Alexander #163875 v. Michigan, State of et al
Filing
8
OPINION ; signed by Judge Robert Holmes Bell (Judge Robert Holmes Bell, kcb)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JOHN ALEXANDER,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 1:13-cv-1372
v.
Honorable Robert Holmes Bell
STATE OF MICHIGAN et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 et seq., and
state law. Plaintiff has paid the entire filing fee. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L.
NO . 104-134, 110 STAT . 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought
under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A;
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly
irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these
standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s action against Defendants Snyder, Hilfinger, Heyns,
Killough, Martin and the Michigan Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs, Bureau of
Commercial Services (LARA) for failure to state a claim and on immunity grounds. In addition, the
Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims and RLUIPA claims for monetary damages against the
State of Michigan and the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) on immunity grounds.
Also, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claims against Defendants Hoffner and Tompkins
on immunity grounds. The Court will serve the remainder of Plaintiff’s action on Defendants
Hoffner, Tompkins, State of Michigan and MDOC.
Discussion
I.
Factual allegations
Plaintiff John H. Alexander-Bey presently is incarcerated at the Lakeland Correctional
Facility. Plaintiff purports to bring a class action on behalf of himself and other similarly situated
prisoners, who are members of the “Reincarnate Temple, MSTA, Inc.” (Compl., docket #1, Page
ID#2; Mot., docket #3, Page ID#129.) In his pro se complaint, Plaintiff sues the State of Michigan,
LARA1 (LARA), Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC), LARA Director Steven Hilfinger,
Michigan Governor Rick Snyder, and the following employees of the MDOC, in their official and
individual capacities: Director Daniel Heyns, Special Litigation employee Norma Killough,
Chaplain Administrator Michael Martin, Warden Bonita J. Hoffner and Chaplain D.A. Tompkins.
Plaintiff alleges that he is the “Michigan Republic Representative for the Moorish
Science Temple of America, Inc., of the Reincarnate Temple, MSTA” (Reincarnate Temple, MSTA).
(Compl., docket #1, Page ID#11.) Plaintiff claims that all Moorish Americans do not practice the
same form of Islam, and provides:
Ismaili, the sacred way of the Plaintiffs also known as “Ismaili Sevener’s,”
is the Islam of the Muurs. That the Moorish American under the 1926 corporate and
1
In his complaint, Plaintiff names this Defendant as the Bureau of Commercial Services. The Bureau of
Commercial Services changed its name to the Corporations, Securities and Commercial Licensing Bureau. The
Corporations, Securities and Commercial Licensing Bureau is a division of the Department of Licensing and Regulatory
Affairs (LARA). See https://www.michigan.gov/lara/0,4601,7-154-28077---,00.html. The Court will refer to this
Defendant throughout this opinion as LARA.
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divine Charter are representatives of the original Moorish Science Temple of
America, Inc., and sacred community and religious estate who have been deprived
of bona fide recognition and the right to practice our faith; for we are enrollee(s) of
the Washitaw Nation of Muurs United Nations IPO #215/93 U.S. Land Grants No.
922 & 923 1802 . . . and are original members of the Chicago Moorish Temple(s)
within the Prophet’s biological Washitaw family of [Muslims], in society have our
Religious Services on Fridays from 8:00 pm until 10:00 pm and Sunday school from
9:00 AM until 1:00 PM. . . . .
(Id. at Page ID#11.) Plaintiff states that the Ismaili Muslim is separate from the “Sunni religion of
Islam and as well other Moorish Science Temples in America” and protected under the United States
Land Patents for the Washitaw Nation. (Id. at Page ID#7.) Plaintiff has filed grievances with the
MDOC and complaints with LARA and the Office of Legal Affairs to have his religion recognized
as a separate religion to no avail. (Id. at Page ID#9.)
Plaintiff alleges that MDOC prison officials have retaliated against Washitaw Ismaili
Muslim inmates for filing grievances by harassing them, confiscating and/or destroying “religious
and nationality documents” and other materials, and by transferring them to other prisons. (Id. at
Page ID#10.) Plaintiff also states that Ismaili Muslims are denied Friday prayer, Sunday school,
sacred ceremonies, the wearing of religious medallions and attire, and the accommodation of a
vegetarian diet in violation of his First Amendment rights. Plaintiff further claims that MDOC
prison officials have issued misconduct tickets, increased security levels and seized property without
hearings and placed Ismaili Muslims in segregation for seeking permission to worship in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In addition to the above constitutional claims, Plaintiff lists the following nine claims
(summarized):
1.
