Runion #548994 v. Unknown Party #1 et al

Filing 12

OPINION; Judgment and Order to issue; signed by Judge Janet T. Neff (Judge Janet T. Neff, clb)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

CHARLES DARWIN RUNION,
Petitioner,
v.

Case No. 1:14-cv-225
Honorable Janet T. Neff

UNKNOWN PARTY #1 et al.,
Respondents.
_______________________________/
OPINION
This is a habeas corpus action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. Promptly after the filing of a petition for habeas corpus, the Court must undertake a
preliminary review of the petition to determine whether “it plainly appears from the face of the
petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.”
Rule 4, RULES GOVERNING § 2254 CASES; see 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If so, the petition must be
summarily dismissed. Rule 4; see Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970) (district court
has the duty to “screen out” petitions that lack merit on their face). A dismissal under Rule 4
includes those petitions which raise legally frivolous claims, as well as those containing factual
allegations that are palpably incredible or false. Carson v. Burke, 178 F.3d 434, 436-37 (6th Cir.
1999). After undertaking the review required by Rule 4, the Court concludes that the petition must
be dismissed because it fails to raise a meritorious federal claim.

Background
Petitioner Charles Darwin Runion presently is incarcerated at the Bellamy Creek
Correctional Facility. He pleaded guilty in the Kent County Circuit Court to one count of seconddegree criminal sexual conduct involving a person under 13, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520c(1)(a).
On March 29, 2011, the court sentenced him to a prison term of 20 to 30 years.
Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal his conviction to the Michigan
Court of Appeals. Through counsel, Petitioner raised the following two issues:
I.

DID THE PROSECUTION DENY MR. RUNION HIS STATUTORY
RIGHT TO A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION AND DID THIS MAKE HIS
GUILTY PLEA INVOLUNTARY?

II.

IS IT AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY FOR DENIAL OF HIS RIGHT TO A
POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION FOR THE COURT TO ALLOW MR.
RUNION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA, SET UP A POLYGRAPH
EXAMINATION, AND, IF NECESSARY, HAVE A TRIAL AFTER HE
TAKES HIS POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION?

(Ex. 1 to Am. Pet., docket #10-1, Page ID#143.) The court of appeals denied leave to appeal on
May 8, 2012, for lack of merit in the grounds presented. (Id., Page ID#159.) Petitioner filed a pro
per application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, raising the same two grounds.
The Supreme Court denied leave to appeal on September 24, 2012.
On May 13, 2013, Petitioner filed a motion for relief from judgment in the Kent
County Circuit Court, raising the same two grounds presented on direct appeal, together with one
new ground:
I.

DID THE MICH. STATE COURT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER
A FEDERAL INDIAN DEFENDANT.

(Am. Pet., docket #10, Page ID#130.) In a five-page opinion and order issued that same date, the
court denied the motion. (Ex. 1 to Br. in Supp. of Pet., docket #3-7, Page ID##95-99.) Petitioner
-2-

did not appeal his convictions to either the Michigan Court of Appeals or the Michigan Supreme
Court.1
In his timely filed habeas application, Petitioner raises all three claims that he
presented on direct and collateral review.
Standard of Review
This action is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, PUB.
L. 104-132, 110 STAT. 1214 (AEDPA). See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792 (2001). The
AEDPA “prevents federal habeas ‘retrials’” and ensures that state court convictions are given effect
to the extent possible under the law. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693-94 (2002). An application for
writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person who is incarcerated pursuant to a state conviction cannot
be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the
adjudication: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Discussion

1

Petitioner indicates in his petition that he appealed the decision, but the case number he provides (No. 310944)
does not correspond with the Michigan Court of Appeals online docket. See People v. Cummings, Docket No. 310944,
http://courts.mi.gov/opinions_orders/case_search/pages/default.aspx?SearchType=1&CaseNumber=310944
&CourtType_CaseNumber=2. Moreover, the dates on which he claims that he filed and received the results of the court
of appeals decision preceded the date of the trial court’s disposition of the motion for relief from judgment. Further, a
search of the public docketing system for the court of appeals reveals that Petitioner filed only one appeal in the state
courts, and that is Petitioner’s direct appeal of his convictions. See http://courts.mi.gov/opinions_orders/case_search/
pages/default.aspx?SearchType=2&PartyName=Runion+Charles&CourtType_PartyName=3&PageIndex=0&PartyO
penOnly=0. The Court assumes that the error arises from Petitioner’s incomplete revision of another prisoner’s habeas
application form.

