Davis #223815 v. Michigan Department of Corrections et al
Filing
6
OPINION ; signed by Judge Robert J. Jonker (Judge Robert J. Jonker, mil)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
RONALD L. DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 1:13-cv-1231
v.
Honorable Robert J. Jonker
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation Reform
Act, PUB. L. NO . 104-134, 110 STAT . 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner
action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se
complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s
allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504
U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure
to state a claim against Defendants MDOC, Sutton, Property Room Officers Unknown Parties ##1-2,
Young, Lauer, Food Service Director Unknown Party #3, Heffelbower and other unspecified
Unknown Parties. The Court will serve the complaint against Defendants Lehman, Cooper, Tate,
Thrush, Allen, Wood, Harding, Dulaney and Darnell.
Discussion
I.
Factual allegations
Plaintiff Ronald L. Davis presently is incarcerated by the Michigan Department of
Corrections (MDOC) at the Lakeland Correctional Facility (LCF) although the events about which
he complains took place when he was housed at the Richard A. Handlon Correctional Facility
(MTU). Plaintiff names the MDOC and the following MTU employees as defendants: Corrections
Officers (Unknown) Dulaney, (Unknown) Darnell, (Unknown) Lehman, (Unknown) Cooper,
(Unknown) Allen, (Unknown) Sutton, (Unknown) Wood and (Unknown) Tate; Nurses (Unknown)
Thrush and (Unknown) Harding; Grievance Coordinator C. Heffelbower; Property Room Officers
Unknown Parties ##1-2; Assistant Deputy Warden (Unknown) Young; Resident Unit Manager
(Unknown) Lauer; Food Service Director Unknown Party #3; and an unspecified number of
additional Unknown Parties.
Plaintiff alleges that on June 17, 2013, he filed a grievance against Defendants
Dulaney and MDOC and requested protection because he feared that the MDOC and its employees
would retaliate against him for writing the grievance. Thus began a series of events, all stemming,
Plaintiff alleges, from his June 17, 2013 grievance.
On June 24, 2013, Defendant Dulaney approached Plaintiff in the card room at C-Unit
and told Plaintiff that he got the grievance that Plaintiff had filed against him. He told Plaintiff that
the grievance would hurt Plaintiff much worse then it would hurt him. When Plaintiff asked
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Defendant Dulaney if that was a threat, Defendant Dulaney told Plaintiff that he would not have a
good day because he was writing so many grievances.
That same day as he was entering the MTU recreational yard, Defendant Darnell
called Plaintiff over and demanded that he give a “shake down.” (Compl., docket #1, Page ID#9.)
During the shake down Defendant Darnell asked Plaintiff if he was “Davis who locks in C-16?” (Id.)
After Plaintiff affirmed his identity, Defendant Darnell gave him a “direct order to get your grievance
writing ass off of my yard!” (Id.) Plaintiff asked Defendant Darnell why he was being ordered off
the yard and Defendant Darnell replied, “You wrote a grievance against Dulaney didn’t you. Now
get the hell off of my yard and go write another grievance!” (Id.) Plaintiff told Defendant Darnell
that it was wrong to kick him off the yard and he asked to see a Captain. Plaintiff asked to see a
Captain because he was afraid to go back to his housing unit where Defendant Dulaney was still
working. Plaintiff hoped that a Captain could protect him from being physically harmed. In
addition, Plaintiff wanted to inform the Captain about the behavior of Defendants Dulaney and
Darnell.
After Plaintiff asked to see a Captain, Defendant Darnell angrily told him “I’m not
calling a Captain for you. I’m not Dulaney, I know how to deal with your type!” (Id. at Page
ID#10.) Defendant Darnell then called out “Are you threatening me? Put your hands behind your
back and cuff up.” (Id. at Page ID#11.) Plaintiff was very fearful and felt that if he cuffed up
Defendant Darnell might hurt him. He put his hands in the air and continued asking to see a Captain.
Other MTU correctional officers arrived. Defendant Darnell told the other officers that Plaintiff had
come up to him with clenched fists and threatened him. Plaintiff kept his hands in the air, believing
it was the most submissive position he could take, and continued to ask to see a Captain.
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When Defendant Lehman arrived, he pointed his taser gun at Plaintiff. Defendant
Lehman told Plaintiff to put his hands behind his back and “cuff up.” (Id. at Page ID#12.) Plaintiff
told Defendant Lehman that he would cuff up when a Captain came because he did not feel safe.
Defendant Lehman screamed at Plaintiff to “cuff up now!” (Id.) Before Plaintiff had time to react,
Defendant Lehman shot Plaintiff with his taser gun causing Plaintiff to suffer terrible pain. Plaintiff
believed that the correctional officers were attempting to goad him into acting aggressively. Plaintiff
told those assembled “that this is not going to make me do anything to anybody.” (Id. at Page
ID#12.) After hearing Plaintiff’s words, Defendant Cooper told Defendant Lehman to “shoot him
again.” (Id.) In response, Defendant Lehman shot Plaintiff with his taser gun. Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant Lehman shot him with the taser a second time “to satisfy the defendant(s) sadistic intent
to see me suffer in unnecessarily excruciating physical and mental pain.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that
at no time during this encounter did he act aggressively “towards anyone in a manner that would
warrant the use of excessive force with a deadly weapon.” (Id. at Page ID#13.) Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants’ conduct was directed at him because he had filed a grievance against Defendant
Dulaney.
