Sleighter v. Kent, County of et al

Filing 4

OPINION; Order to issue; signed by Judge Janet T. Neff (Judge Janet T. Neff, clb)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

BRADLEY KEITH SLEIGHTER,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:13-cv-1071

v.

Honorable Janet T. Neff

COUNTY OF KENT et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has
granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Complaints filed in forma pauperis are subject
to the screening requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 866 (6th
Cir. 2000). The Court is required to dismiss the case if it determines that the complaint is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro
se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s
allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504
U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure
to state a claim against all Defendants except Kent County and Sheriff Lawrence Stelma.

Discussion
I.

Factual allegations

Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Kent County Correctional Facility (KCCF) from June
3, 2013 to August 19, 2013. The allegations in his complaint relate to this approximately two-month
period of incarceration. Plaintiff sues Kent County, the Kent County Jail Administration, Sheriff
Lawrence Stelma, Under Sheriff Jon Hess, Captain Randy Demory, Captain (Unknown) DeWitt,
Aramark Food Services (AFS), Unknown Party named as Chaplain “Bill,” and the Forgotten Man
Mission.
Plaintiff alleges claims for relief for violation of his rights under the First Amendment
and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. With
respect to his first claim, Plaintiff alleges that when he arrived at KCCF he wrote to Chaplain Bill,
who is in charge of religious dietary accommodations at KCCF, and requested a Jewish Kosher Diet.
Plaintiff was told that the only religious dietary accommodation available was a “vegan” diet.
Plaintiff accepted this diet, although it did not meet the requirements of the Jewish Kosher law.
Plaintiff alleges that he received food that was neither Kosher nor vegan, and that the food he
received did not meet his nutritional needs. As a result, Plaintiff lost weight during his time at
KCCF.
Plaintiff corresponded with Defendants Demory, DeWitt and AFS to try to “rectify
the problems with his dietary provisions” but “his attempts were left unanswered.” (Docket #1,
Page ID#4.) Plaintiff alleges that he either had to stop eating or violate his core religious beliefs.
Plaintiff “chose a middle path and still lost weight consistently as a result of his nutritional
deprivation.” (Id. at Page ID#3.) Plaintiff does not explain what he means by “middle path.”

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Plaintiff alleges that he “attempted to point out to ‘Chaplain Bill’ the provisions of the RLUIPA and
his rights under the First Amendment ‘Free Exercise’ clause,” however, “Chaplain Bill” told him
KCCF policy “supersedes any such rights,” (id. at Page ID#5), the only law is God’s law and that
KCCF only allows Christian religious practices and articles of faith.
With respect to his second claim for relief, Plaintiff alleges that KCCF “violated his
rights by making him choose between either participating in the Sunday Christian religious service
or . . . return[ing] to his cell and forego[ing] privileges normally allow[ed] at the specified time.”
(Id.) Even when he stayed in his cell, he was able to hear the entire Christian religious service.
Plaintiff contends that KCCF attempts to convert inmates to Christianity by holding Christian
religious services in common living areas, setting aside a section of the prison facility, called the
“God Pod,” for “the advancement of the Christian religion” and by failing to accommodate any other
religious practices. (Id. at Page ID#6.) Plaintiff also contends that KCCF practices, policies and
procedures favor the Christian religion above all other religions. Plaintiff alleges that he asked the
Chaplain about other religious accommodations and was told that if he would convert to Christianity
he would receive many accommodations.
II.

Failure to state a claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if “‘it fails to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include
more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

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statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for
more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility
standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)
and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a
right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed
by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal
rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
To establish that his First Amendment rights have been violated, Plaintiff must
demonstrate that Defendants’ behavior infringes upon his sincerely held religious practice or belief.
Kent v. Johnson, 821 F.2d 1220, 1224-25 (6th Cir. 1987); see also, Flagner v. Wilkinson, 241 F.3d
475, 481 (6th Cir. 2001) (same); Bakr v. Johnson, No. 95-2348,1997 WL 428903, at *2 (6th Cir.

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July 30, 1997) (noting that “sincerely held religious beliefs require accommodation by prison
officials”).

Similarly, “[t]he threshold inquiry under RLUIPA is whether the challenged

governmental action substantially burdens the exercise of religion.” Baranowski v. Hart, 486 F.3d
112, 124 (5th Cir. 2007); see Barhite v. Caruso, No. 09–1312, 2010 WL 1957493, at *3 (6th Cir.
May 14, 2010) (“RLUIPA [ ] requires an inmate to show that his or her religious exercise [is]
substantially burdened.”); Living Water Church of God v. Charter Twp. of Meridian, 258 F. App’x
729, 733 (6th Cir. 2007).
A.