-3-

Petitioner raises three challenges to his guilty plea: (1) the court lacked jurisdiction
to prosecute Petitioner; (2) the plea was involuntary, because the prosecutor constructively denied
Petitioner’s statutory right to a polygraph examination; and (3) for both reasons, Petitioner should
have been permitted to withdraw his plea.
It has long been the case that a valid guilty plea bars habeas review of most
non-jurisdictional claims alleging antecedent violations of constitutional rights. See Mabry v.
Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508 (1984) (“It is well-settled that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty
made by an accused person, who has been advised by competent counsel, may not be collaterally
attacked.”); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). Among claims not barred are those that
challenge “the very power of the State to bring the defendant into court to answer the charge against
him,” Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30 (1974), and those that challenge the validity of the guilty
plea itself. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985); Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 320
(1983); Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267. A plea not voluntarily and intelligently made has been obtained
in violation of due process and is void. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969).
Petitioner’s habeas application challenges both the power of the state to bring him
into court, see Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30, and the voluntariness of his plea.
I.

Lack of Jurisdiction

As he did in his state-court motion for relief from judgment, Petitioner argues that
his convictions are void because the Kent County Circuit Court lacked both personal and subjectmatter jurisdiction to charge and convict him. Specifically, Petitioner contends that he is an
American Indian who committed his alleged offenses on Indian land. As a result, Petitioner argues,
the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over any crimes he may have committed. In

-4-

support of his argument, Petitioner attaches to his brief a description of the Nottawaseppi Huron
Band of Potawatomi and its seven-county service area, together with a copy of the 1821 Treaty
between the United States and the Ottawa tribes. (Ex. 3-4 to Br. in Supp. of Pet., docket ##3-3 to
3-4, Page ID##51-60.)
The trial court correctly and thoroughly addressed Petitioner’s argument and
concluded that it was patently frivolous:
Defendant Runion has the burden of proving that he is entitled to relief from the
judgment. See MCR 6.508(D). Here, Mr. Runion pleaded guilty to one count of
criminal sexual conduct in the second degree as a habitual offender, and he agreed
to a 20 to 30 year sentence. By accepting a guilty plea, Mr. Runion waived all
challenges to his conviction other than a challenge based on the “right of the
government to prosecute the defendant[.]” See People v New, 427 Mich 482, 495
(1986). Challenges to the government’s right to prosecute include subject-matter
jurisdiction challenges and challenges relating to “‘the very authority of the state to
bring the defendant to trial,’ not merely ‘the factual determination of the defendant’s
guilt.’” People v Harris, 488 Mich 955, 956-957 (2010) (Young, J., dissenting),
citing New, 427 Mich at 491.
...
At the outset, the Court notes the distinction between subject-matter
jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. “Subject matter jurisdiction concerns a court’s
abstract power to try a case” and is not subject to waiver. People v Lown, 488 Mich
242, 268 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). On the other hand, “a party may
stipulate to, waive, or implicitly consent to personal jurisdiction.” Id. Here,
Defendant Runion asserts that the Court did not have personal jurisdiction over him,
but “by entering a guilty plea in the circuit court, and failing to contest the circuit
court’s jurisdiction, [the] defendant implicitly consented to that court’s exercise of
personal jurisdiction.” People v Kiyoshk, 493 Mich 923, 924 (2013). Thus, Mr.
Runion’s personal-jurisdiction challenge must be denied.
Despite the fact that Mr. Runion labeled his jurisdictional challenge as a
personal-jurisdiction challenge, the Court nevertheless considers what appears to be
a subject-matter jurisdiction challenge. See Rothenberg v Follman, 19 Mich App
383, 391 n 14 (1969) (“It is the business of the courts to look through form to
substance.”) Mr. Runion argues that the Court did not have jurisdiction to hear this
case because he is Native American and the crime was committed in Indian country.
To be sure, the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over specific criminal
-5-