Defendant Cooper then took out his taser gun and pointed it “point blank” at
Plaintiff’s face and told Plaintiff to “cuff up” or he would shoot Plaintiff too. (Id. at Page ID#13.)
Plaintiff alleges that he was in shock and afraid for his life so he put his hands behind his back and
allowed the Defendants to handcuff him. After being handcuffed, Plaintiff was taken to punitive
segregation. On the way to punitive segregation, Plaintiff told Defendant Cooper that the taser wires
were getting tangled in his legs and he was afraid of tripping. Plaintiff asked if he could get
untangled. Defendant Cooper said “I don’t care about you tripping you’re a tuff guy right? So do
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what you want to do! You do think your tuff right?” (Id. at Page ID#14.) Plaintiff responded that
he did not think he was tough, but he told Defendant Cooper “[C]learly you do!” (Id.) After
Plaintiff made that comment Defendant Cooper slammed Plaintiff to the ground and pinned Plaintiff
down with his knee. Defendant Cooper called out that Plaintiff should stop resisting. Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant Cooper did this to justify his decision to slam Plaintiff to the ground “using
unnecessary excessive force.” (Id.) Plaintiff was not trying to resist Defendant Cooper. Defendant
Cooper then tightened Plaintiff’s handcuffs around his wrist such that the handcuffs cut into
Plaintiff’s skin and cut off the circulation to Plaintiff’s hands, causing them to be numb for hours
after the handcuffs were removed.
After a short time in punitive segregation Plaintiff began having sharp pains in his
lower back. Plaintiff asked Defendant Tate for his “TENS Unit.” (Id.) Plaintiff states that a TENS
unit is “a medical device that was prescribed . . . by the MDOC’s own health service providers to
help me cope with my on going chronic back pains.” (Id.) After asking an unspecified person about
whether Plaintiff could have his TENS unit, Defendant Tate told Plaintiff it was a medical problem
so Plaintiff should talk to the nurse during rounds the next day. Plaintiff alleges that he suffered
unnecessary excruciating pain all night.
The next morning, on June 25, 2013, Plaintiff asked Defendant Thrush for his TENS
unit. Plaintiff explained that he was in terrible pain and that he had a medical detail for the TENS
unit. Defendant Thrush explained to Plaintiff that he would have to see if Plaintiff was allowed to
have the TENS unit while in punitive segregation; if so, Defendant Thrush would get the TENS unit
for Plaintiff. Defendant Thrush never returned. Plaintiff also asked Captain Allen for his TENS
unit. Like Defendant Thrush, Captain Allen told Plaintiff that he would find out if Plaintiff could
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have the TENS unit. Captain Allen never returned. Plaintiff did not receive his TENS unit or any
other help for his back, so he continued to suffer tremendous pain.
On June 26, 2013, Plaintiff once again asked Defendant Thrush for help getting his
TENS unit or any other help for his back pain. Defendant Thrush said he would check if Plaintiff
could have his TENS unit, but he never returned. Plaintiff continued to suffer. Plaintiff tried talking
with Lieutenant Wood about getting the TENS unit, but Lieutenant Wood told Plaintiff he did not
have time to talk. Lieutenant Wood said that he would come back, but he never did. Plaintiff
continued to suffer. For another two days Plaintiff tried to get his TENS unit because he was in
terrible pain. Plaintiff alleges that he felt suicidal because he was in excruciating pain, he could not
sleep and no one seemed to want to help him. Plaintiff could not believe what was happening to him
just because he filed a grievance.
On June 28, 2013, Plaintiff asked Defendant Harding to help him get his TENS unit.
He explained to Defendant Harding that he was in terrible pain and had been trying to get the TENS
unit since June 24, 2013. Defendant Harding told Plaintiff that she would send an email to the
property room and to Defendant Sutton to try and get the TENS unit. Defendant Harding never
returned. Plaintiff did not get his TENS unit.
On June 30, 2013, Plaintiff again spoke with Defendant Harding and asked her for
anything to help deal with his back pain. Defendant Harding told Plaintiff that she would send
another e-mail to the Defendant Property Room Officers Unknown Parties ##1-2, because the TENS
unit was in the property room and “neither of them wanted to go into” Plaintiff’s property and get
the TENS unit out. (Id. at Page ID#17.) Later that same day, Plaintiff spoke with Lieutenant Scott,
for the first time, and explained to her what was going on. Lieutenant Scott got very upset and told
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Plaintiff that she would personally make sure that Plaintiff got the TENS unit. Lieutenant Scott
came back to Plaintiff’s cell about 20 minutes later with his TENS unit. Plaintiff was made to suffer
for six days before he received his TENS unit. None of the other defendants with whom he had
spoken ever helped him get his TENS unit nor did they offer to help him get any other kind of pain
relief.
On June 30, 2013, Plaintiff did not eat breakfast or lunch. Defendant Dulaney was
the officer assigned to distribute Plaintiff’s breakfast and lunch food trays. When Defendant
Dulaney came to deliver his meals, Plaintiff saw a sinister smile on Defendant Dulaney’s face and
was afraid to eat anything that Defendant Dulaney delivered.
On July 2, 2013, Defendants Young and Lauer told Plaintiff that they were not going
to allow him back in the MTU compound and that he would be transferred once he finished his
punitive segregation. Plaintiff alleges that this transfer was done maliciously, was motivated by
Defendants Dulaney and Darnell and was intended to retaliate against Plaintiff.
