Ryan #787263 v. Heyns et al
Filing
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OPINION; signed by Judge Gordon J. Quist (Judge Gordon J. Quist, jmt)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
SEAN MICHAEL RYAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 1:14-cv-754
Honorable Gordon J. Quist
DANIEL HEYNS et al.,
Defendants.
______________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, PUB. L. NO . 104-134, 110 STAT . 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any
prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s
pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s
allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504
U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure
to state a claim against Defendants Heyns, Smith, Huss, Simon and Johnson. The Court will serve
the complaint against Defendants Canefield, Jamison, Elliot, Krunk and Dolittle.
Discussion
I.
Factual allegations
Plaintiff presently is incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections
(MDOC) at the Ionia Correctional Facility (ICF). Plaintiff sues MDOC Director Daniel Heyns and
the following ICF personnel: Warden William Smith; Assistant Resident Unit Supervisor
(Unknown) Simon; Deputy Warden Erica Huss; Correctional Officers (Unknown) Canefield,
(Unknown) Elliot and (Unknown) Jamison; Nurses (Unknown) Krunk and (Unknown) Dolittle and
Daphne M. Johnson.1
Plaintiff alleges that he has physician’s orders authorizing him to have access to a
wheelchair and a cane. On March 13, 2014, his housing unit experienced a “shake down.” (Compl.,
docket #1, Page ID#5.) Before Plaintiff was escorted from his cell, he asked Defendant Simon to
ensure that he received his ambulatory aids. When Defendants Jamison and Canefield came to
escort Plaintiff out of his cell, they told Plaintiff that his cane and wheelchair were for out-of-unit
use only and they ordered Plaintiff to “cuff up.” (Id.) Plaintiff complied. While escorting Plaintiff,
Defendants Jamison and Canefield intentionally inflicted unnecessary pain upon Plaintiff when they
allowed him to fall three times, all the while laughing and taunting him. Because Plaintiff was
handcuffed behind his back and shackled, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants intentionally put him at
risk of injury. Defendants Canefield and Jamison responded to Plaintiff’s request for help by
ridiculing him.
Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that instead of putting him in a shower on the same
level as his cell, Defendants Canefield and Jamison made him drag himself up stairs to another
shower putting him “at risk of staph or mercer [sic] infection and causing more pain.” (Id.)
Defendants Canefield and Jamison were aware of Plaintiff’s chronic pain and ambulatory
difficulties, but chose to ignore these problems “for apparently their own amusement or to ‘punish’
Plaintiff with [sic] out penological justification.” (Id.) As Plaintiff was laying on the shower floor,
1
Although not identified as a Defendant, Plaintiff purports to set forth claims against the MDOC in the body
of his complaint. Even if it had been properly identified as a Defendant, the MDOC is immune from suit. See, e.g.,
McCoy v. Michigan, 369 F. App’x 646, 653-54 (6th Cir. 2010); Turnboe v. Stegall, No. 00-1182, 2000 W L1679478, at
*2 (6th Cir. Nov. 1, 2000).
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Defendant Dolittle refused to provide medical care despite Plaintiff’s request for help and his
“obvious pain and suffering.” (Id. at Page ID#6)
On March 19, 2014, Defendant Krunk gave Plaintiff a cell-side medical examination
due to his inability to get to the examination room. Defendant Jamison ignored Plaintiff’s requests
for help and intentionally refused to help Plaintiff onto the scale “resulting in unnecessary pain
intentionally inflicted.” (Id. at Page ID#5) Plaintiff almost fell two times and managed not to hit
the floor only because a wall helped him prop himself up. After he was weighed, Plaintiff made his
way to a chair. When Defendant Krunk completed her examination, Plaintiff tried to get out of the
chair but “collapsed back into [the] chair due to pain.” (Id.) Plaintiff again tried to get out of the
chair and as he was doing so Defendant Elliot pulled the chair out from under him causing him to
fall to the ground. Defendant Krunk did not try to help Plaintiff, and instead said “‘Stop[,] I can’t
hold it in’ (referring to laughter).” (Id.)
Plaintiff filed grievances regarding the March 13 and 19 incidents, which were
denied. Plaintiff sent “kites” to Defendants Smith, Huss and Heyns, but they have failed to
investigate, “forward to internal affairs or perserve [sic]. . . the videos as Plaintiff requested (to
cover up incidents).” (Id.) Because Defendants Smith, Huss and Heyns failed to investigate his
grievances, Plaintiff concludes that Defendants Smith, Huss and Heyns have failed to train,
supervise or discipline “the abusive staff members and in effect condoned the unconstitutional
infliction of pain and cruel and unusual punishment.” (Id.)