matters if the crime was committed in Indian country. See People v Collins, 298
Mich App 166, 173-75 (2012). Accordingly, Mr. Runion has pieced together an
argument that the Michigan Legislature failed to meet the requirements to retain
statehood when it enacted the 1963 Michigan Constitution, so all of Michigan is
merely a territory and, therefore, Indian country. Accordingly, Mr. Runion argues
that this crime, which was committed at 3753 Groveland Avenue, SW, in Wyoming,
Michigan, took place in Indian country. The Court rejects this argument.
Even assuming, arguendo, that Defendant Runion’s claim to Native
American status enjoys factual support, his crabbed view of the state’s authority to
prosecute him proves to be nothing more than wishful thinking. As an initial matter,
Indian land can be converted to “non-Indian fee land,” and “once tribal land is
converted into fee simple, the tribe loses plenary jurisdiction over it.” See Plains
Commerce Bank v Long Family Land and Cattle Co, Inc, 554 US 316, 328 (2008).
Indeed, even if a Tribe recovers property once ceded to a state by treaty or otherwise,
“‘standards of federal Indian law and federal equity practice’ preclude the Tribe from
rekindling embers of sovereignty that long ago grew cold.” City of Sherrill, New
York v Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 544 US 197, 214 (2005). Therefore,
although the State of Michigan comprises vast acreage that was once Indian land, the
privately owned real property on which Mr. Runion committed criminal sexual
conduct irretrievably lost its character as Indian land long before Mr. Runion
perpetrated his criminal acts on that real property. To say that the entire State of
Michigan is Indian country points up the absurdity of Mr. Runion’s theory. If he is
correct, no prisoner is validly being incarcerated by the State of Michigan. Mr.
Runion’s argument in this regard is as frivolous as it is novel.
(5/13/13 Cir. Ct. Ord., docket #3-7, Page ID##95-99 (footnote omitted).)
The trial court’s disposition of Petitioner’s personal-jurisdiction claim is indisputably
correct. Although the trial court cited Michigan cases, those cases rested upon and referenced
federal constitutional law. As the trial court recognized, personal jurisdiction “is a waivable right
. . . .” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 (1985). A guilty plea waives any
objection to the court having personal jurisdiction over a defendant. See United States v. Juvenile
Male, 939 F.2d 321, 324 (6th Cir. 1991).
Moreover, the trial court properly applied federal law in rejecting Petitioner’s
argument that the State of Michigan lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to charge and convict him.

-6-

In Michigan, the circuit court is a court of general jurisdiction and has original jurisdiction over all
criminal cases involving felonies that occur within its boundaries. See MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 600.601. Thus, absent some exception, the Kent County Circuit Court clearly had subject-matter
jurisdiction over the offense for which Petitioner was charged, which occurred at 3753 Groveland
Avenue, SW, Wyoming, Michigan.
Petitioner sweepingly claims that the circuit court lacks jurisdiction from this general
rule because he is an Indian and the crime occurred on Indian land. Petitioner has provided factual
evidence of neither proposition. In addition, as the trial court recognized, Petitioner’s arguments
– that the Michigan Territory never became the State of Michigan and that the entire State of
Michigan is Indian country – are patently absurd. The state court’s rejection of Petitioner’s first
habeas ground is neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme
Court precedent.
II.

Involuntary Plea

Petitioner contends that the state constructively denied his right to a polygraph
examination. As a result, he argues, his guilty plea was involuntary.
In denying Petitioner’s motion for relief from judgment, the trial court recited the
history of the litigation, as follows:
In the summer of 2010, the Kent County Prosecutor brought four charges
against Defendant Charles Darwin Runion after learning of an alleged sexual assault
committed against an eight-year-old child. Mr. Runion’s trial was set for January 3,
2011, but the Court adjourned the trial so that Mr. Runion could exercise his right
to a polygraph examination prior to trial. See MCL 776.21(5). Despite the
adjournment, Mr. Runion chose not to participate in a polygraph examination after
he allegedly read an article in the Grand Rapids Press that indicated that the
prosecutor would not drop the charges against Mr. Runion even if he passed the
polygraph examination.

