Hernandez v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
15
OPINION; signed by Magistrate Judge Ellen S. Carmody (Magistrate Judge Ellen S. Carmody, jal)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
REBECCA HERNANDEZ,
Plaintiff,
Hon. Ellen S. Carmody
v.
Case No. 1:14-cv-958
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
_____________________________________/
OPINION
This is an action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g), to review a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff’s claim
for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. On
December 3, 2014, the parties agreed to proceed in this Court for all further proceedings, including
an order of final judgment. (Dkt. #11).
Section 405(g) limits the Court to a review of the administrative record and provides
that if the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence it shall be conclusive. The
Commissioner has found that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. For the reasons
stated below, the Court concludes that the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence. Accordingly, the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court’s jurisdiction is confined to a review of the Commissioner’s decision and
of the record made in the administrative hearing process. See Willbanks v. Sec’y of Health and
Human Services, 847 F.2d 301, 303 (6th Cir. 1988). The scope of judicial review in a social security
case is limited to determining whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards in
making her decision and whether there exists in the record substantial evidence supporting that
decision. See Brainard v. Sec’y of Health and Human Services, 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989).
The Court may not conduct a de novo review of the case, resolve evidentiary
conflicts, or decide questions of credibility. See Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir.
1984). It is the Commissioner who is charged with finding the facts relevant to an application for
disability benefits, and her findings are conclusive provided they are supported by substantial
evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See
Cohen v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health and Human Services, 964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1992) (citations
omitted). It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342,
347 (6th Cir. 1993). In determining the substantiality of the evidence, the Court must consider the
evidence on the record as a whole and take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from
its weight. See Richardson v. Sec’y of Health and Human Services, 735 F.2d 962, 963 (6th Cir.
1984).
As has been widely recognized, the substantial evidence standard presupposes the
existence of a zone within which the decision maker can properly rule either way, without judicial
2
interference. See Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). This
standard affords to the administrative decision maker considerable latitude, and indicates that a
decision supported by substantial evidence will not be reversed simply because the evidence would
have supported a contrary decision. See Bogle, 998 F.2d at 347; Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545.
PROCEDURAL POSTURE
Plaintiff was 15 years of age on her alleged disability onset date and 22 years of age
as of the date of the ALJ’s decision. (Tr. 49, 160). She possesses a General Education Diploma
(GED) and has never worked. (Tr. 59). Plaintiff applied for benefits on September 15, 2011,
alleging that she had been disabled since September 1, 2004, due to anxiety and bi-polar disorder.
(Tr. 160-65, 173). Plaintiff’s application was denied, after which time she requested a hearing before
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (Tr. 82-159). On October 26, 2012, Plaintiff appeared before
ALJ Paul Colter with testimony being presented by Plaintiff and a vocational expert. (Tr. 53-73).
In a written decision dated January 10, 2013, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled.
(Tr. 41-49). The Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ’s determination, rendering it the
Commissioner’s final decision in the matter. (Tr. 7-11). Plaintiff initiated this pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g), seeking judicial review of the ALJ’s decision.
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RELEVANT MEDICAL EVIDENCE
On March 27, 2007, Plaintiff was admitted to the hospital after she began
experiencing “increasing depression and suicidal ideations.” (Tr. 366). While Plaintiff had
previously been prescribed certain medications to treat her depression, she “recently” stopped taking
“all medications.” (Tr. 349). Following her admission, Plaintiff was given medication immediately
after which she began “to stabilize psychologically.” (Tr. 345). Plaintiff was discharged from the
hospital two days later. (Tr. 345).
Treatment notes dated April 11, 2007, indicate that Plaintiff was suffering from
dysthymic disorder and major depression, single episode, moderate. (Tr. 237). Plaintiff’s GAF score
was rated as 55.1 (Tr. 237). On May 16, 2011, Plaintiff reported that her medications were “helping
a lot.” (Tr. 233). Treatment notes dated March 19, 2012, indicate that Plaintiff was suffering from
bi-polar disorder. (Tr. 247). Plaintiff’s GAF score was rated as 55. (Tr. 247). Treatment notes
dated April 20, 2012, through July 25, 2012, indicate that Plaintiff was not taking her medications
regularly. (Tr. 243-45).
ANALYSIS OF THE ALJ’S DECISION
The social security regulations articulate a five-step sequential process for evaluating
disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a-f), 416.920(a-f).2 If the Commissioner can make a
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The Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) score refers to the clinician’s judgment of the individual’s
overall level of functioning. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
32 (4th ed. 1994) (hereinafter DSM-IV). A GAF score of 55 indicates “moderate symptoms or moderate difficulty in
social, occupational, or school functioning.” DSM-IV at 34.
