Wells #125291 v. Sawyer et al

Filing 12

OPINION signed by Chief Judge Paul L. Maloney (Chief Judge Paul L. Maloney, kw)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

DAVID WELLS,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:13-cv-183

v.

Honorable Paul L. Maloney

DAVID SAWYER et al.,
Defendants.
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OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and Plaintiff has paid the initial
partial filing fee. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321
(1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the
complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly
irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these
standards, Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed on the grounds of immunity and failure to state a
claim.

Factual Allegations
Plaintiff David Wells presently is incarcerated at the Thumb Correctional Facility.
He sues the following Defendants: Michigan Court of Appeals (MCOA) Judge David Sawyer;
MCOA Chief Clerk Larry Royster; MCOA Staff Attorney Gary Chambon; Michigan Supreme Court
(MSC) Assistant Clerk J. Mills; MSC Deputy Clerk Inger Z. Meyer; and MSC Chief Clerk Corbin
R. Davis.
Plaintiff alleges that, on June 2, 2011, he filed a state habeas corpus complaint in the
Lapeer County Circuit Court, which was denied on June 21, 2011. On March 9, 2012, Plaintiff filed
a habeas corpus complaint in the MCOA and applied to proceed in forma pauperis. Defendant
Chambon sent a letter to Plaintiff on March 14, 2012, instructing him to file a copy of his prisoner
account statement to support his request for pauper status. Plaintiff objected, contending that he was
entitled to proceed in forma pauperis without financial documentation of indigency, based on Smith
v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 709 (1961). In an order issued June 11, 2012, Defendant Sawyer
dismissed the habeas action, citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2963(1)1 and (7)2 and holding that
1

MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2963(1) provides as follows:
If a prisoner under the jurisdiction of the department of corrections submits for
filing a civil action as plaintiff in a court of this state or submits for filing an appeal
in a civil action in a court of this state and states that he or she is indigent and
therefore is unable to pay the filing fee and costs required by law, the prisoner
making the claim of indigency shall submit to the court a certified copy of his or her
institutional account, showing the current balance in the account and a 12-month
history of deposits and withdrawals for the account. The court then shall order the
prisoner to pay fees and costs as provided in this section. The court shall suspend
the filing of the civil action or appeal until the filing fee or initial partial filing fee
ordered under subsection (2) or (3) is received by the court. If the court orders that
a prisoner pay a filing fee or partial filing fee, all documents submitted by the
prisoner that relate to that action or appeal shall be returned to the prisoner by the
court along with 2 certified copies of the court order. An additional certified copy
of the court order shall be sent to the department of corrections facility where the
prisoner is housed. The prisoner then shall, within 21 days after the date of the
court order, resubmit to the court all documents relating to the action or appeal,
accompanied by the required filing fee or partial filing fee and 1 certified copy of

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Smith, 365 U.S. 708, did not prohibit the court from considering financial circumstances before
granting pauper status in a habeas corpus action. On June 13, 2012, Plaintiff filed a petition for
mandamus in the MSC, seeking an order directing the MCOA to allow him access to the court and
properly resolve the merits of his complaint. Defendant Mills sent a letter to Plaintiff dated June 14,
2012, requiring Plaintiff to file a copy of his prisoner account with the MSC to support his request
to proceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiff filed objections to the characterization of his mandamus
action as an application for leave to appeal and to the imposition of financial considerations on his
right to access the court. On June 27, 2012, Defendant Meyer signed a letter denying leave to file
an application for a writ of superintending control, indicating that only an application for leave to
appeal may be filed. Plaintiff filed a request on July 2, 2012, asking the MSC to construe his earlier
mandamus action as an application for habeas corpus. On August 21, 2012, Defendant Davis signed
an order directing the court to close the file, pursuant to MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2963(1).
Plaintiff contends that Defendants have violated his right of access to the courts. He
alleges that MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2963, by its terms, applies only to civil actions and therefore
does not apply to a complaint for habeas corpus that challenges an underlying criminal conviction.

the court order. If the filing fee or initial partial filing fee is not received within 21
days after the day on which it was ordered, the court shall not file that action or
appeal, and shall return to the plaintiff all documents submitted by the plaintiff that
relate to that action or appeal.
2

MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2963(7) states:
For purposes of this section, the fact of a prisoner’s incarceration cannot be the sole
basis for a determination of indigency. However, this section shall not prohibit a
prisoner from commencing a civil action or filing an appeal in a civil action if the
prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.
If the court, pursuant to court rule, waives or suspends the payment of fees and
costs in an action described in subsection (1) because the prisoner has no assets and
no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee, the court shall order the fees
and costs to be paid by the prisoner in the manner provided in this section when the
reason for the waiver or suspension no longer exists.

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He therefore contends that he should not be required to provide financial documentation in order to
proceed in forma pauperis. He also alleges that, as applied and on its face, MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 600.2963 unconstitutionally denies indigent prisoners the right to access the courts. He seeks
declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as reimbursement of his costs and fees.
Discussion
I.

