Steed #170747 et al v. Berghuis
Filing
10
OPINION; signed by Judge Gordon J. Quist (Judge Gordon J. Quist, jmt)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
LARRY STEED,
SONIA MEISSNER,
Petitioners,
Case No. 1:13-cv-845
v.
Honorable Gordon J. Quist
MARY BERGHUIS,
Respondent.
_______________________________/
OPINION
This is a habeas corpus action brought by a state prisoner and another individual
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Promptly after the filing of a petition for habeas corpus, the Court must
undertake a preliminary review of the petition to determine whether “it plainly appears from the face
of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district
court.” Rule 4, RULES GOVERNING § 2254 CASES; see 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If so, the petition must be
summarily dismissed. Rule 4; see Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970) (district court
has the duty to “screen out” petitions that lack merit on their face). A dismissal under Rule 4
includes those petitions which raise legally frivolous claims, as well as those containing factual
allegations that are palpably incredible or false. Carson v. Burke, 178 F.3d 434, 436-37 (6th Cir.
1999). After undertaking the review required by Rule 4, the Court concludes that the petition must
be dismissed because it fails to raise a meritorious federal claim.
Factual Allegations
Petitioner Larry Steed is incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections
(MDOC) at the Earnest C. Brooks Correctional Facility (LRF). According to his profile on the
MDOC’s Offender Tracking Information System, Petitioner Steed is serving several sentences, the
longest of which is a life sentence issued in 1986 for conspiracy to deliver or manufacture 650 grams
or more of a narcotic drug or cocaine, Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.7401(2)(a)(i).1 Petitioner Sonia
Meissner is a “[m]ember of the [p]ublic” residing in Holt, Michigan. (See docket #1, Page ID##12.) Respondent Mary Berghuis is the warden of LRF.
Petitioners initiated this action on July 30, 2013, by filing a document titled,
“NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE HABEAS CORPUS PETITION CHALLENGING THE
DECISION OF THE RESPONDENTS IN FOIA REQUEST NO. 13-495.” (Docket #1.) Thereafter,
Petitioner Steed filed another “notice of intent,” indicating that Petitioners intended to file a brief
in support of the petition, and asking the Court not to render a final decision on the petition until the
brief was filed (docket #5). On September 4, 2013, the Court ordered Petitioners to file their petition
and supporting brief within fifteen days (docket #6). Petitioner Steed then filed a document with
the following title:
PETITIONER[’]S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF COMPLAINT FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS TESTING THE RULING OF THE RESPONDENTS IN
ITS DECISION TO DENY FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
REQUEST NO.13-495 & REQUEST FOR ORDER REQUIRING A
RESPONSIVE PLEADING ON CLAIMS PRESENTED WITHIN THIS
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF HABEAS CORPUS PETITION[] UNDER [28]
U.S.C. [§ ]2254 & REQUEST FOR RESPONSIVE PLEADING PRIOR TO
ENTERING A FINAL DECISION ON THE HABEAS CORPUS
JUDGMENT.
(Pet’r’s Br., docket #7, Page ID#12.) Petitioners did not file a separate “complaint” or petition, so
the Court construes Petitioner Steed’s brief as the operative pleading in this action.
In his brief, Petitioner Steed contends that in April 2013, he and Meissner filed a
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request with the MDOC, requesting all files pertaining to Steed.
1
See http://mdocweb.state.mi.us/OTIS2/otis2profile.aspx?mdocNumber=170747.
-2-
In May 2013, Petitioners received a response indicating that the cost of fulfilling the request would
be over $228,000, and that Petitioners needed to submit a deposit of approximately $114,000 before
the request would be processed. Petitioner Steed claims that the FOIA response was improper and
deprived him of due process of law.
Petitioner Steed further contends that his MDOC file includes documents “that are
contrary to the laws of the United States of America,” and that the Michigan Parole Board uses these
documents to make decisions that affect Petitioner’s “programming, classification, housing
management, security level placements, parole eligibility processes, parole commutation
applications, parole lifer review applications, and executive clemency consideration,” thereby
violating Petitioner’s constitutional right to due process. (Pet’r’s Br. docket #7, Page ID#15.)