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1. An individual who is working and engaging in substantial gainful activity will not be found to be “disabled”
regardless of medical findings (20 C.F.R. 404.1520(b));
2. An individual who does not have a “severe impairment” will not be found “disabled” (20 C.F.R.
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dispositive finding at any point in the review, no further finding is required. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a), 416.920(a). The regulations also provide that if a claimant suffers from a nonexertional
impairment as well as an exertional impairment, both are considered in determining his residual
functional capacity. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945.
The burden of establishing the right to benefits rests squarely on Plaintiff’s shoulders,
and she can satisfy her burden by demonstrating that her impairments are so severe that she is unable
to perform her previous work, and cannot, considering her age, education, and work experience,
perform any other substantial gainful employment existing in significant numbers in the national
economy. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); Cohen, 964 F.2d at 528. While the burden of proof shifts
to the Commissioner at step five, Plaintiff bears the burden of proof through step four of the
procedure, the point at which her residual functioning capacity (RFC) is determined. See Bowen v.
Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987); Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir.
1997) (ALJ determines RFC at step four, at which point claimant bears the burden of proof).
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffered from anxiety and bi-polar disorder, severe
impairments that whether considered alone or in combination with other impairments, failed to
satisfy the requirements of any impairment identified in the Listing of Impairments detailed in 20
404.1520(c));
3. If an individual is not working and is suffering from a severe impairment which meets the duration
requirement and which “meets or equals” a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of Regulations No.
4, a finding of “disabled” will be made without consideration of vocational factors (20 C.F.R. 404.1520(d));
4. If an individual is capable of performing work he or she has done in the past, a finding of “not disabled”
must be made (20 C.F.R. 404.1520(e));
5. If an individual’s impairment is so severe as to preclude the performance of past work, other factors
including age, education, past work experience, and residual functional capacity must be considered to
determine if other work can be performed (20 C.F.R. 404.1520(f)).
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C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 43-44). With respect to Plaintiff’s residual functional
capacity, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform work subject to the
following limitations: (1) she is limited to simple, repetitive tasks; and (2) she can have only
occasional interaction with the public. (Tr. 44).
Because Plaintiff has no past relevant work the burden of proof shifted to the
Commissioner to establish by substantial evidence that a significant number of jobs exist in the
national economy which Plaintiff could perform, her limitations notwithstanding. See Richardson,
735 F.2d at 964. While the ALJ is not required to question a vocational expert on this issue, “a
finding supported by substantial evidence that a claimant has the vocational qualifications to perform
specific jobs” is needed to meet the burden. O’Banner v. Sec’y of Health and Human Services, 587
F.2d 321, 323 (6th Cir. 1978) (emphasis added). This standard requires more than mere intuition
or conjecture by the ALJ that the claimant can perform specific jobs in the national economy. See
Richardson, 735 F.2d at 964. Accordingly, ALJs routinely question vocational experts in an attempt
to determine whether there exist a significant number of jobs which a particular claimant can
perform, his limitations notwithstanding. Such was the case here, as the ALJ questioned a vocational
expert.
The vocational expert reported that there existed approximately 36,900 jobs in the
state of California3 and more than 500,000 jobs nationally which an individual with Plaintiff’s RFC
could perform, such limitations notwithstanding. (Tr. 70-71). This represents a significant number
of jobs. See Born v. Sec’y of Health and Human Services, 923 F.2d 1168, 1174 (6th Cir. 1990); Hall
3
Plaintiff lived in California at the time of the administrative hearing through the date of the ALJ’s decision.
(Tr. 29-30, 33, 38).
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v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 272, 274 (6th Cir. 1988); Martin v. Commissioner of Social Security, 170 Fed.
Appx. 369, 374 (6th Cir., Mar. 1, 2006).
A.
The ALJ Properly Evaluated Plaintiff’s Impairments
The ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from anxiety and bi-polar disorder both of
which he characterized as severe impairments. Plaintiff asserts that she is entitled to relief because
the ALJ failed to find that she also suffered from severe depressive disorder. At step two of the
sequential disability analysis, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant suffers from a severe
impairment. The Sixth Circuit has held that where the ALJ finds the presence of a severe
impairment at step two and proceeds to continue through the remaining steps of the analysis, the
alleged failure to identify as severe some other impairment constitutes harmless error so long as the
ALJ considered the entire medical record in rendering his decision. See Maziarz v. Sec’y of Health
and Human Services, 837 F.2d 240, 244 (6th Cir. 1987); Kirkland v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 528 Fed. Appx. 425, 427 (6th Cir., May 22, 2013) (“so long as the ALJ considers all the
individual’s impairments, the failure to find additional severe impairments. . .does not constitute
reversible error”).
