Chambers v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 17

OPINION; signed by Magistrate Judge Ray Kent (Magistrate Judge Ray Kent, fhw)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

JOHN CHAMBERS,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 1:14-cv-1014

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,

Hon. Ray Kent

Defendant.
/
OPINION
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of
a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (Commissioner) denying
his claim for disability insurance benefits (DIB).
Plaintiff was born in 1973. PageID.252. He completed high school and had past
employment as a machine operator and repair technician. PageID.196. Plaintiff alleged a disability
onset date of June 1, 2008. PageID.252. Plaintiff identified his disabling conditions as asthma, bipolar, memory loss, migraines, knee problems, social anxiety, obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD),
carpal tunnel syndrome (bilateral), and back problems. PageID.257. The administrative law judge
(ALJ) reviewed plaintiff’s claim de novo and entered a written decision denying benefits on May 17,
2013. PageID.48-61. This decision, which was later approved by the Appeals Council, has become
the final decision of the Commissioner and is now before the Court for review.

I. LEGAL STANDARD
This Court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is typically focused on
determining whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C.
§405(g); McKnight v. Sullivan, 927 F.2d 241 (6th Cir. 1990). “Substantial evidence is more than
a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Cutlip v. Secretary of Health & Human
Services, 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994). A determination of substantiality of the evidence must
be based upon the record taken as a whole. Young v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 925
F.2d 146 (6th Cir. 1990).
The scope of this review is limited to an examination of the record only. This Court
does not review the evidence de novo, make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.
Brainard v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989). The fact that
the record also contains evidence which would have supported a different conclusion does not
undermine the Commissioner’s decision so long as there is substantial support for that decision in
the record. Willbanks v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 847 F.2d 301, 303 (6th Cir. 1988).
Even if the reviewing court would resolve the dispute differently, the Commissioner’s decision must
stand if it is supported by substantial evidence. Young, 925 F.2d at 147.
A claimant must prove that he suffers from a disability in order to be entitled to
benefits. A disability is established by showing that the claimant cannot engage in substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can
be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
of not less than twelve months. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505; Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923
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(6th Cir. 1990). In applying the above standard, the Commissioner has developed a five-step
analysis:
The Social Security Act requires the Secretary to follow a “five-step
sequential process” for claims of disability. First, plaintiff must demonstrate that she
is not currently engaged in “substantial gainful activity” at the time she seeks
disability benefits. Second, plaintiff must show that she suffers from a “severe
impairment” in order to warrant a finding of disability. A “severe impairment” is one
which “significantly limits . . . physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.”
Third, if plaintiff is not performing substantial gainful activity, has a severe
impairment that is expected to last for at least twelve months, and the impairment
meets a listed impairment, plaintiff is presumed to be disabled regardless of age,
education or work experience. Fourth, if the plaintiff's impairment does not prevent
her from doing her past relevant work, plaintiff is not disabled. For the fifth and final
step, even if the plaintiff’s impairment does prevent her from doing her past relevant
work, if other work exists in the national economy that plaintiff can perform, plaintiff
is not disabled.
Heston v. Commissioner of Social Security, 245 F.3d 528, 534 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
The claimant bears the burden of proving the existence and severity of limitations
caused by her impairments and the fact that she is precluded from performing her past relevant work
through step four. Jones v. Commissioner of Social Security, 336 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 2003).
However, at step five of the inquiry, “the burden shifts to the Commissioner to identify a significant
number of jobs in the economy that accommodate the claimant’s residual functional capacity
(determined at step four) and vocational profile.” Id. If it is determined that a claimant is or is not
disabled at any point in the evaluation process, further review is not necessary. Mullis v. Bowen, 861
F.2d 991, 993 (6th Cir. 1988).
II. ALJ’S DECISION
Plaintiff’s claim failed at the fifth step of the evaluation. At the first step, the ALJ
found that he had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of June 1,