As relief, Petitioner seeks an order requiring Respondent to answer the following
question:
[D]ID THE RESPONDENT[] CREATE A PROTECTED LIBERTY
INTEREST BY PROVIDING FALSE[] AND MISLEADING REASONS
TO THE PETITIONER[’]S AND COURT IN ITS MAY 13, 2013
RESPONSE TO THE F.O.I.A. REQUEST AS THAT . . . DENIAL WAS
NOT BASED ON A LAWFULLY VALID RESPONSE REQUIRING THIS
COURT TO ORDER A RESPONSIVE PLEADING TO THE
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AS THAT . . . DENIAL HAS
VIOLATED THE MANDATED PUBLIC ACT REQUIREMENTS AND
DEPRIVED PETITIONER OF HIS 14TH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS OF LAW?
(Id. at Page ID#18.) Petitioner also requests that the Court require Respondent to answer a series
of questions before the Court issues a final decision in the matter (docket #8). Because the petition
is clearly without merit, however, it will be dismissed.
Discussion
Petitioners’ action is patently frivolous. They purport to seek relief under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254, but that statute permits an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person “in custody
-3-
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)
(emphasis added). “[T]he traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody,”
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973), but Petitioners do not seek release from custody.
Instead, they challenge the response to their FOIA request, and they seek review of that response.
Indeed, it appears that Petitioner Meissner is not in custody, in which case § 2254 does not apply
to her. Moreover, though Petitioner Steed is “in custody” within the meaning of § 2254, success on
his FOIA-related claim would have no impact on his custody. Consequently, Petitioners’ claim that
they were deprived of due process in connection their FOIA request is outside the scope of federal
habeas corpus review.
Petitioner Steed also contends that the parole board denied him due process of law
in connection with decisions concerning his “programming, classification, housing management,
security level placements, parole eligibility processes, parole commutation applications, parole lifer
review applications, and executive clemency consideration.” (See Pet’r’s Br. docket #7, Page
ID#15.) To the extent Petitioner asserts a separate due process claim regarding the parole board’s
actions, his claim is without merit. To establish a procedural due process violation, a petitioner must
show that (1) he was deprived of a protected liberty or property interest, and (2) such deprivation
occurred without the requisite due process of law. Club Italia Soccer & Sports Org., Inc. v. Charter
Twp. of Shelby, 470 F.3d 286, 296 (6th Cir. 2006); see also Swihart v. Wilkinson, 209 F. App’x 456,
458 (6th Cir. 2006). Petitioner fails to raise a claim of constitutional magnitude because he does not
have a cognizable liberty interest in classification, housing, security level placement, access to
prison programming, or in early release from confinement via parole, commutation, or executive
clemency.
The Supreme Court repeatedly has held that a prisoner has no constitutional right to
be incarcerated in a particular facility, to be assigned a specific security classification, or to
-4-
participate in prison programming. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983) (no right to
remain at a particular prison); Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976) (Due Process Clause
not implicated by prisoner classification and eligibility for rehabilitative programs); Meachum v.
Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228-29 (1976) (no right to remain at a particular prison); see also Harris v.
Truesdell, 79 F. App’x 756, 759 (6th Cir. 2003) (no constitutional right to be held in a particular
prison or security classification); Carter v. Tucker, 69 F. App’x 678, 680 (6th Cir. 2003) (same);
O’Quinn v. Brown, No. 92-2183, 1993 WL 80292, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 22, 1993) (no right to a
particular security level or place of confinement). Moreover, even if Petitioner Steed did have a
constitutional right to any of the foregoing, a deprivation of those rights would not give rise to a
claim for habeas corpus relief. Habeas corpus is not available to prisoners who are complaining
only about the conditions of their confinement or mistreatment during their legal incarceration. See
Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 2004); Lutz v. Hemingway, 476 F. Supp. 2d 715, 718
(E.D. Mich. 2007). Complaints concerning such conditions “do not relate to the legality of the
petitioner’s confinement, nor do they relate to the legal sufficiency of the criminal court proceedings
which resulted in the incarceration of the petitioner.” Lutz, 476 F. Supp. 2d at 718 (quoting Maddux
v. Rose, 483 F. Supp. 661, 672 (E.D. Tenn. 1980)). Thus, such claims “fall outside of the cognizable
core of habeas corpus relief.” Hodges v. Bell, 170 F. App’x 389, 393 (6th Cir. 2006).