On July 9, 2013, while Plaintiff was still in punitive segregation, he began fasting for
Ramadan. Plaintiff alleges that the next day, July 10, 2013, he was poisoned when he ingested the
bag of food he was given by Defendants Food Service Director Unknown Party #3 and other
Unknown Parties to break his Ramadan fast. Plaintiff’s bag of food arrived at approximately 1:30
p.m. Within the bag were foods that required refrigeration unless consumed right away, including
meat products. Plaintiff was unable to eat the contents of his Ramadan food bag until sunset, well
over 5½ hours after he received it. During that time, Plaintiff’s Ramadan food bag was kept
unrefrigerated in his cell at well over 80 degrees. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Food Service
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Director Unknown Party #3 and other Unknown Parties knew that Plaintiff would not be able to
break his religious fast until sunset, although they delivered the bag to his cell at 1:30 p.m.
On July 10, 2013, after Plaintiff ate the contents of his Ramadan food bag, he got very
sick. Plaintiff informed Officer Castle that he was feeling ill, was vomiting and using the toilet, his
stomach was upset, he was dizzy and he was feeling weak. Plaintiff also told Officer Castle that the
symptoms came on suddenly. Plaintiff asked to see a nurse. Officer Castle told Plaintiff that none
of the nurses were currently at work, but that she would e-mail a nurse about Plaintiff’s symptoms
and find out what to do. When Officer Castle returned she told Plaintiff that the nurse believed his
symptoms sounded like food poisoning and the nurse recommended that he “drink water and try to
flush it out because food poisoning just has to run its course.” (Id. at Page ID#19.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Food Service Director Unknown Party #3 and other
Unknown Parties were all aware that Plaintiff would not be able to refrigerate his Ramadan food bag
in his cell. As a result, Plaintiff alleges they knowingly forced him to store his food in a way that
would create a high risk of a serious health problem when he ate the food. Plaintiff believes that
Defendants Food Service Director Unknown Party #3 and other Unknown Parties were motivated
by a malicious intent to force him to stop practicing his religion by making it impossible for him not
to fast. Plaintiff alleges that this situation tested his faith because the only food he had available was
the food given to him by Defendants Food Service Director Unknown Party #3 and other Unknown
Parties. Plaintiff was forced to eat only on days where the food in his Ramadan food bag did not
need to be refrigerated.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Heffelbower and Unknown Parties refused to
acknowledge or give a grievance identifier number to four grievances that Plaintiff submitted to
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them.1 The four grievances are: (1) a July 6, 2013, grievance against Defendants Young, Lauer and
MDOC for ordering a retaliatory transfer; (2) a July 11, 2013, grievance against Defendant
Heffelbower, the MDOC and Unknown Parties for violating his constitutionally protected right to
file a grievance;2 (3) a July 11, 2013, grievance against Defendants Food Service Director Unknown
Party #3, MDOC and all other Unknown Parties for violating MDOC PD 03.03.130 ¶E and for cruel
and unusual punishment; and (4) a July 11, 2013 grievance against Defendant Heffelbower, MDOC
and all other Unknown Parties for violating Plaintiff’s constitutionally protected rights to file a
grievance. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Heffelbower and Unknown Parties violated MDOC
Policy Directive (PD) 03.02.130 ¶W by failing to give grievance identifier numbers to his
submissions. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that his grievances were never returned to him because
Defendants Heffelbower and Unknown Parties were attempting to prevent him from filing a lawsuit.
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Heffelbower and Unknown Parties’ conduct was retaliatory.
Plaintiff alleges that if Defendants Dulaney and Darnell had not retaliated against him
for filing a grievance against Defendant Dulaney in the first place, then none of the other defendants
would have violated his constitutionally protected rights, state law and/or MDOC policy. Plaintiff
alleges that the MDOC failed to protect Plaintiff from Defendants’ retaliation and was deliberately
indifferent and/or grossly negligent with respect to its obligation to keep Plaintiff safe. Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants took adverse action against Plaintiff for engaging in protected conduct, used
1
In a letter written August 6, 2013 to the MTU Warden and the Director of the MDOC, Plaintiff requested that
video footage of the segregation/detention wing from June 24, 2013, to July 20, 2013, be preserved. Apparently, Plaintiff
sought to have this video footage preserved so that he could demonstrate that he handed each of these grievances to a
correctional officer for delivery to Defendants Heffelbower and Unknown Parties.
2
Plaintiff filed this grievance because Defendant Heffelbower and Unknown Parties refused to acknowledge
a June 26, 2013, grievance that Plaintiff filed against Defendants Tate, Allen, Thrush and W ood for denying him his
TENS unit and any other medical treatment in connection with his back pain.
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excessive force against Plaintiff, denied Plaintiff medical treatment and violated his due process
rights.
Plaintiff asserts claims for the following: retaliation; denial of equal protection; cruel
and unusual punishment; violation of due process; violation of MDOC policies and state law,
including conduct unbecoming of an officer, dereliction of duty and falsification or altering
documents; inhumane treatment; and discrimination and harassment.
For relief, Plaintiff requests compensatory, emotional and punitive damages, along
with an order directing the MDOC to fire all defendants, create a review board to investigate all
occasions in which a taser is used, create a grievance board of review to receive and investigate all
grievances, create a religious review board to direct the MDOC in all matters related to religion, and
order that all federal funding to the MDOC be terminated until the MDOC creates the review boards
previously identified.
II.
Immunity
Regardless of the form of relief requested, the states and their departments are
immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts, unless the state has waived
immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98–101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438
U.S. 781, 782 (1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1993). Congress has not
expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341
(1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. Abick v.
Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). In numerous unpublished opinions, the Sixth Circuit
has specifically held that the MDOC is absolutely immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.
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See, e.g., McCoy v. Michigan, 369 F. App’x 646, 653–54 (6th Cir. 2010); Turnboe v. Stegall, No.
00–1182, 2000 WL1679478, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 1, 2000). In addition, the State of Michigan (acting
through the MDOC) is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages. See
Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 617 (2002) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491
U.S. 58, 66 (1989)). Therefore, the MDOC must be dismissed from this action.
III.
Failure to state a claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While
a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more
than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although
the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED . R. CIV . P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility
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standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)
and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal
rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
A.
Eighth Amendment Claims
1.
Excessive Force
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Lehman used excessive force when he tazed Plaintiff
two times without cause. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Cooper used excessive force
when he slammed Plaintiff, who was handcuffed, to the ground, pinned Plaintiff down with his knee
and then tightened Plaintiff’s handcuffs to the point that they cut off Plaintiff’s circulation and
caused Plaintiff’s hands to go numb. Plaintiff alleges that he did not provoke Defendants Lehman
or Cooper and that their uses of force were unnecessary and intended solely to make Plaintiff suffer.
The Eighth Amendment embodies a constitutional limitation on the power of the
states to punish those convicted of a crime. Punishment may not be “barbarous” nor may it
contravene society’s “evolving standards of decency.” See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 34546 (1981); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). The Eighth Amendment also prohibits
conditions of confinement which, although not physically barbarous, “involve the unnecessary and
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wanton infliction of pain.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346. Among unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain are those that are “totally without penological justification.” Id.
Plaintiff’s excessive force claims must be analyzed under the Supreme Court
authority limiting the use of force against prisoners. This analysis must be made in the context of
the constant admonitions by the Supreme Court regarding the deference that courts must accord to
prison or jail officials as they attempt to maintain order and discipline within dangerous institutional
settings. See, e.g., Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1986).
Generally, restrictions and even harsh conditions of confinement are not necessarily
cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. The
Supreme Court has held that “whenever guards use force to keep order,” the standards enunciated
in Whitley, 475 U.S. at 312, should be applied. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992); see also
Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 36-39 (2010). Under Whitley, the core judicial inquiry is “whether
force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7; Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37. In determining
whether the use of force is wanton and unnecessary, the court should evaluate the need for
application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the threat
“reasonably perceived by the responsible officials,” and any efforts made to temper the severity of
the forceful response. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7 (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321); accord Griffin v.
Hardrick, 604 F.3d 949, 953-54 (6th Cir. 2010); McHenry v. Chadwick, 896 F.2d 184 (6th Cir.
1990). Physical restraints are constitutionally permissible where there is penological justification
for their use. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346; Jones v. Toombs, No. 95-1395, 1996 WL 67750, at *1 (6th
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Cir. Feb. 15, 1996); Hayes v. Toombs, No. 91-890, 1994 WL 28606, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 1, 1994);
Rivers v. Pitcher, No. 95-1167, 1995 WL 603313, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 12, 1995).
At this stage of the proceedings, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations are
sufficient to warrant service upon Defendants Lehman and Cooper.
2.
Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Tate, Thrush, Allen, Wood, Harding, Sutton and
Property Room Officers Unknown Parties ##1-2 were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
needs when they failed to give Plaintiff his prescribed TENS unit or any other kind of relief for his
back pain. Plaintiff was without his TENS unit for six days before Lieutenant Scott obtained it for
him.
The Eighth Amendment obligates prison authorities to provide medical care to
incarcerated individuals, as a failure to provide such care would be inconsistent with contemporary
standards of decency. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 102, 103-04 (1976). The Eighth Amendment is
violated when a prison official is deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of a prisoner.
Id. at 104-05; Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001).
A claim for the deprivation of adequate medical care has an objective and a subjective
component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy the objective component, the
plaintiff must allege that the medical need at issue is sufficiently serious. Id. In other words, the
inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.
Id. The objective component of the adequate medical care test is satisfied “[w]here the seriousness
of a prisoner’s need[ ] for medical care is obvious even to a lay person.” Blackmore v. Kalamazoo
Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir. 2004). If, however the need involves “minor maladies or
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non-obvious complaints of a serious need for medical care,” Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 898, the inmate
must “place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of the delay
in medical treatment.” Napier v. Madison Cnty., 238 F.3d 739, 742 (6th Cir. 2001).
The subjective component requires an inmate to show that prison officials have “a
sufficiently culpable state of mind in denying medical care.” Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867
(6th Cir. 2000) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). Deliberate indifference “entails something more
than mere negligence,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, but can be “satisfied by something less than acts
or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Id.
Under Farmer, “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn
that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837.
[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” proscribed by the Eighth
Amendment. This is true whether the indifference is manifested by prison
doctors in their response to the prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in
intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally
interfering with the treatment once prescribed. Regardless of how evidenced,
deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury states a cause
of action under § 1983.
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05 (internal citations omitted).
