Law #526663 v. Heyns et al
Filing
7
OPINION; signed by Judge Gordon J. Quist (Judge Gordon J. Quist, jmt)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
KURTIS LAW,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 1:13-cv-471
v.
Honorable Gordon J. Quist
DANIEL H. HEYNS et al.,
Defendants.
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OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and Plaintiff will pay when
funds become available. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. NO . 104-134, 110 STAT .
1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the
complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly
irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these
standards, Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff presently is incarcerated at the Clinton County Jail but complains of events
that occurred at the Newberry Correctional Facility (NCF).1 In his pro se complaint, Plaintiff sues
Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) Director Daniel Heyns and NCF Classification
Director Unknown Party.
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated his constitutional rights, as follows:
On Nov. 26, 2012 I was packed up and on Nov. 26, 2012, was transferred to
Level 2 at Kinross Corr. Facility on my way to Clinton Co. Jail.
While walking to dinner at 6:30 p.m. I was stabbed in the right side of the
face by “Mark Moore” just below the eye and was seen by an RN, John Do[e], in Aunit where the RN put a band aid on the wound and I remained in A-unit [until] he
was transferred to Clinton Co. Jail.
The Director signed the Order to Transfer or had a subordinate give the
Classification Director at Newberry the authority to transfer me without giving me
24 hour notice of intent to conduct an administrative hearing before a hearing officer.
The classification was done in violation of my due process rights and in violation of
the administrative rules governing the procedural due process rights entitled to every
inmate before a significant right or a specific punishment is imposed or right
violated.
I had a right to be free from harm and a reasonable expectation that my rights
would be protected to be free from harm at the hands of prison classification total
disregard for my rights of due process, when the Director had the rules promulgated
for that purpose. The neglect of prison administrators to comply with these rules
placed me in [immediate] danger of serious great bodily harm and the result was a
significant risk existed when the rules were disregarded to place me at a facility that
had a potential advantage of causing me harm, whether known or unknown enemies
existed without the defendants knowledge. The fact remains that I sustained a harm
that was due to the refusal of defendants to follow the rules.
I submitted a written notice to the defendant on March 23, 2013 to investigate
and resolve this matter because my grievance rights were revoked as result of
1
Plaintiff also asserts allegations concerning events at the Kinross Correctional Facility (KCF). It is unclear
from Plaintiff’s complaint where he was housed first, NCF or KCF.
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D.O.M. 2012-24 and thus my exhaustion of remedies have been complied with under
the statute and rules and D.O.M. 2012-7, see copy of Plaintiff Notice attached.
(Compl., docket #1, Page ID#3.)2
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his due process rights when they classified
him to administrative segregation and transferred him to another prison. Reading Plaintiff’s
complaint liberally, he also seems to claim a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights when
Defendants failed to protect him from the inmate that stabbed him. See Haines, 404 U.S. at 520.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that Defendants violated MDOC administrative rules.
For relief, Plaintiff requests monetary damages.
Discussion
I.
Failure to state a claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While
a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more
than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although
the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than
2
Plaintiff does not list RN John Doe as a Defendant in this action.
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a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED . R. CIV . P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility
standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)
and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a
right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed
by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v.
Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994).
A.
Due Process Clause
Plaintiff alleges that NCF Classification Director John Doe violated his due process
rights by placing him in administrative segregation and transferring him to another prison. Plaintiff
also claims that MDOC Director Heyns wrongfully signed a transfer order and/or gave the transfer
order to Classification Director John Doe.
“The Fourteenth Amendment protects an individual from deprivation of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law.” Bazetta v. McGinnis, 430 F.3d 795, 801 (6th Cir. 2005).
To establish a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process violation, a plaintiff must show that
one of these interests is at stake. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). “Without a
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protected liberty or property interest, there can be no federal procedural due process claim.”
Experimental Holdings, Inc. v. Farris, 503 F.3d 514, 519 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Bd. of Regents of
State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 579 (1972)).