-7-

The Court reconvened to conduct Mr. Runion’s trial on January 24, 2011, but
after a lengthy discussion about Mr. Runion’s decision not to take a polygraph
examination, see Plea Hearing Transcript at 3-10, Mr. Runion agreed to a 20 to 30
year sentence, and the Court sentenced Mr. Runion accordingly on March 29, 2011.
Subsequently, Mr. Runion filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, see MCR
6.310(C), primarily arguing that his plea was involuntary. This argument was based
on the notion that the state constructively denied Mr. Runion’s right to a polygraph
examination by making statements to the press that the prosecutor would pursue
charges against him regardless of the results of the polygraph examination. See
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. After a hearing, the Court denied the motion to
withdraw the guilty plea, and Mr. Runion appealed his case to the Michigan Court
of Appeals on the same grounds. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied leave to
appeal on May 8, 2012, and Mr. Runion appealed his case to the Michigan Supreme
Court, again on the same grounds, but the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to
appeal on September 24, 2012. In a last-ditch effort, Mr. Runion now brings a
motion for relief from judgment, see MCR 6.501, et seq, arguing again, inter alia,
that his guilty plea was involuntary because the prosecutor constructively denied his
right to a polygraph examination.
(5/13/13 Cir. Ct. Ord., docket #3-7, Page ID##95-96.) The trial court concluded that, by entering
his guilty plea, Petitioner had waived his right to a polygraph examination. Id. (citing People v.
New, 398 N.W.2d 358, 494 (Mich. 1986)).
The test for determining a guilty plea’s validity is “‘whether the plea represents a
voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.’”
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970)).
Courts assessing whether a defendant’s plea is valid look to “all of the relevant circumstances
surrounding it,” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749 (1970), and may consider such factors
as whether there is evidence of factual guilt. While courts may consider whether a factual basis for
a guilty plea exists in their assessments of its validity, it has generally been held that the Constitution
does not require that they ensure such a basis exists. See Alford, 400 U.S. at 31 (“Strong evidence
of guilt may suffice to sustain a conviction on an Alford plea, and may be essential under FED. R.
CRIM. P. 11, but it is not necessary to comply with the Constitution.”); see also Matthew v. Johnson,
-8-

201 F.3d 353, 365 (5th Cir. 2000); Wallace v. Turner, 695 F.2d 545, 548 (11th Cir. 1983);
Thundershield v. Solem, 565 F.2d 1018 (8th Cir. 1977); Edwards v. Garrison, 529 F.2d 1374, 1376
(4th Cir. 1975); Roddy v. Black, 516 F.2d 1380, 1385 (6th Cir. 1975); Freeman v. Page, 443 F.2d
493, 497 (10th Cir. 1971).
Furthermore, in order to find a guilty plea constitutionally valid, several requirements
must be met. The defendant pleading guilty must be competent, see Brady, 397 U.S. at 756, and
must have notice of the nature of the charges against him, see Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637,
645 n.13 (1976); Smith v. O’Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941). The plea must be entered
“voluntarily,” i.e., not be the product of “actual or threatened physical harm, or . . . mental coercion
overbearing the will of the defendant” or of state- induced emotions so intense that the defendant
was rendered unable to weigh rationally his options with the help of counsel. Brady, 397 U.S. at
750; Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962) (“A guilty plea, if induced by promises
or threats which deprive it of the character of a voluntary act, is void.”). The defendant must also
understand the consequences of his plea, including the nature of the constitutional protection he is
waiving. Henderson, 426 U.S. at 645 n.13; Brady, 397 U.S. at 755; Machibroda, 368 U.S. at 493
(“Out of just consideration for persons accused of crime, courts are careful that a plea of guilty shall
not be accepted unless made voluntarily after proper advice and with full understanding of the
consequences.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Finally, the defendant must have
available the advice of competent counsel. Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267-68; Brady, 397 U.S. at 756;
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 & n.14 (1970). The advice of competent counsel exists
as a safeguard to ensure that pleas are voluntarily and intelligently made. Cf. Henderson, 426 U.S.
at 647 (“[I]t may be appropriate to presume that in most cases defense counsel routinely explain the

-9-

nature of the offense in sufficient detail to give the accused notice of what he is being asked to
admit.”); Brady, 397 U.S. at 754 (suggesting that coercive actions on the part of the state could be
dissipated by counsel).
Petitioner does not argue that he was incompetent or lacked notice of the offense.
He does not dispute that he was advised of the nature of the rights he was waiving and of the
consequences of his plea – nor does he contend that he did not understand them. He does not
dispute that he consulted counsel before entering his plea, and he acknowledges that his attorney
properly advised him that, by taking the plea, Petitioner could reduce his minimum sentence from
25 to 20 years imprisonment and he could avoid the maximum sentence of life imprisonment.
Further, Petitioner does not deny that he was given ample opportunity to take a polygraph
examination.2 He also acknowledges that he discussed his concerns about the polygraph with the
trial judge, prior to making his decision to enter the plea. (Pet’r’s Br., docket 3-1, Page ID##26-27.)
In fact, Petitioner does not even argue that the plea itself was coerced – that he was
induced by threats or promises to plead guilty rather than to proceed to trial. See Brady, 397 U.S.
at 755; Machibroda, 368 U.S. at 493. He merely contends that the prosecutor’s public statement
that she would pursue the charges, regardless of the outcome of Petitioner’s polygraph examination,
coerced him into waiving his statutory right to a polygraph examination. Whether Petitioner was

