Moore #284240 v. Palmer
Filing
5
OPINION ; signed by Judge Robert Holmes Bell (Judge Robert Holmes Bell, kcb)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JERRELL KEMPLE MOORE,
Petitioner,
Case No. 1:14-cv-558
v.
Honorable Robert Holmes Bell
CARMEN PALMER,
Respondent.
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OPINION
This is a habeas corpus action brought by a state prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Promptly after the filing of a petition for habeas corpus, the Court must undertake a preliminary
review of the petition to determine whether “it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any
exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rule 4, RULES
GOVERNING § 2254 CASES; see 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If so, the petition must be summarily dismissed.
Rule 4; see Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970) (district court has the duty to “screen
out” petitions that lack merit on their face). A dismissal under Rule 4 includes those petitions which
raise legally frivolous claims, as well as those containing factual allegations that are palpably
incredible or false. Carson v. Burke, 178 F.3d 434, 436-37 (6th Cir. 1999). After undertaking the
review required by Rule 4, the Court concludes that Petitioner has failed to exhaust his available
state-court remedies as to all claims raised in the petition. Because Petitioner has fewer than 60
days remaining in the limitations period for filing a habeas petition, the Court will not dismiss the
action at this time, pending Petitioner’s compliance with the further directions of this Court set forth
in this opinion and attached order.
Discussion
I.
Factual allegations
Petitioner presently is incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections at
the Michigan Reformatory. On May 11, 2010, he was convicted in the Wayne County Circuit Court
of felony murder, MICH . COMP . LAWS § 750.316(1)(b), felony firearms, MICH . COMP . LAWS
§ 750.227b, felon in possession of a firearm, MICH . COMP . LAWS § 750.224f, and three counts of
assault with intent to rob while armed, MICH . COMP . LAWS § 750.89. Petitioner was sentenced to
a term of life imprisonment for his felony murder conviction, 5 years’ imprisonment his felony
firearms conviction, 6 to 15 years’ imprisonment for his felon in possession of a firearm conviction,
and three terms of 30 to 50 years’ imprisonment for his assault with the intent to rob while armed
convictions.
Petitioner appealed as of right to the Michigan Court of Appeals. In an unpublished
opinion issued on December 11, 2012, the court of appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and
sentences. On May 28, 2013, the Michigan Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s application for leave
to appeal because it was not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by the court.
In his application for habeas corpus relief, Petitioner raises the following seven
grounds for relief:
I.
Due Process-Right to Confrontation.
II.
Failure to Instruct on Alibi Defense.
III.
Denial of Due Process-Verdict Form
IV.
Due Process Violation-Defective Instruction
V.
Insufficient Evidence
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VI.
Prosecutorial Mischarging
VII.
Judicial Abuse of Discretion
(Docket #1, Page ID ##3-6 .)
Although Petitioner checked “yes” in box 13(a) of the form petition which asks
whether all grounds for relief raised in the petition have been presented to the highest state court, he
also states that he is raising two new grounds for relief, identified here as grounds VI and VII.
Review of the Michigan Court of Appeals opinion supports Petitioner’s statement that these are new
issues because they were not addressed by the court of appeals.
II.
Failure to exhaust available state-court remedies
Before the Court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner, the prisoner must exhaust
remedies available in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838,
842 (1999). Exhaustion requires a petitioner to “fairly present” federal claims so that state courts
have a “fair opportunity” to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon a petitioner’s
constitutional claim. See O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 842; Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-77
(1971), cited in Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995), and Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4,
6 (1982). To fulfill the exhaustion requirement, a petitioner must have fairly presented his federal
claims to all levels of the state appellate system, including the state’s highest court. Duncan, 513
U.S. at 365-66; Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 414 (6th Cir. 2009); Hafley v. Sowders, 902 F.2d
480, 483 (6th Cir. 1990). “[S]tate prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve
any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s established appellate review
process.” O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845. The district court can and must raise the exhaustion issue
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sua sponte, when it clearly appears that habeas claims have not been presented to the state courts.
See Prather v. Rees, 822 F.2d 1418, 1422 (6th Cir. 1987); Allen, 424 F.2d at 138-39.
Petitioner bears the burden of showing exhaustion. See Rust v. Zent, 17 F.3d 155, 160
(6th Cir. 1994). Petitioner appears to have exhausted the first five grounds for relief on direct appeal
before the Michigan appellate courts. However, Petitioner has not yet exhausted his last two grounds
for relief. An applicant has not exhausted available state remedies if he has the right under state law
to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). Petitioner has at
least one available procedure by which to raise the unexhausted issues he has presented in this
application. He may file a motion for relief from judgment under MICH . CT . R. 6.500 et. seq. Under
Michigan law, one such motion may be filed after August 1, 1995. MICH . CT . R. 6.502(G)(1).
