutor Frank Machnik, Cass County Circuit Judge Michael Dodge, trial counsel Tat
Parish, court-appointed appellate counsel Susan Meinberg, Cass County Sheriff Sergeant Todd
McMichael, Cass County Court Reporter Vicky Knutson, and Cass County Sheriff Department
employee Richard Beneke.
Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested on April 13, 2008 on multiple counts: two
counts of home invasion, MICH . COMP . LAWS § 750.110a(2); two counts of breaking and entering
a building with intent to commit a felony or larceny, MICH . COMP. LAWS § 750.110; breaking and
entering a vehicle with intent to steal property less than $200.00, MICH . COMP . LAWS
§ 750.356a(2)(a); one count of unlawfully driving away an automobile, MICH . COMP . LAWS
§ 750.413; one count of attempted breaking and entering a vehicle with damage, MICH . COMP . LAWS
§ 750.356a(3); and two counts of assault and battery, MICH . COMP . LAWS § 750.81. Plaintiff hired
Defendant Parish to represent him. Parish advised Plaintiff to waive his preliminary examination.
On April 13, 2008, Plaintiff’s behavior was so bizarre that Defendants Parish and Machnik stipulated
to a forensic examination to determine criminal responsibility and competency to stand trial. The
forensic examiner concluded that Plaintiff did not meet the definition of insanity and was competent
to stand trial.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Machnik did not provide all of the discovery
requested by Defendant Parish, including certain pictures that Plaintiff did not see until the date of
trial. Defendant Parish allegedly failed to object to the admission of the exhibits, including evidence
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of a crack pipe found on Plaintiff’s person at the time of the arrest. Plaintiff complains that
witnesses Stephen Pease and Daniel Paulos gave conflicting testimony at trial. He also complains
that Parish did not obtain or introduce evidence of the 911 telephone recording, which Plaintiff
broadly alleges would have permitted Plaintiff to challenge the evidence provided by witnesses Pease
and McMichael. Plaintiff’s mother apparently requested the telephone records from Cass County,
to which Defendant Beneke responded in January 2012, indicating that the recordings between
dispatch and Defendant McMichael had undoubtedly been destroyed.
Defendant McMichael testified that, during his arrest of Plaintiff, he confiscated a key
from Plaintiff that opened Michael Anders’ garage door. Witnesses Pease and Paulos identified
Plaintiff as the person who entered Michael Anders’ house.
Plaintiff attempted to fire Defendant Parish because he did not adequately respond
to Plaintiff or his mother. Defendant Judge Dodge denied Plaintiff’s motion to terminate Defendant
Parish’s representation, as well as Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial on the grounds of ineffective
assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct.
Defendant Meinberg of the State Appellate Defender’s Office was appointed to
represent Plaintiff on appeal. Defendant Meinberg argued on appeal that Plaintiff was denied a fair
trial by the prosecutor’s admission of irrelevant and highly prejudicial evidence that the crack pipe
was found on Plaintiff’s person at the time of his arrest, where Plaintiff was not charged with
possession of drug paraphernalia. Plaintiff complains that the issues raised by Meinberg were
designed to prevent review of other claims: the prosecutor’s noncompliance with discovery; the
alleged perjury committed by McMichael; the conflicting accounts of the assault and battery; the
denial of due process; and defense counsel’s failure to object to the admission of evidence of the
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crack pipe. (See Compl. ¶ 34) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Knutson misrecorded one of the
questions posed by Defendant Machnik at trial.
Plaintiff next alleges that his motion to remand for prosecutorial misconduct was
denied because he was impaired from adequately preparing it, given the six-hour weekly limit on
library privileges set forth in MICH . DEP’T

OF

CORR., Policy Directive 05.03.115. The court of

appeals affirmed his conviction, finding that the evidence of the crack pipe was relevant to the
explanation for Plaintiff’s behavior on the day of the incident. Plaintiff sought leave to appeal to the
Michigan Supreme Court, which was denied. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a motion for relief from
judgment, raising ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel and prosecutorial misconduct.
The motion was denied by Defendant Dodge. Plaintiff has sought leave to appeal to the Michigan
Court of Appeals.
Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants conspired to deprive him of access to the courts.
He claims that he is not seeking a speedier release, nor is he seeking monetary damages. Instead,
he requests declaratory relief in the form of answer to a question: “Have these named Defendants
performed actions, or chose not to act when action was required, to conspire together and prohibit
the Plaintiff from having a state court address the facts alleged in Paragraph 34?” (Compl., docket
#1, Page ID#8.)
Discussion
I.

Failure to state a claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if “‘it fails to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
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While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include
more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for
more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED . R. CIV . P. 8(a)(2)); see also
Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility
standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)
and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v. Corr.
Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal
rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
Plaintiff expressly claims that he does not seek a speedier release from prison.
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However, Plaintiff seeks a declaration that his rights were violated in the course of his criminal
proceedings. If granted, such a declaration would undermine the validity of Plaintiff’s incarceration
by the State of Michigan. Plaintiff’s action therefore presents a challenge to the fact of his
confinement.
A challenge to the fact or duration of confinement should be brought as a petition for
habeas corpus and is not the proper subject of a civil rights action brought pursuant to § 1983. See
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973) (the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a
person in custody upon the legality of that custody and the traditional function of the writ is to secure
release from illegal custody). Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiff’s complaint challenges the fact
or duration of his incarceration, it must be dismissed. See Adams v. Morris, 90 F. App’x 856, 858
(6th Cir. 2004) (dismissal is appropriate where § 1983 action seeks equitable relief and challenges
fact or duration of confinement); see also Moore v. Pemberton, 110 F.3d 22, 23-24 (7th Cir. 1997)
(reasons for not construing a § 1983 action as one seeking habeas relief include (1) potential
application of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), (2) differing defendants, (3) differing
standards of § 1915(a)(3) and § 2253(c), (4) differing fee requirements, (5) potential application of
second or successive petition doctrine or three-strikes rules of § 1915(g)).
Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff merely seeks declaratory relief for alleged violations
of Constitutional rights, his claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994),
which held that “in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction
or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been
[overturned].” See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646 (1997) (emphasis in original). In Heck,
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the Supreme Court held that a state prisoner cannot make a cognizable claim under § 1983 for an
allegedly unconstitutional conviction or for “harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would
render a conviction or sentence invalid” unless a prisoner shows that the conviction or sentence has
been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus.” Id. at 486-87 (footnote omitted). The holding in Heck has been extended to
actions seeking injunctive or declaratory relief. See Edwards, 520 U.S. at 646-48 (declaratory relief);
Clarke v. Stalder, 154 F.3d 186, 189-90 (5th Cir. 1998) (claim for injunctive relief intertwined with
request for damages); Wilson v. Kinkela, No. 97-4035, 1998 WL 246401, at *1 (6th Cir. May 5,
1998) (injunctive relief). Plaintiff’s allegations clearly call into question the validity of his
conviction. Therefore, his action is barred under Heck until his criminal conviction has been
invalidated.
A court’s dismissal of a claim on the basis that it is barred by Heck v. Humphrey is
properly considered a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) because it fails to state a claim on which
relief can be granted. See Hunt v. Michigan, 482 F. App’x 20, 22 (6th Cir. 2012) (a claim barred by
Heck is properly dismissed for failure to state a claim); Morris v. Cason, 102 F. App’x 902, 903 (6th
Cir. 2004) (same).
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b).

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The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611
(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no
good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the
$455.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless
Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g).
If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $455.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

Dated: January 28, 2013

/s/ Robert Holmes Bell
ROBERT HOLMES BELL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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