2

Petitioner argues that he had a right to a polygraph examination that was violated by the prosecutor’s comments
to the media. Under MICH. COMP. LAWS § 776.21(5), Petitioner had a right under Michigan law to be given a polygraph,
if he so requested. By the statute’s own terms, the right is not absolute; it is available only upon a defendant’s request.
Petitioner, after being given the opportunity, elected not to undergo a polygraph test. It therefore does not appear that
state law was violated. Regardless, habeas relief is not available to remedy an error of state law. See Wilson v.
Corcoran, 131 S. Ct. 13, 14 (2010); Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 67-68
(1991); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984). “[A] federal court may issue the writ to a state prisoner ‘only on the
ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’” Wilson, 131 S. Ct.
at 16 (2010) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)). A habeas petition must “state facts that point to a ‘real possibility of
constitutional error.’” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n.7 (1977) (quoting Advisory Committee Notes on Rule
4, RULES GOVERNING HABEAS CORPUS CASES).

-10-

“coerced” into waiving the polygraph by the prosecutor’s remarks, by his fear of what the polygraph
examination might show, or by his attorney’s recommendations concerning the wisdom of taking
a polygraph examination is irrelevant to the sole inquiry before this Court: whether Petitioner’s plea
was knowingly, voluntarily and understandingly made. Petitioner utterly fails to make the requisite
showing.
As a consequence, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the state-court’s rejection of
his claim was either contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court
precedent.
III.

Right to Withdraw the Plea

In his final claim of relief, Petitioner contends that, because he did not receive a
polygraph examination and because the trial court lacked jurisdiction, he should be permitted to
withdraw his plea and proceed to trial.
A state defendant has no constitutionally guaranteed right to withdraw a guilty plea.
See Carwile v. Smith, 874 F.2d 382 (6th Cir. 1989). The only constitutional challenge that a habeas
court may entertain with regard to a plea of guilty is that the state court acted without jurisdiction
or the plea was not entered in a knowing and voluntary fashion under the standards set forth by the
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Hill, 474 U.S. at 56. A habeas court is restricted to these federal
principles, and may not grant habeas relief on the basis of state law governing the taking or
withdrawal of guilty pleas. Riggins v. McMackin, 935 F.2d 790, 794-95 (6th Cir. 1991). Inasmuch
as the Court has rejected Petitioner’s challenges to the trial court’s jurisdiction and to the
voluntariness of his plea, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief.
Conclusion

-11-

In light of the foregoing, the Court will summarily dismiss Petitioner’s application
pursuant to Rule 4 because it fails to raise a meritorious federal claim.
Certificate of Appealability
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), the Court must determine whether a certificate of
appealability should be granted. A certificate should issue if Petitioner has demonstrated a
“substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This Court’s
dismissal of Petitioner’s action under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases is a determination
that the habeas action, on its face, lacks sufficient merit to warrant service. It would be highly
unlikely for this Court to grant a certificate, thus indicating to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals that
an issue merits review, when the Court has already determined that the action is so lacking in merit
that service is not warranted. See Love v. Butler, 952 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1991) (it is “somewhat
anomalous” for the court to summarily dismiss under Rule 4 and grant a certificate); Hendricks v.
Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990) (requiring reversal where court summarily dismissed under
Rule 4 but granted certificate); Dory v. Comm’r of Corr. of New York, 865 F.2d 44, 46 (2d Cir.
1989) (it was “intrinsically contradictory” to grant a certificate when habeas action does not warrant
service under Rule 4); Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050 n.1 (2d Cir. 1983) (issuing
certificate would be inconsistent with a summary dismissal).
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has disapproved issuance of blanket denials of
a certificate of appealability. Murphy v. Ohio, 263 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2001). Rather, the district
court must “engage in a reasoned assessment of each claim” to determine whether a certificate is
warranted. Id. at 467. Each issue must be considered under the standards set forth by the Supreme
Court in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000). Murphy, 263 F.3d at 467. Consequently, this

-12-

Court has examined each of Petitioner’s claims under the Slack standard. Under Slack, 529 U.S. at
484, to warrant a grant of the certificate, “[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists
would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Id. “A
petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that . . . jurists could conclude the issues presented
are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,
327 (2003). In applying this standard, the Court may not conduct a full merits review, but must limit
its examination to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of Petitioner’s claims. Id.
The Court finds that reasonable jurists could not conclude that this Court’s dismissal
of Petitioner’s claims was debatable or wrong. Therefore, the Court will deny Petitioner a certificate
of appealability.
A Judgment and Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

Dated: July 10, 2014

/s/ Janet T. Neff
Janet T. Neff
United States District Judge

-13-