Bolden v. Chad et al
Filing
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OPINION; Judgment to issue; signed by Judge Janet T. Neff (Judge Janet T. Neff, clb)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
TYJUAN BOLDEN,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 1:13-cv-676
v.
Honorable Janet T. Neff
UNKNOWN CHAD et al.,
Defendants.
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OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a former state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss
any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently,
see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless
they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992).
Applying these standards, Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff TyJuan Bolden previously was incarcerated at the Kent County Correctional
Facility (KCCF), though he had been released by the time he filed the instant action. He sues the
following KCCF employees: Correctional Officers (unknown) Chad, (unknown) Royda, and Rob
Steele; Sergeant Vick Hayes, and unknown kitchen and medical employees.
Plaintiff alleges that, for some period of time during his incarceration at KCCF, he
was subjected to discriminatory and disrespectful treatment. He also alleges that he was provided
an inadequate diabetic diet and received improper medical treatment for his diabetes, including
going days without his insulin. He also alleges that he had no soap for 2½ weeks and that he had
received rotten and molded food on occasion. Plaintiff alleges that the inadequacies of his food,
medical care, and other prison conditions caused him to fear for his life. He further alleges that his
physical condition deteriorated as the result of his confinement. He seeks compensatory damages
of $4 million.
Discussion
I.
Failure to state a claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While
a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more
than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state
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a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although
the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility
standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)
and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a
right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed
by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v.
Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994).
It is a basic pleading essential that a plaintiff attribute factual allegations to
particular defendants. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544 (holding that, in order to state a claim, Plaintiff
must make sufficient allegations to give a defendant fair notice of the claim). Where a person is
named as a defendant without an allegation of specific conduct, the complaint is subject to dismissal,
even under the liberal construction afforded to pro se complaints. See Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F.
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App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (dismissing Plaintiff’s claims where the complaint did not allege
with any degree of specificity which of the named defendants were personally involved in or
responsible for each alleged violation of rights); Griffin v. Montgomery, No. 00-3402, 2000 WL
1800569, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 2000) (requiring allegations of personal involvement against each
defendant)); Rodriguez v. Jabe, No. 90-1010, 1990 WL 82722, at *1 (6th Cir. June 19, 1990)
(“Plaintiff’s claims against those individuals are without a basis in law as the complaint is totally
devoid of allegations as to them which would suggest their involvement in the events leading to his
injuries.”); see also Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994); Krych v. Hvass, 83 F. App’x
854, 855 (8th Cir. 2003); Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974); Williams v. Hopkins,
No. 06-14064, 2007 WL 2572406, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 6, 2007); McCoy v. McBride, No. 3:96cv-227RP, 1996 WL 697937, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 5, 1996); Eckford-El v. Toombs, 760 F. Supp.
1267, 1272-73 (W.D. Mich. 1991). Plaintiff fails even to mention a Defendant in the body of his
complaint, much less to attribute any particular conduct to a specific Defendant. His allegations fall
far short of the minimal pleading standards under FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (requiring “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”).
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611
(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no
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good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the
$505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless
Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g).
If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated: March 17, 2014
/s/ Janet T. Neff
Janet T. Neff
United States District Judge
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