Petitioner has not yet filed his one allotted motion. Therefore, the Court concludes that he has at
least one available state remedy. In order to properly exhaust his claim, Petitioner must file a motion
for relief from judgment in the Wayne County Circuit Court. If his motion is denied by the circuit
court, Petitioner must appeal that decision to the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan
Supreme Court. See Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66.
Because Petitioner has some claims that are exhausted and some that are not, his
petition is “mixed.” Under Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982), district courts are directed to
dismiss mixed petitions without prejudice in order to allow petitioners to return to state court to
exhaust remedies. However, since the habeas statute was amended to impose a one-year statute of
limitations on habeas claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), dismissal without prejudice often
effectively precludes future federal habeas review. This is particularly true after the Supreme Court
ruled in Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181-82 (2001), that the limitations period is not tolled
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during the pendency of a federal habeas petition. As a result, the Sixth Circuit adopted a stay-andabeyance procedure to be applied to mixed petitions. See Palmer v. Carlton, 276 F.3d 777, 781 (6th
Cir. 2002). In Palmer, the Sixth Circuit held that when the dismissal of a mixed petition could
jeopardize the timeliness of a subsequent petition, the district court should dismiss only the
unexhausted claims and stay further proceedings on the remaining portion until the petitioner has
exhausted his claims in the state court. Id.; see also Griffin v. Rogers, 308 F.3d 647, 652 n.1 (6th
Cir. 2002).
Petitioner’s application is subject to the one-year statute of limitations provided in
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Under § 2244(d)(1)(A), the one-year limitation period runs from “the date
on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time
for seeking such review.” Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Michigan Court of Appeals and
Michigan Supreme Court. The Michigan Supreme Court denied his application on May 28, 2013.
Petitioner did not petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, though the ninety-day
period in which he could have sought review in the United States Supreme Court is counted under
§ 2244(d)(1)(A). See Bronaugh v. Ohio, 235 F.3d 280, 283 (6th Cir. 2000). The ninety-day period
expired on August 26, 2013. Accordingly, Petitioner has one year, until August 26, 2014, in which
to file his habeas petition. At present, Petitioner has less then sixty days before expiration of the
limitations period.
The Palmer Court has indicated that thirty days is a reasonable amount of time for
a petitioner to file a motion for post-conviction relief in state court, and another thirty days is a
reasonable amount of time for a petitioner to return to federal court after he has exhausted his statecourt remedies. Palmer, 276 F.3d at 721. See also Griffin, 308 F.3d at 653 (holding that sixty days
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amounts to mandatory period of equitable tolling under Palmer).1 In the instant case, Petitioner has
less than sixty days remaining before the statute of limitations expires. Petitioner therefore would
not have the necessary 30 days to file a motion for post-conviction relief or the additional 30 days
to return to this court before expiration of the statute of limitations. As a result, were the Court to
dismiss the petition without prejudice for lack of exhaustion, the dismissal could jeopardize the
timeliness of any subsequent petition. Palmer, 276 F.3d at 781.
The Supreme Court has held, however, that the type of stay-and-abeyance procedure
set forth in Palmer should be available only in limited circumstances because over-expansive use
of the procedure would thwart the AEDPA’s goals of achieving finality and encouraging petitioners
to first exhaust all of their claims in the state courts. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005).
In its discretion, a district court contemplating stay and abeyance should stay the mixed petition
pending prompt exhaustion of state remedies if there is “good cause” for the petitioner’s failure to
exhaust, if the petitioner’s unexhausted claims are not “plainly meritless” and if there is no indication
that the petitioner engaged in “intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.” Id. at 278. Moreover, under
Rhines, if the district court determines that a stay is inappropriate, it must allow the petitioner the
opportunity to delete the unexhausted claims from his petition, especially in circumstances in which
dismissal of the entire petition without prejudice would “unreasonably impair the petitioner’s right
to obtain federal relief.” Id.
Consequently, if Petitioner wishes to pursue his unexhausted claims in the state
courts, he must show cause within 28 days why he is entitled to a stay of these proceedings.
1
The running of the statute of limitations is tolled while “a properly filed application for State post-conviction
or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
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Specifically, Petitioner must show: (1) good cause for his failure to exhaust before filing his habeas
petition; (2) that his unexhausted claims are not plainly meritless; and (3) that he has not engaged
in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics. See Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277-78. If Petitioner fails to meet
the Rhines requirements for a stay or fails to timely comply with the Court’s order, the Court will
review only his exhausted claims. In the alternative, Petitioner may file an amended petition setting
forth only his exhausted claims.
An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated: July 17, 2014
/s/ Robert Holmes Bell
ROBERT HOLMES BELL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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