The ALJ stated that he considered “the entire record” in this matter, an assertion
supported by his detailed discussion of the meager evidence of record. Moreover, this is not a
circumstance in which the ALJ failed to recognize as severe an impairment significantly distinct
from the other impairments the ALJ found to be severe. See, e.g., Mish v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 2011 WL 836750 (W.D. Mich., Mar. 4, 2011). Rather, Plaintiff asserts that she is disabled
due to her emotional impairments. The ALJ considered the entire record and concluded that
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Plaintiff, in fact, suffers from severe emotional impairments. Finally, there is no evidence that
Plaintiff’s alleged depressive disorder imposes on her limitations greater than those recognized by
the ALJ. Accordingly, this argument is rejected.
B.
The ALJ Properly Evaluated the Medical Evidence
On September 26, 2011, Dr. Denise Dittemore completed a Mental Residual
Functional Capacity Assessment form regarding Plaintiff’s limitations in 20 separate categories
encompassing (1) understanding and memory, (2) sustained concentration and persistence, (3) social
interaction, and (4) adaptation. (Tr. 225-27). Plaintiff’s abilities were characterized as “moderate”
in three categories, “marked” in nine categories, and “extreme” in three categories. (Tr. 225-27).
With respect to the remaining 5 categories, the doctor reported that Plaintiff experienced no
limitations. (Tr. 225-27). Plaintiff asserts that she is entitled to relief because the ALJ failed to
afford controlling weight to this particular assessment.
The treating physician doctrine recognizes that medical professionals who have a long
history of caring for a claimant and his maladies generally possess significant insight into his medical
condition. See Barker v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 789, 794 (6th Cir. 1994). An ALJ must, therefore, give
controlling weight to the opinion of a treating source if: (1) the opinion is “well-supported by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques” and (2) the opinion “is not
inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record.” Gayheart v. Commissioner of
Social Security, 710 F.3d 365, 375-76 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527).
Such deference is appropriate, however, only where the particular opinion “is based
upon sufficient medical data.” Miller v. Sec’y of Health and Human Services, 1991 WL 229979 at
8
*2 (6th Cir., Nov. 7, 1991) (citing Shavers v. Sec’y of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 232,
235 n.1 (6th Cir. 1987)). The ALJ may reject the opinion of a treating physician where such is
unsupported by the medical record, merely states a conclusion, or is contradicted by substantial
medical evidence. See Cohen, 964 F.2d at 528; Miller v. Sec’y of Health and Human Services, 1991
WL 229979 at *2 (6th Cir., Nov. 7, 1991) (citing Shavers v. Sec’y of Health and Human Services,
839 F.2d 232, 235 n.1 (6th Cir. 1987)); Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health and Human Services, 25 F.3d 284,
286-87 (6th Cir. 1994).
If an ALJ accords less than controlling weight to a treating source’s opinion, the ALJ
must “give good reasons” for doing so. Gayheart, 710 F.3d at 376. Such reasons must be
“supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any
subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source’s medical opinion and
the reasons for that weight.” This requirement “ensures that the ALJ applies the treating physician
rule and permits meaningful review of the ALJ’s application of the rule.” Id. (quoting Wilson v.
Commissioner of Social Security, 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004)). Simply stating that the
physician’s opinions “are not well-supported by any objective findings and are inconsistent with
other credible evidence” is, without more, too “ambiguous” to permit meaningful review of the
ALJ’s assessment. Gayheart, 710 F.3d at 376-77.
If the ALJ affords less than controlling weight to a treating physician’s opinion, the
ALJ must still determine the weight to be afforded such. Id. at 376. In doing so, the ALJ must
consider the following factors: (1) length of the treatment relationship and frequency of the
examination, (2) nature and extent of the treatment relationship, (3) supportability of the opinion,
(4) consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, (5) the specialization of the treating source,
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and (6) other relevant factors. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527). While the ALJ is not required to
explicitly discuss each of these factors, the record must nevertheless reflect that the ALJ considered
those factors relevant to his assessment. See, e.g., Oldham v. Astrue, 509 F.3d 1254, 1258 (10th Cir.