As relief, Plaintiff seeks an injunction and money damages.
II.
Failure to state a claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if “‘it fails to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
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While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include
more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for
more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED . R. CIV . P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility
standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)
and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a
right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed
by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal
rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
A.
Defendants Heyns, Smith and Huss
Plaintiff fails to make specific factual allegations against Defendants Heyns, Smith
and Huss, other than his claim that they failed to conduct an investigation in response to his
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grievances.2 Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their
subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676;
Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691(1978); Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d
484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009).
A claimed constitutional violation must be based upon active
unconstitutional behavior. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575 (6th Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber,
310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002). The acts of one’s subordinates are not enough, nor can
supervisory liability be based upon the mere failure to act. Grinter, 532 F.3d at 575; Greene, 310
F.3d at 899; Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir. 2004). Moreover, § 1983 liability may
not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based
upon information contained in a grievance. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir.
1999). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own
individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Plaintiff has failed to
allege that Defendants Heyns, Smith and Huss engaged in any active unconstitutional behavior.
Accordingly, he fails to state a claim against them.
B.
Eighth Amendment
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Canefield and Jamison were escorting him from his
cell during a unit shakedown. Plaintiff was handcuffed and shackled during the escort. While
Defendants Canefield and Jamison were walking with Plaintiff, they let him fall three times while
they were laughing and taunting him. Defendants Canefield and Jamison responded to Plaintiff’s
requests for help by ridiculing him. Additionally, Defendants Canefield and Jamison made Plaintiff
drag himself upstairs to another shower, rather than allow him to go to a shower on the same level
2
Plaintiff concludes that Defendants Heyns, Smith and Huss have failed to train and supervise staff which,
according to Plaintiff “in effect condoned” staff behavior. (Compl., docket #1, Page ID#6.) However, Plaintiff comes
to these conclusions based solely on his allegation that Defendants Heyns, Smith and Huss failed to investigate his
grievances.
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as his cell, despite their awareness of Plaintiff’s ambulatory difficulties. While Plaintiff was laying
on the shower floor, Defendant Dolittle refused to provide medical care.
Additionally, Defendant Jamison refused to help Plaintiff step onto a scale to be
weighed by Nurse Krunk. Because of Defendant Jamison’s refusal to help, Plaintiff almost fell two
times. After he was weighed, Plaintiff made his way to a chair, but when he attempted to rise from
the chair, Defendant Elliot pulled it out from under him, causing him to fall to the ground. Defendant
Krunk did not try to help and merely held back her laughter.
At this juncture in the proceedings, Plaintiff’s allegations warrant service of the
complaint on Defendants Canefield, Jamison, Elliot, Krunk and Dolittle.
C.
Defendant Simon
Plaintiff alleges that when he learned that his unit would be experiencing a
shakedown he asked Defendant Simon to ensure that he received his ambulatory aids. That is
Plaintiff’s sole allegation against Defendant Simon. Plaintiff does not explain how he came to
communicate with Defendant Simon or why he believed Defendant Simon would be able to ensure
that he received his ambulatory aids.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment
against those convicted of crimes. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment obligates
prison authorities to provide medical care to incarcerated individuals, as a failure to provide such
care would be inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
102, 103-04 (1976). The Eighth Amendment is violated when a prison official is deliberately
indifferent to the serious medical needs of a prisoner. Id. at 104-05; Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d
693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001).
A claim for the deprivation of adequate medical care has an objective and a
subjective component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy the objective
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component, the plaintiff must allege that the medical need at issue is sufficiently serious. Id. In
other words, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk
of serious harm. Id. The objective component of the adequate medical care test is satisfied “[w]here
the seriousness of a prisoner’s need[ ] for medical care is obvious even to a lay person.” Blackmore
v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir. 2004). If, however the need involves “minor
maladies or non-obvious complaints of a serious need for medical care,” Blackmore, 390 F.3d at
898, the inmate must “place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental
effect of the delay in medical treatment.” Napier v. Madison Cnty., 238 F.3d 739, 742 (6th Cir.
2001).
