King et al v. Curtis et al

Filing 207

OPINION AND ORDER APPROVING AND ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 190 ; Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 122 is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, for the reasons stated in the Report and Recommendation; signed by Judge Janet T. Neff (Judge Janet T. Neff, clb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

MADISON KING, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. 1:14-cv-403

v

HON. JANET T. NEFF

CHAD CURTIS, et al.,
Defendants.
_______________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs initiated this case in April 2014. An Order of Reference to the Magistrate Judge
was entered on July 21, 2015 (Dkt 92). In September 2015, Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial
summary judgment (Dkt 122). The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R),
recommending that the motion be granted in part and denied in part (Dkt 190). Now pending before
the Court is Plaintiffs’ December 22, 2015 Objection to the Report and Recommendation (Dkt 195).
On January 5, 2016, Defendant Lakewood Public Schools, Defendant Lakewood Public Schools
Board of Education and James Roes 1-10 (collectively the “Lakewood Defendants”), filed a response
to Plaintiffs’ Objection (Dkt 201). In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and FED. R. CIV. P.
72(b)(3), the Court has performed de novo consideration of those portions of the Report and
Recommendation to which Objection was made. For the reasons that follow, the Court denies
Plaintiffs’ Objection and approves and adopts the Report and Recommendation.

I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed this case on April 11, 2014, alleging that Defendant Curtis sexually assaulted
Plaintiffs while Curtis was a substitute teacher and worked in Lakewood High School’s weight
room. Defendant Curtis was convicted by a jury of six charges of criminal sexual conduct involving
three of the four Plaintiffs and is currently serving a 7–15 year prison sentence (Dkt 1, Compl. ¶ 3).
Against Defendant Curtis, Plaintiffs allege Battery (Count I) and Intentional Infliction of Severe
Emotional Distress (IIED) (Count II). Against Defendant Lakewood Public Schools and Defendant
Lakewood Public Schools Board of Education (collectively the “School Defendants”), Plaintiffs
allege a Violation of the Educational Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), 20 U.S.C. § 1981 et seq.
(Count III). Last, against the Lakewood Defendants, Plaintiffs allege a violation of Plaintiffs’
constitutional rights, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count IV). The Lakewood Defendants, in
turn, filed a Third-Party Complaint against Defendant Professional Contract Management, Inc.
(PCMI) (Dkt 107).
On September 18, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a “Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against
Defendant Curtis on Liability” (Dkt 122), arguing that Curtis’ “criminal convictions established
certain facts beyond a reasonable doubt which also establish each and every fact necessary to prove
liability against Defendant Curtis on these [civil] claims, leaving only damages and the extent of
Plaintiffs’ emotional distress to be resolved by trial” (Dkt 123 at 2-3). Defendant PCMI filed a
Response to Plaintiffs’ motion (Dkt 131), as did Defendant Curtis (Dkt 132). Plaintiffs filed a Reply
(Dkt 141). Following a motion hearing on October 26, 2015, the Magistrate Judge took the motion
under advisement and permitted supplemental briefing (Order, Dkt 145).
On December 8, 2015, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation,
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recommending that this Court grant Plaintiffs’ motion as to Plaintiffs’ claims of Battery but deny the
motion as to their IIED claims (R&R, Dkt 190 at 9). On December 22, 2015, Plaintiffs filed the
instant Objection (Dkt 195), to which the Lakewood Defendants responded (Dkt 201). PCMI did
not file a response.
II. DISCUSSION
A.

Standard of Review
“[A] judge may designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine any pretrial matter

pending before the court,” with certain exceptions, including “a motion ... for summary judgment.”
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). “[A] judge may also designate a magistrate judge to conduct hearings,
including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and
recommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the court, of any motion excepted in
subparagraph (A). . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
“Within fourteen days after being served with a copy, any party may serve and file written
objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as provided by rules of court.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1). See also FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(2) (Objections). “Any party may respond to another
party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof.” W.D. Mich.
LCivR 72.3(b) (Review of case-dispositive motions). “A judge of the court shall make a de novo
determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to
which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the
findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). See also FED.
R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3) (Resolving Objections).

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B.