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2008, and that he met the insured status requirements of the Act through December 31, 2013.
PageID.50. At the second step, the ALJ found that plaintiff had the severe impairments of alcohol
dependence, asthma, back pain, anxiety (including social anxiety and generalized anxiety disorders),
and a mood disorder. Id. at PageID.51. At the third step, the ALJ found that these impairments,
which included the substance use disorder, met sections 12.04 (affective disorders) and 12.09
(substance addiction disorders) of the Listing of Impairments in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App.
1. PageID.52.
After reaching this determination, the ALJ reviewed plaintiff’s claim without
consideration of limitations caused by his substance use. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1535(a) (“[i]f we find
that you are disabled and have medical evidence of your drug addiction or alcoholism, we must
determine whether your drug addiction or alcoholism is a contributing factor material to the
determination of disability”); Siemon v. Commissioner of Social Security, 72 Fed. Appx. 421, 422
(6th Cir. 2003) (“the social security administration must deny a claim for benefits if drug addiction
or alcohol is a contributing factor material for a finding of disability”).
At the second step, the ALJ found that if plaintiff stopped the substance use, he would
still have severe impairments due to the asthma, back pain, anxiety (including social anxiety and
generalized anxiety disorders) and a mood disorder. PageID.53-54. At the third step, the ALJ found
that if plaintiff stopped the substance use, he would not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals any of the impairments in the Listing of Impairments in
20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, specifically Listings 12.04 and 12.06 (anxiety related disorders).
PageID.54. The ALJ decided at the fourth step that:
If the claimant stopped the substance use, the claimant would have the
residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b)
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except with the following limitations: frequent balancing, stooping, kneeling,
crouching, crawling, and climbing ladders, ropes, scaffolds, ramps or stairs; limited
to simple, routine tasks; occasional contact with the public, co-workers, and
supervisors.
PageID.55. The ALJ also found that if plaintiff stopped the substance use, he would be unable to
perform past relevant work. PageID.60.
At the fifth step, the ALJ determined that if plaintiff stopped the substance use, he
could perform a significant number of unskilled, light jobs in the national economy. PageID.60-61.
Specifically, plaintiff could perform the following work in the State of Michigan: machine tender
(7,800 jobs); assembler (14,000 jobs); and line attendant (4,800 jobs). Id. Based on this record, the
ALJ found that, if plaintiff stopped the substance use, he would be capable of making a successful
adjustment to work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy and would be found
not disabled. PageID.61.
The ALJ concluded that the substance use disorder was a contributing factor material
to the determination of disability because plaintiff would not be disabled if he stopped the substance
use. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 1520(g) and 404.1535). Accordingly, the ALJ found that because the
substance use disorder was a contributing factor material to the determination of disability, plaintiff
has not been disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act at any time from January 27,
2011(the alleged onset date) through May 17, 2013 (the date of the decision). Id.

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III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff raised two issues on appeal.1
A.

The decision failed to consider the treating
doctor’s opinion in deciding whether plaintiff’s
depression and anxiety met or equaled a listing.

Bobga Fomunung, M.D., plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist, completed a medical
provider’s assessment of ability to do mental work-related activities dated March 26, 2013 (Exhibit
17F). PageID.699-703. Dr. Fomunung’s assessment included the following opinions. With respect
to making occupational adjustments, the doctor found that plaintiff had extreme limitations in
dealing with work stress, marked limitations in functioning independently, and moderate limitations
in a number or areas (relating to co-workers, dealing with the public, interacting with supervisors,
using judgment and maintaining attention/concentration). PageID.699. Plaintiff had moderate
limitations in understanding, remembering and carrying out complex job instructions. Id. With
respect to making personal or social adjustments, plaintiff had extreme limitations in behaving in
an emotionally stable manner and relating predictably in social situations, and marked limitations
in demonstrating reliability. PageID.700. With respect to functional limitations, the doctor stated
that plaintiff had extreme limitations in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace, marked
limitations in maintaining social functioning, and one or two episodes of decompensation (each of
extended duration). Id.
Dr. Fomunung also included a narrative describing plaintiff’s condition:

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The Court notes that plaintiff’s reply brief (incorrectly named “Defendant’s Reply Brief”) (docket
no. 15) consists of nine pages. Plaintiff’s counsel is advised that future reply briefs which exceed the fivepage limit may be stricken.

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Mr. Chambers currently carries a diagnosis of bipolar II, along with social
anxiety disorder and generalized anxiety disorder. Over the time he has been in
treatment his mood has fluctuated despite numerous attempts to regulate his mood
with medications. He has frequently changed dosages or types of medication in order
to find a workable medication regimen. To date we have not been successful. Mr.
Chambers reports continued periods of severe depression in which he is unable to
function outside his home.
If he were to attempt a return to work we would expect that he would miss
work periodically, on a frequency of at least 2 days per month. On the days when his
depression is not so bad he functions better. But these extreme low periods make it
difficult for him to work.
His anxiety expresses itself in an inability to work with and around strangers.
If he were to attempt a return to work it would be best if he did not work with the
general public and had limited contact with co-workers and supervisors. Mr.
Chambers also has a history of alcohol abuse. He had a period of binge drinking in
the spring of 2012 which led to an in-patient hospitalization. The alcohol abuse is not
a cause of his problems. His abuse of alcohol is a symptom of his condition. Even if
he were to remain completely sober he would still have the underlying bipolar
disorder with the limitations described above.
PageID.701.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not refer to Dr. Fomunung’s opinion when
determining whether plaintiff met the requirements of a listed impairment. In finding that plaintiff
met Listings 12.04 and 12.09, the ALJ gave little weight to the opinions of Dr. Fomunung and other
treating psychiatrists because, according to the ALJ, “none of these opinions addressed the
claimant’s alcohol abuse.” PageID.53. Contrary to the ALJ’s decision, Dr. Fomunung’s opinion
explicitly referred to plaintiff’s alcohol abuse. Then, the ALJ did not address Dr. Fomunung’s
opinion when he evaluated whether plaintiff met a listed impairment without considering the
substance abuse. PageID.54-55. Finally, as discussed, infra, the ALJ did not properly evaluate Dr.
Fomunung’s opinion. For these reasons, this matter should be reversed and remanded pursuant to

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sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for a re-evaluation of whether plaintiff met the requirements of
Listing 12.04 or 12.06.
B.