Immunity

Plaintiff claims that Judge Sawyer and the remaining Defendants, acting in their
capacities as judicial administrative officers of the MCOA and MSC, violated his right of access to
the courts. Generally, a judge is absolutely immune from a suit for monetary damages. Mireles v.
Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991) (“[I]t is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper
administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free
to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of person consequences to himself.”)
(internal quotations omitted); Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246, 254 (6th Cir. 1997); Barnes v.
Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1115 (6th Cir. 1997). Absolute judicial immunity may be overcome in
only two instances. First, a judge is not immune from liability for non-judicial actions, i.e., actions
not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11. Second, a judge is not immune
for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in complete absence of all jurisdiction. Id. at 12.
Plaintiff’s allegations clearly fail to implicate either of the exceptions to judicial
immunity. There is no doubt that dismissing Plaintiff’s habeas application was a judicial act and
that Judge Sawyer was acting within his jurisdiction in issuing the order. Accordingly, Judge
Sawyer is absolutely immune from liability. Because Judge Daniels is clearly immune from liability
in this case, Plaintiff may not seek monetary relief him. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).

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In addition, absolute judicial immunity is extended to non-judicial officers who
perform “quasi-judicial” duties. “Quasi-judicial immunity extends to those persons performing tasks
so integral or intertwined with the judicial process that these persons are considered an arm of the
judicial officer who is immune.” Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842 (6th Cir. 1994) (probate court
administrator entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for his role in carrying out the orders of the court)
(citing Scruggs v. Moellering, 870 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1989)); see also Johnson v. Turner, 125 F.3d
324, 333 (6th Cir. 1997) (one who acts as a judge’s designee in carrying out a function for which
the judge is immune is also protected from suit seeking monetary damages)); Foster v. Walsh, 864
F.2d 416, 417-18 (6th Cir. 1988) (clerk of court was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for issuing
a warrant as directed by the court); accord Carlton v. Baird, No. 03-1294, 2003 WL 21920023, at
*1 (6th Cir. Aug. 8, 2003) (state court clerk’s office employees were entitled to quasi-judicial
immunity from state prison inmate’s § 1983 claim); Lyle v. Jackson, No. 02-1323, 2002 WL
31085181, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 17, 2002) (quasi-judicial immunity applied to claims against state
court clerks who allegedly failed to provide prisoner with requested copies of previous filings and
transcripts); Bradley v. United States, 84 F. App’x 492 (6th Cir. 2003) (federal court clerk);
Washington v. Shelby County, No. 88-6321, 1989 WL 63896 (6th Cir. June 15, 1989) (court
reporter is entitled to judicial immunity when acting within the scope of his or her official duties).

The remaining Defendants were clearly acting on behalf of the court when they
issued various letters and orders with respect to the cases Plaintiff had filed in the MCOA and MSC.
The therefore are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. Plaintiff may not seek monetary relief from
them.

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Moreover, injunctive relief is not available under § 1983, because that statute
provides that injunctive relief “shall not be granted” in an action against “a judicial officer for an
act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated
or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983; accord Savoie v. Martin, 673 F.3d 488,
496 (6th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff does not allege that a declaratory decree was violated or that
declaratory relief was unavailable. Consequently, his claim for injunctive relief is barred. See
Coleman v. Gov. of Mich., 413 F. App’x 866, 874 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding that judicial officials
were entitled to judicial or quasi-judicial immunity from claims seeking legal and equitable relief
based on defendants’ application of MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2963).
II.

Failure to state a claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if “‘it fails to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include
more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for
more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting

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Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); see also
Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility
standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)
and 1915(e)(2)(B)(I)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a
right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed
by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v.
Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994).
Even if Defendants were not immune from suit under § 1983, Plaintiff’s complaint
would be subject to dismissal. First, to the extent that Plaintiff challenges Defendants’ conclusion
that MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2963(1) applies to requests for pauper status in habeas corpus and
mandamus actions, he challenges the state courts’ interpretation of a Michigan statute. Section 1983
does not provide redress for a violation of a state law. Pyles v. Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir.
1995); Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1166 (6th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants
violated state law therefore fails to state a claim under § 1983.
Second, to the extent that he raises an as-applied challenge to MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 600.2963(1) (which requires prisoners claiming indigency to submit prisoner account statements)