At this stage of the proceedings, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations are
sufficient to warrant service upon Defendants Tate, Thrush, Allen, Wood and Harding. However,
Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendants Sutton and Property Room Officers Unknown Parties ##12 are insufficient to state a claim. With respect to Defendant Sutton, Plaintiff alleges only that
Defendant Harding sent him an email to try and get Plaintiff’s TENS unit. With respect to
Defendants Property Room Officers Unknown Parties ##1-2, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
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Harding sent two e-mails to Defendants Property Room Officers Unknown Party ##1-2 because
Plaintiff’s TENS unit was in the property room and “neither of them wanted to go into” Plaintiff’s
property and get the TENS unit out. (Id. at Page ID#17.) These allegations are insufficient to
establish that Defendants Sutton and Property Room Officers Unknown Party ##1-2 were aware that
Plaintiff had a serious medical need. Plaintiff therefore fails to allege facts that demonstrate the
subjective component of the deliberate indifference standard. Consequently, Defendants Sutton and
Property Room Officers Unknown Party ##1-2 will be dismissed.
3.
Deliberate Indifference to Health or Safety
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Dulaney and Darnell subjected him to cruel and
unusual punishment by verbally threatening and harassing him. Plaintiff also claims that on June
30, 2013, Defendant Dulaney sinisterly smiled at Plaintiff after delivering his breakfast and lunch
trays, causing Plaintiff to be too afraid to eat.
Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that on July 10, 2013, Defendant Unknown Party #3
and additional Unknown Parties subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment by giving him a
Ramadan food bag that contained items that required refrigeration at 1:30 p.m. knowing that Plaintiff
had no way to refrigerate the food and that Plaintiff would not be eating the food until sundown,
some 5 ½ hours after receiving it. Plaintiff alleges that he suffered from food poisoning after eating
his Ramadan meal. Plaintiff alleges that after suffering from food poisoning he would only eat on
the days that his Ramadan food bag had items that did not need refrigeration.
As discussed above, the Eighth Amendment prohibits conduct by prison officials that
involves the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir.
1987) (per curiam) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346). “Not every unpleasant experience a prisoner
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might endure while incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the
Eighth Amendment.” Ivey, 832 F.2d at 954. Instead, the Eighth Amendment is concerned with
“deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation” or “other conditions intolerable for
prison confinement.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348 (citation omitted).
In order for a prisoner to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, he must show that
he faced a sufficiently serious risk to his health or safety and that the defendant official acted with
“‘deliberate indifference’ to [his] health or safety.” Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 479-80 (6th Cir.
2010) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (applying deliberate indifference standard to medical claims);
see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (applying deliberate indifference standard to
conditions of confinement claims)).
Plaintiff claims that Defendants Dulaney and Darnell verbally harassed him. The use
of harassing or degrading language by a prison official, although unprofessional and deplorable, does
not rise to constitutional dimensions. See Ivey, 832 F.2d at 954-55; see also Johnson v. Dellatifa,
357 F.3d 539, 546 (6th Cir. 2004) (harassment and verbal abuse do not constitute the type of
infliction of pain that the Eighth Amendment prohibits); Violett v. Reynolds, No. 02-6366, 2003 WL
22097827, at *3 (6th Cir. Sept. 5, 2003) (verbal abuse and harassment do not constitute punishment
that would support an Eighth Amendment claim); Thaddeus-X v. Langley, No. 96-1282, 1997 WL
205604, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 24, 1997) (verbal harassment is insufficient to state a claim); Murray
v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, No. 95-5204, 1997 WL 34677, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 28, 1997) (“Although
we do not condone the alleged statements, the Eighth Amendment does not afford us the power to
correct every action, statement or attitude of a prison official with which we might disagree.”); Clark
v. Turner, No. 96-3265, 1996 WL 721798, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 13, 1996) (“Verbal harassment and
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idle threats are generally not sufficient to constitute an invasion of an inmate’s constitutional
rights.”); Brown v. Toombs, No. 92-1756, 1993 WL 11882 (6th Cir. Jan. 21, 1993) (“Brown’s
allegation that a corrections officer used derogatory language and insulting racial epithets is
insufficient to support his claim under the Eighth Amendment.”).
Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant Dulaney’s sinister smile caused him
not to eat the food Defendant Dulaney delivered, fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim. See
White v. Hall, No. 1:2008-cv-498, 2008 WL 2783256, at *2 (W.D. Mich. July 17, 2008) (finding
that “use of an “angry, hostile” voice and “intimidating” demeanor fall far short of the requisite
denial of ‘minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” or the “unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain.”). Consequently, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Dulaney and
Darnell will be dismissed.
With respect to Defendant Food Service Director Unknown Party #3 and other
Unknown Parties, Plaintiff alleges that he suffered a single incident of food poisoning. Plaintiff
complains that he became ill after consuming items from his Ramadan food bag that were left
unrefrigerated for many hours. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that after his alleged food poisoning
experience, he only consumed items from his Ramadan food bag that did not require refrigeration.
In general, convicted criminals are not in a position to complain about the mere
unpleasantness of prison meals. See Ivey, 832 F.2d at 954. Moreover, a single incident of
unintended food poisoning does not amount to a violation of a prisoner’s constitutional rights. See
George v. King, 837 F.2d 705, 707 (7th Cir. 1988); accord Green v. Atkinson, 623 F.3d 278, 281
(5th Cir. 2010) ; Green v. Tudor, 685 F. Supp. 678, 694 (W.D. Mich. 2010) (citing George);
Islam v. Jackson, 782 F. Supp. 1111, 1114-15 (E.D. Va. 1992) (serving one meal contaminated with
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maggots and meals under unsanitary conditions for thirteen days was not cruel and unusual
punishment, even though inmate suffered symptoms of food poisoning on one occasion).
