Harrell #678078 v. McKee
Filing
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OPINION ; signed by Judge Robert J. Jonker (Judge Robert J. Jonker, ymc)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
TRAVIS BURTON HARRELL,
Petitioner,
v.
Case No. 1:14-cv-945
Honorable Robert J. Jonker
KENNETH T. McKEE,
Respondent.
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OPINION
This is a habeas corpus action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. Promptly after the filing of a petition for habeas corpus, the Court must undertake a
preliminary review of the petition to determine whether “it plainly appears from the face of the
petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.”
Rule 4, RULES GOVERNING § 2254 CASES; see 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If so, the petition must be
summarily dismissed. Rule 4; see Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970) (district court
has the duty to “screen out” petitions that lack merit on their face). A dismissal under Rule 4
includes those petitions which raise legally frivolous claims, as well as those containing factual
allegations that are palpably incredible or false. Carson v. Burke, 178 F.3d 434, 436-37 (6th Cir.
1999). After undertaking the review required by Rule 4, the Court concludes that the petition must
be dismissed because it fails to raise a meritorious federal claim.
Factual Allegations
Petitioner Travis Burton Harrell presently is incarcerated with the Michigan
Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility. He was convicted
by guilty pleas of two counts of first-degree home invasion, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.110a(2). On
March 3, 2008, he was sentenced to a prison term of two years and six months to twenty years.
Petitioner does not challenge his underlying conviction, but instead challenges the
procedures used by the Michigan Parole Board to suspend its October 8, 2010 parole decision
granting Petitioner parole with a projected parole date of January 5, 2011. Petitioner asserts that, in
reaching its decision, the parole board relied on inaccurate information and failed to comply with
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 791.233e and he vaguely asserts that “false charges of alleged misconduct”
were used to suspend his grant of parole. (Compl., docket #1, Page ID#14.) Additionally, Petitioner
challenges the Michigan Parole Board’s decision to continue to deny him parole, most recently on
September 27, 2013. Finally, Petitioner vaguely alleges that the denial of parole violated his right
to equal protection. Petitioner seeks a new parole hearing based on accurate information and proper
application of state law and immediate parole.
Discussion
Petitioner claims that Defendant violated his due process rights by relying on false
information and failing to conduct its decisionmaking within the requirements of state law and
policy. To establish a procedural due process violation, a Petitioner must prove that (1) he was
deprived of a protected liberty or property interest, and (2) such deprivation occurred without the
requisite due process of law. Club Italia Soccer & Sports Org., Inc. v. Charter Twp. of Shelby, 470
F.3d 286, 296 (6th Cir. 2006); see also Swihart v. Wilkinson, 209 F. App’x 456, 458 (6th Cir. 2006).
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Petitioner fails to raise a claim of constitutional magnitude because he has no liberty interest in being
released on parole. There is no constitutional or inherent right to be conditionally released before
the expiration of a prison sentence. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S.
1, 7 (1979). Although a state may establish a parole system, it has no duty to do so; thus, the
presence of a parole system by itself does not give rise to a constitutionally protected liberty interest
in parole release. Id. at 7, 11; Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373 (1987). Rather, a liberty
interest is present only if state law entitles an inmate to release on parole. Inmates of Orient Corr.
Inst. v. Ohio State Adult Parole Auth., 929 F.2d 233, 235 (6th Cir. 1991).
In Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1164-165 (6th Cir. 1994) (en banc), the Sixth
Circuit, noting “the broad powers of the Michigan authorities to deny parole,” held that the Michigan
system does not create a liberty interest in parole. In a recent published decision, the Sixth Circuit
reiterated the continuing validity of Sweeton. See Crump v. Lafler, 657 F.3d 393, 404 (6th Cir.
2011). In Crump, the court held that the adoption of specific parole guidelines since Sweeton does
not lead to the conclusion that parole release is mandated upon reaching a high probability of parole.
See id.; see also Carnes v. Engler, 76 F. App’x 79, 80 (6th Cir. 2003). In addition, the Sixth Circuit
has rejected the argument that the Due Process Clause is implicated when changes to parole
procedures and practices have resulted in incarcerations that exceed the subjective expectation of the
sentencing judge. See Foster v. Booker, 595 F.3d 353, 369 (6th Cir. 2010). Finally, the Michigan
Supreme Court has recognized that there exists no liberty interest in parole under the Michigan
system. Glover v. Mich. Parole Bd., 596 N.W.2d 598, 603-04 (Mich. 1999). As a consequence,
Petitioner has no liberty interest in the Michigan parole procedures.
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Petitioner’s related allegation that Respondent relied on false information to deny his
parole also fails to raise a meritorious federal claim. Because Petitioner has no liberty interest in
being paroled, he cannot show that the false information was relied upon to a constitutionally
significant degree. See Caldwell v. McNutt, No. 04-2335, 2006 WL 45275, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 10,
2006) (“[E]ven if the Parole Board relied on inaccurate information to deny Caldwell parole, it did
not violate any liberty interest protected by the United States Constitution.”); Echlin v. Boland, No.