Plaintiff states that Governor Snyder, MDOC Director Heyns, LARA
Director Hilfinger, Chaplain Martin and other MDOC officials have violated
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the Establishment Clause and MDOC Policy Directive 05.03.150, ¶C2
because Ismaili Muslims are compelled to attend other religious services.
2.
Plaintiff claims that Governor Snyder, MDOC Director Heyns, wardens,
chaplains and prison guards and other state employees acted in concert under
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and 42 U.S.C. §1986 to violate his constitutional rights
by failing to establish minimum standards for recognition of all religious
groups.
3.
Plaintiff asserts that LARA Hilfinger conspired with the Chaplainry Board
to disregard Plaintiff’s November 30, 2006 registration and allow an
amendment to the Washitaw’s registration by an unauthorized individual in
violation of the “[Louisiana] Cession Treaty of 1803 and the First & Fifth
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.” (Id., Page ID#13.) Plaintiff also
states that Hilfinger failed to correct the mistake despite repeated attempts by
Plaintiff. Plaintiff further provides that Hilfinger along with the MDOC’s
Chaplainry Board Members negatively influenced Governor Snyder and
MDOC Director Heyns so the Ismaili Muslims could not obtain the benefits
of their registration as a foreign corporation.
4.
Plaintiff argues that MDOC Director Heyns and Chaplain Administrator
Martin conspired to deprive Plaintiff of his First Amendment rights and
Article III of the Louisiana Treaty of 1803 by failing to recognize the
Reincarnate Temple, MSTA and by not allowing Plaintiff to have religious
services.
5.
Plaintiff complains that Special Litigation Officer Killough and the
Chaplainry Department conspired to deprive Plaintiff and other Ismaili
Muslims of registering their religion with the U. S. Government. Because of
Defendant Killough’s actions, Plaintiff states that articles, papers and other
religious effects were confiscated from Plaintiff in violation of his First,
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiff further
argues that Defendants conspired to deny Plaintiff of access to his religion by
not allowing Ismaili Muslims to meet or assemble privately. Because
Defendants allegedly destroyed religious and nationality documents without
due process of law, Plaintiff claims that they violated his Fourteenth
Amendment rights.
2
The policy states that “[n]o employee, agent of the Department, or other prisoner shall proselytize, nor permit
others to proselytize, any prisoner without his/her consent. No prisoner shall be discriminated against, or given
preferential treatment, because of his/her religious beliefs or practices.” MDOC Policy Directive 05.03.150, ¶ C
(effective Sept. 20, 2007).
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6.
Plaintiff asserts that Warden Hoffner and Chaplain Tompkins denied Plaintiff
access to his religion and the use of religious symbols. Plaintiff also asserts
a RLUIPA claim against “the MDOC and its respective agencies (Lakeland
Correctional Facility’s Officials).” (Id. at Page ID#17.)
7.
Plaintiff argues that he was denied his First Amendment right to the free
exercise of religion when Defendants refused to grant him religious
accommodations, including the use of traditional sacred garments, medallions
and sacred beads.
8.
Plaintiff states that the MDOC prison facilities, chaplains and prisons guards
have denied religious services for prison inmates of the Reincarnate Temple,
MSTA, in violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and the
State of Michigan’s constitution.
9.
Plaintiff claims that the Reincarnate Temple, MSTA, should be recognized
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
(Id. at Page ID##12-16.)
For relief, Plaintiff requests declaratory and injunctive relief as well as monetary
damages.
II.
Class Action
On December 27, 2013, Plaintiff filed a motion for class certification (docket #3) to
bring this action along with similarly-situated prisoners, who are members of the Reincarnate
Temple, MSTA. Plaintiff, however, is the only person who signed the complaint. Plaintiff lacks
standing to assert the constitutional rights of other prisoners. Newsom v. Norris, 888 F.2d 371, 381
(6th Cir. 1989); Raines v. Goedde, No. 92-3120, 1992 WL 188120, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 6, 1992).
As a layman, Plaintiff may only represent himself with respect to his individual claims, and may not
act on behalf of other prisoners. Thus, absent class certification, he may not bring claims on behalf
of any other prisoners.
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For a case to proceed as a class action, the Court must be satisfied on a number of
grounds, including the adequacy of class representation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). It is well
established that pro se litigants are inappropriate representatives of the interests of others. See
Garrison v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 333 F. App’x 914, 919 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Oxendine v.
Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975)); see also Dodson v. Wilkinson, 304 F. App’x 434,
438 (6th Cir. 2008); Ziegler v. Michigan, 59 F. App’x 622, 624 (6th Cir. 2003); Palasty v. Hawk,
15 F. App’x 197, 200 (6th Cir. 2001); Howard v. Dougan, No. 99–2232, 2000 WL 876770, at *1
(6th Cir. June 23, 2000); Ballard v. Campbell, No. 98–6156, 1999 WL 777435, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept.
21, 1999); Marr v. Michigan, No. 95–1794, 1996 WL 205582, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 25, 1996).
Accordingly, because Plaintiff is an incarcerated, pro se litigant, the Court finds that he is not an
appropriate representative of a class. Therefore, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion for class
certification (docket #3). Plaintiff may proceed in this action only with respect to claims that pertain
to himself.
III.
Immunity
A.
Section 1983
Plaintiff may not maintain a § 1983 action against the State of Michigan, the MDOC
and LARA. Regardless of the form of relief requested, the states and their departments are immune
under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts, unless the state has waived immunity
or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782
(1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1993). Congress has not expressly
abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity in § 1983, see Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341
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(1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court, Abick v.
Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). The Sixth Circuit has specifically held that the MDOC
is absolutely immune from a suit under § 1983. See, e.g., Turnboe v. Stegall, No. 00-1182, 2000
WL1679478, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 1, 2000). In addition, the State of Michigan (acting through the
MDOC and LARA) is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages. See
Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613 (2002) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S.
58, 71 (1989)). Consequently, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against the State of Michigan, the MDOC
and LARA must be dismissed.
B.
RLUIPA
Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief as well as monetary damages for
alleged violations of RLUIPA purportedly against all of the Defendants.3 Although that statute
permits the recovery of “appropriate relief against a government,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–2(a), a claim
for monetary damages against the State of Michigan, the MDOC and LARA, is not available under
RLUIPA. In Sossamon v. Texas, ––– U.S. –––, 131 S.Ct. 1651 (2011), the Supreme Court held that
RLUIPA did not abrogate sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Thus, Plaintiff’s
RLUIPA claim for monetary damages against the State of Michigan, the MDOC and LARA and the
other Defendants in their official capacities is barred by sovereign immunity.4 See Cardinal v.
Metrish, 564 F.3d 794, 801 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars RLUIPA
claims for money damages against states and state employees in their official capacities).
Consequently, the State of Michigan, the MDOC and LARA, and Defendants Snyder, Hilfinger,
3
The individual Defendants are employed by the State of Michigan (acting through the MDOC and LARA), and,
thus, are state employees.
4
The Court will address RLUIPA claims against individual Defendants in their individual capacities, infra.
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Heyns, Killough, Martin, Hoffner and Tompkins in their official capacities are immune from
Plaintiff’s claim for monetary relief.
IV.
Failure to state a claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While
a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more
than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although
the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED . R. CIV . P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility
standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)
and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
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To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v. Corr.
Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal
rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
A.
Conspiracy
1.
Sections 1985 and 1986
Plaintiff claims that Governor Snyder, MDOC Director Heyns, wardens, chaplains,
prison guards and other state employees5 conspired under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3) and 1986 by failing
to recognize Plaintiff’s religion. A violation of § 1986 requires a violation of Section 1985 as a
necessary prerequisite. Boddie v. Am. Broad. Cos. Inc., 694 F. Supp. 1304 (N.D. Ohio 1988). To
maintain a cause of action for conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), a plaintiff must establish the
following four elements:
(1) a conspiracy involving two or more persons (2) for the purpose of depriving,
directly or indirectly, a person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws
and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy (4) which causes injury to a person or
property, or a deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.
Smith v. Thornburg, 136 F.3d 1070, 1078 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Johnson v. Hills & Dales Gen.
Hosp., 40 F.3d 837, 839 (6th Cir. 1994)). The § 1985 plaintiff also must demonstrate that the
conspiracy was motivated by a class based animus, such as race. Radvansky v. City of Olmstead
Falls, 395 F.3d 291, 314 (6th Cir. 2005); Johnson v. Hills & Dales Gen. Hosp., 40 F.3d 837, 839
5
The Court assumes that Plaintiff’s assertion against state employees includes LARA Director Hilfinger. See
Haines, 404 U.S. at 520.