Allegations about temporary inconveniences, e.g., being deprived of a lower bunk, subjected to a
flooded cell, or deprived of a working toilet, do not demonstrate that the conditions fell beneath the
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities as measured by a contemporary standard of decency.
Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir. 2001); see also J.P. v. Taft, 439 F. Supp.
2d 793, 811 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (“[M]inor inconveniences resulting from the difficulties in
administering a large detention facility do not give rise to a constitutional claim.” (internal citation
omitted)); Hartsfield v. Vidor, 199 F.3d 305, 310 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that “deprivations of fresh
water and access to the toilet for a 20-hour period, while harsh, were not cruel and unusual
punishment”) (citing Stephens v. Carter Cnty Jail, 816 F.2d 682 (6th Cir. 1987))
Plaintiff alleges little more than a single incident of food poisoning. Although
Plaintiff subsequently did not eat certain of his bagged items during the remainder of Ramadan,
Plaintiff does not allege that he was denied food altogether. Instead, he makes clear that he ate items
from his Ramadan food bag that did not require refrigeration. Because he alleges only temporary
inconveniences, Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Food Service
Director Unknown Party #3 and other Unknown Parties.
B.
First Amendment Claims
1.
Retaliation: Grievances
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Dulaney and Darnell retaliated against him for
writing a grievance naming Defendant Dulaney. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dulaney retaliated
against him by making a number of verbal threats. First, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dulaney
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told Plaintiff that if he thought his grievance against Defendant Dulaney was going to hurt Defendant
Dulaney he was wrong, because “its going to end up hurting [Plaintiff ] way wors[e] then it will ever
hurt” Defendant Dulaney. (Compl., docket #1, Page ID#8.) Second, Defendant Dulaney said to
Plaintiff “I bet you won’t have a good day today since you like writing grievances so much!” (Id.
at Page ID#9.) Finally, Defendant Dulaney said “enjoy your yard if you can.” (Id.) Shortly
thereafter Plaintiff went to the recreational yard where Defendant Darnell demanded a “shake down,”
determined Plaintiff’s identity and said “I’m giving you a direct order to get your grievance writing
ass off of my yard!” (Id.) When Plaintiff asked why he was being ordered off the yard, Defendant
Darnell said “you wrote a grievance against Dulaney didn’t you, Now get the hell off of my yard and
go write another grievance!” (Id.)
Retaliation based upon a prisoner’s exercise of his or her constitutional rights violates
the Constitution. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). In order
to set forth a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) he was engaged
in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against him that would deter a person of
ordinary firmness from engaging in that conduct; and (3) the adverse action was motivated, at least
in part, by the protected conduct. Id. Moreover, a plaintiff must be able to prove that the exercise
of the protected right was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant’s alleged retaliatory
conduct. See Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Mount Healthy City
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)). He must show a causal connection
between Defendants’ adverse actions and his protected conduct. King v. Zamiara, 680 F.3d 686,
694-95 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[P]rotected speech causes an adverse action if the speech motivates an
individual actor to take act[ion] that then proximately cause[s] an adverse action.”).
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Plaintiff’s allegations satisfy the three Thaddeus-X requirements. First, the filing of
a prison grievance is constitutionally protected conduct for which a prisoner cannot be subjected to
retaliation. See Smith, 250 F.3d at 1037; Hall v. Nusholtz, No. 99-2442, 2000 WL 1679458, at *2
(6th Cir. Nov. 1, 2000); Burton v. Rowley, No. 00-1144, 2000 WL 1679463, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 1,
2000). Second, a specific threat of harm may satisfy the adverse-action requirement if it would deter
a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his or her First Amendment rights, see, e.g.,
Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 396, 398 (threat of physical harm); Smith v. Yarrow, 78 F. App’x 529, 542
(6th Cir. 2003) (threat to change drug test results). Finally, Plaintiff’s allegations convey that, if true,
Defendants’ threats were motivated by Plaintiff’s grievance.
At this stage in the proceedings, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations are
sufficient to warrant service upon Defendants Dulaney and Darnell.
2.
Retaliation: Transfer
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Young and Lauer retaliated against him by ordering
that he be transferred once he was released from punitive segregation. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges
that Defendants Young and Lauer’s decision to transfer him “was done with the malicious intent of
retaliation against me because this transfer was solely motivated by the retaliatory actions against
[Plaintiff] by Defendants Dulaney and Darnell.” (Compl., docket #1, Page ID#18.) Finally, in a
grievance attached as Exhibit 14 to Plaintiff’s Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the decision to
transfer him was intended to prevent him from filing a lawsuit against MTU employees.
It is well recognized that “retaliation” is easy to allege and that it can seldom be
demonstrated by direct evidence. See Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 580 (6th Cir. 2005);
Murphy v. Lane, 833 F.2d 106, 108 (7th Cir. 1987); Vega v. DeRobertis, 598 F. Supp. 501, 506 (C.D.
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Ill. 1984), aff’d, 774 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir. 1985). However, “alleging merely the ultimate fact of
retaliation is insufficient.” Murphy, 833 F.2d at 108. While a complaint need not contain detailed
factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The court need not
accept “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements . . . .” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has
not ‘show[n]’ – that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting FED . R. CIV . P. 8(a)(2)).