2007); Undheim v. Barnhart, 214 Fed. Appx. 448, 450 (5th Cir., Jan. 19, 2007).
First, the form that Dr. Dittemore completed does not constitute a “medical opinion”
to which deference must be accorded. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2); 416.927(a)(2) (a medical
opinion is defined as “statements from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical
sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of your impairment(s), including your
symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what you can still do despite impairment(s), and your physical
or mental restrictions”); see also, Ashley v. Commissioner of Social Security, 2014 WL 1052357 at
*7-8 (W.D. Mich., Mar. 19, 2014) (where “check-box forms” are unaccompanied by explanation,
treatment notes, or other evidence, ALJ properly rejected such). Furthermore, as the ALJ concluded,
the assessment in question is not supported by the evidence of record. The record simply fails to
support the conclusion that Plaintiff is impaired to the extent suggested by Dr. Dittemore. To the
contrary, the record supports the conclusion that when Plaintiff takes her prescribed medications she
is able to function at a level well beyond that suggested by Dr. Dittemore. Accordingly, this
argument is rejected.
C.
Plaintiff does not Suffer from a Listed Impairment
The Listing of Impairments, detailed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1,
identifies various impairments which, if present to the severity detailed therein, result in a finding
that the claimant is disabled. Plaintiff asserts that her impairments satisfy the requirements of
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section 12.04 of the Listing of Impairments. Section 12.04 of the Listing provides as follows:
12.04 Affective Disorders: Characterized by a disturbance of mood,
accompanied by a full or partial manic or depressive syndrome. Mood
refers to a prolonged emotion that colors the whole psychic life; it
generally involves either depression or elation.
The required level of severity for these disorders is met when the
requirements in both A and B are satisfied, or when the requirements
in C are satisfied.
A.
Medically documented persistence, either continuous
or intermittent, of one of the following:
1.
Depressive syndrome characterized by
at least four of the following:
a.
b.
Appetite disturbance with change in weight; or
c.
Sleep disturbance; or
d.
Psychomotor agitation or retardation; or
e.
Decreased energy; or
f.
Feelings of guilt or worthlessness; or
g.
Difficulty concentrating or thinking; or
h.
Thoughts of suicide; or
i.
2.
Anhedonia
or
pervasive loss of
interest in almost all
activities; or
Hallucinations, delusions or paranoid thinking; or
Manic syndrome characterized by at
least three of the following:
a.
Hyperactivity; or
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b.
Pressure of speech; or
c.
Flight of ideas; or
d.
Inflated self-esteem; or
e.
Decreased need for sleep; or
f.
Easy distractibility; or
g.
Involvement
in
activities that have a
high probability of
painful consequences
which are not
recognized; or
h.
Hallucinations, delusions or paranoid thinking;
Or
3.
Bipolar syndrome with a history of
episodic periods manifested by the full
symptomatic picture of both manic
and depressive syndromes (and
currently characterized by either or
both syndromes);
And
B.
Resulting in at least two of the following:
1.
Marked restriction of activities of
daily living; or
2.
Marked difficulties in maintaining
social functioning; or
3.
Marked difficulties in maintaining
concentration, persistence, or pace; or
4.
Repeated episodes of decompensation,
each of extended duration;
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Or
C.
Medically documented history of a chronic affective
disorder of at least 2 years’ duration that has caused
more than a minimal limitation of ability to do basic
work activities, with symptoms or signs currently
attenuated by medication or psychosocial support, and
one of the following:
1.
Repeated episodes of decompensation,
each of extended duration; or
2.
A residual disease process that has
resulted in such marginal adjustment
that even a minimal increase in mental
demands or change in the environment
would be predicted to cause the
individual to decompensate; or
3.
Current history of 1 or more years’
inability to function outside a highly
supportive living arrangement, with an
indication of continued need for such
an arrangement.
20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, § 12.04.
The burden rests with Plaintiff to demonstrate that she satisfies the requirements of
a listed impairment. See Kirby v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2002 WL 1315617 at *1 (6th Cir., June 14,
2002). There is no support in the record that Plaintiff’s impairments satisfy the requirements of this
listing. The ALJ evaluated the evidence of record and determined that Plaintiff failed to meet her
burden in this regard. This conclusion is supported substantial evidence.
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D.
The ALJ Properly Discounted Plaintiff’s Subjective Allegations
Plaintiff testified at the administrative hearing that she was unable to work. When
asked why she was unable to work, Plaintiff stated:
Well, because I have bipolar II disorder I feel down a lot of the time.