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(6th Cir. 1994); Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 233 (6th Cir. 1996). Moreover, a plaintiff must
plead a claim of conspiracy with particularity, as vague and conclusory allegations unsupported by
material facts are insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 (recognizing that allegations of conspiracy
must be supported by allegations of fact that support a “plausible suggestion of conspiracy,” not
merely a “possible” one); Fieger v. Cox, 524 F.3d 770, 776 (6th Cir. 2008); Spadafore v. Gardner,
330 F.3d 849, 854 (6th Cir. 2003); Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538 (6th Cir. 1987); Smith
v. Rose, 760 F.2d 102,106 (6th Cir. 1985); Pukyrys v. Olson, No. 95–1778, 1996 WL 636140, at *1
(6th Cir. Oct. 30, 1996). “[V]ague allegations of a wide-ranging conspiracy are wholly conclusory
and are, therefore, insufficient to state a claim.” Hartsfield v. Mayer, No. 95–1411, 1196 WL 43541,
at *3 (6th Cir. Feb. 1, 1996). A simple allegation that defendants conspired to cover up wrongful
actions is too conclusory and too speculative to state a claim of conspiracy. Birrell v. Michigan, No.
94–2456, 1995 WL 355662, at *2 (6th Cir. June 13, 1995). Plaintiff’s claim under § 1985 fails
because he makes no allegation that his alleged mistreatment resulted from race-based animus. See
Radvansky, 395 F.3d at 314. Further, Plaintiff’s allegations of conspiracy are vague, conclusory and
speculative. He alleges no facts that would support any of the elements of a claim of conspiracy.
Accordingly, a § 1985 conspiracy claim fails.
Section 1986 imposes liability on those who have knowledge of the wrongs
prohibited by § 1985 but failed to prevent them. Seguin v. City of Sterling Heights, 968 F.2d 584,
590 (6th Cir. 1992). Absent a violation of § 1985, a plaintiff may not maintain an action under
§ 1986. See id.; Browder v. Tipton, 630 F.2d 1149, 1155 (6th Cir. 1980). As Plaintiff failed to state
a claim under § 1985, his claim under § 1986 against Defendants Snyder and Hilfinger also fails.
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2.
Section 1983
Plaintiff alleges that LARA Director Hilfinger conspired with the Chaplainry Board
to allow an unauthorized amendment to Plaintiff’s registration of the Reincarnate Temple, MSTA
and failed to correct the mistake. In addition, Plaintiff argues that MDOC Director Heyns and
Chaplain Administrator Martin conspired to deprive Plaintiff of his First Amendment rights and
Article III of the Louisiana Treaty by failing to recognize the Reincarnate Temple, MSTA and by
refusing to allow Plaintiff to have religious services. Further, Plaintiff complains that Special
Litigation employee Killough conspired with the Chaplainry Board to deprive Plaintiff and other
Ismaili Muslims of registering their religion with the U.S. Government.
A civil conspiracy under § 1983 is “an agreement between two or more persons to
injure another by unlawful action.’” See Hensley v. Gassman, 693 F.3d 681, 695 (6th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 943-44 (6th Cir. 1985)). The plaintiff must show the
existence of a single plan, that the alleged coconspirator shared in the general conspiratorial
objective to deprive the plaintiff of a federal right, and that an overt action committed in furtherance
of the conspiracy caused an injury to the plaintiff. Hensley, 693 F.3d at 695; Bazzi v. City of
Dearborn, 658 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2011). Moreover, a plaintiff must plead a conspiracy with
particularity, as vague and conclusory allegations unsupported by material facts are insufficient.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 (recognizing that allegations of conspiracy must be supported by
allegations of fact that support a “plausible suggestion of conspiracy,” not merely a “possible” one);
Fieger v. Cox, 524 F.3d 770, 776 (6th Cir. 2008); Spadafore v. Gardner, 330 F.3d 849, 854 (6th Cir.
2003); Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538 (6th Cir. 1987).
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Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims are wholly conclusory. Plaintiff has not provided any
allegations establishing a link between any of the Defendants nor has he established any agreement
between them. Because Plaintiff’s allegations of conspiracy are vague, conclusory and speculative,
he fails to state a § 1983 conspiracy claim against Defendants Hilfinger, Heyns, Martin and Killough.
B.
Establishment Clause and State Law
Plaintiff asserts that Governor Snyder, MDOC Director Heyns, LARA Director
Hilfinger, and Chaplain Administrator Martin violated the Establishment Clause and MDOC Policy
Directive 05.03.150 for failing to recognize the Reincarnate Temple, MSTA.
“The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment provide: ‘Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.’ The first of the two
Clauses, commonly called the Establishment Clause, commands a separation of church and state.
