Jackson #252398 v. Taylor et al

Filing 5

OPINION; Judgment to issue; signed by Judge Janet T. Neff (Judge Janet T. Neff, clb)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

WILL ARCHER JACKSON,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:13-cv-100

v.

Honorable Janet T. Neff

JEFFREY B. TAYLOR et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any
prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint
indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as
true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33
(1992). Applying these standards, Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed as frivolous.

Factual Allegations
Plaintiff Will Archer Jackson presently is incarcerated at the Lakeland Correctional
Facility. He currently is serving a prison term of 20 to 80 years, imposed by the Berrien County
Circuit Court on July 26, 1999, after Plaintiff pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 750.317. Plaintiff unsuccessfully appealed his convictions in the state courts and later
unsuccessfully sought federal habeas corpus relief. See Jackson v. Howes, 1:07-cv-137 (W.D. Mich.
Mar. 27, 2007).
Plaintiff now sues Berrien County Circuit Judge Dennis M. Wiley and Berrien
County Assistant Prosecutor Jeffrey B. Taylor for alleged civil rights violations in prosecuting and
convicting him on the murder charge. Plaintiff’s complaint consists of specious UCC-based
arguments. He alleges that he is a secured party creditor who was kidnaped and fraudulently
confined without jurisdiction when Defendants improperly charged and convicted him as WILL
ARTHUR JACKSON instead of “Will Arthur Jackson©,” failed to recognize his assigned security
agreement indemnifying him from all process, and improperly asserted maritime jurisdiction over
him. (Compl., docket #1, Page ID##4, 7-8.) For relief, he seeks immediate release from prison and
$156 million in damages.
Discussion
I.

Frivolousness

An action may be dismissed as frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law
or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198
(6th Cir.1990). Claims that lack an arguable or rational basis in law include claims for which the
defendants are clearly entitled to immunity and claims of infringement of a legal interest which

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clearly does not exist; claims that lack an arguable or rational basis in fact describe fantastic or
delusional scenarios. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28; Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199. The Court has the
“unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims
whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. “A finding of factual
frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly
incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” Denton
v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). “Examples of claims lacking rational facts include a
prisoner’s assertion that Robin Hood and his Merry Men deprived prisoners of their access to mail
or that a genie granted a warden’s wish to deny prisoners any access to legal texts.” Lawler, 898
F.2d at 1199. An in forma pauperis complaint may not be dismissed, however, merely because the
court believes that the plaintiff’s allegations are unlikely. Id.
Plaintiff’s claims are both legally and factually frivolous. First, to the extent Plaintiff
seeks release from custody, his action is not cognizable in this proceeding. A challenge to the fact
or duration of confinement should be brought as a petition for habeas corpus and is not the proper
subject of a civil rights action brought pursuant to § 1983. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,
484 (1973) (the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
custody and the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody). Therefore,
to the extent that Plaintiff’s complaint challenges the fact or duration of his incarceration, it must
be dismissed. See Adams v. Morris, 90 F. App’x 856, 858 (6th Cir. 2004) (dismissal is appropriate
where § 1983 action seeks equitable relief and challenges fact or duration of confinement); see also
Moore v. Pemberton, 110 F.3d 22, 23-24 (7th Cir. 1997) (reasons for not construing a § 1983 action
as one seeking habeas relief include (1) potential application of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477

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(1994), (2) differing defendants, (3) differing standards of § 1915(a)(3) and § 2253(c), (4) differing
fee requirements, (5) potential application of second or successive petition doctrine or three-strikes
rules of § 1915(g)).
Second, to the extent Plaintiff seeks injunctive, declaratory and monetary relief for
alleged violations of Constitutional rights, his claim is barred by Heck, 512 U.S. 477. In Heck, the
Supreme Court held that a state prisoner cannot make a cognizable claim under § 1983 for an alleged
unconstitutional conviction or for “harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a
conviction or sentence invalid” unless a prisoner shows that the conviction or sentence has been
“reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus.” Id. at 486-87 (footnote omitted). The holding in Heck has been extended to
actions seeking injunctive or declaratory relief. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646-48
(1997) (declaratory relief); Clarke v. Stalder, 154 F.3d 186, 189-90 (5th Cir. 1998) (claim for
injunctive relief intertwined with request for damages); Wilson v. Kinkela, No. 97-4035, 1998 WL
246401, at *1 (6th Cir. May 5, 1998) (injunctive relief). Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants
lacked jurisdiction to charge, convict and confine him clearly call into question the validity of his
conviction. Therefore, his action is barred under Heck until his criminal conviction has been
invalidated.
Third, both Defendant Wiley and Defendant Taylor are entitled to absolute immunity
from damages. Generally, a judge is absolutely immune from a suit for monetary damages. Mireles
v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991) (“[I]t is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper
administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free