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and (7) (which requires indigent prisoners to pay the filing fee when and if they become able to do
so, even if they are permitted to proceed in forma pauperis at the time of filing) his claim is not
cognizable in this action. The federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and Plaintiff has the
burden of proving the Court’s jurisdiction. United States v. Horizon Healthcare, 160 F.3d 326, 329
(6th Cir. 1998). Even where subject matter jurisdiction is not raised by the parties, the Court must
consider the issue sua sponte. See City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 511 (1973); Norris v.
Schotten, 146 F.3d 314, 324 (6th Cir. 1998); Mickler v. Nimishillen & Tuscarawas Ry. Co., 13 F.3d
184, 189 (6th Cir. 1993).
This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s as-applied challenge to
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2963(1) and (7). See Howard v. Whitbeck, 382 F.3d 633, 639-40 (6th
Cir. 2004) (affirming the dismissal of an as-applied challenge to MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2963).
The Supreme Court has held that federal district courts have no authority to review final judgments
of state-court judicial proceedings, as jurisdiction to review state-court decisions rests exclusively
with the Supreme Court. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482
(1983); Gottfried v. Med. Planning Servs., Inc., 142 F.3d 326, 330 (6th Cir. 1998). A loser in the
state court may not be heard in the federal district court on complaints of injuries by a state-court
judgment rendered before the federal proceeding commenced. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic
Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283-84 (2005). Even constitutional claims that are inextricably
intertwined with the state-court decisions are not reviewable. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n.16;
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923); Patmon v. Michigan Supreme Court, 224
F.3d 504, 509-10 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Owens, 54 F.3d 271, 274 (6th Cir. 1995). A
federal claim is inextricably intertwined with the state-court judgment “‘if the federal claim succeeds

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only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it. Where federal relief can
only be predicated upon a conviction that the state court was wrong, it is difficult to conceive the
federal proceeding as, in substance, anything other than a prohibited appeal of the state-court
judgment.’” Peterson Novelties, Inc. v. City of Berkley, 305 F.3d 386, 391 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 293 (6th Cir. 1998)) (other internal citations omitted); see also Hood
v. Keller, 341 F.3d 593, 597 (6th Cir. 2003) (where a party losing in state court seeks to challenge
the state-court judgment, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district court jurisdiction);
Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994) (holding that, under the Rooker- Feldman
doctrine, “a party losing in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate
review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party’s claim that
the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.”).
Plaintiff’s claims are “inextricably intertwined” with decisions of the state courts
because they amount to nothing more nor less than a “prohibited appeal” from the decisions of the
Michigan state courts in ordering production of Plaintiff’s financial documents and dismissing his
appeals or original complaints. Howard, 382 F.3d at 639-40 (holding that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine bars a Michigan prisoner from challenging the application of MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 600.2963 to his appellate proceedings). The recourse available to Plaintiff in response to any
adverse state-court decisions was to apply for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court. See Gottfried, 142 F.3d at 330 (“[L]ower federal courts do not have jurisdiction to review
a case litigated and decided in state court; only the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to
correct state court judgments.”). Because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine clearly precludes a lower

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federal court from reviewing state-law decisions, Plaintiff’s as-applied challenge is dismissed for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Moreover, Plaintiff’s facial challenges to MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2963(1) and (7)
are without merit. Plaintiff alleges that subsection (1) of the statute unconstitutionally requires
prisoners to provide evidence of their ability to pay the filing fee, even in cases in which the prisoner
challenges his conviction on collateral review.

Plaintiff also alleges that subsection (7)

impermissibly requires an indigent prisoner to pay the full filing fee as funds become available.
“To succeed in a facial attack on a statute, Plaintiff must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid . . . or that the statute lacks any plainly
legitimate sweep.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1587 (2010). In Smith,
356 U.S. at 713-14, the Supreme Court held that a state violates the Equal Protection Clause when
it denies an indigent prisoner the right to file a habeas corpus proceeding on the basis of his inability
to pay the filing fee. Id. By its express terms, § 2963(7) permits a prisoner who is unable to pay the
filing fee or an initial partial filing fee at the time of filing to proceed in his action without first
paying that partial filing fee. The mere fact that the prisoner may be required to pay the fee at some
time in the future when he has the funds does not in any way discriminate against the prisoner on
the basis of his indigency, nor does it deny him access to the courts, as non-indigent persons must
pay the filing fee, too. On its face, therefore, § 2863(7) does not impose a constitutional injury. The
only injury occurs if a state judge improperly denies a prisoner the right to proceed without
prepayment of the filing fee – an as-applied challenge that is barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. See Carney v. Christiansen, 375 F. App’x 494, 497 n.3 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Inasmuch as
the putative injury – i.e., that Carney could be perpetually denied access to the Michigan courts due

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to his indigency while incarcerated – could not occur purely as a result of legislative, administrative
or ministerial proceedings, but only as the result of discretionary judicial decisions, . . it is apparent
that this facial challenge is illusory.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Plaintiff’s facial challenge to subsection (1) is wholly conclusory and unsupported.
The Court is aware of no constitutional impediment to a state-court’s requirement that a person
claiming indigency must document his financial circumstances. Indeed, this Court similarly requires
prisoners who claim indigency – even those seeking habeas corpus relief – to document their
financial circumstances by providing copies of their prisoner trust account statements. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); W.D. MICH. LCIVR 3.4(a).
In sum, Plaintiff’s as-applied and facial challenges to subsections (1) and (7) of
section 600.2963 of the Michigan Compiled Laws fail to state a claim.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed on the grounds of immunity and failure to state
a claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611
(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no
good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the
$455.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless
Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g).
If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $455.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.

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This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

Dated:

May 3, 2013

/s/ Paul L. Maloney
Paul L. Maloney
Chief United States District Judge

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