Courts #157672 v. Smith et al

Filing 6

OPINION; Order to issue; signed by Judge Janet T. Neff (Judge Janet T. Neff, clb)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

ADELL COURTS,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:12-cv-1352

v.

Honorable Janet T. Neff

WILLIE SMITH et al.,
Defendants.
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OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any
prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s
pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s
allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504
U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure
to state a claim against Defendants Smith, Trierweiler, Leonard, Thelie, Kiefer, Herald, Miller,
Krick and Koenigsknecht. The Court will serve the complaint against Defendants Holmes,
Filsinger, Over and McKenna.

Discussion
I.

Factual allegations

Plaintiff Adell Courts presently is incarcerated with the Michigan Department of
Corrections (MDOC) at the Muskegon Correctional Facility, though the actions about which he
complains occurred while he was housed at the Carson City Correctional Facility (DRF). He sues
the following DRF employees: Warden Willie Smith; Deputy Warden Tony Trierweiler; Plant
Superintendent Stan Leonard; Maintenance Supervisors L. Thelie, Gary Kiefer and Fred Herald;
Resident Unit Manager Cheryl Miller; Assistant Deputy Warden Laura Krick; Administrative
Assistant J. Koenigsknecht; Dr. Scott Holmes; Physician Assistants Kent D. Filsinger and George
R. Over; and Health Unit Manager E. McKenna.
On March 3, 2012, Plaintiff entered the bathroom of DRF housing unit 900. He was
unaware that a faulty drainage structure within the wall had caused a puddle of water to form on the
floor. No danger sign had been posted. Plaintiff slipped on the wet floor and fell, causing him to
hit his head. He was rendered unconscious and had injuries to his head, lower back and ankle.
Plaintiff was escorted to the Carson City Hospital emergency room, where he was examined and
subsequently returned to the facility. Upon his return Officer Akins explained to Plaintiff what had
happened and told him that, when it rained, the drainage system routinely caused water to infiltrate
the bathroom and living quarters.
Plaintiff filed a complaint with Defendant Trierweiler about the leaking of
contaminated water into the unit. Trierweiler told Plaintiff that a drainage system had been placed
in the area and that walls had been sealed and cracks mended. Nevertheless, water continues to
accumulate in the bathroom and living quarters. Trierweiler apologized to Plaintiff for his accident.

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Defendant Leonard also admitted to Plaintiff that the leaking wall had continued to be a problem for
years and had been noted by prior maintenance supervisors Teft and Defendant Kiefer.
Plaintiff contends that Defendants Smith, Trierweiler, Leonard, Thelie, Kiefer,
Herald, Miller, Krick and Koenigsknecht knew or should have known about the problem, but failed
to take adequate actions to cure it, resulting in Plaintiff’s ongoing exposure to hazardous and
unsanitary conditions.

According to Plaintiff, Defendants’ inaction amounted to deliberate

indifference to Plaintiff’s safety and future health and a failure to uphold their legal duties. Plaintiff
also alleges that Defendant Koenigsknecht rejected his grievance and failed to respond to the
allegation of risk.
Plaintiff alleges that MDOC Director Heyns, Grievance Specialist Sean Lockhart,
and Grievance Manager Richard Russell rejected his grievances and failed to ensure that Plaintiff’s
living conditions were safe. None of the MDOC officials has been named as a Defendant.
Plaintiff next complains that Defendants Holmes, Filsinger, Over and McKenna were
aware of Plaintiff’s injuries and need for medical treatment and had a duty to avoid future risks of
harm to Plaintiff. On July 2, 2012, Plaintiff filed a grievance against Holmes, Filsinger, Over and
McKenna for failing to adequately treat his pain. Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. He also asserts that, soon after Plaintiff filed his
grievance, Defendants Holmes, Filsinger, Over and McKenna told him that, because he had chosen
to complain, they could not do anything to help him or treat his pain and injuries. Plaintiff alleges
that Defendants’ failure to provide adequate medical treatment both violated the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments and amounted to retaliation based on his exercise of his First Amendment

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right to file a grievance. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants’ collective actions amounted to gross
negligence.
Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, together with compensatory and
punitive damages.
II.

