Travis #688812 v. Bailey et al
Filing
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OPINION; Judgment to issue; signed by Judge Janet T. Neff (Judge Janet T. Neff, clb)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
DYLAN T. TRAVIS,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 1:12-cv-1373
v.
Honorable Janet T. Neff
PAUL BAILEY et al.,
Defendants.
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OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and Plaintiff has paid the initial
partial filing fee. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321
(1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the
complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly
irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these
standards, Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff Dylan Travis is incarcerated by the Michigan Department of Corrections and
housed at the Michigan Reformatory, though the events giving rise to his complaint occurred while
he was detained at the Berrien County Jail. He sues the following individuals: Berrien County
Sheriff Paul Bailey, “Paul Bailey Medical Staff,” and “Paul Bailey’s Dep[uties] as a whole.”
(Compl., docket #1, Page ID#2.)
According to Plaintiff,1 in March 2010, while was at the Berrien County Jail, he
requested treatment to remove a genital wart. The nurse at the facility offered a treatment consisting
of the application of an ointment to the wart on a weekly basis. After several treatments, Plaintiff
informed the nurse that the treated area felt “tender,” like it was “burning.” (Compl., Page ID#3;
Plf’s letter, docket #1-1, Page ID#8.) She told him, “it’s OK[,] the [o]intment is working,” (Plf’s
letter, docket #101, Page ID#8), so Plaintiff “p[aid] it no mind” and received another treatment.
(Compl., Page ID#3). When he woke up the next day, he felt “excruciating pain” on his penis.
(Plf’s letter, Page ID#8.) Apparently, the ointment had burned his skin, leaving a “[p]ink area the
size of a [q]uarter.” (Id.) He went to the healthcare unit, where a nurse examined him and stated,
“[W]e was putting the ointment on wrong.” (Compl., Page ID#3.) Plaintiff was told that nothing
could be done for him, and he was sent back to his cell, still in pain. For a time, while his skin
healed, he was unable to “take showers[,] workout[,] sleep[,] etc.” (Id.) He attempted to get help
from corrections officers, but they ignored him. He sent kites to healthcare requesting treatment for
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Attached to Plaintiff’s complaint is a signed letter from Plaintiff to Defendant Bailey, informing Bailey that
Plaintiff will pursue a § 1983 action against him and describing the events giving rise to the action. (Plf’s letter, docket
#1-1.) The letter provides a more detailed account of the events at issue than the complaint; thus, the Court includes
details from the letter in the summary of Plaintiff’s allegations.
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his burns, but he was told that he needed to fill out a “$25 form” in order to receive treatment. (Id.)
In the complaint, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Bailey’s staff “refused” to respond
to his requests for treatment. (Id.) In the letter attached to the complaint, however, he states that
he filled out the aforementioned form and was seen by medical staff, who told him that he needed
to see a dermatologist at a local hospital to receive further treatment. (Plf’s letter, Page ID#9.)
Plaintiff waited to be taken to a dermatologist, but he was not able to see one because it took too
long for staff to “fill out the proper writ.” (Id., Page ID#10.) Plaintiff further alleges that jail
personnel intentionally placed him “with a bunky on two different floors,” which made his “healing
process and personal life a living hell.” (Id.) Plaintiff left the facility on June 3, 2010. He was not
able to meet with a doctor until later that summer.
Plaintiff claims that the foregoing conduct by the staff at the Berrien County Jail was
discriminatory and constituted deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. As relief in this action, he seeks compensatory damages.
Discussion
I.
Failure to state a claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if “‘it fails to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include
more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
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statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for
more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); see also
Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility
standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)
and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a
right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed
by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v.
Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994).
A. Respondeat Superior
Plaintiff fails to make specific factual allegations against Defendant Bailey, other
than that certain individuals responsible for Plaintiff’s custody and care at Berrien County Jail were
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part of Bailey’s staff. Defendant Bailey may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of
his subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676;
Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691(1978); Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d
484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009).
A claimed constitutional violation must be based upon active
unconstitutional behavior. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575 (6th Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber,
310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002). The acts of one’s subordinates are not enough, nor can
supervisory liability be based upon the mere failure to act. Grinter, 532 F.3d at 575; Greene, 310
F.3d at 899; Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir. 2004). Moreover, § 1983 liability may
not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based
upon information contained in a grievance. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir.
1999). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own
individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Plaintiff does not allege
that Defendant Bailey engaged in any active unconstitutional behavior. Thus, Plaintiff fails to state
a claim against him.
B. Insufficient Allegations
The other defendants to this action are identified only as Bailey’s medical staff and
deputies “as a whole.” (Compl., docket #1, Page ID#2.) Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegations generally
do not ascribe conduct to particular individuals, either because the allegations are stated in the
passive form (e.g., “I was sent back to my cell.”), or because they refer to a group of people rather
than a single person (e.g., “medical staff,” “healthcare”). (Id. at Page ID##2-3.) Such allegations
are not adequate to state a claim. It is a basic pleading essential that a plaintiff attribute factual
allegations to particular defendants. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544 (holding that, in order to state
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a claim, a plaintiff must make sufficient allegations to give a defendant fair notice of the claim).