Chaplain “Bill”

Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Chaplain “Bill” because he has not alleged any
facts suggesting that Chaplain “Bill” violated his First Amendment rights or his rights under
RLUIPA.1
Plaintiff complains that the diet made available to him after Chaplain “Bill” approved
his request for a religious accommodation did not meet his religious or nutritional needs. Nowhere,
however, does Plaintiff suggest that Chaplain “Bill” had a role in creating the menu or that he had
any authority to change the menu. Additionally, Plaintiff complains that KCCF has policies that
favor Christian religious practices above all others and that Chaplain “Bill” conveyed information
about these policies to Plaintiff. Nevertheless, Plaintiff does not suggest that Chaplain “Bill” had
a role in creating or enforcing these policies, nor does Plaintiff suggest that Chaplain “Bill” would
have any role in resolving any complaints about the policies. Plaintiff’s allegations suggest only that
Chaplain “Bill” could approve or deny religious dietary accommodations. Chaplain “Bill” approved

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The Court assumes, without deciding, that Chaplain “Bill” is a state actor. The Court further assumes without
deciding that the RLUIPA authorizes individual capacity claims against state officials. See Heard v. Caruso, 351 Fed.
App’x 1, 13 n.5 (6th Cir. 2009).

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Plaintiff’s religious meal accommodation. Thus, Chaplain “Bill” did not engage in any conduct that
infringed or burdened Plaintiff’s exercise of his religion. Consequently, Plaintiff fails to state a
claim against Chaplain “Bill.”
B.

County Defendants

Plaintiff sues Kent County and KCCF. Plaintiff’s claim against KCCF fails because
KCCF is a building, not capable of being sued in its own right. Watson v. Gill, 40 F. App’x 88, 89
(6th Cir. 2002). Kent County is the appropriate Defendant in Plaintiff’s action. Id. Following
initial review, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has sufficiently stated claims for violation of his
First Amendment rights and his rights under RLUIPA against Kent County.
C.

Insufficient Allegations of Active Conduct

Plaintiff fails even to mention Defendant Stelma, Hess or the Forgotten Man Mission
in the body of his complaint. It is a basic pleading essential that a plaintiff attribute factual
allegations to particular defendants. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544 (holding that, in order to state
a claim, Plaintiff must make sufficient allegations to give a defendant fair notice of the claim).
Where a person is named as a defendant without an allegation of specific conduct, the complaint is
subject to dismissal, even under the liberal construction afforded to pro se complaints. See Frazier
v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (dismissing Plaintiff’s claims where the
complaint did not allege with any degree of specificity which of the named defendants were
personally involved in or responsible for each alleged violation of rights); Griffin v. Montgomery,
No. 00-3402, 2000 WL 1800569, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 2000) (requiring allegations of personal
involvement against each defendant)); Rodriguez v. Jabe, No. 90-1010, 1990 WL 82722, at *1 (6th
Cir. June 19, 1990) (“Plaintiff’s claims against those individuals are without a basis in law as the

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complaint is totally devoid of allegations as to them which would suggest their involvement in the
events leading to his injuries.”); see also Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994); Krych
v. Hvass, 83 F. App’x 854, 855 (8th Cir. 2003); Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir.
1974); Williams v. Hopkins, No. 06-14064, 2007 WL 2572406, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 6, 2007);
Eckford-El v. Toombs, 760 F.Supp. 1267, 1272-73 (W.D. Mich. 1991). Plaintiff’s complaint against
Defendants Stelma , Hess and Forgotten Man Mission falls far short of the minimal pleading
standards under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (requiring “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief”). See also Wood v. Michigan Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:12-CV-1342,
2013 WL 2458390 (W.D. Mich. June 6, 2013).
Nevertheless, with respect to Defendant Stelma only, Plaintiff alleges that his
constitutional rights were violated by policies and practices at KCCF that favored Christians and
disfavored all other religions. In matters pertaining to the conditions of the jail and to the operation
of the deputies, the sheriff is the policymaker for the county. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 51.75 (sheriff
has the “charge and custody” of the jails in his county); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 51.281 (sheriff
prescribes rules and regulations for conduct of prisoners); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 51.70 (sheriff may
appoint deputies and revoke appointments at any time); Kroes v. Smith, 540 F. Supp. 1295, 1298
(E.D. Mich. 1982) (the sheriff of “a given county is the only official with direct control over the
duties, responsibilities, and methods of operation of deputy sheriffs” and thus, the sheriff
“establishes the policies and customs described in Monell”). Reading Plaintiff’s complaint
indulgently, the Court presumes that Plaintiff intended to include Defendant Stelma in his
allegations regarding policies and practices at KCCF that caused plaintiff to be deprived of his
constitutional rights and his rights under RLUIPA. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. Consequently,

