Glombowski #806721 v. Beardslee et al
Filing
4
OPINION ; signed by Judge Robert J. Jonker (Judge Robert J. Jonker, ymc)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
BRANDON GLOMBOWSKI,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 1:14-cv-870
v.
Honorable Robert J. Jonker
UNKNOWN BEARDSLEE et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any
prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro
se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s
allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504
U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state
a claim.
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff presently is incarcerated at the St. Louis Correctional Facility. In his pro se
complaint, he sues Assistant Resident Unit Supervisor (ARUS) Unknown Beardslee and Corrections
Officer Unknown Party for violating his Eighth Amendment rights.
On May 7, 2014, Plaintiff informed Officer Unknown Party that Plaintiff and his cellmate “were not getting along and that it would be in the best interest of both [] of [them if one] were
assigned to a different cell.” (Compl., docket #1, Page ID#6.) Officer Unknown Party instructed
Plaintiff to speak with ARUS Beardslee. When Plaintiff met with Beardslee, Beardslee told Plaintiff
that she would not move him because there was “no real threat.” (Id.) On May 8, 2014, however,
Plaintiff was anally raped by his cell-mate. Plaintiff did not report the incident until May 9, 2014,
because Plaintiff’s cell-mate threatened further assault.
For relief, Plaintiff requests monetary damages.
Discussion
I.
Failure to state a claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While
a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more
than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial
-2-
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although
the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility
standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)
and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v. Corr.
Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal
rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
The Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional limitation on the power of the states
to punish those convicted of crimes. Punishment may not be “barbarous” nor may it contravene
society’s “evolving standards of decency.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345-46 (1981). The
Amendment, therefore, prohibits conduct by prison officials that involves the “unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain.” Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346). The deprivation alleged must result in the denial of the “minimal civilized
-3-
measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; see also Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596,
600-01 (6th Cir. 1998). The Eighth Amendment is only concerned with “deprivations of essential
food, medical care, or sanitation” or “other conditions intolerable for prison confinement.” Rhodes,
452 U.S. at 348 (citation omitted). Moreover, “[n]ot every unpleasant experience a prisoner might
endure while incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment.” Ivey, 832 F.2d at 954.
Inmates have a constitutionally protected right to personal safety grounded in the
Eighth Amendment. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). Thus, prison staff are obliged
“to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates” in their care. Hudson v. Palmer,
468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984). To establish a violation of this right, a plaintiff must show that a
defendant was deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff’s risk of injury. Walker v. Norris, 917 F.2d
1449, 1453 (6th Cir. 1990); McGhee v. Foltz, 852 F.2d 876, 880-81 (6th Cir. 1988). While a
prisoner does not need to prove that he has been the victim of an actual attack to bring a personal
safety claim, he must at least establish that he reasonably fears such an attack. Thompson v. Cnty.
of Medina, Ohio, 29 F.3d 238, 242-43 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that plaintiff has the minimal burden
of “showing a sufficient inferential connection” between the alleged violation and inmate violence
to “justify a reasonable fear for personal safety.”)
An Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim has both an objective and subjective
component. See Bishop v. Hackel, 636 F.3d 757, 766 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at
833-34). To satisfy the objective component, the inmate must show that the failure to protect him
from risk of harm is objectively “sufficiently serious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. In particular, the
-4-
inmate must show that “he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious
harm.” Id.
To satisfy the subjective component, the inmate must establish that prison officials
acted with “deliberate indifference” to his health or safety. Bishop, 636 F.3d at 766 (citing Farmer,
511 U.S. at 834). “An official is ‘deliberately indifferent’ if he or she ‘knows of and disregards an
excessive risk to inmate health and safety; the official must both be aware of the facts from which
the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference.’ ” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. “[A]n official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he
should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot . . . be condemned as
the infliction of punishment.” Id. at 838. In analyzing the subjective component, a district court
should consider each defendant’s state of mind individually, not collectively. Bishop, 636 F.3d at
767. Additionally, “prison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety
may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately
was not averted.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. “Whether one puts it in terms of duty or deliberate
indifference, prison officials who act reasonably cannot be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause.” Id. at 845.
In hindsight, Plaintiff faced an objectively substantial risk of serious harm. Plaintiff,
however, fails to allege facts suggesting that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to that risk.
He does not allege that he told Defendant Unknown Party or Defendant Beardslee that his cell-mate
had threatened him or that his cell-mate had a history of attacking others. Instead, according to the
allegations in the complaint, Plaintiff only told Defendants that he and his cell-mate were “not
getting along.” (See Compl., docket #1, Page ID#6.) Such allegations are grossly insufficient to
-5-
demonstrate that either Defendant subjectively knew of and disregarded a substantial risk that
Plaintiff would be physically attacked by his cell-mate. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Plaintiff
therefore fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Unknown Party and
Beardslee.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Plaintiff’s action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611
(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no
good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the
$505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless
Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g).
If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated:
November 26, 2014
/s/ Robert J. Jonker
ROBERT J. JONKER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
-6-
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?