Where individuals are named as defendants without an allegation of specific conduct, the complaint
is subject to dismissal, even under the liberal construction afforded to pro se complaints. See
Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (dismissing the plaintiff’s claims where
the complaint did not allege with any degree of specificity which of the named defendants were
personally involved in or responsible for each alleged violation of rights); Griffin v. Montgomery,
No. 00–3402, 2000 WL 1800569, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 2000) (requiring allegations of personal
involvement against each defendant)); Rodriguez v. Jabe, No. 90–1010, 1990 WL 82722, at *1 (6th
Cir. June 19, 1990) (“Plaintiff’s claims against those individuals are without a basis in law as the
complaint is totally devoid of allegations as to them which would suggest their involvement in the
events leading to his injuries.”). It cannot be the case that all of Bailey’s medical staff and deputies
were involved in the conduct alleged, much less that every staff-member at the jail was deliberately
indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. See
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 102, 103–04 (1976) (to state a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim,
a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs). Because Plaintiff’s complaint fails to name or identify a specific defendant
to this action other than Sheriff Bailey, and fails to describe conduct attributable to a particular
defendant, it falls far short of the minimal pleading standards required to state a claim.
C. Eighth Amendment
Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff asserts a violation of his Eighth Amendment
rights, the complaint fails to state such a claim. The Eighth Amendment obligates state officials to
provide medical care to incarcerated individuals, as a failure to provide such care would be
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inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04. The Eighth
Amendment is violated when such an official is deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs
of a prisoner. Id. at 104-05; Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001).
A claim for the deprivation of adequate medical care has an objective and a
subjective component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy the objective
component, the plaintiff must allege that the medical need at issue is sufficiently serious. Id. In
other words, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk
of serious harm. Id. The objective component of the adequate medical care test is satisfied “[w]here
the seriousness of a prisoner’s need[ ] for medical care is obvious even to a lay person.” Blackmore
v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir. 2004). If, however, the need involves “minor
maladies or non-obvious complaints of a serious need for medical care,” id. at 898, the inmate must
“place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of the delay in
medical treatment.” Napier v. Madison Cnty., 238 F.3d 739, 742 (6th Cir. 2001).
The subjective component requires an inmate to show that a defendant has “a
sufficiently culpable state of mind in denying medical care.” Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867
(6th Cir. 2000) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). Deliberate indifference “entails something more
than mere negligence,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, but can be “satisfied by something less than acts
or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Id.
Under Farmer, “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn
that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837.
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Not every claim by a prisoner that he has received inadequate medical treatment
states a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. As the Supreme Court
explained:
[A]n inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be
said to constitute an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or to
be repugnant to the conscience of mankind. Thus, a complaint that
a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical
condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under
the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a
constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner. In
order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or
omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs.
Id. at 105-06 (quotations omitted). Thus, differences in judgment between an inmate and prison
medical personnel regarding the appropriate medical diagnoses or treatment are not enough to state
a deliberate indifference claim. Sanderfer v. Nichols, 62 F.3d 151, 154-55 (6th Cir. 1995); Ward
v. Smith, No. 95-6666, 1996 WL 627724, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 29, 1996).
The Sixth Circuit distinguishes “between cases where the complaint alleges a
complete denial of medical care and those cases where the claim is that a prisoner received
inadequate medical treatment.” Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976). Where,
as here, “a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the
treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to
constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.” Id.; see also Alspaugh v. McConnell, 643
F.3d 162, 169 (6th Cir. 2011); Perez v. Oakland Cnty., 466 F.3d 416, 434 (6th Cir. 2006).
Plaintiff alleges that a nurse improperly applied ointment to treat a genital wart even
after he notified her that his skin felt tender. In other words, Plaintiff does not allege a complete
denial of medical care; instead, he challenges the adequacy of the treatment that he received.
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Specifically, he challenges a nurse’s medical judgment that further treatment was appropriate despite
his symptoms. Under the logic of the aforementioned cases, such allegations may state a claim for
negligence or medical malpractice, but they do not state a claim for deliberate indifference. See
Westlake, 537 F.2d at 860 n.5.
Plaintiff also claims that jail officials did not provide treatment for his burns, though
he acknowledges that he was seen by medical staff, who told him that he needed to see a
dermatologist at a hospital to receive further treatment. To the extent that Plaintiff complains about
a failure to send him for treatment by a dermatologist, he alleges no harm as a result of the delay in
receiving that treatment. Furthermore, to the extent that he complains about a failure to provide
immediate treatment to alleviate his pain, he does not identify a particular official who was aware
of, or deliberately indifferent to, that pain. Thus, the foregoing allegations also fail to state an
Eighth Amendment claim.
Plaintiff further claims that the conditions of his confinement made his healing
process unnecessarily painful, and that unidentified officials intentionally altered those conditions
to make them more intolerable. However, Plaintiff makes no allegations identifying any conduct
by a particular official with respect to his cell conditions. His assertion that officials intentionally
altered his conditions to subject him to further pain is wholly unsupported.
D. Equal Protection
Plaintiff also claims that he was subjected to unlawful discrimination. The Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state may not “deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,” which is essentially a direction that all
persons similarly situated should be treated alike. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV; City of Cleburne v.
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Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). Plaintiff’s complaint provides no facts from which
to infer that he was treated differently from similarly-situated individuals. His allegation of
discrimination is wholly conclusory. Thus, he fails to state an equal protection claim.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611
(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no
good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the
$455.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless
Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g).
If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $455.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated: May 3, 2013
/s/ Janet T. Neff
Janet T. Neff
United States District Judge
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