The second, the Free Exercise Clause, requires government respect for, and noninterference with,
the religious beliefs and practices of our Nation’s people. While the two Clauses express
complementary values, they often exert conflicting pressures.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709,
719 (2005). “ ‘[T]here is room for play in the joints between’ the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses, allowing the government to accommodate religion beyond free exercise requirements,
without offense to the Establishment Clause.”6 Cutter, 544 U.S. at 713 (quoting Locke v. Davey, 540
U.S. 712, 718 (2004)).
In Cutter, the Supreme Court stated, “ ‘This Court has long recognized that the
government may . . . accommodate religious practices . . . without violating the Establishment
Clause.’ ” Cutter, 544 U.S. at 713–14 (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla.,
6
Although applicable originally only against the federal government, the Establishment Clause has been
incorporated against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947).
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480 U.S. 136, 144-145 (1987)). “[T]he Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce
anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which
establishes a state religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.” Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587
(1992). It is incredulous to suggest that Defendants Snyder, Hilfinger and Heyns coerced Plaintiff
into participating in any religious practices or took any action establishing a state religion. There are
several different religions that are practiced within the MDOC.7 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s First
Amendment Establishment Clause claim against Defendants Snyder, Hilfinger and Heyns fails to
state a claim.
To the extent Plaintiff suggests that Defendants Snyder , Hilfinger, Heyns and Martin
violated MDOC Policy Directive 05.03.150, § 1983 does not provide redress for a violation of a state
law. Pyles v. Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995); Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1166
(6th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants Snyder and Hilfinger violated state law
therefore fails to state a claim under § 1983. Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to invoke
this Court’s supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim against Defendants Snyder and
Hilfinger, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction. In determining whether to retain supplemental
jurisdiction, “[a] district court should consider the interests of judicial economy and the avoidance
of multiplicity of litigation and balance those interests against needlessly deciding state law issues.”
Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1993). Ordinarily, where a
district court has exercised jurisdiction over a state-law claim solely by virtue of supplemental
jurisdiction and the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, the court will dismiss the remaining
state-law claims. Id. Dismissal, however, remains “purely discretionary.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v.
7
For a full list of recognized religions, see Attachment A to MDOC Policy Directive 05.03.150 (effective July
26, 2013).
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HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)); Orton v. Johnny’s Lunch
Franchise, LLC, 668 F.3d 843, 850 (6th Cir. 2012). Here, the balance of the relevant considerations
weighs against the continued exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s statelaw claim against Defendants Snyder, Hilfinger and Heyns will be dismissed without prejudice.
C.
Supervisory Liability
To the extent that Plaintiff implies that Defendants Snyder, Hilfinger, Heyns, Martin
and Killough failed to correct the registration of the Reincarnate Temple, MSTA, Plaintiff fails to
state a claim. Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their
subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676;
Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691(1978); Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d
484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009).
A claimed constitutional violation must be based upon active
unconstitutional behavior. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575 (6th Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber,
310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002). The acts of one’s subordinates are not enough, nor can
supervisory liability be based upon the mere failure to act. Grinter, 532 F.3d at 575; Greene, 310
F.3d at 899; Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir. 2004). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each
Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply
because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information
contained in a grievance. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). “[A] plaintiff
must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions,
has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Because Plaintiff suggests that Defendants
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Snyder, Hilfinger, Heyns, Martin and Killough were responsible for the actions of their subordinates,
he fails to state a claim against them.
D.
RLUIPA
1.
Individual-Capacity Claims
RLUIPA “protects institutionalized persons who are unable freely to attend to their
religious needs and are therefore dependent on the government’s permission and accommodation
for exercise of their religion.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 721 (2005). It does so by limiting
the burdens that a government may place on a prisoner’s free exercise rights:
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a
person residing in or confined to an institution, as defined in section 1997 of this title,
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government
demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person —
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a). RLUIPA also provides a cause of action against a government: “A person
may assert a violation of this chapter as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain
appropriate relief against a government.” Id. § 2000cc–2(a). RLUIPA defines “government,” in
relevant part, as “(i) a State, county, municipality, or other governmental entity created under the
authority of a State; (ii) any branch, department, agency, instrumentality, or official of an entity listed
in clause (i); and (iii) any other person acting under color of State law.”
Id.
§ 2000cc–5(4)(A)(i)–(iii).