The subjective component requires an inmate to show that prison officials have “a
sufficiently culpable state of mind in denying medical care.” Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867
(6th Cir. 2000) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). Deliberate indifference “entails something more
than mere negligence,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, but can be “satisfied by something less than acts
or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Id.
Under Farmer, “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn
that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837.
Even if Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to establish that Defendant Simon was
aware that he had a serious medical need, Plaintiff fails to establish that Defendant Simon was
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need. Plaintiff merely alleges that he asked Defendant
Simon to ensure that he received his ambulatory aids during the unit shakedown. That Plaintiff did
not actually receive those ambulatory aids is insufficient to establish that Defendant Simon
deliberately failed to provide them to Plaintiff. It very well could have been that Defendant Simon
did everything he could to ensure that Plaintiff received his ambulatory aids, but he was thwarted
in this endeavor. Plaintiff simply fails to set forth any facts to suggest deliberate indifference by
Defendant Simon.
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To the extent Plaintiff brings a claim against Defendant Simon for failure to protect
Plaintiff, the analysis is the same. An Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim has both an
objective and subjective component. First, “to establish a constitutional violation based on failure
to protect, a prison inmate . . . must show that the failure to protect from risk of harm is objectively
‘sufficiently serious.’” Bishop v. Hackel, 636 F.3d 757, 766 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Farmer, 511
U.S. at 833). “The inmate must show that ‘he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial
risk of serious harm.’” Id.
Second, “a plaintiff also must show that prison officials acted with [subjective]
‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety.” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). A
plaintiff must show “more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety.”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. The subjective requirement is met only where a plaintiff demonstrates that
prison officials acted with “deliberate indifference” to a substantial risk of harm. An official is
deliberately indifferent where “the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate
health or safety; the official must both be aware of the facts from which the inference could be
drawn that a substantial risk of harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. “[A]n
official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no
cause for commendation, cannot . . . be condemned as the infliction of punishment.” Id. at 838. In
analyzing the subjective component, a district court should consider each defendant’s state of mind
individually, not collectively. Bishop, 636 F.3d at 767. Additionally, “prison officials who actually
knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they
responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” Farmer, 511 U.S.
at 844. “Whether one puts it in terms of duty or deliberate indifference, prison officials who act
reasonably cannot be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.” Id. at 845.
Even if Plaintiff can establish that Defendant Simon failed to protect him from a
sufficiently serious harm - being forced to walk without ambulatory aids, Plaintiff has not
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established that Defendant Simon deliberately disregarded the risk of harm. Plaintiff offers no facts
to suggest that Defendant Simon’s deliberate failure to act was the reason he did not receive his
ambulatory aids.
Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Simon.
Consequently, Defendant Simon must be dismissed.
D.
Defendant Johnson
With respect to Defendant Johnson, Plaintiff fails to set forth any factual allegations.
It is a basic pleading essential that a plaintiff attribute factual allegations to particular defendants.
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544 (holding that, in order to state a claim, a plaintiff must make sufficient
allegations to give a defendant fair notice of the claim). Where a person is named as a defendant
without an allegation of specific conduct, the complaint is subject to dismissal, even under the
liberal construction afforded to pro se complaints. See Gilmore v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 92 F. App’x
188, 190 (6th Cir. 2004) (dismissing complaint where plaintiff failed to allege how any named
defendant was involved in the violation of his rights); Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764
(6th Cir. 2002) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims where the complaint did not allege with any degree of
specificity which of the named defendants were personally involved in or responsible for each
alleged violation of rights); Griffin v. Montgomery, No. 00-3402, 2000 WL 1800569, at *2 (6th Cir.
Nov. 30, 2000) (requiring allegations of personal involvement against each defendant); Rodriguez
v. Jabe, No. 90-1010, 1990 WL 82722, at *1 (6th Cir. June 19, 1990) (“Plaintiff’s claims against
those individuals are without a basis in law as the complaint is totally devoid of allegations as to
them which would suggest their involvement in the events leading to his injuries”). Because
Plaintiff’s claims fall far short of the minimal pleading standards under FED . R. CIV . P. 8 (requiring
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”), his
complaint must be dismissed against Defendant Johnson.
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Conclusion
Having conducted the review now required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the
Court determines that Defendants Heyns, Smith, Huss, Simon and Johnson will be dismissed for
failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court will serve the complaint against Defendants Canefield, Jamison, Elliot, Krunk and
Dolittle.
An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated: September 5, 2014
/s/ Gordon J. Quist
GORDON J. QUIST
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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