Specifically, where Plaintiff alleges a retaliation claim “conclusory allegations of
retaliatory motive ‘unsupported by material facts will not be sufficient to state . . . a claim under
§ 1983.’” Harbin-Bey, 420 F.3d at 580 (quoting Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538-39 (6th
Cir. 1987)); see also Skinner v. Bolden, 89 F. App’x 579, 579-80 (6th Cir. 2004) (without more,
conclusory allegations of temporal proximity are not sufficient to show a retaliatory motive); Birdo
v. Lewis, No. 95-5693, 1996 WL 132148, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 21, 1996); Fields v. Powell, No. 941674, 1995 WL 35628, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 30, 1995); Williams v. Bates, No. 93-2045, 1994 WL
677670, at *3 (6th Cir. Dec. 2, 1994).
Even if Plaintiff could establish that his transfer from MTU was an adverse action,
he fails to allege the protected conduct in which he was engaged and the causal connection between
his protected conduct and the decision to transfer him. Assuming Plaintiff would assert that his
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grievance writing against Defendant Dulaney and Darnell motivated the transfer, he nevertheless
fails to set forth any facts to suggest that a causal connection exists between his writing grievances
and Defendants Young and Lauer’s decision to transfer him. See Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 394; see
also King, 680 F.3d at 695 (“To show causation in a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show (1) that
the adverse action was proximately caused by an individual defendant’s acts, and (2) that the
defendant taking those acts was ‘motivated in substantial part by a desire to punish an individual for
exercise of a constitutional right.’”). Plaintiff makes no factual allegations linking his grievance
writing against two individuals to the allegedly adverse action of other individuals. Because his
claim is wholly conclusory, Plaintiff fails to state a retaliation claim against Defendants Young and
Lauer. Consequently, they will be dismissed.
3.
Retaliation: Access to Courts
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Heffelbower and Unknown Parties retaliated against
him by not acknowledging four grievances or giving them a grievance identifier number, and by
failing to return the grievances to Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that in engaging in the foregoing
retaliatory conduct, Defendants were “attempt[ing] to derail any attempt [Plaintiff] would make to
file a lawsuit against their co-workers.” (Compl., docket #1, Page ID##21-23.) Plaintiff has failed
to sufficiently allege any adverse action. Even if Plaintiff had been improperly prevented from filing
a grievance, his right of access to the courts to petition for redress of his grievances (i.e., by filing
a lawsuit) cannot be compromised by his inability to file institutional grievances. See, e.g., Lewis
v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996) (requiring actual injury); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821-24
(1977). The exhaustion requirement only mandates exhaustion of available administrative remedies.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). If Plaintiff were improperly denied access to the grievance process, the
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process would be rendered unavailable, and exhaustion would not be a prerequisite for initiation of
a civil rights action. In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable
claim against Defendant Heffelbower and Unknown Parties.
4.
Interference with Religion
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Food Service Director Unknown Party #3 and other
Unknown Parties interfered with the practice of his religion by providing him with Ramadan food
bags that contained items requiring refrigeration that he could not eat for fear of getting food
poisoning.
While “incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many
privileges and rights,” inmates clearly retain First Amendment protection to freely exercise their
religion, O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987), subject to reasonable restrictions and
limitations related to legitimate penological interests. Id. at 350-53; accord Turner v. Safley, 482
U.S. 78, 89 (1987). First Amendment protection extends to all religious beliefs, and guaranties
“religious liberty and equality to the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian faith . . ..”
Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 615 (1989).
To state a free exercise claim, a plaintiff must allege facts from which an inference
may be drawn that the government has placed “a substantial burden on the observation of a central
religious belief or practice.” Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989). Likewise, the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) provides in pertinent part that, “[n]o
government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or
confined to an institution ... unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden . . .”
furthers “a compelling governmental interest” and is done so by the least restrictive means.
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42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (1)-(2). RLUIPA’s institutionalized-persons provision alleviates exceptional
government-created burdens on private religious exercise. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720
(2005).
Although RLUIPA does not define “substantial burden,” courts apply the traditional
substantial burden test, as defined by the Supreme Court’s free exercise jurisprudence. Episcopal
Student Found. v. City of Ann Arbor, 341 F. Supp. 2d 691, 701 (E.D. Mich. 2004). A “substantial
burden” requires something more than an incidental effect on religious exercise. See Lyng v. Nw.
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 450 (1988) (a substantial burden has “a tendency
to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs”); Hobbie v. Unemployment
Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987) (there is a substantial burden where a regulation
puts “substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs”); Midrash
Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1226-27 (11th Cir. 2004) (a substantial burden
must place more than an inconvenience on religious exercise); Civil Liberties for Urban Believers
v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003) (substantial burden is “one that necessarily
bears direct, primary, and fundamental responsibility for rendering religious exercise ... effectively
impracticable”).
Plaintiff’s allegation that his Ramadan food bag contained items that he did not eat
entirely fails to demonstrate that Defendant Food Service Director Unknown Party #3 and other
Unknown Parties infringed upon the Plaintiff’s religious practice. Plaintiff does not allege that
Defendant Food Service Director Unknown Party #3 and other Unknown Parties refused to
accommodate Plaintiff’s religious practice. Instead, Plaintiff alleges that he did not like the
accommodation that had been made. Although Plaintiff may have preferred more or different food
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inside his Ramadan bag, the facts he has alleged fail to show, or support a reasonable inference, that
Defendant Food Service Director Unknown Party #3 and other Unknown Parties imposed a
substantial burden on his ability to freely exercise his religion.
C.
Fourteenth Amendment-Due Process
Plaintiff alleges that his due process rights were violated when Defendant
Heffelbower and Unknown Parties failed to acknowledge, provide a grievance identifier number for
or return four grievances.