Plaintiff specifically brought his claims against all individual Defendants in both their
official and individual capacities. As noted by the Sixth Circuit, it has not ruled on whether damages
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are available against government defendants acting in their individual capacities. Selby v. Caruso,
734 F.3d 554, 561 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[O]ur court has not ruled on whether RLUIPA authorizes a
prisoner to pursue damages against prison officials who are sued in their individual capacities . . . .”)
(citing Heard v. Caruso, 351 F. App’x 1, 13 n.5 (6th Cir. 2009)). However, every other appellate
court that has addressed the issue has held that RLUIPA, as an exercise of Congress’s Spending
Clause power, does not authorize a claim for damages against state employees in their individual
capacities. See Washington v. Gonyea, 731 F.3d 143, 145 (2d Cir. 2013); Stewart v. Beach, 701 F.3d
1322, 1334-35 (10th Cir. 2012); Sharpe v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 154–55 (3d Cir. 2012); Sossamon
v. Lone Star State of Tex., 560 F.3d 316, 327–28 & n. 23 (5th Cir. 2009); Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d
868, 889 (7th Cir. 2009); Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1272–75 (11th Cir. 2007). On this basis,
this Court routinely has held that RLUIPA does not provide a cause of action for damages against
state actors in their individual capacities. See, e.g., Green v. Tudor, 685 F. Supp.2d 678, 699 (W.D.
Mich. 2010); Wood v. Mich. Dep’t of Corrs., No. 1:12-cv-1342, 2013 WL 2458390 (W.D. Mich.
June 6, 2013); Crump v. Prelesnik, No. 1:10-cv-353, 2013 WL 1337790, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Mich. Mar.
29, 2013); Hall v. Martin, No. 1:10-cv-1221, 2012 WL 1579334, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 29, 2012);
accord Haight v. Thompson, No. 5:11-cv-118, 2013 WL 1092969, at *8 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 15, 2013);
Aladimi v. Hamilton Cnty. Justice Ctr., No. 1:09–cv–398, 2012 WL 292587, at *18 (S.D. Ohio Feb.
1, 2012). Plaintiff, therefore, cannot bring a RLUIPA claim against the remaining Defendants in
their individual capacities.
2.
LARA
Plaintiff makes no allegations to implicate LARA in any unconstitutional activity.
It is a basic pleading essential that a plaintiff attribute factual allegations to particular defendants.
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See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544 (holding that, in order to state a claim, a plaintiff must make sufficient
allegations to give a defendant fair notice of the claim). Where a person is named as a defendant
without an allegation of specific conduct, the complaint is subject to dismissal, even under the liberal
construction afforded to pro se complaints. See Gilmore v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 92 F. App’x 188,
190 (6th Cir. 2004) (dismissing complaint where plaintiff failed to allege how any named defendant
was involved in the violation of his rights); Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir.
2002) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims where the complaint did not allege with any degree of specificity
which of the named defendants were personally involved in or responsible for each alleged violation
of rights); Griffin v. Montgomery, No. 00-3402, 2000 WL 1800569, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 2000)
(requiring allegations of personal involvement against each defendant); Rodriguez v. Jabe, No. 901010, 1990 WL 82722, at *1 (6th Cir. June 19, 1990) (“Plaintiff’s claims against those individuals
are without a basis in law as the complaint is totally devoid of allegations as to them which would
suggest their involvement in the events leading to his injuries”). Because Plaintiff’s claims fall far
short of the minimal pleading standards under FED . R. CIV . P. 8 (requiring “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”), his RLUIPA action must be
dismissed against Defendant LARA.
E.
Service
At this stage of the proceedings, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations are
sufficient to warrant service of his § 1983 claims against Defendants Hoffner and Tompkins and his
remaining RLUIPA claims on Defendants State of Michigan and MDOC.
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Conclusion
Having conducted the review now required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the
Court determines that Defendants Snyder, Hilfinger, Heyns, Killough, Martin and LARA will be
dismissed for failure to state a claim and on immunity grounds pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b),
and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). In addition, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims and
Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claims seeking monetary relief against Defendants State of Michigan and MDOC
on immunity grounds pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). Also, the Court
will dismiss Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claims against Defendants Hoffner and Tompkins for failure to state
a claim and on immunity grounds pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The
Court will order service of the § 1983 claims on Defendants Hoffner and Tompkins and the
remaining RLUIPA claims on Defendants State of Michigan and MDOC. Finally, the Court will
deny Plaintiff’s motion for class certification (docket #3).
An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated: June 11, 2014
/s/ Robert Holmes Bell
ROBERT HOLMES BELL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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