Analysis
In their Objection, Plaintiffs request that this Court accept the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation, “with the exception that this Court grant summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ IIED
claim[s], and hold that consent is unavailable as a defense to all Defendants in this matter” (Obj.,
Dkt 195 at 7). First, regarding their IIED claims, Plaintiffs argue that “based on the law and the
undisputed material facts, no reasonable juror could find for Defendant Curtis on the grounds that
his conduct was not extreme or outrageous, that Defendant Curtis’s [conduct] was not intentional,
or that Plaintiffs were not severely emotionally injured” (Obj., Dkt 195 at 5). Plaintiffs conclude that
summary judgment on the IIED claims should be granted for Plaintiffs (id.). Second, on the matter
of consent, Plaintiffs argue that “given Judge Carmody’s findings, Lakewood Defendants’
representations, and all Defendants’ failure to plead consent as an affirmative defense, this Court
[should] hold that Lakewood Defendants and Third-Party Defendant PCMI also are prohibited from
claiming that Plaintiffs ‘consented’ to Defendant Curtis’s misconduct” (id. at 6-7).
In their response to Plaintiffs’ Objection, the Lakewood Defendants take no position on the
Magistrate Judge’s recommendation regarding Curtis’ liability for Plaintiffs’ claims against him (Dkt
201). However, they assert that Plaintiffs’ request for an order restricting the legal arguments
available to the Lakewood Defendants or Third-Party Defendant PCMI is not properly before this
Court (id. at 2-3). Specifically, the Lakewood Defendants point out that Plaintiffs, in their Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment Against Defendant Curtis on Liability, made only one argument, to
wit: that summary judgment against Defendant Chad Curtis was warranted (id. at 2). The Lakewood
Defendants emphasize that Plaintiffs did not seek relief against either the Lakewood Defendants or
PCMI, nor did Magistrate Judge Carmody consider whether such relief is appropriate (id.).
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Accordingly, the Lakewood Defendants conclude that this Court should deny Plaintiffs’ request to
prohibit the Lakewood Defendants or PCMI from claiming that Plaintiffs “consented” to Defendant
Curtis’s misconduct (id.).
Plaintiffs’ Objection is properly denied.
1. IIED. Plaintiffs do not express disagreement with the Magistrate Judge’s recitation of
the elements for an IIED claim or the law for applying the collateral estoppel doctrine. Their first
objection is limited to application of the law to the facts at bar.
On the first IIED element, “extreme and outrageous misconduct,” Plaintiffs opine that “[t]he
Court cannot leave it to jurors to conclude that [Curtis’ misconduct] is not extreme and outrageous
misconduct” (Objs., Dkt 195 at 5). However, as the Magistrate Judge pointed out, Plaintiffs, who
bear the burden on this question, did not identify any relevant Michigan authority in support of their
proposition that the element is not a jury question (R&R, Dkt 190 at 3-4). Nor do Plaintiffs in their
Objection address the contrary Michigan authority identified by the Magistrate Judge (id. at 4-5,
citing McCalla v. Ellis, 341 N.W.2d 525, 528 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (“The question of whether
defendant Ellis’s rape of plaintiff was sufficiently outrageous and extreme as to render him liable
for intentional infliction of emotional distress is a matter of determination by the trier of fact.”)).
Even assuming arguendo that Plaintiffs established the first IIED element as a matter of law,
Plaintiffs have not established the second or fourth IIED elements, “intent” and “severe emotional
distress,” for purposes of collateral estoppel. Plaintiffs’ objection fails to address, let alone reveal
any error in, the Magistrate Judge’s determinations that Plaintiffs are not entitled to relief as to these
elements where neither were elements of the crimes of which Curtis was convicted (R&R, Dkt 190

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at 5-6).1
In sum, Plaintiffs’ objection supplies no basis for rejecting the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation to deny Plaintiffs’ “Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against Defendant
Curtis on Liability” as to their IIED claims.
2. Consent. The Court agrees with the Lakewood Defendants that Plaintiffs’ request to
restrict the legal arguments available to the Lakewood Defendants or Third-Party Defendant PCMI
is not properly before this Court. The request was not part of Plaintiffs’ underlying motion, and the
Magistrate Judge did not rule on the topic. See generally Murr v. United States, 200 F.3d 895, 902
n.1 (6th Cir. 2000) (observing that “[c]ourts have held that while the Magistrate Judge Act, 28
U.S.C. § 631 et seq., permits de novo review by the district court if timely objections are filed, absent
compelling reasons, it does not allow parties to raise at the district court stage new arguments or
issues that were not presented to the magistrate”). Accordingly, the Court also denies Plaintiffs’
second “objection.” Therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Objections (Dkt 195) are DENIED, and the
Report and Recommendation (Dkt 190) is APPROVED and ADOPTED as the Opinion of the Court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ “Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Against Defendant Curtis on Liability” (Dkt 122) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART,
for the reasons stated in the Report and Recommendation.
Date: January 19, 2016

/s/ Janet T. Neff
JANET T. NEFF
United States District Judge

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Plaintiffs also fail to address how collateral estoppel could apply to establish liability as to
the fourth plaintiff, D.K., whom Defendant Curtis was not convicted of sexually assaulting.
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