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although Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendants Hess and the Forgotten Man Mission, the
Court concludes that he has stated a claim against Defendant Stelma.
However, to the extent Plaintiff implies that Defendant Stelma or any other
Defendant failed to adequately supervise their subordinates, he fails to state a claim under §1983.
Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates
under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Monell v. New
York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th
Cir. 2009). A claimed constitutional violation must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior.
Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575 (6th Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir.
2002). The acts of one’s subordinates are not enough, nor can supervisory liability be based upon
the mere failure to act. Grinter, 532 F.3d at 575; Greene, 310 F.3d at 899; Summers v. Leis, 368
F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir. 2004). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant,
through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.
To the extent Plaintiff suggests that Defendant Stelma or any other Defendants were responsible for
the actions of their subordinates, he fails to state a claim against them.
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants Demory, DeWitt, and AFS are liable under
§ 1983 because they failed to adequately respond to his grievances. Section 1983 liability may not
be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based
upon information contained in a grievance.2 See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir.
1999). The failure to respond to Plaintiff’s complaints does not constitute active conduct by these

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Although Plaintiff does not refer to any formal grievance in his complaint, he indicates that he sent
“correspondence” to Defendants Demory, DeWitt and AFS to alert them to the problem with the “vegan” diet and that
his “correspondence” was ignored. (Docket #1, Page ID#4.) The analysis is the same whether Plaintiff submitted an
official grievance or simply notified the Defendants in writing of his grievance.

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Defendants. Consequently, Plaintiff fails to state claims against Defendants Demory, DeWitt and
AFS.
Plaintiff also fails to state a § 1983 claim against AFS because he has not alleged that
AFS had a policy or practice that deprived Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. The Sixth Circuit
has held that “a private entity which contracts with the state to perform a traditional state function
such as providing medical services to prison inmates may be sued under § 1983 as one acting ‘under
color of state law.’” Hicks v. Frey, 992 F.2d 1450, 1458 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487
U.S. 42, 54 (1988)). Although Plaintiff does not say so expressly, AFS has apparently contracted
with KCCF to provide food services to inmates. If AFS is not a state actor, Plaintiff cannot bring
a § 1983 claim against it. However, even if AFS is a state actor, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim fails
because “[r]espondeat superior is not a proper basis for liability under § 1983.” McQueen v.
Beecher Cmty. Schs., 433 F .3d 460, 470 (6th Cir. 2006). A municipality cannot be held responsible
for a constitutional deprivation unless there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or
custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. This same analysis
applies to § 1983 claims against a private corporation like AFS. See Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am.,
102 F.3d 810, 818 (6th Cir. 1996) (“Monell involved a municipal corporation, but every circuit to
consider the issue has extended the holding to private corporations as well.”) Liability must be
based on a policy or custom of the contracted private entity or “the inadequacy of [an employee's]
training.” Id.; Starcher v. Corr. Med. Sys., Inc., 7 F. App’x 459, 465 (6th Cir. 2001) (“CMS’s
[Correctional Medical Systems, Inc.,] liability must also be premised on some policy that caused a
deprivation of [plaintiff’s constitutional] rights.”) Nothing in Plaintiff’s complaint suggests that the
action or inaction of any AFS personnel occurred as a result of a policy or custom implemented or

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endorsed by AFS. Consequently, Plaintiff fails to state a § 1983 claim against AFS.
D.

Equal Protection

In his second claim for relief, Plaintiff contends that KCCF has policies, practices
and procedures that favor the Christian religion above all other religions. Although he does not
expressly raise it, Plaintiff’s allegations arguably intend to raise an equal protection claim. Upon
initial review, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has sufficiently stated an equal protection claim
against Kent County and Sheriff Stelma.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court
determines that all Defendants except Kent County and Sheriff Stelma will be dismissed for failure
to state a claim. The Court will serve the complaint against Defendants Kent County and Stelma.
An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

Dated: October 31, 2013

/s/ Janet T. Neff
Janet T. Neff
United States District Judge

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