03-2309, 2004 WL 2203550, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 17, 2004) (prisoner could not bring a § 1983 action
to challenge the information considered by the parole board because he has no liberty interest in
parole); see also Draughn v. Green, No. 97-1263, 1999 WL 164915, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 12, 1999)
(in order for the Due Process Clause to be implicated, false information in a prisoner’s file must be
relied on to a constitutionally significant degree); Pukyrys v. Olson, No. 95-1778, 1996 WL 636140,
at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 30, 1996) (no constitutional violation by having false information placed in a
prison file); Carson v. Little, No. 88-1505, 1989 WL 40171, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 18, 1989)
(inaccurate information in an inmate’s file does not amount to a constitutional violation). Therefore,
Petitioner fails to state a claim for a violation of his due process rights arising from the inaccurate
information contained in his file.
Petitioner’s vague allegation that “false charges of alleged misconduct” were used
to suspend his grant of parole, also fails to raise a meritorious claim. (Compl., docket #1, Page
ID#14.) A prisoner’s ability to challenge a prison misconduct conviction depends on whether the
conviction implicated any liberty interest. In the seminal case in this area, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539 (1974), the Court prescribed certain minimal procedural safeguards that prison officials
must follow before depriving a prisoner of good-time credits on account of alleged misbehavior. The
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Wolff Court did not create a free-floating right to process that attaches to all prison disciplinary
proceedings; rather the right to process arises only when the prisoner faces a loss of liberty, in the
form of a longer prison sentence caused by forfeiture of good-time credits:
It is true that the Constitution itself does not guarantee good-time credit for
satisfactory behavior while in prison. But here the State itself has not only provided
a statutory right to good time but also specifies that it is to be forfeited only for
serious misbehavior. Nebraska may have the authority to create, or not, a right to a
shortened prison sentence through the accumulation of credits for good behavior, and
it is true that the Due Process Clause does not require a hearing “in every conceivable
case of government impairment of private interest.” But the State having created the
right to good time and itself recognizing that its deprivation is a sanction authorized
for major misconduct, the prisoner’s interest has real substance and is sufficiently
embraced within Fourteenth Amendment “liberty” to entitle him to those minimum
procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process
Clause to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated.
Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557 (citations omitted).
Plaintiff does not allege that his misconduct convictions resulted in any loss of goodtime credits, nor could he. The Sixth Circuit has examined Michigan statutory law, as it relates to
the creation and forfeiture of disciplinary credits1 for prisoners convicted of crimes occurring after
April 1, 1987. In Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434 (6th Cir. 2007), the court determined that loss of
disciplinary credits does not necessarily affect the duration of a prisoner’s sentence. Rather, it
merely affects parole eligibility, which remains discretionary with the parole board. Id. at 440.
Building on this ruling, in Nali v. Ekman, 355 F. App’x 909 (6th Cir. 2009), the court held that a
misconduct citation in the Michigan prison system does not affect a prisoner’s constitutionally
protected liberty interests, because it does not necessarily affect the length of confinement. 355 F.
App’x at 912; accord, Taylor v. Lantagne, 418 F. App’x 408, 412 (6th Cir. 2011); Wilson v.
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For crimes committed after April 1, 1987, Michigan prisoners earn “disciplinary credits” under a statute that
abolished the former good-time system. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 800.33(5).
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Rapelje, No. 09-13030, 2010 WL 5491196, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 24, 2010) (Report &
Recommendation) (holding that “plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing and major misconduct sanction does
not implicate the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause”), adopted as judgment of court, 2011
WL 5491196 (Jan. 4, 2011). In the absence of a protectible liberty interest permitting Petitioner to
challenge his misconduct conviction, Petitioner has no due process claim based on the use of
allegedly false misconduct charges to suspend his projected parole date.
However, even in the absence of a protectible liberty interest in disciplinary credits,
a prisoner may be able to raise a due process challenge to prison misconduct convictions that result
in a significant, atypical deprivation. See Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). Petitioner has not
identified any significant deprivation arising from his convictions. Although Petitioner presumably
would claim that the failure to receive parole is a significant deprivation, as explained above,
Petitioner has no constitutional or inherent right to be conditionally released before the expiration
of his prison sentence. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979).
Unless a prison misconduct conviction results in an extension of the duration of a prisoner’s sentence
or some other atypical hardship, a due process claim fails. Ingram v. Jewell, 94 F. App’x 271, 273
(6th Cir. 2004).
Until Petitioner has served his maximum sentence of twenty years, he has no
reasonable expectation of liberty. The discretionary parole system in Michigan holds out “no more
than a mere hope that the benefit will be obtained.” Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11. The Michigan
Parole Board’s failure or refusal to follow its own procedures, its use of false or misleading
information or its use of allegedly false misconduct charges or convictions, implicates no federal
right. Consequently, Petitioner fails to raise a meritorious due process claim.
