LeBlanc #333019 v. Michigan, State of
OPINION ; signed by Judge Robert J. Jonker (Judge Robert J. Jonker, ymc)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
JEFFREY R. LeBLANC,
Case No. 1:14-cv-552
Honorable Robert J. Jonker
STATE OF MICHIGAN,
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any
prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A. The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint
indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as
true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33
(1992). Applying these standards, Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed on immunity grounds and for
failure to state a claim.
Plaintiff is incarcerated at the Richard A. Handlon Correctional Facility. He pleaded
nolo contendere in the Kalamazoo County Circuit Court to malicious destruction of property, for
which the trial court sentenced him on September 3, 2013, to imprisonment of 18 months to five
years. Plaintiff also has several previous convictions in Wayne and Kalamazoo counties, which have
been discharged. In his pro se complaint, Plaintiff sues “The People of the State of Michigan, Office
of the Prosecuting Attorney,” claiming that his prosecution and conviction for malicious destruction
of property were illegal. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, including immediate release from custody,
as well as monetary damages of forty million dollars.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff may not maintain a § 1983 action against the State of
Michigan. Regardless of the form of relief requested, the states and their departments are immune
under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts, unless the state has waived immunity
or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782
(1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1993). Congress has not expressly
abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979),
and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. Abick v. Michigan,
803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, the State of Michigan must be dismissed from this
action. Michigan courts operate as arms of the state and are entitled to the same sovereign immunity
as the State of Michigan. Pucci v. Nineteenth Dist. Ct., 628 F.3d 752, 762–64 (6th Cir. 2010); see
also Chambers v. Michigan, No. 10–12509, 2011 WL 940830, *3–4 (E.D. Mich. March 16, 2011).
And this sovereign immunity extends to judges and prosecutors sued in their official capacities.
Pucci, 628 F.3d at 764; Cady v. Arenac Cnty., 574 F.3d 334, 342-45 (6th Cir. 2009). In addition,
individual prosecutors are entitled is absolute immunity for the initiation and pursuit of a criminal
prosecution. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976); Lomaz v. Hennosy, 151 F.3d 493, 497
(6th Cir. 1998). Thus, the Kalamazoo County prosecutor’s office also must be dismissed on
Furthermore, a challenge to the fact or duration of confinement should be brought as
a petition for habeas corpus and is not the proper subject of a civil rights action brought pursuant to
§ 1983. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973) (the essence of habeas corpus is an
attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody and the traditional function of the writ
is to secure release from illegal custody). Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff seeks release from
custody, his action must be dismissed. See Adams v. Morris, 90 F. App’x 856, 858 (6th Cir. 2004)
(dismissal is appropriate where § 1983 action seeks equitable relief and challenges fact or duration
of confinement); see also Moore v. Pemberton, 110 F.3d 22, 23-24 (7th Cir. 1997) (reasons for not
construing a § 1983 action as one seeking habeas relief include (1) potential application of Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), (2) differing defendants, (3) differing standards of § 1915(a)(3) and
§ 2253(c), (4) differing fee requirements, (5) potential application of second or successive petition
doctrine or three-strikes rules of § 1915(g)).
To the extent Plaintiff seeks injunctive, declaratory or monetary relief for alleged
violations of Constitutional rights, his claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87
(1994), which held that “in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction
or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been
[overturned].” See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646 (1997) (emphasis in original). In Heck,
the Supreme Court held that a state prisoner cannot make a cognizable claim under § 1983 for an
allegedly unconstitutional conviction or for “harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would
render a conviction or sentence invalid” unless a prisoner shows that the conviction or sentence has
been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus.” Id. at 486-87 (footnote omitted). The holding in Heck has been extended to
actions seeking injunctive or declaratory relief. See Edwards, 520 U.S. at 646-48 (declaratory relief);
Clarke v. Stalder, 154 F.3d 186, 189-90 (5th Cir. 1998) (claim for injunctive relief intertwined with
request for damages); Wilson v. Kinkela, No. 97-4035, 1998 WL 246401, at *1 (6th Cir. May 5,
1998) (injunctive relief). Plaintiff’s allegations clearly call into question the validity of his
conviction. Therefore, his action is barred under Heck until his criminal conviction has been
A court’s dismissal of a claim on the basis that it is barred by Heck v. Humphrey is
properly considered a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) because it fails to state a claim on which
relief can be granted. See Hunt v. Michigan, 482 F. App’x 20, 22 (6th Cir. 2012) (a claim barred by
Heck is properly dismissed for failure to state a claim); Morris v. Cason, 102 F. App’x 902, 903 (6th
Cir. 2004) (same).
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b),
on immunity grounds and for failure to state a claim.
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611
(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no
good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the
$505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless
Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g).
If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
June 19, 2014
/s/ Robert J. Jonker
ROBERT J. JONKER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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