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to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.”)
(internal quotations omitted); Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246, 254 (6th Cir. 1997); Barnes v.
Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1115 (6th Cir. 1997). Absolute judicial immunity may be overcome in
only two instances: (1) a judge is not immune from liability for non-judicial actions, i.e., actions
not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity, Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11; and (2) a judge is not immune for
actions, though judicial in nature, taken in complete absence of all jurisdiction. Id. at 12.
Plaintiff’s allegations clearly fail to implicate either of the exceptions to judicial
immunity. There is no doubt that arraigning Plaintiff, accepting his plea and sentencing Plaintiff
were judicial acts. Moreover, notwithstanding Plaintiff’s declaration that he is not subject to state
law, Judge Wiley, as a state circuit-court judge, clearly was acting within his jurisdiction in
overseeing the adjudication of state felony charges. See MICH. CONST. 1963, art. VI, §§ 13, 29;
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.601. Accordingly, Wiley is absolutely immune from liability in this case,
and Plaintiff may not maintain an action for monetary damages against him.

28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). Moreover, injunctive relief is not available under § 1983, because that statute
provides that injunctive relief “shall not be granted” in an action against “a judicial officer for an
act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated
or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983; accord Savoie v. Martin, 673 F.3d 488,
496 (6th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff does not allege that a declaratory decree was violated or that
declaratory relief was unavailable. Consequently, any claim against Defendant Wiley for injunctive
relief is barred. Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1999).
Similarly, a prosecutor also is entitled to absolute immunity for his actions in
prosecuting a criminal action. The Supreme Court embraces a functional approach to determining

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whether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127 (1997);
Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988); accord
Koubriti v. Convertino, 593 F.3d 459, 467 (6th Cir. 2010); Lomaz v. Hennosy, 151 F.3d 493, 497
(6th Cir. 1998). Under a functional analysis, a prosecutor is absolutely immune when performing
the traditional functions of an advocate. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 130; Spurlock v. Thompson, 330 F.3d
791, 797 (6th Cir. 2003); Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1137 (6th Cir. 1989). The Supreme
Court has held that a prosecutor is absolutely immune for the initiation and pursuit of a criminal
prosecution. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976); Lomaz, 151 F.3d at 497. Acts which
occur in the course of the prosecutor’s role as advocate are entitled to protection of absolute
immunity in contrast to investigatory or administrative functions that are normally performed by a
detective or police officer. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273, 276-78 (1993); Grant, 870
F.2d at 1137. In the Sixth Circuit, the focus of the inquiry is how closely related the prosecutor’s
conduct is to his role as an advocate intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal
process. Spurlock, 330 F.3d at 797; Ireland v. Tunis, 113 F.3d 1435, 1443 (6th Cir. 1997).
Obviously, charging and prosecuting a defendant in a criminal action is part of the prosecutor’s role
as an advocate. Accordingly, Defendant Taylor is entitled to immunity.
For all these reasons, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Wiley and Taylor are
legally frivolous. In addition, Plaintiff’s factual assertions concerning his secured-party status, his
indemnity agreements, his sovereign status, the application of admiralty jurisdiction and the Uniform
Commercial Code are all patently irrational and factually frivolous. Plaintiff’s complaint therefore
will be dismissed as frivolous.

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Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)
and 1915A(b).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611
(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no
good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the
$455.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless
Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g).
If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $455.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

Dated: February 25, 2013

/s/ Janet T. Neff
Janet T. Neff
United States District Judge

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