The decision failed to give good reasons for
rejecting the treating psychiatrist’s opinion about
plaintiff’s work limitations.

A treating physician’s medical opinions and diagnoses are entitled to great weight in
evaluating plaintiff's alleged disability. Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 773 (6th Cir. 2001). “In
general, the opinions of treating physicians are accorded greater weight than those of physicians who
examine claimants only once.” Walters v. Commissioner of Social Security, 127 F.3d 525, 529-30
(6th Cir. 1997). “The treating physician doctrine is based on the assumption that a medical
professional who has dealt with a claimant and his maladies over a long period of time will have a
deeper insight into the medical condition of the claimant than will a person who has examined a
claimant but once, or who has only seen the claimant’s medical records.” Barker v. Shalala, 40 F.3d
789, 794 (6th Cir. 1994). See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2) and 416.927(c)(2) (“Generally, we give
more weight to opinions from your treating sources, since these sources are likely to be the medical
professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of your medical impairment(s) and
may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective
medical findings alone or from reports of individual examinations, such as consultative examinations
or brief hospitalizations”).
Under the regulations, a treating source’s opinion on the nature and severity of a
claimant’s impairment must be given controlling weight if the Commissioner finds that: (1) the
opinion is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques; and
(2) the opinion is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record. See

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Gayheart v. Commissioner of Social Security, 710 F.3d 365, 375 (6th Cir. 2013). Finally, the ALJ
must articulate good reasons for not crediting the opinion of a treating source. See Wilson v.
Commissioner of Social Security, 378 F.3d 541, 545 (6th Cir. 2004); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)
and 416.927(c)(2) (“[w]e will always give good reasons in our notice of determination or decision
for the weight we give your treating source’s opinion”).
The ALJ gave partial weight to Dr. Fomunung’s opinion as follows:
Finally, Dr. Fomunung opined the claimant’s substance use was not a cause of the
claimant's problems; however, this portion of the opinion was contradicted by the
primary care provider who indicated the claimant [sic] memory problems were
related to substance use (Ex 11F/13 and 17F). Moreover, despite Dr. Fumunung’s
[sic] March 2013 statement that the claimant was unable to regulate his moods with
medication, the treating physician, Stacia Lagrave M.D., in a July 2012 note indicated
otherwise by documenting the claimant’s bipolar disorder was controlled by
medication (Ex 13F/2 and 17F/3). Moreover, the opinion is not consistent with the
fact the claimant worked on other people’s cars, and enjoyed working on custom
cars, bikes, and motorcycles, and his testimony that he attended car shows in large
venues in downtown Grand Rapids, Michigan (Ex 10F/10, 12F/46, and Hearing
Testimony). This indicated the claimant was more capable of dealing with others and
displayed at least some ability to follow instructions and demonstrate responsibility.
Therefore, this opinion of Dr. Fomunung is given partial weight.
PageID.59.
The ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. Fomunung’s opinion is a mixed bag. As an initial
matter, it does not appear that Dr. Lagrave’s records conflicted with Dr. Fomunung’s opinion with
respect to whether the bipolar disorder was controlled by medication. The page cited from Dr.
Lagrave’s July 2012 records merely stated that “Pt is working with psychiatrist to get meds filled
with KHPB.” PageID.686. However, the ALJ noted that plaintiff engaged in activities which
indicated that he could deal with others, follow instructions and demonstrate responsibility. Such
activities would be inconsistent with some of the limitations identified by Dr. Fomunung. Finally,

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while the ALJ gave partial weight to Dr. Fomunung’s opinion, he did not clearly articulate which
limitations he accepted and which limitations he rejected. See Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 307 (7th
Cir. 1995) (an ALJ “must articulate, at some minimum level, his analysis of the evidence to allow
the appellate court to trace the path of his reasoning”). For these reasons, this matter will be reversed
and remanded to re-evaluate of Dr. Fomunung’s opinion.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, the Commissioner’s decision will be REVERSED and
REMANDED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). On remand, the Commissioner is
directed to re-evaluate Dr. Fomunung’s March 26, 2013 opinion and to re-evaluate whether plaintiff
met the requirements of either Listing 12.04 or 12.06. A judgment consistent with this opinion will
be issued forthwith.

Dated: March 8, 2016

/s/ Ray Kent
RAY KENT
United States Magistrate Judge

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