Failure to state a claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if “‘it fails to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include
more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for
more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); see also
Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility

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standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)
and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a
right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed
by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal
rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
A.

Eighth Amendment1
1.

Drainage Problems

Plaintiff contends that Defendants Smith, Trierweiler, Leonard, Thelie, Kiefer,
Herald, Miller, Krick and Koenigsknecht violated his Eighth Amendment rights by their deliberate
indifference to ongoing hazardous and unsanitary conditions caused by water leaks.

He also

alleges that Defendant medical providers Holmes, Filsinger, Over and McKenna failed to protect
him from possible future health hazards by failing to take action to ensure that the water leakage was
corrected.
The Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional limitation on the power of the states
to punish those convicted of crimes. Punishment may not be “barbarous” nor may it contravene
society’s “evolving standards of decency.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345-46 (1981). The

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Plaintiff argues that his conditions-of-confinement claims are governed by the Due Process Clause. While the
Due Process Clause governs conditions of incarceration after arraignment and prior to conviction, see Aldini v. Johnson,
609 F.3d 858 (6th Cir. 2010); Thompson v. County of Medina, Ohio, 29 F.3d 238, 242 (6th Cir. 1994), the Eighth
Amendment governs the conditions of confinement for post-conviction inmates, see Barber v. City of Salem, Ohio, 953
F.2d 232, 235 (6th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff is a prisoner serving several life sentences following convictions for first-degree
murder and armed robbery. His conditions of confinement therefore are governed by the Eighth Amendment.

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Amendment, therefore, prohibits conduct by prison officials that involves the “unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain.” Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346). The deprivation alleged must result in the denial of the “minimal civilized
measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; see also Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596,
600-01 (6th Cir. 1998). The Eighth Amendment is only concerned with “deprivations of essential
food, medical care, or sanitation” or “other conditions intolerable for prison confinement.” Rhodes,
452 U.S. at 348 (citation omitted). Moreover, “[n]ot every unpleasant experience a prisoner might
endure while incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the
Eighth Amendment.” Ivey, 832 F.2d at 954.
In order for a prisoner to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, he must show that
he faced a sufficiently serious risk to his health or safety and that the defendant official acted with
“‘deliberate indifference’ to [his] health or safety.” Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 479-80 (6th
Cir. 2010) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (applying deliberate indifference
standard to medical claims); see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (applying
deliberate indifference standard to conditions of confinement claims)).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his health and
safety because they were aware or should have been aware of a structural problem that caused
leakage, but they failed to correct the leakage problems. Although Plaintiff uses the label of
“deliberate indifference,” his allegations fail to support such a claim.
A claim of deliberate indifference has an objective and a subjective component.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. To satisfy the objective component, the plaintiff must allege that the risk
to the prisoner is sufficiently serious. Id. In other words, the inmate must show that he is

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incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. The subjective
component requires an inmate to show that prison officials have “a sufficiently culpable state of
mind” in failing to address the serious risk. Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000)
(citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). Deliberate indifference “entails something more than mere
negligence,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, but can be “satisfied by something less than acts or omissions
for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Id. Under Farmer,
“the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. The deliberate
indifference standard “describes a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence.” Id. at 835;
see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (“conduct that does not purport to be
punishment at all must involve more than the ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests
or safety”). As the Supreme Court explained:
The Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual “conditions”; it outlaws
cruel and unusual “punishments.” An act or omission unaccompanied by knowledge
of a significant risk of harm might well be something society wishes to discourage,
and if harm does result society might well wish to assure compensation. The
common law reflects such concerns when it imposes tort liability on a purely
objective basis. But an official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should
have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our
cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-38 (citations omitted). Thus, accidents, mistakes, and other types of
negligence are not constitutional violations merely because the victim is a prisoner. Acord v. Brown,
No. 93-2083, 1994 WL 679365, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 5, 1994) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
106 (1976)). Rather, what is required is a conscious disregard of a substantial risk of harm. Farmer,
511 U.S. at 839.