The Supreme Court has held that a prisoner does not have a protected liberty interest
in the procedures affecting his classification and security because the resulting restraint does not
impose an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of
prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). In Rimmer-Bey v. Brown, 62 F.3d 789,
790-91(6th Cir. 1995), the Sixth Circuit applied the Sandin test to the claim of a Michigan inmate
that the mandatory language of the MDOC’s regulations created a liberty interest that he receive
notice and hearing before being placed in administrative segregation. The court held that regardless
of the mandatory language of the prison regulations, the inmate did not have a liberty interest
because his placement in administrative segregation did not constitute an atypical and significant
hardship within the context of his prison life. Id; see also Mackey v. Dyke, 111 F.3d 460, 463 (6th
Cir. 1997). Without a protected liberty interest, plaintiff cannot successfully claim that his due
process rights were violated because, “[p]rocess is not an end in itself.” Olim v. Wakinekona, 461
U.S. 238, 250 (1983).
Moreover, the Supreme Court repeatedly has held that a prisoner has no
constitutional right to be incarcerated in a particular facility or to be held in a specific security
classification. See Olim, 461 U.S. at 245; Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976); Meachum
v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228-29 (1976). The Sixth Circuit has followed the Supreme Court’s rulings
in a variety of security classification challenges. See, e.g., Cash v. Reno, No. 97-5220, 1997 WL
809982, at *1-2 (6th Cir. Dec. 23, 1997) (prisoner’s allegation that he was placed in a security level
higher than warranted based on the information contained in his prison file failed to state a due
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process claim because he had no constitutional right to be held in a particular prison or security
classification); O’Quinn v. Brown, No. 92-2183, 1993 WL 80292, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 22, 1993)
(prisoner failed to state a due process or equal protection claim regarding his label as a “homosexual
predator” because he did not have a constitutional right to a particular security level or place of
confinement).
In summary, Plaintiff fails to state due process claims for his placement in
administrative segregation or his transfer to another facility.
B.
Eighth Amendment
Reading Plaintiff’s complaint liberally, he seems to allege that Defendants violated
his Eighth Amendment rights by transferring him to another prison where an inmate assaulted him.
Inmates have a constitutionally protected right to personal safety grounded in the Eighth
Amendment. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). Thus, prison staff are obliged “to take
reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates” in their care. Hudson v. Palmer, 468
U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984). To establish a violation of this right, Plaintiff must show that Defendant
was deliberately indifferent to the Plaintiff’s risk of injury. Walker v. Norris, 917 F.2d 1449, 1453
(6th Cir. 1990); McGhee v. Foltz, 852 F.2d 876, 880-881 (6th Cir. 1988). While a prisoner does not
need to prove that he has been the victim of an actual attack to bring a personal safety claim, he must
at least establish that he reasonably fears such an attack. Thompson v. Cnty. of Medina, 29 F.3d 238,
242-43 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that plaintiff has the minimal burden of “showing a sufficient
inferential connection” between the alleged violation and inmate violence to “justify a reasonable
fear for personal safety”). Assuming that all of the allegations in the complaint are true, however,
Plaintiff cannot make such a showing. There are no allegations indicating that Plaintiff was at risk
of being attacked by an inmate when he was transferred, much less that Defendants were aware of
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this risk and deliberately ignored it. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth Amendment
claim.
C.
State Law
Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated MDOC administrative rules. Section 1983
does not provide redress for a violation of a state law. Pyles v. Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir.
1995); Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1166 (6th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants
violated state law therefore fails to state a claim under § 1983. Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff
seeks to invoke this Court’s supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim, the Court declines to
exercise jurisdiction. In determining whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction, “[a] district court
should consider the interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation and
balance those interests against needlessly deciding state law issues.” Landefeld v. Marion Gen.
Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1993). Ordinarily, where a district court has exercised
jurisdiction over a state-law claim solely by virtue of supplemental jurisdiction and the federal
claims are dismissed prior to trial, the court will dismiss the remaining state-law claims. Id.
Dismissal, however, remains “purely discretionary.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S.
635, 639 (2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)); Orton v. Johnny’s Lunch Franchise, LLC, 668 F.3d
843, 850 (6th Cir. 2012). Here, the balance of the relevant considerations weighs against the
continued exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state-law claim will be
dismissed without prejudice.
Conclusion
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Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611
(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no
good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the
$455.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless
Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g).
If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $455.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated: June 17, 2013
/s/ Gordon J. Quist
GORDON J. QUIST
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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