Plaintiff has no due process right to file a prison grievance. The Sixth Circuit and
other circuit courts have held that there is no constitutionally protected due process right to an
effective prison grievance procedure. Walker v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 128 F. App’x 441, 445 (6th
Cir. 2005); Argue v. Hofmeyer, 80 F. App’x 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2003); Young v. Gundy, 30 F. App’x
568, 569-70 (6th Cir. 2002); Carpenter v. Wilkinson, No. 99-3562, 2000 WL 190054, at *2 (6th Cir.
Feb. 7, 2000); see also Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996); Adams v. Rice, 40
F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994). Michigan law does not create a liberty interest in the grievance
procedure. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983); Keenan v. Marker, 23 F. App’x 405,
407 (6th Cir. 2001); Wynn v. Wolf, No. 93-2411, 1994 WL 105907, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 28, 1994).
Because Plaintiff has no liberty interest in the grievance process, Defendants’ conduct did not
deprive him of due process. Consequently, Plaintiff fails to state a due process claim against
Defendants Heffelbower and Unknown Parties.
D.
Equal Protection
Plaintiff largely fails to allege any facts to support an equal protection claim against
any Defendant. Reading Plaintiff’s complaint indulgently as the Court must, Haines, 404 U.S. at
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520, to the extent Plaintiff makes any allegations that could even arguably raise an equal protection
claim, he alleges only that Defendant Food Service Director Unknown Party #3 and other Unknown
Parties “deprived [him] of the same types of foods that everybody else who participated in the fast
was being provided with.” (Compl., docket #1, Page ID#20.)
The Equal Protection Clause commands that no state shall “deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. A state practice
generally will not require strict scrutiny unless it interferes with a fundamental right or discriminates
against a suspect class of individuals. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976).
Plaintiff does not suggest that he is a member of a suspect class, and “prisoners are not considered
a suspect class for purposes of equal protection litigation.” Jackson v. Jamrog, 411 F.3d 615, 619
(6th Cir. 2005); see also Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 604 (6th Cir.1998). In addition, Plaintiff
does not allege any facts demonstrating that a fundamental right had been interfered with by any
Defendant.
Because neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class is at issue, Plaintiff’s claim
is reviewed under the rational basis standard. Club Italia Soccer & Sports Org., Inc. v. Charter Twp.
of Shelby, 470 F.3d 286, 298 (6th Cir. 2006). “Under rational basis scrutiny, government action
amounts to a constitutional violation only if it ‘is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination
of legitimate purposes that the court can only conclude that the government’s actions were
irrational.’” Id. (quoting Warren v. City of Athens, 411 F.3d 697, 710 (6th Cir. 2005)). To prove
his equal protection claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate “intentional and arbitrary discrimination” by
the state; that is, he must demonstrate that he “has been intentionally treated differently from others
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similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Vill. of
Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to suggest that Defendants Food Service Director
Unknown Party #3 and other Unknown Parties treated him differently than any of the other prisoners
who participated in the Ramadan fast. Moreover, even if Plaintiff had been treated differently,
Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts to suggest that there was no rational basis for the difference
in treatment. While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations
must include more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “[W]here the wellpleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 679 (quoting FED . R. CIV . P. 8(a)(2)).
Plaintiff concludes that he “was deprived of the same types of foods that everybody
else who participated in the fast was being provided,” (Compl., docket #1, Page ID#20), but nowhere
does he allege any facts to suggest that any prisoner who engaged in the Ramadan fast received
anything other than the same Ramadan food bag that Plaintiff received. Consequently, he fails to
state an equal protection claim.
E.
State Law Claims
Plaintiff sets out a laundry list of state-law claims, including, violation of MDOC
policy, conduct unbecoming a department employee, dereliction of duty and falsification or altering
documents. Section 1983 does not provide redress for a violation of a state law. Pyles v. Raisor,
60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995); Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1166 (6th Cir. 1994).
Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants violated state law therefore fails to state a claim under § 1983.
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Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to invoke this Court’s supplemental jurisdiction over a
state-law claim against a defendant where the federal claim against that defendant will be dismissed,
the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction.
In determining whether to retain supplemental
jurisdiction, “[a] district court should consider the interests of judicial economy and the avoidance
of multiplicity of litigation and balance those interests against needlessly deciding state law issues.”
Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1993). Ordinarily, where a
district court has exercised jurisdiction over a state-law claim solely by virtue of supplemental
jurisdiction and the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, the court will dismiss the remaining
state-law claims. Id. Dismissal, however, remains “purely discretionary.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v.
HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)); Orton v. Johnny’s Lunch
Franchise, LLC, 668 F.3d 843, 850 (6th Cir. 2012). Here, the balance of the relevant considerations
weighs against the continued exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s statelaw claims against Defendants MDOC, Sutton, Property Room Officers Unknown Parties ##1-2,
Young, Lauer, Food Service Director Unknown Party #3, other unspecified Unknown Parties and
Heffelbower will be dismissed without prejudice.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Defendants MDOC, Sutton, Property Room Officers Unknown Parties ##1-2,
Young, Lauer, Food Service Director Unknown Party #3, other unspecified Unknown Parties and
Heffelbower will be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and
1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court will serve the complaint against Defendants
Lehman, Cooper, Tate, Thrush, Allen, Wood, Harding, Dulaney and Darnell.
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An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
/s/Robert J. Jonker
ROBERT J. JONKER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: March 25, 2014
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