Jackson v. Michigan, State of et al

Filing 25

ORDER APPROVING AND ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 19 , granting 13 Defendants' motion to dismiss, and denying 20 plaintiff's motion for leave to file a first amended complaint. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with prejudice ; signed by Judge Robert Holmes Bell (Judge Robert Holmes Bell, kcb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
REBECCA WILLIAMS JACKSON,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 1:13-CV-74
v.
HON. ROBERT HOLMES BELL
STATE OF MICHIGAN, et al.,
Defendants.
/
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
APPROVING AND ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a declaratory judgment case filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Defendants Snyder
and Schuette filed a Motion to Dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that Plaintiff’s claims
are barred by (1) the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; (2) issue preclusion; and (3) in the alternative, that
no case or controversy exists between Plaintiff and remaining Defendants. The matter was referred
to Magistrate Judge Scoville, who issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R). The Magistrate
Judge recommended that this Court grant Defendant’s motion. The matter is presently before the
Court on Plaintiff’s objections to the Report and Recommendation. Also before the Court is
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a First Amended Complaint. In accordance with 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3), the Court has performed de novo consideration of those
portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections have been made. The Court denies
the objections, denies Plaintiff’s motion, and issues this Opinion and Order.
Plaintiff raises four objections to the Report and Recommendation. First, Plaintiff reiterates
her argument that if the Court now lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it “would have needed to argue
that [it] lacked subject matter jurisdiction before” dismissing the State of Michigan as a Defendant

(Pl.’s Obj., Dkt. No. 23 at 5; R&R, Dkt. No. 19 at 6). Second, Plaintiff reiterates her argument that
Evans v. Cordray, 424 F. App’x 537 (6th Cir. 2011), controls in her case (Pl.’s Obj., Dkt. No. 23 at
5). Third, Plaintiff argues that the Report and Recommendation is deficient because it “neglects to
cite legal authorities” to contradict Plaintiff’s interpretation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which
“require[s] that in order for a court to apply the doctrine, the court must have not issued any order
other than it lacked subject matter jurisdiction” (id.). Finally, Plaintiff contends that the Report and
Recommendation is deficient because it “neglects any cited legal authority for the argument that a
state court medical malpractice claim is equal to federal court claim [sic] for unconstitutional
enforcement of a law to apply res judicata” (id.).
Plaintiff’s objection to the evaluation of the existence of subject matter jurisdiction after the
Court has dismissed a Defendant is without merit. The existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a
foundational matter, so important that “[t]he existence of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised
at any time, by any party, or even sua sponte by the court itself.” In re Lewis, 398 F.3d 735, 739 (6th
Cir. 2005) (citing Cmty. Health Plan of Ohio v. Mosser, 347 F.3d 619, 622 (6th Cir. 2003).When this
Court granted the State of Michigan’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 12) on the basis of the 11th
Amendment, it did not “grant[] itself subject matter jurisdiction” (Pl.’s Obj., Dkt. No. 23 at 6) over
Plaintiff’s case.
Even if the Court had “granted itself subject matter jurisdiction,” the existence of subject
matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time. See In re Lewis, 398 F.3d at 739. As the Sixth Circuit
has recently reiterated, “a federal court must dismiss any claim for which it lacks jurisdiction without
addressing the merits.” Chase Bank v. City of Cleveland, 695 F.3d 548, 553 (6th Cir. 2012). It is
therefore wholly appropriate to evaluate the existence of subject matter jurisdiction at this stage of
the present case.
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Plaintiff’s objections to the Magistrate Judge’s application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
are without merit. Plaintiff cites Evans v. Cordray, 424 F. App’x 537 (6th Cir. 2011), for the
proposition that to apply Rooker-Feldman, the “source of the injury must be evaluated” (Pl.’s Obj.,
Dkt. No. 23 at 7). However, the Magistrate Judge correctly identified the injury for which Plaintiff
seeks redress: “Plaintiff asks this court to reverse the decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals and
to direct that court to remand the matter to the . . . Circuit Court” (R&R, Dkt. No. 19 at 5). Plaintiff’s
injury, then, is “caused by the state-court judgment” and Plaintiff seeks “federal-court review and
rejection of that judgment.” (id.) (quoting Skinner v. Switzer, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1297
(2011). The Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that the relief Plaintiff seeks regarding the statecourt judgments against her “falls squarely within [Rooker-Feldman’s] prohibition” (R&R, Dkt. No.
19 at 5). Plaintiff’s objections that the Magistrate Judge did not cite legal authority to support his
conclusions are facially without merit.
Plaintiff also objects to the Magistrate Judge’s application of res judicata to her due process
and equal protection claims (Pl.’s Obj., Dkt. No. 23 at 8-12). Plaintiff argues that if the Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over some of her claims, it cannot apply res judicata to others of her
claims (id.). Plaintiff appears to conflate the Court’s rejection of her request to review (and overturn)
the decision of Michigan’s state courts on the basis of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the Court’s
rejection of her constitutional claims on the basis of res judicata (id.).
The Magistrate Judge correctly applied relevant law to conclude that because Plaintiff fully
litigated her constitutional claims before Michigan’s Circuit Court, Court of Appeals, Supreme
Court, and the Supreme Court of the United States, she is precluded from re-litigating those same
constitutional issues before this Court (R&R, Dkt. No. 19 at 7-8) (citing United States v. Domiguez,
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359 F.3d 839, 842 (6th Cir. 2004); People v. Gates, 452 N.W.2d 627, 630-31 (Mich. 1990)).
Plaintiff’s objections to the contrary are without merit.
Plaintiff has also filed a Motion for Leave to File a First Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 20),
to which Defendants have filed a Response (Dkt. No. 21). Plaintiff argues that this Court’s grant of
leave to amend her complaint “serves the interests of justice” (Pl.’s Mot., Dkt. No. 20 at 3). Plaintiff
states “Magistrate Scoville noted that if he understood the direction of the claim to challenge the
enactment and enforcement of the law . . . then the claim could proceed” (id.). Unfortunately for
Plaintiff, such language does not appear in either Report and Recommendation issued by Magistrate
Judge Scoville. Further, as Defendants point out, the proposed First Amended Complaint contains
substantially ths same claims as the original complaint, and would be subject to dismissal for the
same reasons given in the Report and Recommendation (Def.’s Resp., Dkt. No. 21 at 2). “When
amendment is sought at a late stage in the litigation, there is an increased burden to show
justification for failing to move earlier.” Wade v. Knoxville Utilities Bd., 259 F.3d 452, 459 (6th Cir.
2001). Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden to show why amendment at this stage serves the
interests of justice, particularly when the proposed amendment continues to fail to state a claim for
which relief can be granted.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Objections are denied, and the Court will enter a
Judgment consistent with this Opinion and Order. Therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (Dkt. No. 19) is
APPROVED and ADOPTED as the Opinion of this Court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Objections to the Report and
Recommendation (Dkt. No. 23) are DENIED.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 13) is
GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a First Amended
Complaint (Dkt. No. 20) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.

Dated: September 12, 2013

/s/ Robert Holmes Bell
ROBERT HOLMES BELL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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