In addition, there is no constitutional or inherent right to be released before the
expiration of a prison sentence. Although a state may establish a system for early release on parole,
it has no duty to do so; thus, the presence of a parole system by itself does not give rise to a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole release. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal &
Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7, 11 (1979); Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373 (1987). Rather,
a liberty interest is present only if state law entitles an inmate to release on parole. Inmates of Orient
Corr. Inst. v. Ohio State Adult Parole Auth., 929 F.2d 233, 235 (6th Cir. 1991).
-5-
In Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162 (6th Cir. 1994) (en banc), the Sixth Circuit, noting
“the broad powers of the Michigan authorities to deny parole,” held that the Michigan system does
not create a liberty interest in parole. Id. at 1164-65; see also Crump v. Lafler, 657 F.3d 393, 404
(6th Cir. 2011) (holding that the adoption of specific parole guidelines since Sweeton does not lead
to the conclusion that parole release is mandated upon reaching a high probability of parole); Carnes
v. Engler, 76 F. App’x 79, 80 (6th Cir. 2003). In addition, the Sixth Circuit has rejected the
argument that due process is implicated when changes to parole procedures and practices have
resulted in incarcerations that exceed the subjective expectation of the sentencing judge. See Foster
v. Booker, 595 F.3d 353, 369 (6th Cir. 2010). Finally, the Michigan Supreme Court has recognized
that there exists no liberty interest in parole under the Michigan system. Glover v. Mich. Parole Bd.,
596 N.W.2d 598, 603-04 (Mich. 1999).
Furthermore, an inmate has no constitutional or inherent right to early release through
executive clemency or commutation. Ohio Adult Parol Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 280
(1998); Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981). Moreover, because the
Governor of Michigan has broad discretionary power to commute sentences, Michigan prisoners do
not have a state-created liberty interest in commutation. Manning v. Unknown Parties, 56 F. App’x
710, 711 (6th Cir. 2003); Moran v. McGinnis, 1996 WL 304344, at *2 (6th Cir. June 5, 1996); Vertin
v. Gabry, No. 94–2267, 1995 WL 613692, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 18, 1995). In the absence of a
protected liberty interest, Petitioner Steed cannot raise a due process claim.
In summary, Petitioners’ challenge to a state agency’s response to their FOIA request
is outside the scope of federal habeas review, and Petitioner Steed’s claim that the parole board
violated his right to due process is meritless on its face.
-6-
Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, the Court will summarily dismiss Petitioners’ application
pursuant to Rule 4 because it fails to raise a meritorious federal claim.
Certificate of Appealability
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), the Court must determine whether a certificate of
appealability should be granted. A certificate should issue if Petitioners have demonstrated a
“substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This Court’s
dismissal of Petitioners’ action under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases is a determination
that the habeas action, on its face, lacks sufficient merit to warrant service. It would be highly
unlikely for this Court to grant a certificate, thus indicating to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals that
an issue merits review, when the Court has already determined that the action is so lacking in merit
that service is not warranted. See Love v. Butler, 952 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1991) (it is “somewhat
anomalous” for the court to summarily dismiss under Rule 4 and grant a certificate); Hendricks v.
Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990) (requiring reversal where court summarily dismissed under
Rule 4 but granted certificate); Dory v. Comm’r of Corr. of New York, 865 F.2d 44, 46 (2d Cir.
1989) (it was “intrinsically contradictory” to grant a certificate when habeas action does not warrant
service under Rule 4); Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050 n.1 (2d Cir. 1983) (issuing
certificate would be inconsistent with a summary dismissal).
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has disapproved issuance of blanket denials of
a certificate of appealability. Murphy v. Ohio, 263 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2001). Rather, the district
court must “engage in a reasoned assessment of each claim” to determine whether a certificate is
warranted. Id. at 467. Each issue must be considered under the standards set forth by the Supreme
Court in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000). Murphy, 263 F.3d at 467. Consequently, this
Court has examined each of Petitioners’ claims under the Slack standard. Under Slack, 529 U.S. at
-7-
484, to warrant a grant of the certificate, “[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists
would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Id. “A
petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that . . . jurists could conclude the issues presented
are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,
327 (2003). In applying this standard, the Court may not conduct a full merits review, but must limit
its examination to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of Petitioner’s claims. Id.
The Court finds that reasonable jurists could not conclude that this Court’s dismissal
of Petitioners’ claims was debatable or wrong. Therefore, the Court will deny Petitioner a certificate
of appealability.
A Judgment and Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated: November 14, 2013
/s/ Gordon J. Quist
GORDON J. QUIST
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
-8-
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?