I have a lot of depressive states where I don’t feel like doing anything,
and I lack the motivation to do those things because I feel down so
much. I don’t have mania like a regular bipolar I so I don’t have
those extreme highs. I get hypomania. That’s where I feel maybe I’ll
have a little energy or something, but it’s not always energy or
positive things. Most of the time it’s negative even if I have mania.
And, I feel unstable, like, mentally. Like, I might be fine for a while,
but then I always switch to something else, like maybe I feel
motivated to do something for like, a day, and then the next day I’m
like, I don’t want to do it. I might go start projects, you know,
complete them, things like that, so I find like, I have a hard time
seeing myself working like a normal job.
(Tr. 61-62).
Plaintiff also reported that she experiences anxiety when venturing out in public as
well as difficulty with concentration and short term memory. (Tr. 62-67). The ALJ found Plaintiff
to be less than credible. (Tr. 46). Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to relief because the ALJ
improperly rejected her subjective allegations.
As the Sixth Circuit has long recognized, “pain alone, if the result of a medical
impairment, may be severe enough to constitute disability.” King v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 968, 974 (6th
Cir. 1984) (emphasis added); see also, Grecol v. Halter, 46 Fed. Appx. 773, 775 (6th Cir., Aug. 29,
2002) (same). As the relevant Social Security regulations make clear, however, a claimant’s
“statements about [his] pain or other symptoms will not alone establish that [he is] disabled.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.1529(a); see also, Walters v. Commissioner of Social Security, 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th
Cir. 1997) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a)) Hash v. Commissioner of Social Security, 309 Fed.
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Appx. 981, 989 (6th Cir., Feb. 10, 2009). Instead, as the Sixth Circuit has established, a claimant’s
assertions of disabling pain and limitation are evaluated pursuant to the following standard:
First, we examine whether there is objective medical evidence of an
underlying medical condition. If there is, we then examine: (1)
whether objective medical evidence confirms the severity of the
alleged pain arising from the condition; or (2) whether the objectively
established medical condition is of such a severity that it can
reasonably be expected to produce the alleged disabling pain.
Walters, 127 F.3d at 531 (citations omitted). This standard is often referred to as the Duncan
standard. See Workman v. Commissioner of Social Security, 105 Fed. Appx. 794, 801 (6th Cir., July
29, 2004).
Accordingly, as the Sixth Circuit has repeatedly held, “subjective complaints may
support a finding of disability only where objective medical evidence confirms the severity of the
alleged symptoms.” Id. (citing Blankenship v. Bowen, 874 F.2d 1116, 1123 (6th Cir. 1989)).
However, where the objective medical evidence fails to confirm the severity of a claimant’s
subjective allegations, the ALJ “has the power and discretion to weigh all of the evidence and to
resolve the significant conflicts in the administrative record.” Workman, 105 Fed. Appx. at 801
(citing Walters, 127 F.3d at 531).
In this respect, it is recognized that the ALJ’s credibility assessment “must be
accorded great weight and deference.” Workman, 105 Fed. Appx. at 801 (citing Walters, 127 F.3d
at 531); see also, Heston v. Commissioner of Social Security, 245 F.3d 528, 536 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[i]t
is for the [Commissioner] and his examiner, as the fact-finders, to pass upon the credibility of the
witnesses and weigh and evaluate their testimony”). It is not for this Court to reevaluate such
evidence anew, and so long as the ALJ’s determination is supported by substantial evidence, it must
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stand. The ALJ found Plaintiff’s subjective allegations to not be fully credible, a finding that should
not be lightly disregarded. See Varley v. Sec’y of Health and Human Services, 820 F.2d 777, 780
(6th Cir. 1987). In fact, as the Sixth Circuit recently stated, “[w]e have held that an administrative
law judge’s credibility findings are virtually unchallengeable.” Ritchie v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 540 Fed. Appx. 508, 511 (6th Cir., Oct. 4, 2013) (citation omitted).
The ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s subjective allegations on the ground that such were
contradicted by the evidence of record. The ALJ specifically noted that Plaintiff responded well
when she took her medications as prescribed, but often failed to do so. As noted above, the evidence
simply fails to support Plaintiff’s allegations that her impairments are disabling or limit her to the
extent alleged. The ALJ’s decision, therefore, to discount Plaintiff’s subjective allegations is
supported by substantial evidence.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated herein, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed. A
judgment consistent with this opinion will enter.
Date: June 4, 2015
/s/ Ellen S. Carmody
ELLEN S. CARMODY
United States Magistrate Judge
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