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To the extent that Petitioner seeks to challenge the suspension of his projected parole
date as a parole revocation, he must first exhaust his administrative remedies in the state court. The
Supreme Court has recognized a parolee’s due process right to adequate procedures leading up to
the revocation of parole. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 489 (1972). However, a
prisoner must exhaust state remedies for these claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); see Sneed v. Donahue,
993 F.2d 1239, 1241 (6th Cir. 1993) (noting that petitioner had exhausted all state remedies before
bringing habeas action); Brewer v. Dahlberg, 942 F.2d 328, 337 (6th Cir. 1991) (dismissing
challenge to state parole revocation because state remedies arguably available). Parole revocations
may be reviewed under Michigan’s Administrative Procedures Act. See Penn v. Dep’t of Corr., 298
N.W.2d 756, 757-58 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980). In addition, a parolee may attack a revocation decision
by a state petition for habeas corpus. See Hinton v. Parole Bd., 383 N.W.2d 626, 629-30 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1986); Triplett v. Deputy Warden, 371 N.W.2d 862, 865-66 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985); see also
Caley v. Hudson, 759 F. Supp. 378, 381 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (dismissing federal habeas corpus
petition by a state prisoner for lack of exhaustion of his available state habeas corpus action to
challenge revocation of parole). Until Petitioner has exhausted his claims by presenting them to all
levels of state judicial review, he may not maintain a habeas corpus action challenging the alleged
revocation of his parole.
Finally, to the extent that Petitioner seeks to challenge the denial of parole on equal
protection grounds, he fails to state a claim. The Equal Protection Clause commands that no state
shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. A state practice generally will not require strict scrutiny unless it interferes with
a fundamental right or discriminates against a suspect class of individuals. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v.
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Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976). Plaintiff does not suggest that he is a member of a suspect class,
and “prisoners are not considered a suspect class for purposes of equal protection litigation.” Jackson
v. Jamrog, 411 F.3d 615, 619 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 604 (6th
Cir.1998). In addition, as explained above, prisoners do not have a fundamental right to parole.
Because neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class is at issue, Plaintiff’s claim
is reviewed under the rational basis standard. Club Italia Soccer & Sports Org., Inc. v. Charter Twp.
of Shelby, 470 F.3d 286, 298 (6th Cir. 2006). “Under rational basis scrutiny, government action
amounts to a constitutional violation only if it ‘is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination
of legitimate purposes that the court can only conclude that the government’s actions were
irrational.’” Id. (quoting Warren v. City of Athens, 411 F.3d 697, 710 (6th Cir. 2005)). To prove
his equal protection claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate “intentional and arbitrary discrimination” by
the state; that is, he must demonstrate that he “has been intentionally treated differently from others
similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Vill. of
Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). Petitioner fails to set forth any facts to suggest that
he has been intentionally treated differently from other similarly situated prisoners. Consequently
he fails to state an equal protection claim.
Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, the Court will summarily dismiss Petitioner’s application
pursuant to Rule 4 because it fails to raise a meritorious federal claim.
Certificate of Appealability
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), the Court must determine whether a certificate of
appealability should be granted. A certificate should issue if Petitioner has demonstrated a
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“substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This Court’s
dismissal of Petitioner’s action under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases is a determination
that the habeas action, on its face, lacks sufficient merit to warrant service. It would be highly
unlikely for this Court to grant a certificate, thus indicating to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals that
an issue merits review, when the Court has already determined that the action is so lacking in merit
that service is not warranted. See Love v. Butler, 952 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1991) (it is “somewhat
anomalous” for the court to summarily dismiss under Rule 4 and grant a certificate); Hendricks v.
Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990) (requiring reversal where court summarily dismissed under
Rule 4 but granted certificate); Dory v. Comm’r of Corr. of New York, 865 F.2d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1989)
(it was “intrinsically contradictory” to grant a certificate when habeas action does not warrant service
under Rule 4); Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050 n.1 (2d Cir. 1983) (issuing certificate
would be inconsistent with a summary dismissal).
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has disapproved issuance of blanket denials of
a certificate of appealability. Murphy v. Ohio, 263 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2001). Rather, the district
court must “engage in a reasoned assessment of each claim” to determine whether a certificate is
warranted. Id. at 467. Each issue must be considered under the standards set forth by the Supreme
Court in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000). Murphy, 263 F.3d at 467. Consequently, this
Court has examined each of Petitioner’s claims under the Slack standard. Under Slack, 529 U.S. at
484, to warrant a grant of the certificate, “[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists
would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Id. “A
petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that . . . jurists could conclude the issues presented
are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327
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(2003). In applying this standard, the Court may not conduct a full merits review, but must limit its
examination to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of Petitioner’s claims. Id.
The Court finds that reasonable jurists could not conclude that this Court’s dismissal
of Petitioner’s claims was debatable or wrong. Therefore, the Court will deny Petitioner a certificate
of appealability.
A Judgment and Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated:
September 25, 2014
/s/ Robert J. Jonker
ROBERT J. JONKER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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