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Plaintiff’s allegations fall short of demonstrating either prong of the deliberateindifference test. First, while Plaintiff alleges that water frequently leaks into the bathroom and
other areas of the housing unit when there is a heavy rain, such allegations cannot demonstrate a
sufficiently serious risk of harm to Plaintiff or other prisoners. Prisoners are aware of the possibility
of standing water and have the opportunity to exercise appropriate caution and to anticipate such
problems during a storm. Under the objective component of the test, while some risk to Plaintiff
may exist, it is not sufficiently likely to rise to the level of a substantial risk of serious harm that
would be obvious to a Defendant. The mere fact that Plaintiff had an accidental fall as a result of
the leak does not make the objective risk sufficiently substantial to meet the objective component.
See Dowell v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 22 F. App’x 610 (6th Cir. 2001) (affirming dismissal of complaint
alleging that prisoner was kept in a cell with standing water, despite the prisoner’s prior complaints
about the condition); see also Noble v. Grimes, 350 F. App’x 892, 893 (9th Cir. 2009) (dismissing
claim that injury from slip and fall on standing water was the result of deliberate indifference,
despite allegation that defendants had repeatedly been warned about the dangers of water in the
shower area); Reynolds v. Powell, 370 F.3d 1028, 1032 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that the fact that
officers were aware of a standing-water problem weeks in advance of a prisoner’s fall was not
sufficient to elevate a state tort claim to a constitutional claim).
In addition, Plaintiff fails to show that any Defendant had a sufficiently culpable state
of mind to meet the subjective component of the test. Plaintiff alleges no fact supporting his
conclusion that any Defendant was indifferent to any risk posed to Plaintiff. Indeed, by Plaintiff’s
own admissions, Defendants have taken numerous steps to address the water problem, even if those

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steps did not fully correct the problem. Plaintiff’s allegations suggest nothing more than possible
negligence by one or more individuals.
Further, to the extent that Plaintiff alleges that certain Defendants were responsibile
for the acts of their subordinates or failed to adequately address Plaintiff’s grievances, Plaintiff fails
to state a claim. Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of
their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
676; Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691(1978); Everson v. Leis, 556
F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009). A claimed constitutional violation must be based upon active
unconstitutional behavior. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575 (6th Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber,
310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002). The acts of one’s subordinates are not enough, nor can
supervisory liability be based upon the mere failure to act. Grinter, 532 F.3d at 575; Greene, 310
F.3d at 899; Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir. 2004). Moreover, § 1983 liability may
not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based
upon information contained in a grievance. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir.
1999). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own
individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. For all these reasons,
Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Smith, Trierweiler, Leonard,
Thelie, Kiefer, Herald, Miller, Krick and Koenigsknecht. He also fails to state an Eighth
Amendment claim based on the water leakage against Defendants Holmes, Filsinger, Over and
McKenna.

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2.

Medical Treatment

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Holmes, Filsinger, Over and McKenna failed to treat
his injuries and pain, including his back problems, headaches and sensitivity to light. The Court
concludes that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to warrant service of this component of his Eighth
Amendment claim against these Defendants.
B.

Retaliation

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Holmes, Filsinger, Over and McKenna told him that
they would do nothing to treat his injuries because he had filed a grievance against them. Plaintiff’s
allegations are sufficient to warrant service of the retaliation claim against Defendants Holmes,
Filsinger, Over and McKenna.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Defendants Smith, Trierweiler, Leonard, Thelie, Kiefer, Herald, Miller, Krick and
Koenigsknecht will be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and
1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court will serve the complaint against Defendants
Holmes, Filsinger, Over and McKenna.
An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

Dated: January 16, 2013

/s/ Janet T. Neff
Janet T. Neff
United States District Judge

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